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All references to Wittgenstein’s works appear in the text in parentheses using the English
abbreviations  provided  by  A.  Pichler,  M.A.R.  Biggs,  and  S.A.  Uffelmann,  in  their
“Bibliographie  der  deutsch-  und  englischsprachigen  Wittgenstein-Ausgaben”
(https://www.alws.at/alws/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Bibliographie-2019-11-26.pdf;  last
accessed 15.05.2021).  These are followed by a page and/or section number, as well as a
manuscript source and date where relevant.  To this, I note the following alteration (T =
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) and the addition of Philosophical Occasions:
T Tractatus  Logico  Philosophicus, trans.  D.F  Pears  &  B.F.  McGuinness
(London and New York: Routledge, 1974). 
PO Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951, eds. J. Klagge & A. Nordmann 




“The  movement  of  thought  [Denkbewegung] in  my
philosophizing  should  be  discernible  [müßte  wiederfinden
lassen] in the history of my mind, of its moral concepts & in
the understanding of my situation.”
—Denkbewegungen [MS 183, p. 125; 1931]
Wittgenstein often remarked that philosophy is a search for das erlösende Wort: the ‘saving’
or  ‘redeeming’ word.   Despite  his  clear  statement  to  the  contrary  in  the  preface  to  the
Tractatus―where he claimed, of course, to have found the final solution to the problems of
philosophy, once and for all―this would not long remain for him a search for the redeeming
word (in the singular) but rather for redeeming words (in the plural).  For, when we look at
his philosophical development as a whole, we witness the relentless pursuit of an apparently
never-ending task.  Thus, in his work, terms of art are coined and diverse problems are
dissolved through the various shifts in perspective they are intended to engender, only to be
later  dropped  as  quickly  as  they  had  once  been  adopted.   Among  such  typically
Wittgensteinian terms of art, even the casual reader will readily recognize those such as
‘sense’ and  ‘nonsense’ or  ‘saying’ and  ‘showing’ from  his  earlier  thought,  as  well  as
‘grammar’, ‘language-games’ and ‘forms of life’ from the latter.  There are, of course, many
others―including the rather poetic ‘das erlösende Wort’ itself.
Throughout Wittgenstein’s work he sought to use contemporary language to craft a novel
response to what were in many cases ancient confusions.  In this work too, I have tried to
identify certain ‘redeeming words’, tools in my own philosophical toolbox so to speak, with
which  I  might  resolve  some  of  the  confusions  that  swirl  around  my own reception  of
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Wittgenstein’s  thought.   That  problem  was  for  me  especially  the  following,  nagging
question: Why did Wittgenstein write Philosophical Investigations anyway?  Put differently:
What  was  he  trying  to  achieve  with  it?   Certainly,  he  was  responding  to  some
misconceptions that he had earlier expressed in the Tractatus.  That much is clear.  But this
fails to fully address the deeper issue, namely:  Why bother?  The question is important
because, unlike the  Tractatus, the  Investigations  never presupposes the  truth of the ideas
that are expressed there.  So, while Wittgenstein’s early thought will always be of interest as
a poignant account of how things simply are with the world, philosophically speaking, his
later work lacks that traditional raison d’être.  And yet, neither is it a work of fiction or
fancy.  
In my pursuit of this question, I came to realise―indeed, as others have before―that the
work’s purpose is heuristic.  It is meant to help us achieve that kind of shift in perspective
that Wittgenstein himself underwent when he realised the faults that were inherent to his
earlier mode of thinking.  As he himself states in the Investigations, these regard principally
the various ‘pictures’ that often hold our thoughts captive and forbid them from moving on
in other more profitable directions―such as, for example, that inherently Tractarian vision
which suggests that the final solution to the problems of philosophy is within our reach at
all,  and,  consequently,  that  no  further  progress  in  that regard  would  subsequently  be
warranted.   And  then,  like  the  great  many  terms  of  art  we  find  within  its  pages,  the
Investigations  itself  seems  somehow intended  to  be  abandoned  once  its  task  has  been
fulfilled.
Here, of course, we are confronted with the ghost of another familiar Tractarian vision: that
of the ladder, which is meant to be cast aside once it has been ascended.  However, unlike
the Tractatus, the Investigations was not finished, and, I would venture to claim, in fidelity
to the open-ended conception of philosophy advanced there, that it could not have been.1
1 N. Venturinha outlines a compelling case for this as well, with an insightful comparison of Wittgenstein’s
Investigations and Pascal’s Pensées.  Venturinha’s comparison raises noteworthy parallels regarding the
respective contexts of production of the two works; the matter hinges, interestingly, on whether Pascal
would  have  arranged  the  book  to  make  it  more  coherent  had  he  lived  longer  or  whether  he,  like
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What would the final word of such a work look like?  I, for one, find it difficult to imagine.
Nonetheless, though it is clear that Wittgenstein never succeeded in fully realizing the ideal
of  Tractarian  transcendence that  he  once  upheld  as  the  highest  achievement  philosophy
could expect of itself, the sought-after solution that had motivated his work at that time
never  ceased  to  motivate  his  later  work  either.   The  true  philosophical  discovery,
Wittgenstein notes in the  Investigations, is the one that “gives philosophy peace”, the one
which allows philosophy to stop tormenting itself (PI §133).  But then again, we might once
more  ask:  Why  not  simply  let  the  philosopher  labour  away  under  the  sway  of  the
‘philosophical superlative’, seeking unbendable rules of some superhuman strength about
the way things…  must be?  Perhaps such rules are indeed illusionary and our search for
them is destined only to bring dissatisfaction, but there were certainly other illusions and
dissatisfactions with which Wittgenstein could not have been bothered.2   So what harm is
done by allowing oneself to fall prey to just this kind?  In other words: What need do we,
philosophers in particular, have for redemption?  The answer to such questions, I maintain,
is  not  found  within  the  pages  of  the  Investigations,  nor  any  other  single  selection  of
Wittgenstein’s remarks, published or otherwise.  To answer it, we must look rather at his
work as a whole and at the relentless evolution that his thought underwent over the course
of his life.
As  I  deal  with  the  questions  framed  above  throughout  this  dissertation,  I  leave  them
unanswered here in order to come back to what served for me as something like a few
erlösende Wörter in my pursuit of a clearer understanding of the problem at hand.  Those
words were for me time, change and history.  They are not very sexy words, I admit.  And
they clearly lack the kind of subtle poetic punch for which Wittgenstein is known, as indeed
are  many  of  his  commentators.   But  they  allowed  me  nonetheless  to  access  a  distinct
Wittgenstein, rather intended his book to represent “a consciously unfinished work.” (N. Venturinha,
“Introduction: A Composite Work of Art”, in ed. N. Venturinha,  The Textual Genesis of Wittgenstein’s
Philosophical Investigations (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp.  1-18.)
2 As Wittgenstein notes humorously in what, by chance, is the last word of the Investigations: it is indeed
possible  to  speak of  the  “changing activity  of  butter  when its  price  rises”,  but  “if  no problems are
produced by this it is harmless.” (PI §693)
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element of Wittgenstein’s thought which seems to me underappreciated and which casts,
moreover, a particular light on what exactly he wished to achieve with his work.  In the
broadest strokes, this dissertation is an investigation into Wittgenstein’s relation to historical
and indeed historicist thinking.  It is a topic which H.-J. Glock notes (in one of the few
articles  to  treat  the  subject  directly)  is  “not  either  obvious  or  popular.”3  At  turns,  this
investigation is undertaken in relation to the thoughts of others (Spengler or Paul Ernst, for
example) and in relation to Wittgenstein’s own thoughts (particularly his later response to
the earlier, resolute a-historicism of the Tractatus).  What I observed here was that, if we are
permitted  to  compartmentalize  his  work  and  divide  it  up  into  more  or  less  discrete
periods―say, that of the Tractatus, that of the early 1930’s, that of the Investigations, and
that  which  we  generally  consider  to  be  his  post-Investigations  work―there  is  almost
invariably put forward there, alongside what we generally consider to be the main themes
developed  at  each  of  these  stages,  a  view  of  time  and  temporality  that  threatens  the
coherence of those very dominant themes themselves.  This, I argue, is no mere coincidence.
Looking at Wittgenstein’s development as a whole, we see that he was extremely sensitive
to the fact that language―though it may be considered a-historical from a particular point of
view―has in itself an ineliminable dynamism, which he variously considered at times in
terms of its ‘temporal’ and/or ‘historical’ dimension.  While stopping short of the claim that
Wittgenstein’s  work  evolved  solely  in  response  to  these  considerations,  the  threat  this
historicism  poses  to  whatever  conception  he  was  advancing  at  a  given  time  finds  a
consistent refrain throughout his work―and this is the case despite the dramatic revolutions
his thought underwent.  Not that Wittgenstein always saw historicism as a threat, however.
Far from it.  Indeed, there were times during the course of this research when I would have
happily  proclaimed  Wittgenstein  was  indeed  a  historicist  himself.   There  are  clearly
moments when he flirts with historicist ideas rather heavily, and the legitimacy he grants
them  is  in  itself  telling  for  such  a  philosopher  as  he  was.   Wittgenstein  ultimately
recognized, however, that the flip-side of that historicism is its natural, dialectical sublation:
3 H.-J. Glock, “Wittgenstein and History”, p. 278, in eds. A. Pichler and S. Säätelä,  Wittgenstein: The
Philosopher and his Works. Frankfurt a.M.: Ontos Verlag, 2006), pp. 277-303.
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if people of different places and different times think differently than we do, it is only by
virtue  of  our  deeply  shared  humanity  that  we  are  able  to  identify  these  differences  as
differences―and not, for example, some incomprehensible form of delusion or madness.
This is not to say that aberrations do not and have not existed.  Nonetheless, I believe today
that  it  is  this  deep  sense  of  shared  humanity  that  Wittgenstein  aimed  at  articulating
throughout  his  philosophy,  regardless  of  the  matter  at  hand,  while  at  the  same  time
recognizing the forces that threaten its dissolution―and encouraging us, as philosophers, to
acknowledge that philosophy itself is no guarantee against our active participation in any
future abdication of that shared humanity.
Expressions of this aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophy are, of course, found particularly in
the  Nachlaß  material of the early 1930’s―and for good reasons too, although under the
sway of popular thinkers of the day (such as Weininger, in particular) they were not always
well-expressed at the time.  Nonetheless, what they clearly bear witness to is the dawning of
a  philosophically  relevant,  historically  conditioned  form  of  cultural  criticism  within
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, as well as a process of acute reflection concerning the timeliness
of the undertaking itself.  Despite the fact that the philosophical vocabulary Wittgenstein
employed at  that  time would  (like  all  the  others  he  variously  employed)  eventually  be
abandoned,  the  issues  raised  there  would  not.   Historically  self-reflective,  cultural
considerations were never a passing interest for Wittgenstein and, indeed, they provide a
steady refrain throughout his private remarks―and even find a privileged (if muted) place
in the last writings collected just shortly before his death.  With such Nachlaß comments in
mind, moreover, we see that these considerations motivated key strategies in his published
and publication-ready works as well, which to this day maintain a privileged place in our
evaluations of Wittgenstein’s philosophical legacy despite the increasing interest that the
Nachlaß has rightly earned.
Certainly, the extensive access we have to the Nachlaß material today has been a boon to
Wittgenstein scholarship.  As the older, incomplete picture of his philosophical development
has  been swept  aside,  there  have  arisen  new and sometimes  radical  conceptions  of  his
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philosophical achievement and its lasting significance.  Nonetheless, with so much material
so readily at hand, there is clearly a risk of ‘cherry-picking’ quotes (as it were) that attribute
to Wittgenstein (possibly)  mistaken or  (far  more likely)  simply irrelevant  views.   Thus,
before concluding,  I sketch briefly here the methodological  touchstones that guided this
research into what, by most accounts, remains rather uncharted territory within Wittgenstein
scholarship, along with a brief chapter summary. 4
In the first instance, I have sought at each turn to put Wittgenstein’s thoughts about time,
change, and history, in relation to what are generally considered to be the dominant trends in
his work at a given point in time.  This is because I believe we, as scholars, have the most to
gain from an appreciation of how the views he develops there, alongside those dominant
trends,  afford  a  deeper  understanding  of  the  dominant  trends  themselves  and  how  his
thought frequently evolved in response to them.  As a work of scholarship, the focus thus
remains by and large on what Wittgenstein himself thought of these ideas rather than what
we might wish to make of them as contemporary philosophers today.  Secondly, I have
sought to contextualize the ideas explored here in relation to some of the major biographical
moments in Wittgenstein’s life.  This is for two reasons.  On the one hand, I maintain that
the connection between Wittgenstein’s life and his philosophy is stronger than in most other
philosophers (even the greatest among them) and that we cannot get a clear understanding
of the latter without an appreciation of the former.  On the other hand, it is the general lack
of  such  an  appreciation―characteristic  of  the  Anglo-Austrian  analytic  tradition,  within
which he initially had the greatest impact―that resulted in the early neglect of the views
that I explore here.  And this is natural, too.  For it is only with our contemporary access to
the  Nachlaß that we are able to appreciate just how outside of that tradition Wittgenstein
himself felt he was.  Of course, his work can no way be considered as  independent  of it.
Nonetheless, as our familiarity with his Nachlaß continues to grow, we gain a greater insight
into just  how distinct  many of  the issues that  motivated his  work were from those that
4 Readers are, in addition, invited to consult the ‘Concluding Remarks’ section of each chapter, for a more
detailed summary of each chapters’ content as well as indication of the its general position in the overall
argumentation of this dissertation.
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motivated the wider academic milieu within which he was situated.  Historical thinking, to
take  just  one  example,  was  clearly  a  key  element  in  Wittgenstein’s  work  and his  own
understanding of that work’s significance―and so, if it  is  true, as noted above, that his
thoughts in this regard are a topic neither obvious nor popular in Wittgenstein scholarship, I
maintain  that  this  is  due  to  our  own  tendency  to  neglect  such  issues  rather  than
Wittgenstein’s.
With this in mind, I have divided the dissertation into two parts.  Part I traces the evolution
of  Wittgenstein’s  thoughts  on  time  and  temporality  from  the  Tractatus,  through  the
Investigations, and into certain key final remarks from those written shortly before his death
(as collected in On Certainty).  In doing so, I suggest that his later thought in this particular
regard―indeed, like so many others within his philosophy―may be viewed as a response
to, and subsequent modification of, that conception first outlined in his early thought.  For
indeed there is a very clear sense in which Wittgenstein had, in the  Tractatus, proclaimed
the end of history.  Of course, by that Tractarian light, time itself would move on.  But that
which happened within it  would be ‘eternal’ in its uniform, empirical character.   People
would continue to be born, to live and to die, of course, but what we might think of as the
‘march  of  ideas’ or  the  ‘movement  of  thought’ would  be  no  more.   For  the  young
Wittgenstein of the  Tractatus, there would be only two things left for philosophers of the
future to do: either see the world aright or vainly speak where they should rather be silent.
Thus, between Wittgenstein’s early work and his return to philosophy a decade later, there
was not merely a correction of certain mistaken beliefs expressed in that earlier work, but
rather a seismic shift in his thought about what it means to be mistaken in philosophy at all.
And with that came an acute sense that history does move on and that it cares little for our
various claims to have found the ultimate solution to whatever it  is that may trouble us
philosophically at a given moment in time.
That Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy coincided with the rise of fascism in Europe has a
significance that cannot be denied, though he rarely referred to it explicitly.  History was
nonetheless marching on, and though the Tractatus had an immeasurable impact in certain
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philosophical quarters, it is clear that the work did not achieve the aim Wittgenstein himself
had intended for it.  Whether or not it could, in principle, have done so is beside the point.
For the fact is that the times were changing―and Wittgenstein, in typical fashion, changed
with them.  Thus, in Part II, I take a closer look at the motivations behind Wittgenstein’s
return to philosophy and in particular at the unique methodology he developed in order to
serve his new purposes.  
Though Wittgenstein’s work in this regard is indeed singular in its application and in its
scope,  it  is  not  without  precedent.   Therefore,  I  look first  at  how Wittgenstein adapted
Goethe’s conception of morphology to his own, modified ends.  I highlight there particularly
how the questions of temporality inherent to the methodology itself were for both initially
suppressed and only later came to occupy a key role in their respective applications of it.
This helps, on the one hand, to contextualize those remarks Wittgenstein made which appear
at  times  to  suggest  that  history  was  unimportant  for  the  kind  of  project  he  wished  to
undertake.   On the  other  hand,  it  highlights  the  extent  to  which those familiar  and yet
apparently  off-handed  remarks  about  the  historical  dimensions  of  language  in  the
Investigations are actually the result of a long thoughtful engagement―rather than a casual
interjection in an otherwise basically ‘a-historical work’, for example.  Following this,  I
look at  what has come to be termed the ‘conservative charge’,  regarding Wittgenstein’s
political orientation and its expression in his philosophy.  Through a review of some of the
major  discussants  in  this  debate,  I  show  that  wherever  one  sits  on  the  matter  of
Wittgenstein’s political convictions (right, left, somewhere in between, or somewhere else
besides)  will  ultimately  depend  upon  how one  understands  (although  has  perhaps  only
vaguely  articulated)  Wittgenstein’s  thoughts  about  tradition,  change  and  the  nature  of
historical continuity.  
In the final chapter, I address the question that motivated this investigation at the outset:
Why did Wittgenstein write  Philosophical Investigations?  I  proceed here,  in effect,  by
historicizing Wittgenstein’s work itself and argue that―as the work is inherently tied to the
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historical particularities of its production―it is no longer possible for us simply to repeat
Wittgenstein’s critical agenda in any kind of straightforward way.  Given that, the question
becomes: What does it mean to philosophise in a Wittgensteinian spirit, now that the times
have moved on and the problems we are confronting are our own?  This, I argue, is the
question he wished above all for us to pose.  And thus, when Wittgenstein writes in the
preface to the work “I should not like my writing to spare others the trouble of thinking”
(PI, p. x), we should take him at his word here.  Far from an expression of false modesty, it
is rather an indication of something essential about the work to follow and the purpose to




The  Austrio-British  philosopher  Ludwig  Wittgenstein  is  famous  among  the  public
(philosophical  and  non-philosophical  alike)  for  having  written  not  only  one,  but  two
magnum  opera―the  Tractatus  Logico-Philosophicus (1921)  and  Philosophical
Investigations (1952)―with the second serving more or less as a complete repudiation of
the first.  Today, however, scholars recognize that far from having two distinct phases of
thought, his later work actually represents a continuous process of development, reflection
upon and refinement of the ideas he first explored in the trenches of World War I, rather than
a  straightforward  repudiation.   This  dissertation  is  an  investigation  into  an  under-
acknowledged element  in  Wittgenstein’s  thought,  one which in  many cases  acted as an
impetus  for  that  life-long  process  of  novel  philosophical  reflection:  History.   What  we
witness  here  above  all  is  the  development  of  a  philosophically  relevant,  historically
conditioned form of cultural criticism throughout Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, as
well as an acute reflection concerning the timeliness of the undertaking itself.  This casts a
new light on the manner in which the Investigations serves as a response to the ideas first
put forth in the Tractatus and, moreover, the manner in which he himself conceived of its
philosophical significance.
As the topic history is (to quote a well-known scholar) ‘neither obvious nor popular’ within
Wittgenstein scholarship, the role that it played in Wittgenstein’s thought is explored here
from multiple angles, both chronologically and thematically.  Part I traces the evolution of
Wittgenstein’s  thoughts  on  time  and  temporality  from  the  Tractatus,  through  the
Investigations, into some key post-Investigations remarks.  These are Chapters One, Two
and  Three  respectively.   Part  II  examines  the  motivations  behind  Wittgenstein’s  post-
Tractarian return to philosophy and, in particular, the unique methodology he developed in
order  to  serve his  renewed purpose.  Chapter  Four  explores  Wittgenstein’s  adaptation of
Goethe’s conception of morphology, highlighting how the questions of temporality that are
in fact inherent to the methodology itself were for both initially suppressed and only later
came  to  occupy  a  key  role  in  their  respective  uses  of  it.   This  helps,  principally,  to
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contextualize  those  remarks  which  may  appear  at  times  to  suggest  that  history  was
unimportant  for  Wittgenstein’s  philosophical  project.   Chapter  Five  addresses  what  has
come to be called the ‘conservative charge’, regarding Wittgenstein’s political orientation.
Through a review of some of the major discussants in this debate, I show that wherever one
sits on the matter of Wittgenstein’s political convictions and its expression in his philosophy
will ultimately depend upon how one understands Wittgenstein’s thoughts about tradition,
change and the nature of historical continuity.  Finally,  Chapter Six seeks to answer the
basic question which, in a certain sense, motivated this research from the outset: What was
Wittgenstein trying to achieve with Philosophical Investigations?  Through a historicization
of the work itself, I argue that it is no longer possible today to repeat Wittgenstein’s critical
agenda in any kind of straightforward way because of the manner in which the work is tied
to its own historical particularities.  Given that, the question becomes: What does it mean to
philosophize in a  Wittgensteinian spirit today, now that the times have moved on and the
problems that we confront are our own?  This, I conclude, is the question he wished above
all for us, the philosophers of the future, to pose ourselves in order to break free of the
dogmatic pictures that hold our thoughts ‘captive’ and forbid them from moving forward in





CHAPTER 1. THE MYTH OF A-TEMPORALITY: TIME AND PROGRESS IN 
WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS
“What has history to do with me? Mine is the first and only
world!”
—Notebooks, 2.9.1916
I. Wittgenstein and the ‘Science of Logic’
Having begun his studies in philosophy shortly before, in 1912 the young Wittgenstein was
asked to write a review of P. Coffey’s  The Science of Logic for the  Cambridge Review.5
This  review,  which  stands  as  the  earliest  written  record  of  Wittgenstein’s  philosophical
thought, is not widely cited outside of biographical contexts.  And this is understandably so,
for not much of what makes Wittgenstein’s  early thought truly distinctive is  discernible
there.6  Even if the tone is more vitriolic than is usual for such a review, the work is in most
respects  exactly  what  one would expect from a gifted young philosopher beginning his
studies and being set on the path of philosophical scholarship by his mentor.  For he was
already then, as R. Monk remarks, “the wearer of Russell’s mantel in logic.”7
5 P. Coffey,  The Science of  Logic:  An Inquiry  into the Principles of  Accurate Thought  and Scientific
Method (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912).
6 Two small but notable exceptions to this include his critical remark that “Mr. Coffey, like many logicians,
draws great advantage from an unclear way of expressing himself; for if you cannot tell whether he
means to say ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, it is difficult to argue against him”, which recalls what would later become
proposition 4.023 of the Tractatus: “A proposition must determine reality one way or the other: yes or
no.”   As  well,  we  might  include  here  what  McGuinness  calls  his  stylistic  “preference  for  the
epigrammatic  and  dismissive.”  (B.  McGuinness,  Wittgenstein:  A  Life  (Young  Ludwig  1889-1921)
(London: Duckworth, 1988), p. 169.) 
7 R. Monk,  The Duty of Genius (New York: Penguin, 1990), p. 74.   In a letter to Ottoline, sent shortly
before the review of Coffey was written, Russell notes: “I believe a certain sort of mathematicians have
far more philosophical capacity than most people who take up philosophy.  Hitherto the people attracted
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However, the review opens with a noteworthy remark that serves to illustrate just how radical a
departure Wittgenstein would soon make from this ‘typical path’ and the tradition of mathematical
logic into which he was being initiated by Russell:
“In no branch of  learning can an author  disregard the results  of  honest  research with so much
impunity as he can in Philosophy and Logic.  To this circumstance we owe the publication of such a
book as  Mr.  Coffey’s  ‘Science of  Logic’:  and only as  a typical  example of  the  work of  many
logicians to-day does this book deserve consideration.  The author’s Logic is that of the scholastic
philosophers,  and he makes all  their  mistakes—of course with the usual  references to Aristotle.
(Aristotle, whose name is so much taken in vain by our Logicians, would turn in his grave if he
know that so many Logicians know no more about Logic to-day than he did 2,000 years ago).  The
author has not taken the slightest notice of the great work of the modern mathematical logicians—
work which has brought about an advance in Logic comparable only to that which made Astronomy
out of Astrology, and Chemistry out of Alchemy.” (PO, p. 3-4)  
What is so noteworthy about this passage is how Wittgenstein describes the work of modern
logicians as “honest research”, the advances of which are “comparable only to that which
made Astronomy out of Astrology, and Chemistry out of Alchemy.”  There can be little
doubt that by modern mathematical logicians, Wittgenstein has Frege and Russell in mind
here: the first “grave mistake” of Coffey’s work is the belief that all propositions are of the
subject-predicate form, this being the heart of Frege’s rejection (and subsequent revision) of
Aristotelian logic, first set out in his own Begriffsschrift and later developed by Russell in
his  Theory  of  Definite  Descriptions.   Despite  Wittgenstein’s  sharp  dismissal  of  the
Aristotelian logic inherent to Coffey’s scholasticism, from this we can see that Wittgenstein
would have agreed with the object of his criticism in this review on at least one point—
namely, that logic is indeed a science.  In this sense, Russell and Frege would have been to
to philosophy have been mostly those who loved the big generalizations, which were all wrong, so that
few people with exact minds have taken up the subject.  It has long been one of my dreams to found a
great  school  of  mathematically-minded  philosophers,  but  I  don’t  know  whether  I  shall  ever  get  it
accomplished.   I  had hopes of  Norton,  but  he  has  not  the  physique,  Broad is  all  right,  but  has  no
fundamental originality.  Wittgenstein of course is exactly my dream.” (Quoted in R. Monk, The Duty of
Genius, op cit., p. 75.)
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the ‘science of logic’ what Galileo was to astronomy or what Lavoisier was to chemistry.
Revolutionaries all, in both the methods and the raw materials of their respective  métiers.
Wittgenstein would soon come to see, however, that this is decidedly not the case.8
In  the  preface  to  the  Tractatus, Wittgenstein  famously  declared  to  have  solved  all  the
problems of philosophy.  This might seem surprising for a slim volume of less than one
hundred pages, but what if one could show that all the various problems of philosophy were
but diverse  expressions of a single error?  As Wittgenstein writes  in  the  preface to  the
Tractatus: “The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the
reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood.” (T,
p. 3)  Within the main body of the text, Wittgenstein repeats this sentiment: “Most of the
propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of
our language.” (T 4.003)
The problem is by now well-known: failing to abide by the requirements imposed upon us
by the logic of our language, we construct illegitimate propositions in our metaphysically-
inclined speculations (“whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful” is the
example Wittgenstein proposes at 4.003, in a conscious parody of Platonic reasoning).  We
thus mistakenly believe ourselves to have fathomed the depths of metaphysical truth, when
in fact we have simply said nothing at all.  Such speculative answers to questions about the
good,  the true and the beautiful  are not therefore false,  Wittgenstein claims,  but simply
8 It is interesting to note in passing that Wittgenstein would later describe his own shift in thought―i.e.
from that found in the Tractatus to that found in his post-1930 writings and lectures―in precisely these
terms.  In his account of Wittgenstein’s early-1930s lectures, Moore notes for example: “I was a good
deal surprised by some of the things he said about the difference between ‘philosophy’ in the sense in
which what he was doing might be called ‘philosophy’ (he called this ‘modern philosophy’), and what
has traditionally been called ‘philosophy’.  He said that what he was doing was a ‘new subject’, and not
merely  a  stage  in  a  ‘continuous  development’;  that  there  was  now,  in  philosophy,  a  ‘kink’ in  the
‘development  of  human  thought’,  comparable  to  that  which  occurred  when  Galileo  and  his
contemporaries invented dynamics; that a ‘new method’ had been discovered, as had happened when
‘chemistry was developed out of alchemy’; and that it was now possible for the first  time that there
should be ‘skilful’ philosophers, though of course there had in the past been ‘great philosophers’.” (PO,
p. 113) 
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nonsense.   As  he  summarily  notes  in  the  Tractatus,  regarding  the  familiar  problem of
philosophical scepticism: 
“Scepticism is  not  irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical,  when it  tries to raise doubts where no
question can be asked.
For doubt exists only where a question exists, a question exists only where an answer exists, and an
answer exists only where something can be said.” (T 6.51)
The  apparent  intractability  of  ancient  and  long-standing  philosophical  problems  is  not,
therefore, due to their enormous difficulty or their unfathomable ‘depth’.  However, if these
problems are not deep, neither are they shallow.  On Wittgenstein’s account, if scepticism is
not  irrefutable,  for  example,  neither  is  it  simply  and straightforwardly  refutable.   “The
riddle does not exist,” he writes.  “If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to
answer it.” (T 6.5)  Like all of the perennial ‘philosophical riddles’, to attempt a refutation
of  scepticism  would  already  be  to  give  it  too  much  linguistic  currency.   For  on
Wittgenstein’s account, there is nothing there to refute: “It is not surprising,” he notes, “that
the deepest problems are in fact not problems at all.” (T 4.003) 
While Wittgenstein would later come to consider the kind of speculative metaphysics so
often found in philosophy as an outright ‘bewitchment’ by language, at the time he was
composing the  Tractatus  the source of this  misunderstanding was for  him but a simple
confusion arising from attending solely to the superficial surface of linguistic form.  Thus,
he writes there: 
“In everyday language it happens that the same word has different symbols―or that two words that
have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same
way.
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Thus the word ‘is’ figures as the copula, as a sign for identity, and as an expression for existence 9;
‘exist’ figures  as  an  intransitive  verb  like  ‘go’,  and  ‘identical’ as  an  adjective;  we  speak  of
something, but also of something’s happening.
(In the proposition, ‘Green is green’—where the first word is the proper name of a person and the
last an adjective—these words do not merely have different meanings: they are different symbols.)
In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (and the whole of philosophy is full
of them).” (T 3.323-3.324)
These confusions arise, he says, because our “language disguises thought” and so it is not
possible to “gather immediately from it what the logic of language is.” (T 4.002)  Were this
not  the  case,  we  would  not  mistake  nonsensical  talk—as  Wittgenstein  believed was  so
frequently  to  be  found  particularly  in  philosophy—for  genuine  sense.   “Most  of  the
propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false,” he notes, “but
nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give an answer to questions of this kind”—whether,
for example, the good is more or less identical than the beautiful—“but can only point out
that they are nonsensical.” (T 4.003)
The use of language as a medium of philosophical insight is of course a quite traditional
one, familiar from the works of Plato to Nietzsche.  Taken at face value, such traditional
attempts to mine language for a proper understanding of the world are not misguided in
spirit.  However, having failed to grasp how language functions principally as a means to
represent things in the world, about which we may genuinely speak and think—such as true
sentences,  good deeds,  and beautiful  things,  rather  than,  say,  the  true,  the good,  or  the
beautiful in and of themselves—philosophers are invariable led by the misuse of language
down the path of metaphysical speculation.  Wallowing in ill-formed expressions, which
ultimately succeed in referring to nothing at all, the philosopher thus fails on Wittgenstein’s
account to fulfil the necessary requirements for achieving genuine expressions of thought in
9 The third of Coffey’s errors, noted in Wittgenstein’s review: “He confounds the copula ‘is’ with the word
‘is’ expressing identity. (The word ‘is’ has different meanings in the propositions—‘Twice two is four’
and ‘Socrates is mortal’.)” (PO, p. 3)
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language.   Like actors repeating lines on a stage, these obscure metaphysical  utterances
amount to nothing but a tale—full of sound and fury to be sure, but ultimately signifying
nothing.
In the preface to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein summaries the work in these terms: 
“What can be said at all can be said clearly and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in
silence.  Thus, the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather not to thought, but to the
expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both
sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought.)” (T, p. 3)
To seek clarity of thought within thought alone is problematic, Wittgenstein suggests here,
because we require a standard by which to distinguish what is clear from what is obscure.
This  standard  cannot  be  found  in  thought  alone  (as  Descartes  had  suggested  in  the
Discourse on Method, for example, under the guise of clear and distinct ideas given by the
lumen naturale of reason10), for recognizing genuine thought by thinking alone would mean
being familiar with some form of ‘non-thought’ from which it might be distinguished.  And
this would require one to realise the paradoxical task of thinking what cannot be thought. 11
However, where no ‘non-thought’ may be identified non-language, in other words nonsense,
may.   Wittgenstein  thus  wished  to  turn  our  attention  away  from  the  introspective
examination of thought, back to sensical language about things in the world—a new prima
philosophia—so that we might have a way to identify what is and what is not genuine in the
expression of thought, and so expunge from philosophy the nonsense to which it is prone.
10 For example,  concerning Descartes’ conception of mathematics as the principle tool for physics and
natural philosophy, he writes: “I have noticed certain laws which God has so established in nature, and of
which he has implanted such notions in our minds, that after adequate reflection we cannot doubt that
they are exactly as observed in everything which exists or occurs in the world.” (R. Descartes, Discourse
on Method, p. 131. In R. Descartes,  The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. I,  ed. and trans. J.
Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 111-
151.)
11 Regarding Descartes own susceptibility to this failing (from the Tractarian point of view), cf. J. Conant
“In Search for Logically Alien Thought”, Philosophical Topics, 20(1), 1991, pp. 115-180.
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We can already begin to see here the extent to which Wittgenstein’s work overlaps that of
his intellectual fore-bearers, particularly Frege and Russell, and the extent to which it differs
radically.   Of  course,  a  great  deal  of  work  has  already  been  devoted  to  outlining  the
similarities  between  the  three,  as  well  as  to  accounting  for  the  enormous  debts  that
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus owes to the work of the other two; however, a few uncontroversial
examples may nonetheless serve to sharpen the point.  In the case of Russell, for example,
referring particularly to his Theory of Descriptions, Wittgenstein notes that it was he “who
performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be
its  real  one.”  (T 4.0031)  It  is  in  this  sense that  Wittgenstein held  that  the  task of  the
philosopher is to alleviate problems by remedying the misconceptions that are involved in
their  formulation.   Russell  clearly  had a  similar  view.   To find  an  example  of  Frege’s
influence on Wittgenstein’s thought in the  Tractatus, we need not look much further than
this, although we may need to adjust our focus a little wider.  For although Wittgenstein
scarcely mentions Frege in a positive light in the work, outside his expression of gratitude in
the preface12, many of the central conceptions within it can be traced back to Fregean roots.
A prime example is Wittgenstein’s use of Frege’s ‘Context Principle’, which states that one
must not ask for the meaning of a sign (or more precisely, the object to which it is supposed
to  refer)  except  from  within  the  context  of  a  proposition.   We  might  compare  here
Wittgenstein’s claim, that “Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition
does a name have meaning” (T 3.3),  with Frege’s original  formulation of the principle:
“Only in a proposition have the words really a meaning.”13  Having restating the Context
Principle here, Wittgenstein goes on to apply it to his account of what an expression is, and
his  characterization  of  an  expression  as  a  mark  of  common  form and  content  (a  dual
12 Perhaps the parenthesis at 4.431 provides an exception, although it is in typical fashion qualified: “Thus
Frege was quite right to use [truth-conditions] as a starting point when he explained the signs of his
conceptual notation.  But the explanation of the concept of truth that Frege gives is mistaken: if ‘the true’
and  ‘the  false’ were  really  objects,  and  were  the  arguments  in  ~p etc.,  then  Frege’s  method  of
determining the sense of ‘~p’ would leave it absolutely undetermined.”
13 G.  Frege,  The Foundations of  Arithmetic,  trans.  J.L.  Austin  (Evanston,  IL:  Northwestern University
Press, 1980), §60. [Hereafter FA]
28
direction of fit between meaningful language and thought) is then woven into the very fabric
of the structure and methodology of the Tractatus as a whole.
Suffice  it  to  say  that  amongst  all  three  thinkers  there  exists  a  common  approach  to
philosophy regarding its task (the logical clarification of language) and the manner in which
that task is to be realized (disambiguation through the use of an adequate logical notation).
However, a great gulf opens up between the philosophies of Wittgenstein and the other two
when we look at their respective accounts concerning what it is about language that allows
such  a  task  to  be  realized  at  all.   Like  Russell  and  Frege,  Wittgenstein  believed  that
philosophical  obscurities  could  be  resolved  by  clarifying  the  foundational  structure  of
language and by remedying the misunderstandings that arise from attending solely to the
superficial surface of linguistic form.  Also like Frege and Russell, Wittgenstein too believed
that the correct understanding would require an adequate logical framework in order avoid
these confusions.  However, for Frege and Russell, what allows this task to be realized is the
truth of those logical foundations, which—in virtue of their being true—might subsequently
be  used  to  ground  more  complex  logico-linguistic  forms  (such  as  those  found  in
mathematics,  for  example).   From  this  point  of  view,  as  the  young  Wittgenstein  so
decisively declared in 1912, substantial revolutions―comparable to those in astronomy or
chemistry, for example―would indeed be possible in logic, as they are in an other science.
In the Tractatus, however, Wittgenstein rejects this possibility: “Philosophy is not one of the
natural sciences,” he notes.  “The word ‘philosophy’ must mean something whose place is
above  or  below  the  natural  sciences,  not  beside  them.”  (T  4.112)   He  stresses  that
philosophy, unlike science, is not a doctrine or a body of true propositions, such as that
which Frege and Russell wished to secure, but rather an activity.  The logic of our language
must be properly applied but it must itself “go without saying.” (T 3.334)  Logic, he writes
at the opening of the preparatory Notebooks, “must take care of itself.” (NB, p. 2)  It is not,
therefore, the job of the philosopher to assert logical truths.  The logic of our language must
be allowed to show itself in its proper use, and it is rather the job of the philosopher to abide
by  its  mandate.   Thus,  Wittgenstein  writes,  “all  philosophy  is  a  ‘critique  of  language’
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(Sprachkritik).” (T 4.0031)  For it is only by speaking clearly that we may call out others’
nonsense, effectively drawing the limits of language from within sensical language itself—
i.e., without ourselves overstepping that limit in the very act of critique, without (that is to
say)  attempting to  think what cannot be  thought.   As he writes towards the  end of the
Tractatus:
“The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be
said,  i.e.  propositions  of  natural  science―i.e.  something  that  has  nothing  to  do  with
philosophy―and  then,  whenever  someone  else  wanted  to  say  something  metaphysical,  to
demonstrate to him that he had failed to give meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although
it would not be satisfying to the other person―he would not have the feeling that we were teaching
him philosophy―this method would be the only strictly speaking correct one.” (T 6.53)
The aim of Wittgenstein’s critical project at this time is thus to clarify the “a priori order of
language”―a task he described early on as “the great problem round which everything I
write turns” (NB, p. 53)―and, having clarified that order, to bring language use (above all
philosophical  language  use) in  line  with  it,  so  that  we  might  be  assured  of  genuinely
represent things in the world when speaking.
Realising this critique would not mean arriving—in a positive sense—at a certain collection
of substantial ‘philosophical truths’ upon which one might rely in complex, uncertain or
ambiguous cases.  Rather, truth for Wittgenstein is a matter of what propositions say  about
things and “there is no a priori order of things.” (T 5.634)  Bringing language into line with
its a priori order means therefore—in a negative sense—expunging from it the nonsense that
clothes, and so disguises, genuine thought in language: “My difficulty,” Wittgenstein notes,
“is only an enormous difficulty of expression.” (NB, p. 40)  In this sense, we would then be
left afterwards with nothing but that which could properly be said of things in the world and
so be rid of the pseudo-propositions that  permeate our ordinary language (as Frege and
Russell also wished) as well as the superfluous attempt to ground this activity in a body of
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substantially  true logical  propositions  (such  as  that  upon  which  Frege  and  Russell
erroneously relied).
Now, at the heart of this critique lies what has come to be called the Picture Theory of
Language, according to which the sense of a given proposition is not determined by the
agreement or disagreement of the proposition with the part of the world it describes but
rather by the very  possibility of such agreement or disagreement.  As Wittgenstein states:
“The sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with possibilities of existence
and non-existence of states of affairs.”  (T 4.2)  Wittgenstein was thus led to claim that
sensical propositions form a kind of linguistic picture of reality, like a  tableau vivant  (T
4.0311), to which the facts of the world could either correspond or not.  For a proposition to
have sense, it must be ‘bipolar’; it must be possible for that proposition to be either true or
false.  Thus, for example, the propositions of natural science (as propositions describing the
particular arrangement of objects in some bounded part of the world) are sensical even if
and when they are false.  Crucially, it is from this that the possibility of scientific fallibility
follows and, therefore, the possibility of scientific progress.
Of  principle  importance  for  Wittgenstein  here  is  the  consequence  of  this  idea  for  the
positivistic reliance on a priori facts in Frege and Russell’s logicism.  Specifically, by the
Tractarian reading, tautologies are not facts simply by virtue of their unconditional truth.
On the contrary,  as  Wittgenstein gestures  metaphorically  in  the  Tractatus:  “A tautology
leaves open to reality the whole—the infinite whole—of logical space: a contradiction fills
the whole of logical  space leaving no point  of it  for reality.   Thus neither of them can
determine reality in any way.”  (T 4.463)  Contrary to the view of Frege and Russell (among
other logicians,  then and now) the ‘unconditionally-true’ quality  of tautologies does not
satisfy the conditions of sense for Wittgenstein.  For here we would not know what it means
for a tautology to be false, nor for a contradiction to be true, and therefore cannot compare it
with reality (as we can a picture) to see if it ‘holds’ or not.  In a manner of speaking, we
would not know where to look for its sense.  “For example,” Wittgenstein notes in a telling
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illustration, “I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not
raining.” (T 4.461)
Wittgenstein was highly critical of appealing to such a body of substantial logical truths,
familiar from the history of logic going back to Aristotle (the Law of Excluded Middle, the
Principle Non-Contradiction, etc.).  Indeed, he considered this critique the  Grundgedanke,
or  ‘fundamental  thought’, of  the  Tractatus: “My  fundamental  idea  is  that  the  ‘logical
constants’ are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts.”
(T 4.0312)  However, the manner in which Wittgenstein rejected this appeal meant that he
had  to  deal  with  a  number  of  problems—or,  if  these  problems  are  mere  philosophical
pseudo-problems, demonstrate that this is so—to which Frege and Russell were immune.
For the question that naturally poses itself here is this: How can we reconcile the necessity
that is supposedly inherent to our practice of logic with the revisions—including those of
Frege,  Russell  and  Wittgenstein  themselves—that  have  taken  place  in  that  very  same
practice over time?  How are we to reconcile the aprioricity of logic with the brute fact of
its historical development?
Where Wittgenstein had once agreed with Frege and Russell, that the advances of logic were
comparable to those of the sciences, he would soon after abandon such a view.  Nonetheless,
that the practice of logic had changed as a result of the inquiries of Frege and Russell cannot
and could not have been denied.  The status of logico-mathematical progress had, therefore,
to figure in the programmes of Frege and (albeit to a lesser extent) Russell, as well as that of
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.  However, because they had two drastically different notions of a
priori truth—as that which on the one hand must be asserted and of which it  would be
absurd to deny, and that which on the other hand must ‘take care of itself’—how they dealt
with the question had likewise to take two drastically different paths.
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II. Frege: Logician and Historian
The problem of the historicity of logic—in other words, the question concerning how it is
that logic can have a history at all—was not unfamiliar to Frege or to Russell, often couched
as it is in terms of the nature of self-evidence and logico-mathematical fallibilism.  It must
be granted that Russell ultimately gave the problem little credence.14  Frege, however, was
very aware of how problematic an appeal to self-evidence can be in light of the similar but
erroneous claims made by his philosophical predecessors.15  He thus provides a rich account
of  how  personal  fallibility  is  possible  in  practice,  despite  the  universal  infallibility  of
genuine a priori truths; indeed, Burge justly makes the claim that “the integration of these
two strands is one of his finest philosophical achievements.”16  Beyond that, however, it is
also interesting to note that Frege provides a number of specific examples where one may
generalize  his  account  of  individual  fallibility  to  the  level  of  community  or  cultural
fallibility.  Perhaps most surprisingly here, for a philosopher who is considered by many to
be the epitome of the a-historical thinker—“a paradigm example of a foundationalist project
14 As  M.  McGinn  notes,  Russell’s  justification  of  aprioricity  through  self-evidence  was  in  fact  quite
uncritical in this regard: “Russell acknowledges that, in certain circumstances, a proposition that we take
to be  self-evident  may turn out  to  be  false,  for  example,  certain  ethical  propositions  and fallacious
memories.   He  responds  to  the  problem by  introducing  the  idea  of  ‘degrees  of  self-evidence’.   A
proposition may, he suggests, ‘have some degree of self-evidence without being true’ (B. Russell,  The
Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 68).  This makes it probable, he
argues,  that  there  are  in  fact  two  different  notions  of  self-evidence,  and  ‘that  one  of  them,  which
corresponds to the highest degree of self-evidence, is really an infallible guarantee of truth, while the
other, which corresponds to all the other degrees, does not give an infallible guarantee, but only a greater
or lesser presumption’ (ibid.).” (M. McGinn, Elucidating the Tractatus (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006), p. 66.)
15 For example, Frege critiques Henkel’s claim thus: “Henkel bases the theory of real numbers on three
fundamental propositions, to which he ascribes the character of ‘common notions’ (notiones communes):
‘Once expounded they are perfectly self-evident; they are valid for magnitudes in every field, as vouched
for by our pure intuition of magnitude; and they can without losing their character be transformed into
definitions, simply by defining the addition of magnitudes as an operation which satisfies them.’  In the
last statement there is an obscurity.  The definition can perhaps be constructed, but it will not do as a
substitute for the original proposition: Are Numbers magnitudes, and is what we ordinarily call addition
of Numbers addition in the sense of this definition?  And to answer it, we should need to know already
his original propositions about Numbers.” (FA §12) 
16 T. Burge, “Frege on Knowing the Foundations,” p. 335.  Mind, 107 (426), 1998, p. 307-347.
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pursued  a-historically,”  notes  M.  Beaney17—Frege  devotes  a  great  deal  of  time  to
investigating past mathematical practice and the logical principles that “formerly passed as
self-evident” for these practitioners (FA §1), all the while situating himself  amidst such a
community of potentially fallible practitioners.
What  is  so  noteworthy  about  Frege’s  treatment  of  history  here  is  not  only  that  he
acknowledges the possibility of subjective error while preserving the objective status of a
priori truth, as Burge notes,  but the fact that he also recognizes that such an account is
essential  to  the  success  of  his  program.   The  possibility  of  realising  genuine  logico-
mathematical progress required Frege to give an account of its history; for it is the very
possibility of such an historical development that allows Frege’s own system to serve as the
pinnacle that he evidently desired it to be.18
We see this historically-oriented approach principally in Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic
of 1884, where he proceeds to trace the history of modern mathematics, showing the faults
of his predecessors and ultimately laying the groundwork for his own work to come.  Thus,
in a specific sense—in terms of the previously held philosophical answers to the question
What are numbers?—he turns to the answers of Leibniz, Locke and Mill, among others, and
devotes a great deal of textual exegesis to elucidating their  faults.   However,  in a more
general methodological sense—in terms of the nature and necessity of posing the question
itself—Frege also looks to the past.   He turns here principally to Kant.   The quality of
Frege’s historical exegesis may perhaps be called into question at points, having apparently
relied  on  secondary  sources  that  may  themselves  have  been  suspect;  however,  we  still
regard Frege’s work today (as he himself did in the  Foundations) as a valiant attempt to
17 M.  Beaney,  “Frege  and  the  Role  of  Historical  Elucidation:  Methodology  and  the  Foundations  of
Mathematics,” p. 66.  In eds Ferreirós & Gray, The Architecture of Modern Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), pp. 47-66.
18 Similarly, the last chapter of Russell’s The History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1945) is entitled “The Philosophy of Logical Analysis,” referring to what he obviously took as the correct
form of philosophy, within which the history of philosophical inquiry had then culminated.
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respond in particular to the Kantian understanding of arithmetic truths as synthetic a priori
truths.
For Kant, such synthetic a priori truths were knowable independently of experience (hence,
a priori) but only through the aid of ‘intuition’, which would provide them with a space for
a genuinely progressive advance of mathematical knowledge (hence, synthetic).  For Kant,
an analytic judgement of the form ‘A is B’ is true if and only if the predicate ‘B’ is contained
in  the  subject  ‘A’.   Thus,  the  familiar  example  ‘A bachelor  is  an  unmarried  man’ is
analytically true because the predicate  unmarried man is already contained in the concept
bachelor.  According to Kant, establishing an analytic a priori truth such as this does not
represent a genuine advance in our knowledge, for we would already have to know what an
‘unmarried man’ is in order to know what a bachelor is, and vice versa.  On this conception,
to learn that a bachelor is an unmarried man is to learn something about the use of the terms
‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’, etc.,  rather than an instance of learning something true
about bachelors.
However, in the case of mathematics, discovering the solution to ‘12×12’ for example, this is
an advance in knowledge for Kant.  Upon learning what twelve times twelve means, we do
not necessarily come to the answer and when we have figured it out, we have not simply
learned something about the meaning of the terms ‘twelve’, ‘times’ and ‘equals’.  Like other
cases of synthetic knowledge (such as ‘Snow is white’) the answer has to be discovered.
But, unlike other cases of synthetic knowledge, this knowledge is not dependent on any
particular observable experience.  Kant thus accounted for the possibility of such knowledge
by  positing  a  realm  of  intuition  which  allows  us  to  advance  our  knowledge  here,
independently of any particular set of experiences to which we might apply the Principle of
Induction.  
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By ‘intuition’ Kant is referring here to the spatio-temporal framework of representation19,
which by providing a medium of resistance allows us to explore and ultimately to advance
mathematical knowledge in a genuinely positive way.  In a manner of speaking, it is because
we can go wrong in the application of mathematical principles (unlike the mere ascription of
terms at work in analytic knowledge) that we can also go right.  As Kant notes, ironically:
“The light dove cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine
that her flight would be still easier in airless space.” (CPR A5/B9)  Of course, she  might
wish it,  but this would not be the case.  In airless space no flight is possible.  Analytic
knowledge requires no such intuition because the consequent is already contained in the
antecedent.  In cases such as these there is no distance between the two terms—in other
words,  there  is  no  friction,  no  resistance  that  allows  for  the  proverbial  ‘flight  of
knowledge’20.   Our movement  is  not ‘more free’ in such cases,  for  in them there is  no
movement at all.  In the case of pure analytic a priori logic we are always already where we
want to be.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously illustrates the necessity for synthetic a priori
truths and the intuition upon which they rely like this:
“Give a philosopher the concept of a triangle, and let him try to find out in his way how the sum of
its angles might be related to a right angle.  He has nothing but the concept of a figure enclosed by
three straight lines, and the concept of equally many angles.  Now he may reflect on this concept as
long as he wants, yet he will never produce anything new.  He can analyse and make distinct the
concept of a straight line, or of an angle, or of the number three, but he will not come upon any other
19 E.g: “It is therefore through the medium of sensibility that objects are given to us and it alone provides us
with intuition.” (I. Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K. Smith (New York, Macmillan, 1929),
A19/B33. [Hereafter CPR])
20 Continuing with this metaphor of the flight within airless space, Kant notes “It is thus that Plato left the
world of the senses, as setting too narrow limits to the understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the
wings of the ideas, in the empty space of the pure understanding.  He did not observe that with all his
efforts he made no advance—meeting no resistance that might, as it were, serve as a support upon which
he could take a stand, to which he could apply his powers, and so set his understanding in motion.”
(CPR, A5/B9)
36
properties that do not already lie in these concepts.  But now let a geometer take up this question.
He begins at once to construct a triangle.  Since he knows that two right angles together are exactly
equal to all of the adjacent angles that can be drawn at one point on a straight line, he extends one
side of his triangle, and obtains two adjacent angles that are together equal to two right ones.  Now
he divides the external one of these angles by drawing a line parallel to the opposite side of the
triangle, and sees that here there arises an external adjacent angle which is equal to the internal one,
etc.  In such a way, through a chain of inferences that is always guided by intuition, he arrives at a
fully illuminating and at the same time general solution of the question.” (CPR, A716-7/B744-5)
Here the ‘geometer’, seizing upon the concepts of straight line and angle, puts them to work
in an exploration of their  spatially-determined representation.21  “I  construct  a triangle,”
Kant writes, “by exhibiting an object corresponding to this concept, either through mere
imagination,  in  pure  intuition,  or  on  paper,  in  empirical  intuition,  but  in  both  cases
completely a priori, without having had to borrow the pattern for it from any experience.”
(CPR A713/B741)  Though geometers  produce a  particular  representation of  a  triangle,
guided as they are by intuition, they nonetheless arrive at a wholly general solution and,
thus, a genuine advance in mathematical knowledge.  Here we have deductive knowledge,
which  is  nonetheless  synthetic.   The  ‘philosopher’,  on  the  other  hand,  comes  up  with
nothing  new  and  will  never  succeed  in  extracting  geometric  truths  from  the  concepts
21 In the case of arithmetic,  equations  are worked out  in a temporally-determined representation.   The
difference,  however,  in  terms of  the  present  survey is  marginal.   For  Kant,  at  least,  and not  unlike
Russell, the cases are symmetrical.  (Cf. M. van Atten, “Kant and Real Numbers”, in eds. P. Dybjer, S.
Lindström, E. Palmgren, and G. Sundholm,  Epistemology versus Ontology: Essays on the Philosophy
and Foundations of Mathematics in Honour of Per Martin-Löf (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), pp. 3-23.)  It
is important to note, however, that Frege was more cautious in this regard, noting e.g.: 
“We shall do well in general not to overestimate the extent to which arithmetic is akin to geometry.
[…] One geometrical point, considered in itself, cannot be distinguished in any way from another; the
same applies to lines and planes.  Only when several points, or lines or planes, are included together in
a single intuition, de we distinguish them.  In geometry, therefore, it is quite intelligible that general
propositions should be derived from intuition; the points or lines or planes which we intuit are not
really particular at all, which is what enables them to stand as representatives of the whole of their
kind.  But with numbers it is different; each number has its own particularities.  To what extent a given
particular number can represent all the others, and at what point its own special character comes into
play, cannot be laid down generally in advance.” (FA §13)
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themselves  without somehow constructing a spatially-determined representation of  those
concepts (whether with a pen and paper, or in thought alone).  We can only claim, as the
geometer does here, that ‘Two right angles are exactly equal to all of the adjacent angles’ is
true because of the limits that intuition places upon the possible geometric construction of
triangles.  In this case, we extend a given figure through chains of inference, mapping its
determinate behaviour within the field of representation, and thus we expand our knowledge
of mathematics.
Now  Frege  agreed  that  the  discoveries  of  mathematics  represent  genuine  advances  in
knowledge; however, he disagreed that this knowledge requires such a realm of ‘intuition’.
Against Kant, Frege attempted to show that at least arithmetic, if not geometry, is indeed a
system of analytic a priori truths, but he had to do so in such a way that it might nonetheless
allow genuine progress to be made.  As he writes in the Foundations:
“Philosophical motives too have prompted me to enquires of this kind.  The answers to the questions
raised about the nature of arithmetical truths—are they a priori or a posterior? synthetic or analytic?
—must lie in the same direction.  For even though the concepts concerned may themselves belong to
philosophy, yet as I believe, no decision on these questions can be reached without assistance from
mathematics—though this depends of course on the sense in which we understand them.” (FA §3)
Like Kant’s ‘light air’, which allows for the flight of knowledge in its very resistance to
flight,  Frege too had to  devise  a sense of  aprioricity  that  would provide a  medium for
logico-mathematical progress.  However, for him, in order to be analytic this medium had to
be intrinsic to the very truths themselves and not a result of some external synthesis of the
truths and a pre-given space of representation according to which they are constrained, à la
Kant’s geometer.
Nonetheless, it is  interesting to note that on Frege’s account Kant had not been entirely
wrong in his understanding the analytic-synthetic distinction.  Indeed, Frege notes in a now
infamous footnote that his own use of the Kantian language of ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ was
not meant “to assign a new sense to these terms, but only to state more accurately what
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earlier writers, Kant in particular, have meant by them.” (FA §3, fn.1)  Kant had, Frege
claims, simply defined the scope of logic too narrowly.22  In other words, had Kant thought
about it more thoroughly, he would have naturally noticed his mistake:
“Kant obviously—as a result, no doubt, of defining them too narrowly—underestimated the value of
analytical judgements, though it seems that he did have some inkling of the wider sense in which I
have used the term.  On the basis of his definition, the division of judgements into analytic and
synthetic is not exhaustive.  What he is thinking of is the universal affirmative judgement; there, we
can speak of a subjective concept and ask—as his definition requires—whether the predicate concept
is contained in it or not [...] He seems to think of concepts as defined by giving a simple list of
characteristics in no special  order;  but  of  all  ways of forming concepts,  that  is  one of the least
fruitful.  If we look through the definitions given in the course of this book, we shall scarcely find
one that is of this description.  The same is true of the really fruitful definitions in mathematics, such
as that of the continuity of a function.  What we find in these is not a simple list of characteristics;
every element in the definition is  intimately,  I might almost  say organically,  connected with the
others.” (FA §88)
What Kant missed, Frege claims here, is the power of ‘fruitful definitions’ to give rise to
genuine advances in knowledge.  Fruitful definitions do not, he argues, only create a list of
22 MacFarlane  addresses  this  question,  pointing  out  how  their  conceptions  differ  in  various  ways—
specifically, how Frege’s conception of logic is more inclusive, and thus what appears to be ‘outside’ for
Kant becomes ‘inside’ for Frege in terms of the ‘resources of logic’: 
“[T]he resources Frege recognizes as logical far outstrip those of Kant’s logic (Aristotelian term logic
with  simple  theory  of  disjunctive  and  hypothetical  propositions  added  on).   The  most  dramatic
difference is that Frege’s logic allows us to define concepts using nested quantifiers, where Kant’s is
limited to representing inclusion relations.”  (J. MacFarlane, ‘Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism’,
Philosophical Review, 111(1), 2002, pp. 25–66.)  
While this is undoubtedly true, it is difficult not to refer here to the great differences between the two
figures in terms of the phenomena to which logic may be applied.  For example, Frege denies Kant’s
dictum (A51/B75) that “Without sensibility, no object would be given to us,” claiming that numbers are
genuine objects but “can’t be given in sensation.” (FA §89)  Frege’s view is that our understanding can
grasp such abstract objects if their definitions can be grounded in analytic propositions governing the
extension of concepts, which represents a significant difference in terms of what it is that allows logico-
mathematical statements to be true at all.
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properties in no particular order (such as Kant’s understanding of analytic truth, in which the
consequent  is  already  contained  in  the  antecedent  ‘in  no  particular  order’).   Rather,
establishing  logico-mathematical  definitions  that  extend  our  knowledge  requires  one  to
work  out  their  precise  logical  consequences  and  thus—where  those  definitions  are
‘fruitful’—gives rise to a series of new ideas over time that was not previously there.  In this
sense, for Frege, an analytic truth is one that is derivable from other truths through the
application of valid rules of inference which are themselves intimately interconnected to our
definitions,  but  are  not  complete  in  and  of  themselves.   When  we  establish  a  new
mathematical definition, we ‘graph’ it onto previously known logico-mathematical truths,
apply  the  rules  of  inference to  our  new series,  and so genuinely discover  what  is  now
contained in this new series that had not previously been given at all.23
Frege thus rejects what he takes to be the narrow Kantian conception of definition: “Kant
seems to think of a concept as defined by a conjunction of marks; but this is one of the least
fruitful ways of forming concepts.” (FA §88)  He continues to describe this insight regarding
the unity of the proposition as follows:
“A geometric illustration will make the distinction clear to intuition.  If we represent concepts (or
their  extensions)  by  figures  or  areas  in  a  plane,  then  the  concept  defined  by  a  simple  list  of
characteristics  corresponds  to  the  area  common  to  all  the  areas  representing  the  definition
characteristics; it  is  enclosed by segments of their  boundary lines.24  With a definition like this,
23 As G. Currie notes: “A statement like: ‘A number is the extension of a concept of the form equinumerate
with the concept F, for some F.’—when read from right to left, so to speak, offers an abbreviation of the
expression on the right.  In this sense Frege’s definitions are conservative; we will not be able to prove
anything about the extensions of concepts that we could not otherwise have proved.  But read from left to
right the definition offers an analysis of the term ‘number’; a term which already has a meaning (perhaps
an imprecise one) but which is now clarified.  It is with respect to this left  to right reading that the
question of fruitfulness arises.  The definition enables us to graft the informal concept of number on to a
theory (the theory of conceptual extensions) which has, from a philosophical  point of  view at least,
certain advantages over the informal arithmetical theory with which we are familiar.” (G. Currie, Frege:
An Introduction to his Philosophy (Sussex: Harvester, 1982), p. 153.)
24 To refer to our earlier example of a strictly analytic truth, in this case the ‘figure’ of the concept bachelor
would precisely overlap at every point that of unmarried man.
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therefore, what we do—in terms of our illustration—is to use the lines already given in a new way
for the purpose of demarcating an area.  Nothing essentially new, however, emerges in the process.
But  the  more  fruitful  type  of  definition  is  a  matter  of  drawing  boundary  lines  that  were  not
previously given at all.  What we shall be able to infer from it, cannot be inspected in advance; here
we are not simply taking out of the box what we have put into it.  The conclusions we draw from it
extend our knowledge, and are therefore, on Kant’s view, to be regarded as synthetic; and yet they
can be proved by purely logical means, and are thus analytic.  The truth is that they are contained in
the definitions, but as plants are contained in their seeds, not as beams are contained in a house.” (FA
§88) 
Frege concludes this lengthy passage with the remark: “Often we need several definitions
for the proof of some proposition, which consequently is not contained in any one of them
alone, and yet does follow purely logically from all of them together.” (ibid.)25
And this is, of course, exactly what Frege sets out to do in the  Basic Laws of Arithmetic,
published nine years after the Foundations  had been laid down.26  In this later work, the
Kantian vocabulary of ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ would be abandoned; nonetheless, Frege’s
emphasis on a genuinely productive analytical combination of definitions follows through
with the same immanency of natural necessity described earlier.  It is important to note,
however,  that  although these  definitions  “draw boundary  lines  that  were  not  previously
given all”—in other words, though they give rise to  new knowledge—Frege is extremely
cautious to delimit  the degree of  creative freedom exhibited there.   As in  the  reference
above, Frege once again claims that the definitions he is proposing in this later work do not
“create anything new” in and of themselves. (BA, p. 2)  Rather, they mark for him the limit
of logical regression, that point at which the propositions of logic and mathematics “are not
25 As  Beaney  notes,  this  passage  suggest  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  definitions:  “The  first  kind  are
genuinely  stipulative  definitions,  which  do  serve  as  abreviatory  devices,  and  which  generate
straightforwardly analytic judgements in Kant’s original sense […] The second kind are Frege’s ‘fruitful’
definitions, which start from a given proposition and yield not the concepts originally ‘thought into it’ but
new concepts.”  (M. Beaney, Frege: Making Sense (London: Duckworth, 1996), p. 129.
26 G. Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, ed. and trans. M. Furth (Berkley: University of California Press,
1964) [Hereafter, BA]
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derived from other propositions” (ibid.), and thus follow through with the natural order of
truth that guides pure logical inference:
“It is important that we make clear at this point what a definition is and what can be attained by
means of it.  It seems frequently to be credited with a creative power; but all it accomplishes is that
something is marked out in sharp relief and designated by a name.  Just as the geographer does not
create a sea when he draws a boundary line and says: the part of the ocean’s surface bounded by
these lines I am going to call the Yellow Sea, so too the mathematician cannot really create anything
by his defining.  Nor can one by pure definition magically conjure into a thing a property that in fact
it does not possess—save that of now being called by the name with which one has named it.” (BA,
p. 11)
Thus, Frege notes:
“I myself can estimate to some extent the resistance with which my innovations will be met, because
I had first to overcome something similar in myself in order to make them.  For I have not arrived at
them haphazardly or out of a craving for novelty, but was driven by  the very nature of the case.”
(BA, p. 7-8, my emphasis)
But we recall  here  that  the progress  Frege presumes that  his  Basic Laws of  Arithmetic
represent  is  founded  on  the  possibility  of  error  and  of  approaching  the  truth  only
approximately (such as that embodied in the errors of past philosophers and mathematicians,
or  Kant’s  ‘narrow understanding’ of  the  nature  of  analytic  truth).   In  the  Foundations,
therefore, it was essential for Frege to first propose an epistemologically robust account of
the history of mathematical error.
In this sense, one might justifiably claim that logico-mathematical fallibility rests at the core
of the logicist program—after all, it is this that allows one to separate good mathematics
from the bad.  Good logic and good mathematics (like good geography) delimit the concepts
required for establishing deductive truths that were not previously known; they nonetheless
avoid the faults of the ‘merely creative’ mathematicians―who conduct themselves “like a
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god, who can create by his mere word whatever he wants” (FA §109)—by being driven by
the very nature of the case.  In other words, good mathematics carves up the conceptual
world at its joints, so to speak.  It is in this sense that logic and mathematics can, for Frege,
provide  genuinely  progressive  knowledge  of  the  world  that  is  nonetheless  objective  in
character—like any other science.  And just as any other science admits approximation and
error without compromising its objectivity, so too do logic and mathematics.  
In the Foundations Frege poses the natural question, which was also the Kantian question:
“How do the empty forms of mathematics disgorge such a rich content?” (FA §16)  But he
proposes a distinctly un-Kantian answer:
“However  much we may disparage deduction,  it  cannot  be denied that  the  laws established by
induction are not enough.  New propositions must be derived from them which are not contained in
any one of them by itself.  No doubt these propositions are in a way contained covertly in the whole
set  taken together, but this  does not absolve us from the labour of actually extracting them and
setting them out in their own right.” (FA §17)
In Kant’s treatment of a mathematical proposition, an arithmetical judgement expands our
knowledge if it is supported by  something outside  of the proposition themselves.  So too
with Frege, but the appeal to intuition drops away when a priori arithmetical judgements are
taken together as a set.  As Tappenden notes: “The additional content plays the role of the
‘something  extra’ represented  by  intuition  in  Kant’s  schema.”27  For  Frege,  a  logical
inference expands our knowledge analytically if that ‘something outside’ the given logico-
mathematical  proposition  is  another logico-mathematical  proposition.28  In  this  way,
27 J. Tappenden, “Extending Knowledge and ‘Fruitful Concepts’: Fregean Themes in the Foundations of
Mathematics.”  Nous, 29(4), 1995, pp. 427-467.
28 This does not mean, however, that it is ‘turtles all the way down’ for Frege, for at the foundation of this
chain of logico-mathematical propositions are elucidations.  As Beaney notes: “Since not everything can
be defined, we must rely on something else—elucidation—to explain the meaning of the most basic
terms of all.  Since there is always the risk of misunderstanding in attempts at elucidation, Frege writes,
‘we have to be able to count on a meeting of minds, on others’ guessing what we have in mind’.  But
Frege goes on, ‘all this precedes the construction of a system and does not belong within a system’”
(“Frege and the Role of Historical Elucidation,” op. cit., p. 53.)  
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inference  yields  progressive  knowledge  if  a  concept  attained  by  carving  up  conceptual
reality is capable of being grafted onto another concept and ‘bearing fruit’, as it were.
It is tempting to view the idea of progress that Frege outlines here in a psychologistic way,
in other words, as a case of simply overcoming the psychological limitations of beings who
think  like  we  do—i.e.  imperfectly.   On  this  account  an  omnipotent  mind  would  know
without further ado  all of the consequences of the complete and eternally true set of all
logico-mathematical propositions.  An omnipotent mind would be absolved of the ‘labour’
of extracting from them their ‘covert’ truth.  However, this is clearly not what Frege meant.
Rather, this idea of logico-mathematical progress is one in which “natural order of truths”
(FA §23) is allowed to blossom by its own necessity, in thought itself.  Attaining the correct
concepts, establishing fruitful definitions and extracting from them their consequences via
the  valid  application  of  logical  inference,  does  not  therefore  reflect  a  mere  human
compulsion.  Rather, thought provides a soil in which concepts grow according to an inner
necessity all their own, which is discovered only through working out the problem itself.  In
this sense the objective ground of progressive knowledge in mathematics is found in the
logical structure of conceptual continuity, which remains in essence the same, though we
proceed to represent conceptual content in fruitfully diverse ways.
Of  course,  despite  these  philosophical  accoutrements,  Frege’s  project  ultimately  failed.
Naturally, he did not believe it was possible for there to have been an error in his system at
the time—having split his basic laws into logically simple steps to make it a matter of ‘pure
logic’—but  it  is  surely  one  of  the  great  ironies  of  the  history  of  philosophy  that  the
introduction  to  Frege’s  Basic  Laws  fatefully  leaves  open  the  very  possibility  that  was
ultimately the downfall of his logicist ambitions.  Specifically, Frege admits the possibility
that his now infamous Axiom V (wherein his notion of ‘value-ranges’ or ‘course-of-values’
are introduced) is defective.  He writes there:
“Because  there  are  no  gaps  in  the  chains  of  inference,  every  ‘axiom’,  every  ‘assumption’,
‘hypothesis’, or whatever you wish to call it, upon which a proof is based is brought to light; and in
44
this way we gain a basis upon which to judge the epistemological nature of the law that is proved.
Of course the pronouncement is often made that arithmetic is merely a more highly developed logic;
yet that remains disputable so long as transitions occur in the proofs that are not made according to
acknowledged laws of logic, but seem rather to be based upon something known by intuition.  Only
if these transitions are split up into logically simple steps can we be persuaded that the root of the
matter is logic alone.  I have drawn together everything that can facilitate a judgement as to whether
the chains of inference are cohesive and the buttress solid.  If anyone should find anything defective,
he must be able to state precisely where, according to him, the error lies: in the Basic Laws, in the
Definitions, in the Rules [of inference], or in the application of the Rules at a definite point.  If we
find  everything  in  order,  then  we  have  accurate  knowledge  of  the  grounds  upon  which  each
individual theorem is based.  A dispute can arise, so far as I can see, only with regard to my Basic
Law concerning course-of-values (V), which logicians have not yet expressly enunciated, and yet
this is what people have in mind, for example, where they speak of the extensions of concepts.  I
hold that it is a law of pure logic.  In any event the place is pointed out where the decision must be
made.” (BA, p. 3-4)29
Indeed, Russell’s discovery of the paradox at the heart of Axiom V would seem to vindicate
this cautious declaration; and Frege’s reaction to Russell’s announcement makes an honest
reference to his initial doubt (although he had not yet denied his conviction that at least
something like his Axiom V would nonetheless have to play a role in ultimately determining
the logical foundations of arithmetic).  In the appendix to Volume II of the Basic Laws,
written hastily after Russell had informed him of his discovery while the book was already
in print, Frege notes: “Hardly anything more unfortunate can befall a scientific writer than
to  have  one  of  the  foundations  of  his  edifice  shaken  after  the  work  is  finished.”   He
continues: 
29 In this sense, it is worth noting that Frege had been singularly good to his word, having declared earlier
in the text: “The ideal of a strictly scientific method in mathematics, which I have here attempted to
realize, and which might indeed be named after Euclid, I should like to describe as follows.  It cannot be
demanded that everything be proved, because that is impossible; but we can require that all propositions
used without proof be expressly declared as such, so that we can see distinctly what the whole structure
rests upon.” (BA, p. 2, my emphasis)
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“This was just the position I was placed in by a letter of Mr. Bertrand Russell, just when the printing
of this volume was nearing completion.  It is a matter of my Axiom (V).  I have never disguised from
myself  its  lack of the self-evidence that  belongs to the other axioms and that  must  properly be
demanded of a logical law.  And so in fact I indicated this weak point in the Preface to Volume I.  I
should gladly have dispensed with this foundation if I had known of any substitute for it.  And even
now I do not see how arithmetic can be scientifically established; how numbers can be apprehended
as logical objects, and brought under review; unless we are permitted—at least conditionally—to
pass from a concept to its extension.” 30
The details concerning the content of Axiom V need not concern us too greatly here.  For
our  present  purposes,  what  is  most  noteworthy about  these  two passages  is  how Frege
initially describes his Axiom V as ‘pure logic’ (a self-evident a priori truth for which no
proof can be given and for which no proof is needed) only to admit in the face of his error
that it had always lacked the self-evidence “that must properly be demanded of a logical
law.”  How, in light of Frege’s claims regarding self-evidence and the infallibility of genuine
a priori  principles  of  logic,  are  we  to  make  sense  of  the  possibility  of  error  here  and,
moreover, of Frege’s initial admission that he too may very well have been mistaken  all
along?  
First of all, it is important to note that Frege does not appear to use the term ‘self-evident’ in
a technically precise way.  The fact that he seems to have resisted using a single term to
perform this function—at different times he employs terms as varied as selbstverständlich,
einleuchtend, evident,  and  unmittelbar klar—would suggest that he is distancing himself
from  the  same  ultra-authoritative  claims  of  ‘self-evidence’ appealed  to  by  some  arch-
rationalists in a similar context (even perhaps by Russell).31  Nonetheless, it is clear that his
use  of  such terms  is  meant  to  gesture  towards  another  notion  that  was  for  him highly
technical and absolutely central to his program.  For Frege, there are two senses in which
30 G. Frege, Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Vol. II, in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.), trans. P. Geach, Translations
from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966), p. 234.
31 Cf. T. Burge, “Frege on Knowing the Foundations,” op cit. p. 335, for further discussion.
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truth manifests itself: the one that is experienced by a subjective knower and the other that is
an objective feature of things (known or unknown).  We keep these two cases distinct, Frege
argues, by maintaining a strict division between the realm of psychology (or the taking-for-
true) on the one hand and the realm of logic (the True) on the other.  
This response to the problem of personal fallibility did not arise solely as a consequence of
the  contradiction  that  Russell  discovered  in  his  Basic  Laws;  rather,  his  concern  for
distinguishing the fallible truths of personal psychology and the infallible truths of logic
motivated his endeavour from the very start.  Frege clearly recognized that the possibility of
realising his program depended on a separation of these two realms.  Thus, in both of the
introductions to his two major works, the  Foundations and the  Basic Laws, he launches a
staunch attack  against  what  he  considered  the  absurdity  of  ‘psychological  logic’.   This
attack follows the de-transcendentalisation of Kantian idealism that was widespread in 19th
century German philosophy, a strain of psychologism which sought to remove logic from
the transcendental sphere of pure reason and return it to the immanent anthropological basis
of particular individuals acting in concrete psycho-social contexts.  Two striking passages
from the German logician B. Erdmann (whom Frege attacks specifically and at length in his
introduction to the Basic Laws as a prototypical ‘psychological logician’), clearly outline the
character of this conception of logic:
“[L]ogical laws only hold within the limits of our thinking, without our being able to guarantee that
this thinking might not alter its character.  For it is possible that such a transformation should occur,
whether affecting all or only some of these laws, since they are not analytically derivable from one
of  them.   It  is  irrelevant  that  this  possibility  is  unsupported  by  the  deliverances  of  our  self-
consciousness  regarding  our  thinking.   Though  nothing  presages  its  actualization,  it  remains  a
possibility.  We can only take our thought as it now is, and are not in a position to fetter its future
character to its present one.”32
32 B. Erdmann,  Logik, trans. and quoted in E. Husserl,  Logical Investigations, Vol. I, trans. J.N. Findlay
(Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1970), p. 162 
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Erdmann here views the so-called necessities of logic sub specie humanitatis, immanent to a
very  particular  and historically-situated human nature,  which because it  is  not  eternally
transcendent is subject (like other kinds of thought) to the possibility of radical change.
This is the case, Erdmann claims, regardless of our inability to properly conceive of what
those changes might be—for  that inability too is merely the result of historical, and thus
accidental, determinations in the character of our thought at a given time:
“[W]e cannot help admitting that all the propositions whose contradictories we cannot envisage in
thought are only necessary if we presuppose the character of our thought, as definitely given in our
experience: they are not absolutely necessary in all possible conditions.  On this view our logical
principles retain their necessity for our thinking, but this necessity  is not seen as absolute,  but as
hypothetical.  We cannot help assenting to them—such is the nature of our presentation and thinking.
They are universally valid, provided our thinking remains the same.  They are necessary, since to
think  means  for  us  to  presuppose  them,  as  long,  that  is,  as  they  express  the  essence  of  our
thinking.”33
While  Frege  also  sought  to  remove  logic  from  the  transcendental  sphere  of  Kantian
idealism, he resisted temporalising—and thus, in his view, relativising—that logic within
the sphere of human praxis, as Erdmann does here.  In Frege’s vocabulary, Erdmann would
thus  seek  to  reduce  the  universal  truths of  logic  to  the  particular  takings-for-true of
psychology.  
In  a  moment  of  poetic  lucidity—a  stylistic  feature  that  he  employs  with  surprising
consistency when he attacks his psychologistic opponents—Frege expresses the idea thus:
“I understand by ‘laws of logic’ not psychological laws of takings-to-be-true, but laws of truth.  If it
is true that I am writing this in my chamber on the 13th of July, 1893, while the wind howls out-of-
doors, then it remains true even if all men should subsequently take it to be false.  If being true is
independent  of  being  acknowledged  by  somebody  or  other,  then  the  laws  of  truth  are  not
psychological laws: they are boundary stones set in an eternal foundation, which our thoughts can
33 Ibid.
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overflow, but never displace.  It is because of this that they have authority for our thought if it would
attain truth.  They do not bear the relation to thought that the laws of grammar bear to language; they
do not make explicit the nature of our human thinking and change as it changes.” (BA, p.13)
Thus, to claim that the primitive principles of logic are self-evidently true, is not to claim
that  we ourselves are unable be mistaken in supposing them.  By extension, to situate a
thinker  among a community  of  fallible  human beings  is  not  to  reduce the  truth of  any
particular thought to the participation of that person among a community of like-minded and
similarly fallible people.  Regardless of how great or wide-spread that community is, the
truth—unlike knowledge—is set in an eternal foundation that the ebb and flow of mortal
opinion will never succeed in displacing.  It matters not for Frege whether one person is
mistaken (at the level of the individual), many people (at the level of the cultural collective)
or all of us (‘human thinking’ as a whole).  If the science of logic is to be a science at all, the
laws of logic must invariably prescribe the way in which one ought to think about truth, and
they can do so precisely  because they are immune to our sometimes meandering minds.
Logic,  Frege insists,  is  concerned with truth,  as  ethics  is  concerned with goodness  and
aesthetics with beauty.  Such objective principles exist wholly independently of how human
beings  think.   We  need  not act  in  accordance  with  them  (just  as  we  need  not  act  in
accordance with moral or aesthetic laws) but we should if we are seriously concerned with
attaining truth rather than the takings-for-true of mere psychology.34
From this it is not difficult to see the role of the history of logico-mathematical investigation
plays in Frege’s work.  The practice of logic has a history, and it is historical still.  But it can
only be so because there is an objective truth that exists independently of that practice to
which it aspires.  The flux of history—like the changing patterns of individuals’ personal
34 E.g., “Just as ‘beautiful’ points the ways for aesthetics and ‘good’ for ethics, so do words like ‘true’ for
logic.  All sciences have truth as their goal; but logic is also concerned with it in a quite different way:
logic has much the same relation to truth as physics has to weight or heat.  To discover truths as truths is
the task of all sciences; it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth. [...] From the laws of truth their
follow prescriptions about asserting, thinking, judging, inferring.” (G. Frege, “Logical Investigations,
Part I: Thoughts,” p. 351, in G. Frege Collected Papers,  ed. B. McGuinness, trans. P. Geach and R.H.
Stootfoff (London: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 351-372.)
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psychology—must not be confused with the stable universality of genuinely a priori truths.
Individual  takings-for-true  must not be confused with  the True,  no matter how ancient or
how deeply ingrained they may appear to be.  And that  they may be ancient or deeply
ingrained holds no authority in the absence of proof.  
This does not mean for him that there is nothing interesting to learn from the history of
mathematics.  There is, as the  Foundations  clearly demonstrates; however, this history—
insofar  as  it  is history—can only ever  be  the history of error.   What  is  true a  priori is
eternally so and therefore, strictly speaking, can have no history.  If new proof is demanded
for a basic laws that formerly passed as self-evident and its status as truth is thereby thrown
into doubt—for example, Frege notes that even Euclid’s standard of rigour was not always
satisfying to geometers,  and out of this  critical  treatment of the axiom of parallels new
developments in modern geometry arose (FA §2)—we can only conclude that it was not an a
priori truth to begin with, but rather a taking-for-true of our fallible personal psychology.35
“Thought is in essentials the same everywhere,” he writes,  “it  is not true that there are
different kinds of laws of thought to suit the different kinds of objects thought about.” (FA,
p. iii)  As the laws of thought hold for everyone everywhere, whether or not one abides by
35 It is interesting to note in this regard, concerning H. Sluga’s criticisms of analytic philosophy for failing
to adequately take account of its  historical  development,  that  insofar as analytic philosophy may be
considered a  Fregean  philosophy,  this  a-historicism  is  not  a  failing but  rather  a  condition of  its
realization.  As Sluga notes: 
“The complimentary tendency, that of underestimating the distance that separates the later tradition [of
analytic philosophy] from its beginnings, can equally be illustrated in the case of Frege.  Its effect is
also  that  of  blocking  real  historical  understanding.   Thus,  it  is  taken  for  granted  that  Frege  was
concerned with ontological questions just as the subsequent analytic tradition has been.  It is assumed
that he was interested in setting up a semantic theory just as logicians have done since Tarski, that,
indeed, model-theoretical semantics begins with Frege.  His considerations about truth as an object are
dismissed as mere scholasticism.  His rejection of logicism after the discovery of Russell’s paradoxes
is considered an overreaction; his objections to Cantorian sets are explained as a result of personal
hostility.  Wherever Frege’s views can be made to fit the current discussion, they are simply identified
with it; where they cannot be made to fit, they are either ignored or explained away in psychological
terms.” (H. Sluga, Gottlob Frege (Routledge: London and New York, 1980), p. 6, my emphasis)  
Here we see a precise analogue with Frege’s own attitude towards history: that the history of philosophy
(insofar as it is history) can only be the history of an error, and what is true is eternally so (and thus a-
historical).
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them, they also hold every-when.  There are not different laws of thought to suit different
times.  
It is no coincidence that Frege devotes the entire first half of his Foundations (and several
significant parts of the Basic Laws) to outlining the history of what previously passed for an
answer to the question What are numbers?  Frege turns to history here in order to motivate
his project, for it will not suffice for him to merely stipulate the meaning of terms such as
‘analytic’, ‘definition’, ‘inference’, etc., and continue from there.  If his analysis is going to
be  critical—and he  needs  it  to  be  critical,  for  indeed his  aim is  to  make  a  significant
contribution  to  the  traditional debate—it  must  also  be  historical.   This  historical
investigation only serves, however, as an elucidatory preparation for further researches into
the genuine a priori foundations and on Frege’s account it “should not usurp their place.”
(FA, p. viii)  This would be, Frege argues, to succumb to the ‘genetic fallacy’ (i.e., to seek
the foundation of an idea in its historical origin) and be tantamount to espousing a form of
relativism.  As he states:
“It may, of course, serve some purpose to investigate ideas and changes of ideas which occur during
the  course  of  mathematical  thinking;  but  psychology should  not  imagine  that  it  can  contribute
whatever to the foundation of arithmetic. [...] The historical approach, with its aim of detecting how
things begin and of arriving from these origins at a knowledge of their nature, is certainly perfectly
legitimate;  but  it  also  has  its  limitations.   If  everything  were  in  continual  flux,  and  nothing
maintained itself fixed for all  time, there would no longer be any possibility of getting to know
anything about the world and everything would be plunged in confusion.  We suppose, it would
seem, that concepts sprout in the individual mind like leaves on a tree, and we think we discover
their nature by studying their birth: we seek to define them psychologically, in terms of the nature of
the human mind.  But this account makes everything subjective and if we follow it through to the
end, does away with truth.  What we know as the history of concepts is really a history of either our
knowledge of concepts or the meaning of words.” (FA, p. vi-vii)
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Subjectively, we may thus indeed mistakenly suppose a logical principle to be self-evidently
true and so not accord with the truth.  Evidently, there is no contradiction in someone’s
taking something for a self-evident a priori truth that is in fact neither self-evident nor true a
priori.  As in the case of all other forms of scientific inquiry, we need only demand further
proof to satisfy ourselves of our position, and if we are not thereby satisfied, then we simply
need to change it.  
However, according to Frege, there is a contradiction involved in something itself formerly
being true.  It is, for example, one thing to claim that one’s past assertions do not accord
with the truth, but it is quite another thing to claim that the truth does not accord with itself.
“If other persons presume to acknowledge and doubt a law in the same breath,” Frege notes,
“it seems to me an attempt to jump out of one’s own skin, against which I can do no more
than  urgently  warn  them.”  (BA,  p.  15)   This  would  be  “a  hitherto  unknown  type  of
madness.” (BA, p. 14)   And this is in fact what historicism (of the psychologistic kind that
Frege here identifies it  with via the genetic fallacy) would espouse.   The psychological
logician, such as Erdmann, who would seek the true content of a mathematical thought in
the history of individuals’ judgements and thus claim that it  is possible (no matter how
incomprehensible) at one time for two plus three to equal five and at another to equal six,
has by this  account failed to make the necessary distinction between the content of  the
proposition and its judgement.  As Frege notes:
“All determinations of the place, the time, and the like, belong to the thought whose truth is in point;
its truth itself is independent of place and time.  How, then, is the Principle of Identity really to be
read?  Like this, for instance: “It is impossible for people in the year 1893 to acknowledge an object
as being different from itself”?  Or like this: “Every object is identical with itself”?  The former law
concerns human beings and contains a temporal reference; in the latter there is no talk either of
human beings or of time.  The latter is a law of truth, the former a law of people’s taking-to-be-true.”
(BA, p. 15)36
36 In this sense, though Russell does not explicitly speak about the consequences of historicism for logic-
mathematical fallibility, we can see a certain accord between his views and those of Frege.  As Beerling
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To claim that the proposition ‘It is impossible for people in the year 1893 to acknowledge
an object as being different from itself ’ is true, is therefore to make a reference to something
known about people in the year 1893 and not about the Principle of Identity.  To claim that
‘Every  object  is  identical  with  itself  ’ is,  on  the  other  hand,  to  make  an  abstract—and
therefore a-historical—claim.37
Self-evidence is by this account not a feature of the a priori primitive principles of logic, but
of their justification (FA, §3).  To claim that a truth is self-evident in this sense is only to
notes: 
“Russell places everything in ‘knowledge by description’ with which I—through external or internal
observation—am directly acquainted.  [...]  Thereto belong the data of memory as the source of all
knowledge about the past.  I am immediately familiar, though, with the data of my own past only.  The
past of others or, to put it more generally ‘the past as such’ is a matter of inference to me.  So my
knowledge thereof falls under the head of what Russell would call ‘knowledge by description.’  By the
latter he means ‘any phrase of the sort,’ ‘a so-and-so’ or ‘the so and so’.  The final difference from
phrases of a strictly logical quality is this, that the latter need not contain any reference to ‘actual
particulars’  and  can  be  composed  completely  of  abstract  terms.”  (R.F.  Beerling,  “Russell  and
Historical Truth,” p. 386-7. Kant-studien, 55(4), 1964, p. 385-393.)  
Thus, according to Russell, for sentences referring to history it is required that they contain at least one
reference to something with which we are directly acquainted: in this case, the person, time or place in
which (or by whom) it is believed that two plus three equals six.
37 The  error  of  the  genetic  fallacy  follows,  Frege  argues,  from  failing  to  distinguish  between  two
propositions that share a similar external form but contain objectively independent content.  Here we see
the  necessity  of  an  adequate  logical  notation  for  Frege,  and  how in  his  logical  notation  he  draws
“together everything that can facilitate a judgement” (BA, p. 4) in order to resolve this difficulty.  This
feature is embodied in Frege’s notation by way of the “content stroke” (“⎯⎯”) and “judgement stroke”
(“|⎯⎯ ”, Russell’s “assertion sign”).  In Frege’s Begriffsschrift this stroke separates the meaning of the
proposition (the possible content) from its assertion  as true  (the judgement):  “Through this mode of
notation I mean to have a very clear distinction between the act of judging and the formation of a mere
assertible content.” (G. Frege, “Conceptual Notation,” p. 94.  In G. Frege,  Conceptual Notation and
Other Articles, ed. and trans. T. W. Bynum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972))
In this sense the proposition ‘2+3=5’ is not to be read as a declaration of the fact that two plus two equals
five but as the content of the thought to be judged (something we might describe as “two plus three’s
equalling five”, transcribed ‘⎯⎯2+3=5’ in the Begriffsschrift), ultimately as true in this case.  Likewise,
transcribing the affirmation of this thought in Frege’s notion, one would would write: ‘ |⎯⎯ 2+3=5’.  In
this case, the thought “two plus three’s equalling five” denotes “the True.”  We might also write ‘2+3=6’,
to refer to the possible content of a judgement (“two plus three’s equally six,”or ‘⎯⎯2+3=6’)—as Frege
notes, “without being guilty of writing a falsehood,” for the thought has a sense when taken as a whole—
but this could not be truthfully asserted and so would denote “the False”; in Frege’s notation:  ‘ |⎯¬
2+3=6’, where the sign ‘⎯¬’ functions as the “negation stroke.”
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claim that we recognise its truth—in judging that it is true—independently of other truths
(including the truth of one’s own acknowledgement of its truth).  The primitive principles of
logic are not in need of any proof.  They are ‘unprovable’ in the sense that they are not
justifiable by derivation.  In this sense, not only is there no contradiction between asserting
that  Frege  took  his  Axiom V to  be  a  matter  of  pure  logic  when  it  was  not,  the  very
possibility of such personal fallibility is in fact inherent to Frege’s project.  For to disregard
this possibility would be to grant the psychological logician the first step—that the True
may be reduced to the taking-for-true—and consequently sound the death-knell of truth,
objectivity  and the very logical  foundation of the science of  logic that  Frege sought  to
establish.   If  Frege begins his  Foundations  with an extensive account of  what previous
thinkers have mistakenly taken number for (i.e. the ‘impure’ psychological truths of history)
before he proceeds to give an account of what numbers are (pure, a-historical, logical truth),
he does so in order to demonstrate that it is this very capacity for error which preserves the
possibility of genuine logico-mathematical progress—such as that Frege believed his work
represented—towards an objective truth that is in itself eternal and unmoving.
Attempting, therefore, to bring the psychological logician to a reductio ad absurdum, Frege
writes:
“When will a stop be put to this?  In the end everything is drawn into the sphere of psychology; the
boundary that separates the objective and subjective fades away more and more, and even actual
objects themselves are treated psychologically, as ideas.  For what else is actual but a predicate? and
what else are logical predicates but ideas?  Thus everything drifts into idealism and from that point
with perfect consistency into solipsism.  If every man designated something different by the name
The fact that Frege used this element of the concept script to investigate past mathematical practice
—“without being guilty of writing a falsehood”, as he states—provides an interesting counterpoint to
Wittgenstein’s own treatment of the ability of a proposition to relate to a speaker: “Frege’s ‘judgement
stroke’ is logically quite meaningless: in the works of Frege (and Russell) it simply indicates that these
authors hold the propositions marked with this sign to be true.  Thus, [the judgement stroke] is not more
a component part of a proposition than is, for instance, the proposition’s number.  It is quite impossible
for a proposition to state that it itself is true.” (T 4.442)  And further: “The correct explanation of the
form of the proposition ‘A makes the judgement p’, must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be
a piece of nonsense. // (Russell’s theory foes not satisfy this requirement.)” (T 5.5422)
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‘moon’, namely one of his own ideas, much as he expresses his own pain by the cry ‘Ouch’, then of
course the psychological point of view would be justified; but an argument about the properties of
the moon would be pointless: one person could perfectly well assert of his moon the opposite of
what the other person, with equal right, said of his.  If we could not grasp anything, but what was
within  our  own selves,  then  a  conflict  of  opinions  [based  on]  mutual  understanding  would  be
impossible, because a common ground would be lacking, and no idea in the psychological sense can
afford us such ground.  There would be no logic to be appointed arbiter in the conflict of opinions.”
(BA, p. 17)
There  are  a  number  of  points  at  which  the  die-hard  psychologistic  logician  might  find
Frege’s account of the paradox of relativism to be unsatisfying here.  Frege himself admits
at the end of his introduction to the Basic Laws that: “The distance between my view and
the psychological logicians’ seems to me so enormous that there is no prospect of my book’s
having any effect on them at present.” (BA, p. 25)  But whether Frege’s staunch logical
realism will successfully persuade the relativists (who Frege here calls the ‘idealist’38) to
give up their erroneous ways is ultimately beside the point.
For as we have seen, Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of proposing a body of substantial
self-evident  truths  of  logic  such as  that  which  Frege  and Russell’s  system relied upon.
Wittgenstein  rejects  the  very  objective  status  of  a  priori  truth  that  allows  error,
approximation  and—finally,  by  Frege  and  Russell’s  account—the  serial  attainment  of
logico-mathematical truth.  In a word, Wittgenstein rejects logico-mathematical progress.
38 This characterisation of  idealism as psychologism is  featured in  Sluga’s critique of  Dummett,  as  an
historical misrepresentation; however, I agree with Dummett’s defence of the equation: “In associating
psychologism with a species of idealism, and in describing it as dominant, I may have been in error; but,
if so, it was an error shared by Frege.  In the Basic Laws, he speaks of the school of logicians of whom
he takes Erdmann as a representative example as ‘the dominant logic’, and immediately says that it is
‘infected through and through with psychology’ (BL, p. xiv).  Later he says that, on Erdmann’s view,
‘everything drifts into idealism’ (BL, p. xix), and, of Erdmann himself, that ‘he is therefore an idealist’
(BL, p. xxi), and goes straight on to argue against idealists.  Perhaps it can be argued that the historical
picture I gave is wrong: but, if so, no one would likely be led into misinterpreting Frege by adopting it,
since it was a picture held by Frege himself” (M. Dummett, “Frege as Realist,” p. 80. In M. Dummett,
Frege and Other Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 79-96). 
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Where Frege claims that the science of logic demands that we regard the necessity of true
logical principles as decisive and build up our system from there, Wittgenstein denies that
there is such as  science of logic  at all.   He nonetheless upholds the claim that a logical
framework for language can and must be found in order to trace the limits of the acceptable
expression of thought (a condition which philosophy, in his view, typically fails to meet).
More to the point then, is the following question: Can Wittgenstein, while refusing to assert
the  substantial  truth  of  logical  principles,  avoid  falling  into  the  vicious  circle  of
psychologistic—or  cultural-historic—relativism that  Frege  describes  here  as  the  natural
outcome of such a refusal?
III. “A Necessarily Momentous Event”
Wittgenstein was dissatisfied with the notion of self-evidence that Frege and Russell viewed
as the ground for putting forth a priori truths.  It is a dissatisfaction that is expressed in the
opening remark of the Notebooks: “Logic must take care of itself.” (NB, p. 2)  Logic must
take care of itself because self-evidence will not do the trick, so to speak.  “If the truth of a
proposition does not follow from the fact that it is self-evident to us,” Wittgenstein notes in
a  remark  the  clearly  points  towards  Frege’s  position  concerning  the  fallibility  of  self-
evidence, “then its self-evidence in no way justifies our belief in its truth.” (T 5.1363)  But
what then are we to make of Frege’s case for logico-mathematical fallibilism?
For  Wittgenstein,  logic  is  not  a  body  of  true  propositions  of  which  it  is  the  job  of
philosophers to assert, regardless of whether they do so correctly or not.  As Wittgenstein
notes at the end of the  Tractatus: “The correct method of philosophy would really be the
following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural sciences,
i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy.” (T 6.53)  Unlike the natural sciences,
there is no room for error in logic because language itself prevents any mistake here.  A
‘logical error’ is by this account not an  errant logic—as there may be an errant science,
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backed by thoughts about the world that  are taken for true but fail  to hold upon closer
examination—but simply no logic at all.
We  recall  that  for  Frege  and  Russell  the  grounds  for  attributing  a  priori status  to  a
proposition  rests  either  on  the  fact  that  the  proposition  stands  in  no  need  of  further
justification (self-evidently true) or in the fact that it may be deduced from a set of more
fundamental a priori propositions taken together as a set (as a matter of pure logic).  Now,
an interesting question we might pose here concerns the number of ‘self-evident principles’
we need in order for  the  analysis  of  non-self-evident theorems (such as those found in
mathematics) to proceed.  Though their respective account of exactly how many ‘logical
constants’ are necessary, it is nonetheless upon the foundation of this genuinely achievable
enumeration that Frege would propose his five fundamental axioms in the Basic Laws, and
that Russell would claim:
“Symbolic  Logic  is  essentially  concerned  with  inference  in  general,  and  is  distinguished  from
various special  branches of mathematics mainly by its  generality [...]  What symbolic logic does
investigate [are] the rules by which inferences are made, and it requires a classification of relations
or  propositions  only  insofar  as  these  general  rules  introduce  particular  notions.   The  particular
notions which appear in the propositions of symbolic logic, and all others are definable in terms of
these notions, are the logic constants.  The number of indefinable logical constants is not great: it
appears, in fact, to be eight or nine.”39
For Wittgenstein logic is not distinguished by its generality.  Logic for him is not concerned
with  what  is  true  for  all things (or  even  for  a  highly  general  class  of  things,  such  as
numbers) but rather with that which makes it possible for a proposition to be true at all.  “In
order for a proposition to be true,” Wittgenstein writes early on in the Notebooks, “it must
first and foremost be capable of truth, and this is all that concerns logic.” (NB, p. 20)
Our question—whether Wittgenstein can avoid succumbing to the relativism with which
Frege  had indicted  the  psychological  logicians,  as  a  result  of  denying the  existence  of
39 B. Russell, Principles of Mathematics (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1903), §12.
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abstract  and  a-temporal  conceptual  entities  and  thus  relativising  logic  to  the  sphere  of
human  praxis—might therefore be better framed if  we take a step back and look at the
Tractatus as a whole and the view of philosophy that is outlined there.  We recall that it was
Alfred North Whitehead who famously claimed that philosophy is best summarized as a
footnote to Plato.  In a comical quip,  one of Wittgenstein’s student would later add “until
Wittgenstein.”40  Indeed,  it  has often been claimed that  in Wittgenstein’s  philosophy we
witness a radical departure from the more or less Platonic foundations of his predecessors
regarding the status of the logical foundations of mathematics.41  It is a rupture that involves
Wittgenstein’s rejection of both sides of the realist coin in logicism: the naturalised sense of
logical propositions and the direct reference of logical constants.42  In realist fashion, Russell
40 Quoted in D. Edmonds and J. Eidinow, Wittgenstein’s Poker (London: Faber and Faber, 2001), p. 9.
41 David  Pears  has  argued  that  one  way  to  characterise  the  difference  between  the  Tractatus  and
Philosophical  Investigations  is  in  fact  precisely  as  a  dispute  between  a  form  of  Platonism  in  the
Tractatus and anti-Platonism in  Philosophical Investigations (D. Pears,  The False Prison,  vol. 1 & 2
(Oxford,  Oxford  University  Press,  1987  &  1988).   I  agree,  however,  with  Carruthers’ claim  that
Wittgenstein’s ‘realism’ in the Tractatus concerning simple objects should not be construed as a form of
Platonism: 
“[T]he early Wittgenstein was equally opposed to Platonism, whether about propositions or universals,
or about numbers.  It is true that TLP is committed to the existence of a class of necessarily existing
objects, but this is not Platonism as it is usually understood [...] because they do not constitute a realm
of entities in contrast to the empirical world, but rather form its substance (2.021).” (P. Carruthers, The
Metaphysics of the Tractatus (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 161.)
42 There has, of course, been quite a lot of debate over the question of whether Frege himself really should
be considered a Platonist or not, notably in the exchange between H. Sluga and M. Dummett.  Against
Dummett’s Platonist interpretation of Frege’s doctrines, Sluga notes, for example: “In calling Frege a
realist, Dummett has laid much stress on the supposed ontological implications of Frege’s doctrines”
(“Frege as Rationalist,” p. 29, in ed. M. Schirn, Studies on Frege, (Stuttgart: Problemata, 1976), pp. 27-
47) and “Frege’s theory of the objectivity of numbers, value-ranges, functions etc., was never intended as
an ontological theory.” (ibid., p. 29)  Sluga goes on to explain that for Frege, “ideal objects are not real,
but merely possess validity.” (ibid.)  Hence, they are to be conceived logically and not ontologically.
However, I agree with Dummett’s justification and take Frege to be a Platonic realist  in at least the
following minimal sense: 
“The word used by Frege, and here translated as ‘real’ by Sluga, is ‘wirklich ’, translated ‘actual’ by
Austin and Fruth; Frege expressly associates Wirklichkeit  with Wirkung (being actual with acting on
things).  Abstract objects are not, for Frege, wirklich (they have no causal effects): for all that, they are
just as objective as concrete ones, and exist in just as great independence of our thinking about them.”
(M. Dummett, “Frege as Realist,” op. cit., p. 81.)
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and  Frege  felt  their  work  represented  a  genuine  advance  in  the  history  of  logico-
mathematical development because it  aimed towards attaining (and ideally  would attain)
knowledge of independently existing a priori truths.  But then to what degree can one claim
that the philosophy of Wittgenstein, which rejects the objective status of logic, nonetheless
embodies a similar event in the history of thought—a revolution, as it were?
There are two ways in which this  question might  be posed from the perspective of the
Tractatus, one biographical and one philosophical.  However, the answer is negative on both
counts.  On the one hand, Wittgenstein was sceptical of his own ability to express what he
felt was necessary in order to realize his task:
“If this work has any value, it consists in two things: the first is that thoughts are expressed in it, and
on this score the better the thoughts are expressed—the more the nail has been hit on the head—the
greater will be its value.—Here I am conscious of having fallen a long way short of what is possible.
Simply because my powers are too slight for the accomplishment of the task.—May others come and
do it better.” (T, p. 4) 
On the other hand, setting aside Wittgenstein’s own doubts about his personal adequacy to
meet the task set before him, there is also reason to believe that the work could never be
considered progressive in any case.  There is reason to believe that it could never achieve
anything  in  principle, regardless  of  how  well  the  thoughts  in  it  are  expressed  (by
Wittgenstein, or by his successors).  Thus, Wittgenstein continues: 
“On the other hand, the truth of the thoughts that are here contained seems to me unassailable and
definitive.  I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the
problems.  And if I am not mistaken in this belief, then the second thing in which the value of this
work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved.” (ibid.)
This  second  admission—that  little  to  nothing  is  achieved  by  solving  the  problems  of
philosophy—is  not  merely  a  reflection  on  Wittgenstein’s  own  ability  (or  inability)  to
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philosophise well.  Rather, it is a reflection on what it means to philosophise and on what it
could mean for their to be progress in philosophy.
Though he became increasingly opposed to the idea, Wittgenstein was never a proponent of
the scientistic spirit which, as he would later claim, “informs the vast stream of European
and  American  civilisation.”  (PR,  Preface)43  At  the  time  of  writing  the  Tractatus he
nonetheless  shared  the  view  that  has  often  been  used  to  characterise  the  scientistic
endeavour—embodied eloquently in Frege’s attack on the genetic fallacies of psychological
logician—that the history of thought and the way in which our investigations into truth have
evolved over time have little to do with genuine understanding.  Of course, for Wittgenstein
philosophy is not a science and he was at this time only interested in the sciences insofar as
they might  serve as  the  paradigm for  clarity  in  language use.   In  other  words,  he  was
interested primarily  in  what  could be said without  the  metaphysical  confusion that  had
infected  philosophy.   Nonetheless,  he  shared  the  spirit  of  a-historicism  that  coincides
strongly  with  the  anti-psychologism at  the  heart  of  the  logicist  program of  Frege  and
Russell.   But, at the same time, he rejected the metaphysical foundations that Frege and
Russell had proposed for that a-historicism: i.e. the real existence of abstract, and thus a-
temporal, conceptual objects.
From the Tractarian perspective, the key difference between progress in natural science and
progress in philosophy might be expressed thus: if Newton could claim to have ‘stood on
the shoulders of giants’, as it were, it was not only their successes that allowed him to see so
far beyond the horizons of those who had come before him, but also their failures.  This was
evidently the case for Frege as well, exhibited by his extensive historical elucidations found
throughout the Foundations, in advance of the ‘real work’ in the science of logic that would
follow nine years later in his Basic Laws.  It is similarly suggested in Russell’s vast writings
43 Similarly,  we  might  recall  here  the  motto  for  Philosophical  Investigations,  taken  from the  Austrian
playwright Nestroy:  “Überhaupt hat der Fortschritt das an sich, daß er viel größer ausschaut, als er
wirklich  ist.”  However,  as  we  will  see  later,  the  motto  from Nestroy  supports  various  alternative
interpretations as well.
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on the history of philosophy, as opposed to what can be found in Principia Mathematica, for
example.  
However, for Wittgenstein, the task of philosophy is neither to build upon the successes of
the past nor to correct its errors.  As he notes in the preface to the Tractatus: “I do not wish
to judge how far my efforts coincide with those of other philosophers.  Indeed, what I have
written here makes no claim to novelty in detail, and the reason why I give no sources is that
it  is  a  matter  of  indifference  to  me  whether  the  thoughts  that  I  have  had  have  been
anticipated by someone else.” (T, p.  4)  What is required is rather to recognise what is
adequate in logic and expunge from it what is confused in its application.  Within the realm
of this confusion,  which is not even error, there can be neither progress nor revision.  If
science  can  advance  in  a  linear  manner,  moving  towards  an  ever  more  accurate
understanding of the world, philosophy has only to abide by the formal framework that
permeates language and leave the rest aside.  This structure—which Wittgenstein calls the
“logical  scaffolding”  of  the  world  (T  6.124)—would  seem  therefore  to  admit  neither
approximation nor improvement.   The provenance of the a priori given of logical space
leaves no room for serial successes.  There is only the clarity of “seeing the world aright” (T
6.54) and the obscurity of speaking where we should rather be silent (T 7).
But what then are we to make of the claim that indeed, despite there being no progress in
logic, the widespread significance of the logical innovations of Frege and Russell cannot be
denied?  How then are we to square this idea with Wittgenstein’s own use of the consequent
system of logical notation (and not only notation) that had been literally non-existent only a
generation before?
Along with his  rejection of the justificatory function of self-evidence,  Wittgenstein also
strongly rejected the objective status of a priori truths, which—like other scientific truths,
according to Frege and Russell—would admit error and approximate knowledge.  Logic
must take care of itself and so self-evidence, along with the notion that logic is a science,
had to be dispensed with: “Self-evidence, which Russell talked about so much, can become
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dispensable in logic, only because language itself prevents every logical mistake.—What
makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought.” (T 5.4731)  It is in this sense
that Wittgenstein responds to the Kantian question concerning the necessity of intuition for
the solution of mathematical problems as follows: “The question whether intuition is needed
for  the  solution  of  mathematical  problems  must  be  given  the  answer  that  in  this  case
language itself provides the necessary intuition.” (T 6.233)  Because the operations that are
necessary for the solution of logico-mathematical problems are internal to the propositions,
the solution will always become apparent with a sufficiently perspicuous formulation.  And
in the absence of such a realm of intuition, in which solutions to mathematical problems are
‘worked out’ despite their resistance to knowledge, no genuine progress is possible.  “My
difficulty,”  Wittgenstein  notes  in  the  Notebooks,  “is  only  an―enormous―difficulty  of
expression.” (NB, p. 40)  Because the propositions of logic and mathematics say nothing,
any resistance encountered here has nothing to do with the notions themselves but only with
the form in which we express them.  Any advance in knowledge here—in other words, any
logico-mathematical  progress—is  in  this  sense  merely  an  instance  of  formal and  not
material  knowledge.   The  only  progress  that  is  possible  is  that  achieved  by  a  more
perspicuous  notation—and  that  is  not  an  advance  of  mathematical  knowledge,  strictly
speaking, neither in the Kantian nor in the Fregean sense.
To return to our earlier example, the mathematical proposition ‘Twelve times twelve equals
one  hundred  and  forty-four’  gains  little  perspicuity  through  the  symbolic  expression
‘12×12=144’ and,  therefore,  this  symbolic expression hardly facilitates  the  arrival  of  the
solution.  The standard alternate form, however—
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—does provide a clearly articulated means for arriving at the solution.  That is to say, it
provides a means, and not the solution itself.  It is not a material advance in mathematical
knowledge, for the solution was always there to begin with.  Rather, it is an advance in the
form of our expression (comprising not only an adequate semantics but also an adequate
syntax) which allows the solution to show itself, completely analogous to Wittgenstein’s
truth-table method.44
This does not imply, however, that the forms of logical articulation necessary for achieving
such perspicuity are static.  Rather, what is essential—as Wittgenstein makes clear—is that
whatever notation is employed it must have the necessary ‘logical multiplicity’ in order for
the  symbols  used  to  effectively  ‘go  proxy’ for  the  state  of  affairs  described when it  is
applied to the world.45  In other words, the wider logical space of which the description of a
particular state of affairs is a part must be completely filled in by the possibility for alternate
states  of  affairs,  with no place left  undetermined and nothing exceeding the  number  of
places available, no matter what may or may not be in any particular case.  “A proposition
can only determine one place in logical space,” Wittgenstein notes, “nevertheless the whole
of logical space must already be given by it.” (T 3.42)
Wittgenstein  outlines  the  consequences  of  this  conception  of  aprioricity  for  the  logicist
programme of  Frege and Russell  at  5.45ff,  where  he discusses  the  introduction  of  new
44 In this sense the ‘=’ sign represents the paradigm of an immaterial, formal relation.  As Wittgenstein
writes: “When I use two signs with one and the same meaning, I express this by putting the sign “=”. //
So ‘a = b’ means that the sign ‘b ’ can be substituted for the sign ‘a ’. // (If I use an equation to introduce
a new sign ‘b ’, laying down that it shall serve as a substitute for the sign ‘a ’ that is already known, then,
like Russell, I write the equation—definition—in the form ‘a = b Def.’  A definition is a rule dealing with
signs.)” (T 4.241)  We might recall here, of course, Kant’s discussion of bachelors and unmarried men.
45 As Wittgenstein expresses it in the  Notebooks  (a slightly more suggestive version of the ‘fundamental
thought’ expressed in T 4.0312): “The proposition says something, is identical with: It has a particular
relation to reality, whatever this may be.  And if this reality is given and also that relation, then the sense
of the proposition is known.  “pvq” has a different relation to reality from “p.q”, etc. // The possibility of
the proposition is, of course, founded on the principle of signs GOING PROXY for objects. // Thus in the
proposition something has  something else  as its proxy. // But there is also the common cement. // My
fundamental thought is that the logical constants are not proxies.  That the  logic of facts cannot have
anything as its proxy.” (NB, p. 37)
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devices into the symbolism of logic.  Wittgenstein begins his meditation on the role that
primitive ideas might play in logic and how they maintain the perspicuity of a wider logical
framework, noting:
“If there are primitive logical signs, then any logic that fails to show clearly how they are placed
relative to one another and to justify their existence will be incorrect.  The construction of logic out
of its primitive signs must be made clear.” (T 5.45)
Following this remark, Wittgenstein returns to reaffirm Frege’s indictment of ‘piecemeal’
definitions, although not only for objects,  but for the logical constants of our notational
systems as well.  He notes there:
“If logic has primitive ideas, they must be independent of one another.  If a primitive idea has been
introduced, it must have been introduced in all the combinations in which it ever occurs.  It cannot,
therefore, by introduced first for one combination and later re-introduced for another.  For example,
once negation has  been introduced,  we must  understand it  both in  propositions  like  ‘~(p  v  q)’,
‘(∃x).~fx’, etc.  We must not introduce it first for the one class of cases and then for the other, since it
would then be left in doubt whether its meaning were the same in both cases, and no reason would
have been given for combining the signs in the same way in both case.
(In short, Frege’s remarks about introducing signs by means of definitions (in  The Fundamental
Laws of Arithmetic) also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the introduction of primitive signs.)”  (T 5.451)
Frege,  we  recall,  indicted  the  piecemeal  introduction  of  concepts  by  mathematicians
throughout  his  work,  claiming  for  example:  “A definition  of  a  concept  (of  a  possible
predicate)  must  be  complete;  it  must  unambiguously  determine,  as  regards  any  object,
whether or not it falls under the concept (whether or not the predicate is truly assertible of
it).  [...]  We may express this  metaphorically as follows:  the  concept must  have a sharp
boundary.” (BL §56)  Frege continues the next section thus: “Now from this it follows that
the mathematicians favourite procedure, piecemeal definition, is inadmissible.” (BL §57)  
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In line with his account of perspicuity, Wittgenstein is not of course claiming that we should
therefore define our primitive operations, but rather that we must clearly and conscientiously
lay out their application in all possible forms throughout the logical space in question—
without, he notes, what one might call “a completely innocent air”:
“The introduction of any new device into the symbolism of logic is necessarily a momentous event
[muß immer ein folgenschweres Ereignis sein].  In logic a new device should not be introduced in
brackets or in a footnote with what one might call a completely innocent air.
(Thus  in  Russell  and  Whitehead’s  Principia  Mathematica there  occur  definitions  and  primitive
propositions  expressed  in  words.   Why  this  sudden  appearance  of  words?   It  would  require
justification, but none can be given, since the procedure is in fact illicit.)
But if the introduction of a new device has proved necessary at a certain point, we must immediately
ask ourselves, ‘At what point is the employment of this device now unavoidable?’ and its place in
logic must be made clear.” (T 5.452)
We see clearly here that for Wittgenstein it  is possible to introduce new ‘logical  signs’,
‘primitive ideas’ and ‘devices’ into logic; indeed, it must be if the demand for perspicuity is
to be met.  Without this possibility, Wittgenstein would have to admit—as Kant did—the
existence  of  genuine  philosophical  problems  that  would  admit  no  solution  (such  as
incongruence  of  the  right  and  left  hand,  and  the  argument  for  the  ideality  of  space).
However,  this  is not the ‘lawless and arbitrary’ creation of un-instantiated concepts that
Frege indicts the ‘creative mathematician’ with in the  Basic Laws.  For the constraint of
logical perspicuity insists that for any introduction of a new device in our notation “its place
in logic must be made clear.”46  In other words, we must be capable of moving smoothly
46 C. Diamond makes clear the implications of this for the Tractarian notion of ‘understanding’, when she
notes: “When I speak of logic as joining the sentences of ‘the language which I understand’, I am picking
up the use of ‘understand’ from Tractatus  5.62 […] Here, and elsewhere in the  Tractatus, reference to
understanding can be explicated in terms of Wittgenstein’s account of the use of language.  Thus, e.g., if
we understand ‘not’ (see  Tractatus  5.451),  this  is  not  because we are  acquainted with something,  a
logical object or anything else, but because a negation sign has been introduced via a rule covering its
use in all propositional combinations.” (C. Diamond, “Does Bismarck have a Beetle in his Box?”, p. 273,
in eds. R. Read and A. Crary, The New Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 262-292.)
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through  each  and  every  point  of  this  space  via  the  construction  of  additional  possible
propositions: “In geometry and logic alike,” Wittgenstein notes, “a place is a possibility:
something can exist in it.” (T 3.411)
Crucially, for Wittgenstein—unlike both Kant and Frege—we must be able to traverse the
space that is coextensive with these operations without resistance.  In other words, we must
know immediately and once and for all what would have to be the case for each contentful
expression  of  this  language  to  be  either  true  or  false,  independently  of  whether  any
particular proposition is or is not the case.  If the a priori structure of this language—and the
whole of a given logical space defined by it—cannot be made absolutely clear, it remains
undetermined and therefore nonsense, syntactically speaking.  We can see, therefore, how
Frege’s quantification theory follows naturally—as a matter of pure a priori inference, in the
Wittgensteinian  sense—from  his  analysis  of  the  proposition  in  terms  of  function  and
argument.  Hyder, for example, makes an excellent claim regarding how this development is
to be conceived of in terms of Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘logical multiplicity’:
“The essential point is that in order to successfully describe a set of elementary facts without naming
them directly, I need to render to them by means of shared properties.  That is what the function-
symbol in a quantified proposition achieves.  If Fa is to be conceived as one point in a manifold of
related points Fb, Ga, …, then Fx is a slice through that manifold.
To claim that such a function-symbol must have the same multiplicity as the propositions that are its
values  is  this  equivalent  to  saying  that:  (1)  it  must  adequately  reflect  both  the structure  of  the
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manifold in which the referents of these propositions lie; and (2) it must select the relevant subset of
that manifold on the basis of shared features of the subset’s elements.”47  
Thus we see how the quantification of ‘all x, such that Fx’ differs fundamentally from some
arbitrary  conjunction  of  Fa,  Fb,  … ,  etc.,  and  is  a  feature  supported  not  only  by  the
semantics of Frege’s Begriffsschrift but also its syntactical structure.  In this case, the mode
of expression used in the proposition is  perfectly perspicuous for both the state of affairs
described and the logical coordinates that surround it.  We can clearly see, for example, that
the rest of the space may be filled in completely through various operations that have a clear
application to any given proposition at hand (e.g., via the negation of the proposition, the
introduction of conditionals or disjunctive propositions, the formation of some logical sum,
etc.,  and especially  the transition from the general  to the specific).   Given the  notation
employed, what is essential is that we can move seamlessly through the logical space that is
completely co-extensive with the syntactical form of the proposition articulated therein.  
It is tempting here to fall back upon the ‘correctness’ of a universal logical syntax, which—
by incorporating semantic elements correlated with eternal logical objects—might provide a
solid  framework  for  all  forms  of  logical  articulation,  past,  present  and future.   This  is
something  Russell  would  seem  to  suggest,  when  he  notes  in  his  Introduction  to  the
Tractatus that  Wittgenstein  is  “concerned  with  the  conditions  which  would  have  to  be
fulfilled by a logically perfect language.” (T, pp. ix-x)48  However, Wittgenstein makes it
47 D. Hyder, The Mechanics of Meaning (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2002), p. 147.
48 As R.  McDonough points  out,  this  claim is  clearly mistaken—and is  a  reflection of  Russell’s  own
concern, rather than Wittgenstein’s: “It is Russell’s view in the Introduction to the Tractatus that the ideal
sign language serve a particular purpose which we can call ‘theoretical’, in order to contrast it with the
practical purposes which the propositional sign must serve in daily life.   Russell  writes: ‘The whole
function of language is to have meaning and it only fulfils this function as it approaches to the ideal
language which we postulate.’ (B. Russell, “Introduction”, T, p. x.)  Russell’s notion of an ideal language
is  the  notion  of  a  language  whose  propositional  signs  are  better  suited  to  ‘have  meaning’ than  the
everyday propositional signs.  But Wittgenstein rejects this view, since he holds that it does not fall to the
perceptible part of the symbol to determine meaning in the first place.  Thus, the existence of an idealized
propositional language is irrelevant to the capacity of language to ‘have meaning’.  The very idea of
Russell’s ideal language is regarded by Wittgenstein as conceptually confused.” (R. McDonough,  The
Arguments of the “Tractatus” (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), p. 132.)
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clear that what an adequate logical notation requires is not some kind of logical perfection
embodied in the correct representation of substantially true a priori facts.  Wittgenstein’s
investigation is not, as Russell supposed, aimed at separating what is correct in language
and what is not, and then improving or refining what is.  It is aimed at revealing what is
already there, in perfect logical order as it is.  What is required is perspicuity, embodied in
the employment of a notation of an appropriate logical multiplicity.  He expresses this idea
in the Tractatus as follows: “In a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable
parts  as  in  the  situation  it  represents.  //  The  two  must  possess  the  same  logical
(mathematical) multiplicity. (Compare Hertz’s Mechanics on dynamic models.)” (T 4.04)49  
We  see  here  the  degree  to  which  Wittgenstein’s  conception  of  logico-mathematical
propositions diverges radically not only from Frege and Russell, but also from Kant and the
notion  of  ‘intuition’ upon which  the  latter’s  understanding of  progressive  mathematical
knowledge  relies.   For  example,  at  4.0411  Wittgenstein  explores  a  few  options  for
alternative  logical  notations  for  expressing  generality—such  as  ‘Gen.fx’,  ‘f  (xg)’,  and
49 Hertz expresses his understanding of ‘dynamical model’ thus: 
“A material system is said to be a dynamical model of a second system when the connections of the
first can be expressed by such coordinates as to satisfy the following following conditions: (1) That the
number of co-ordinates of the first  system is equal  to the number of the second.  (2) That  with a
suitable arrangement of the co-ordinates for both systems the same equations of condition exist. (3)
That  by this arrangement of  the co-ordinates the  expression for the  magnitude of  a  displacement
agrees in both systems.” (H. Hertz, The Principles of Mechanics (New York: Macmillan, 1956), §418.)
Consider M. Potter’s claim: 
“Wittgenstein is here drawing on an analogy between the indefinables of a logical system and the
unknowns of a physical system.  Applied mathematicians talk about the number of degrees of freedom
in a system, meaning by this the number of unknowns in the equations which may be determined
independently of each other. If we have a set of equations in five unknowns with four degrees of
freedom, for instance, we can chose values for any four of the unknowns freely, but the values of the
fifth will be fixed by the choices we have made for the other four.  When we set up a formal system,
Wittgenstein thought it important to ensure that there are no more indefinables than there are degrees
of  freedom  in  the  system  […]  Expressed  in  these  terms,  Wittgenstein’s  point  was  that  if,  after
introducing the names ‘Socrates’ and ‘Plato’, we regard ‘proper name’ as a further indefinable, the
system would have more indefinables than degrees of freedom.” (M. Potter,  Wittgenstein’s Notes on
Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 84-85.)  
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‘(G,G).F(G,G)’—all of which fail because of semantic indetermination.50  They rather fail
because they do not meet this demand for logical perspicuity.  In these cases, he argues, we
would be unable to determine what is  being generalized,  to determine the scope of the
generality  sign,  or  to  establish the  identity  of  a  particular  variable,  respectively.   Thus,
Wittgenstein concludes: “All of these modes of signifying are inadequate because they lack
the necessary mathematical multiplicity.” (T 4.0411)  In other words, each of these modes of
signifying are syntactically indeterminate, and they therefore produce nothing but nonsense.
Wittgenstein continues: “For the same reason the idealist’s appeal to ‘spatial spectacles’ 51 is
inadequate  to  explain  the  seeing  of  spatial  relations,  because  it  cannot  explain  the
multiplicity of these relations.” (T 4.0412)  We might recall here Kant’s claim concerning
the  progressive  mapping  of  geometrical  space  referred  to  earlier  in  our  discussion  of
synthetic a priori truths.  Kant noted in this passage how the ‘geometer’ (as opposed to the
‘philosopher’), upon being given the concept of a triangle, begins at once to construct one
according to  the  determining constraints  of  spatial  representation  provided by intuition.
Now the interesting question we might pose to Kant, from the Tractarian perspective, is the
50 In this respect, it is worthwhile noting that Anscombe—who argued that “the only arbitrariness in the
Tractatus  is  in  the  assignment  of  names”  (An  Introduction  to  Wittgenstein’s  Tractatus (London:
Hutchenson University Library, 1959), p. 154), a view similarly suggested by M. Black (A Companion to
Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractatus’ (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1964),  p. 272.)—herself  notes in
regard  to  these  difficulties  that  they  “could  of  course  be  got  over  by  supplementary  conventions,
corresponding to the ‘enormously complicated tacit conventions’ which Wittgenstein mentions in 4.002
as needed for the understanding of ordinary language.” (ibid.,  p.  140)  Appealing to ‘supplementary
conventions’ that may help us ‘get over’ such syntactic indeterminacy, we see that even Anscombe intuits
a level of arbitrariness at the syntactic level, and thus underestimates the role of perspicuity in favour of
the correctness of the Russell-Frege approach to generality.  As she notes, “Frege’s genius consisted in
inventing a notation in which a formula of a different layout is employed for universal propositions; and
not just of a different layout, but the right layout.” (ibid., p. 139)  Such an understanding of correctness,
which is here employed independently of application, is foreign to Wittgenstein’s thought.
51 Undoubtedly a reference to Russell’s claim in “The Philosophical Importance of Mathematical Logic”:
“The categories of Kant are the coloured spectacles of the mind; truths a priori are the false appearances
produced by these spectacles.” (B. Russell, “The Philosophical Importance of Mathematical Logic,” p.
491. The Monist, 23, 1913, pp. 481-93.)  Black summarizes the contention thus: “Blue spectacles might
lead us to see everything blue.  But we cannot imagine ‘spectacles’ that would impose spatial relations
where none had been perceived.  No ubiquitous distortion of visual experience can explain the logical
properties of visual space.” (M. Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, op cit., p. 177.)
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following:  Given  this  account  of  constrained  geometrical  construction,  how  are  we  to
understand the development of alternative geometrical spaces wherein a figure possess a
different array of possible positions?  How are we to account for the ‘given’ constraints of
some form of spatio-temporal  representation within which things  act  in  a fixed manner
when that very space is itself open to revision?  In other words, how are we to account for
the development of alternate spaces with different degrees of logical multiplicity?
In effect, Wittgenstein poses this very question to Kant in the Tractatus.  He refers there to
Kant’s problem of the incongruence of the right and left hands52, and notes:
“Kant’s problem about the right hand and the left hand, which cannot be made to coincide, exists
even in two dimensions.  Indeed, it exists in one-dimensional space
in which the two congruent figures, a and b, cannot be made to coincide unless they are moved out
of this space.  The right hand and the left hand are in fact completely congruent.  It is quite irrelevant
that they cannot coincide.
A right-hand glove could be put on the left hand, if it could be turned round in four-dimensional
space.” (T 6.36111)
52 As N. K. Smith notes: “For as Kant points out, though the right and the left hand are counterparts, that is
to say,  objects which have a common definition so long as the arrangement of the parts  of  each is
determined in respect to its central line of reference, they are none the less inwardly incongruent, since
the one can never be made to occupy the space of the other.  As he adds in the Prolegomena, the glove of
one hand cannot be used for the other hand.  This inner incongruence compels us to distinguish then as
different,  and this difference is only determinable by location of each in a single absolute space that
constrains everything within it to conform to the conditions which it prescribes.  In three-dimensional
space everything must have a right and left side, and must therefore exhibit such inner differences as
those just noted.” (N. K. Smith,  A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’,  2nd ed.(London:
Macmillan, 1923), p. 163), my emphasis.)
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What we have here is not merely a clever solution to a familiar philosophical puzzle.  It is
rather an essential element of Wittgenstein’s critique of precisely this aspect of the Kantian
transcendental programme.  For here we see that the ‘solution’ to the problem arises not
through  ‘working  out’ the  answer  (such  as  drawing  a  triangle  in  a  pre-given  space  or
multiplying twelve times twelve), but rather through a redefinition of the space in which the
figures performs in a determinate way.53  By moving the figure out of this space, into one of
increased logical multiplicity, the answer becomes evident immediately:
What  this  example  illustrates  is  that  the  space  of  representation  is  something  that  we
construct,  and  we  do  so  through  the  development  of  an  adequate  notation.   In  the
construction of such an adequate notation, apparent philosophical ‘problems’ can indeed be
resolved.   It  is  in  this  sense  that  Wittgenstein  responds  to  the  Kantian  requirement  of
intuition with the claim: “language itself provides the necessary intuition.” (T 6.233)  We
need only map the possible facts within this new space—for example, the ‘right’ and ‘left-
hand’ figures,  in  a  space  of  two  or  more  dimensions—and  the  solution  will  become
apparent.   If  some problem should  remain,  we  need only  adjust  the  space  wherein the
question can be posed in order for it to become answerable.  Where no such space exists,
the question may therefore be rejected as nonsensical.54
53 Similarly,  as  Russell  notes  in  The  Principles  of  Mathematics,  referring  specifically  to  the  puzzle
congruence  posed  for  the  Kantian  position:  “No  motion  will  transform  abcd  into  the  tetrahedron
metrically equal in all respects, but with the opposite sense.  In this fact, however, there seems, to my
mind, to be nothing mysterious, but merely a result of confining ourselves to three dimensions.  In one
dimension, the same would hold of distances with opposite senses; in two dimensions, of areas.” (B.
Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, op cit., p. 418.)
54 We might consider as an example of this impossibility Wittgenstein’s discussion of colour at 6.3751:
“For  example,  the  simultaneous  presence  of  two  colours  at  the  same  place  in  the  visual  field  is
impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical structure of colour.”  There is,
in this sense, no ‘dimension’ in which two colours could exist at the same place (at the same time) in the
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On Wittgenstein’s account, such a novel solution to a familiar problem—as above in the
case of long-form multiplication, or even Russell’s Theory of Descriptions55—is in no way a
material advance.  It is a formal solution to a formal problem, for mapping this figure in
two-dimensional space does not lead us to a new fact.  Rather, it adjusts the limits of the
facts  expressible  via  the  notation  in  question.   This  provides  a  clear  counterpoint  to
Wittgenstein’s discussion of the Necker Cube, where seeing the cube ‘pointing’ first in one
direction (upwards and to the right) and then another (downwards, to the left)—i.e., two
different figures within the same space—does indeed show two different facts.  Here it is the
complex that is perceived in different ways (giving rise to different facts, by the light of this
metaphor) and not the same complex in a different space, which would be analogous to the
use of two superficially identical signs (such as “Green is green,” where the first  is the
proper name of a person and the latter an adjective) but that are rather different symbols (cf.
3.323):
“To perceive a complex means to perceive that its constituents are related to one another in such and
such a way.
This no doubt explains why there are two possible ways of seeing the figure
visual field.
55 It is in this sense that Wittgenstein—immediately after proclaiming the “All philosophy is a ‘critique of
language’”—credits Russell for “performing the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a
proposition need not be its real one.” (4.0031)  In Russell’s Theory of Descriptions, for example, logical
features of the proposition are written into its syntactical form rather than a semantics, which permits the
assignment  of  a  truth-value  that  would  have  been  otherwise  inaccessible,  famously  transcribing  the
proposition ‘The present King of France is bald ’ into the form: ∃(x)[Fx & ∀y(Fy → x=y) & Gx], stating
there is some x such that x is the King of France (and for every x and every y, if both x and y are both
King of  France,  then y is  x),  and  x  is  bald.   We can easily see how this  approach is  analogous to
Wittgenstein’s treatment of identity in the  Tractatus, when he notes for example: “Identity of object I
express by identity of sign, and not by using the sign for identity.  Difference of objects I express by
difference of signs.” (T 5.53)  In this sense, according to Wittgenstein’s treatment of identity, one need
look no further in order to logically articulate ‘The present King of France is bald ’ than the following:
∃(x)Fx & Gx.
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as a cube; and all similar phenomena.  For we really see two different facts.
(If I look in the first place at the corners marked a and only glance at the b’s, then the a’s appear in
front, and vice versa.). (T 5.5423)56
Now, it might be argued that if rival geometric spaces undo the synthetic aprioricity of the
Kantian thesis only by redefining its terms, they do not really undo it; they rather make the
same sentence express a different proposition (something analogous to employing the same
sign for a different symbol, in Wittgenstein’s terminology).  In such a case, it need come as
no surprise that the new figure does not behave in a like manner.  However, Wittgenstein’s
point here is not to undo the Kantian question by solving the problem per se, but rather by
dis-solving it.   For Kant,  the incongruous counterparts of the right and left  hand was a
genuine philosophical puzzle.  He argued therefore that the a priori given impossibility of
arriving at this nonetheless perfectly sensical state of affairs—the congruence of the right
and left hands—afforded confirmation of the ideality of space.  Against Kant, Wittgenstein
suggests that the possibility for the construction of alternative spaces of differing logical
multiplicity does not mean that Kant was  wrong and that the figures can indeed be made
congruent,  but  that  given this  possibility  there  is  no reason for  assuming  one space or
another is primary in the transcendental sense that Kant is after.  For example, the argument
is not that because there are possible spaces (of two or more dimensions) in which a and b
can be made to coincide, a and b are as a matter of fact congruent (though they cannot be
made to coincide in the limited space to which Kant has confined them).  Rather, the point is
that the incongruence of the left and right hand in a space of some particular number of
56 The implications of the temporal element of experience in this example, how for example it is impossible
to see both figures at the same time, would not appear to Wittgenstein until later.  This is, of course, dealt
with extensively in section xii of Part II of the Investigations. 
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dimensions cannot serve to establish the pre-conditioning character of space itself, as Kant
wished it to.  
Similarly—just as there is no one single ‘logically perfect language’, such as that which
Frege and Russell wished to secure and after which no further extension or revision of these
foundations would be warranted—neither can Kant here rely on the transcendental stability
of  the  spatio-temporal  framework  of  representation  as  the  condition  of  progressive
mathematical knowledge.  By Wittgenstein’s account it is rather a proto-picture, an Urbild
that has no primacy beyond the confines of a particular framework of logical articulation,
which is applied in particular cases for particular purposes (cf. T 5.5351).  As Wittgenstein
noted early on in the Notebooks:
“The description of the world by means of propositions is possible because what is signified is not
its own sign!  Application—.
Light on Kant’s question “How is pure mathematics possible?” through the theory of tautologies.”
(NB, p. 15)
Language does indeed thus provide all  the intuition that is necessary for the solution of
mathematical  problems;  however,  it  may  very  well  be  necessary  to  construct  a  more
perspicuous language with a greater or lesser degree of logical multiplicity for that solution
to appear.
IV. Logic, Ethics, and the Spirit of Scientism
It  may  at  first  seem  surprising  that  Wittgenstein—who  after  all  denounced  history  so
strongly in the Notebooks with the cry: “What has history to do with me?  Mine is the first
and only world!” (NB, p. 82)—would by the same token be concerned with accounting for
the introduction of novel logical devices.  However, it is precisely because Wittgenstein felt
compelled to denounce the logical significance of history, while at the same time knowing
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full  well  that  he himself was making use of  previously unrecognisable logical  forms to
dissolve  philosophical  problems  according  to  the  methodological  standpoint  of  his
Sprachkritik, that such an account had to be given.  What Wittgenstein required then was a
conception of logic that would permit the emergence of new logical forms, while proving
them nonetheless to be  a-historical.   This  conception of logic was not  an end in itself,
however.
According to a well-known anecdote, during the time that Wittgenstein was composing his
initial  Notes on Logic in Cambridge, he would often come to visit Russell, pacing up and
down his room for hours at a time in agitated silence.  Once Russell asked him: “Are you
thinking about logic or your sins?” “Both,” replied Wittgenstein, as he resumed pacing.57
Though  this  story  is  typically  recounted  as  something  of  a  joke  about  Wittgenstein’s
eccentric behaviour, we now know indeed just how seriously—as is more often the case
than  not—he  had  replied  to  Russell’s  question.   For  it  is  without  a  hint  of  irony  that
Wittgenstein wrote to Ficker upon the completion of the manuscript:
“You won’t—I really believe—get too much out of reading it.  Because you won’t understand it; the
content will  seem strange to you.  In reality, it isn’t strange to you, for the point of the book is
ethical.  I once wanted to give a few words in the foreward which now actually are not in it, which,
however, I’ll write to you now because they might be a key for you: I wanted to write that my work
consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of everything which I have  not  written.  And
precisely this second part is the important one.  My book draws the limits to the sphere of the ethical
from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those
limits.  In short, I believe that where many others today are just gassing, I have managed in my book
to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it”58
57 This story has been recounted by Russell in several places, among them: B. Russell, The Autobiography
of Bertrand Russell, vol. II. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1968), p. 99.
58 Quoted in C.G. Luckhardt,  Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives (Sussex, UK: Harvester Press, Ltd.,
1979), p. 94.  Cf. P. Engelmann,  Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), p.
143.  Engelmann makes the following interesting observation with respect to this passage: “It is not clear
where the self-quotation ends.” (ibid.)
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The important part of the work, Wittgenstein informs us here, is the ethical part.  Given this
central characterisation of the work it is clear that any account of the main themes of the
Tractatus—such as that outlined here, concerning progress, innovation and the need for an
a-historic conception of logic—will remain woefully incomplete if that ethical dimension
cannot be brought to bare upon it.  It will not be surprising, therefore, to discover that within
the pages of the  Tractatus this a-historicism is indeed intimately tied to the conception of
ethics sketched there.
Nonetheless, despite the clear connection between his view of logic as a-historical and his
(albeit, obliquely expressed) view of the ethical life as a-temporal, it is difficult to speak
about the character of ethics expressed in the Tractatus without transgressing the Tractarian
dictum that  the  content  of  ethical  propositions  belongs  to  that  sphere  about  which  one
cannot meaningfully speak: “It is clear,” he notes towards the end of the work, “that ethics
cannot be put into words.” (T 6.421)  By most accounts these final pages remain among the
most obscure of the book and Wittgenstein himself admits in the  Notebooks—just at that
point  where  ethical  remarks  begin  to  forcefully  crowd  out  those  on  logic  and  the
propositional structure of language—that he was in fact  acutely aware of “the complete
unclarity of all these sentences.” (NB, p. 79, my emphasis)59  In itself, this points moreover
to an additional, less ‘logico-philosophical’ difficulty with elucidating Wittgenstein’s views
on  ethics:  the  provisional status  of  many  of  the  remarks  where  ethics  features  most
prominently, i.e. those in the preparatory Notebooks.60
59 J. Conant, for example, has most notably written a lengthy ‘obituary’ regarding his attempt to write about
Wittgenstein’s ethics in his “Must We Show What We Cannot Say”, in eds. R. Flemming and M. Payne,
The Senses of Stanley Cavell (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1989), pp. 242-283.
60 As J. Schulte notes about several passages that occur in the Notebooks, later to be cut from the Tractatus:
“Whatever his reasons for cutting all this material may have been, most commentators find it helpful to
have recourse to the Notebooks in their attempts to shed light on difficult passages in the Tractatus.  This,
I think, may indeed prove a useful strategy.  But it is not always an easy one to adopt, if only for the
simple reason that the Notebooks themselves are often hard to understand, which in part is naturally due
to their being a first,  at  any rate an early, draft  of  what  was to become the only book Wittgenstein
published in his lifetime.” (“The Happy Man”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 42, 1992, pp. 3-21.)
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In his biographical account of the period in which Wittgenstein was posted to the Russian
Front during the First World War, before completing the final manuscript of the Tractatus,
Monk is certainly correct to have a quote from Schopenhauer serve as the epithet to the
chapter: “Undoubtedly, it is the knowledge of death, and therewith the consideration of the
suffering and misery of life, that give the strongest impulse to philosophical reflection and
metaphysical explanations of the world”61  He is also probably correct to note:
“If Wittgenstein had spent the entire war behind the lines, the Tractatus would have remained what it
almost certainly was in its first inception of 1915: a treatise on the nature of logic.  The remarks in it
about ethics, aesthetics, the soul and the meaning of life have their origin in precisely the ‘impulse to
philosophical  reflection’ that  Schopenhauer  describes,  and  impulse  that  has  as  its  stimulus  a
knowledge of death, suffering and misery.”62
What is not so clear from this remark, however, is whether those reflections on God, the
soul, the meaning of life, the good and bad exercise of the will, etc., are meant to be read as
an instance of engaging in such philosophical reflection—as Monk seems to be suggesting
here, and as Schopenhauer surely intended it—or rather as one more attempt to dissolve the
impetus to indulge in such reflections.  As in the case of a great deal of Wittgenstein’s
provisional  remarks  on  logic  in  his  pre-publication  reflections,  if  there  remains  in  the
posthumously  published  Notebooks  traces  of  an  attempt  to  put  into  words  what  by
Wittgenstein’s own Tractarian light should rather be passed over in silence, just how are we
to separate the ‘wheat’ from the ‘chaff’ in his ethical reflections, so to speak, if indeed there
is any to be found?  In other words, to borrow an expression from Wittgenstein’s later work,
how  are  we  to  determine  which  of  those  remarks  arise  from  his  attempt  to  enact  a
philosophical therapy  against the will to philosophise and which arise from having fallen
prey to it?  
61 A. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Vol. II (Indiana Hills, CO: Falcon Wings Press,
1958), p. 161.
62 R. Monk, The Duty of Genius, op cit., p. 137
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The biographical details are, in any case, clear.  Wittgenstein was posted on the Russian
Front towards the end of March, 1916.  After a long period of silence—at that time he had
not written a remark about logic since almost a year earlier—Wittgenstein resumed writing
in April, 1916.  The fighting was beginning to intensify and Wittgenstein desired to be sent
to the front.  As he notes in his diaries on 4 May 1916: “Tomorrow perhaps I shall be sent
out, at my own request, to the observation post.  Then and only then will the war begin for
me. And—possibly—life too!  Perhaps the nearness to death will bring light into my life.” 63
The offensive came on the forth of June, and he soon found himself in the heat of battle.
Whether or not Wittgenstein was indeed reborn at this time as he wished, the  Tractatus
undoubtedly was.
Wittgenstein’s remarks in the Notebooks resume as if nothing had changed in his thinking
since  being posted  to  the  front.   In  the  well-known string  of  reflections  that  introduce
Wittgenstein’s  concern  with  ethics—answers,  apparently,  to  the  question  posed  at  their
outset: “What do I know about God and the purpose of life?”—we find statements such as
the following: “I know that this world exists. // That I am placed in it like my eye in its
visual field. // That something about it is problematic, which we call its meaning. // That this
meaning does not lie in it but outside it.  That life is the world. [...]” (NB, p. 73)  A handful
of these passages found their way into the final version of the Tractatus, most notably in the
final pages of the work (although not solely there, which testifies to the integral role these
remarks are intended to play in Wittgenstein’s overall strategy in the work).  Many more, of
course, do not figure in the Tractatus at all.  However, between these two extremes there is
an even more suggestive subset: those that are referred to only obliquely in the final version
of the work.  Included in this last group are, particularly, Wittgenstein’s remarks on the good
and the bad exercise of the will, and the respective worlds of the happy and the sad man.
During the war, inspired by his reading of deeply religious and even mystical figures such as
Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, Wittgenstein focused himself intensely on showing no sign of fear
under fire.  He would not allow it, and prayed to God when he felt his courage abandoning
63 Quoted in the B. McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life, op cit., p. 240.
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him before he had the opportunity to prove himself.  In his diaries, he notes: “How will I
behave when it comes to shooting?  I am not afraid of being shot but only of not doing my
duty properly.  God give me strength!  Amen. Amen. Amen.” (13.09.14)—and just two days
later: “Now I have an opportunity to be a decent human being, because I am face to face
with death.”64  Shortly thereafter, having been posted to the front and indeed living up to the
austere expression of this deeply religious sense of duty—maintaining his spiritual strength
and inspiring others with his courage65—Wittgenstein resumed writing in the Notebooks and
formulates this ethical demand thus: “A man who is happy must have no fear.  Not even in
the face of death. // Only a man who lives not in time but in the present is happy. [...] Fear in
the face of death is the best sign of a false, i.e. a bad, life.” (NB, pp. 74-75)  
In the tradition of Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein sought to renounce any influence of the will
as an ethical actor within the phenomenal world of appearances66—this, in the language of
Tractatus, being the “whole sphere of what happens and what is the case”, accidental, and
therefore without higher value (T 6.41).  As just one more phenomenon among others, such
a conception of the will would only be of interest to psychology (T 6.423).  In doing so, he
nonetheless affirmed the will—also in the tradition of Schopenhauer—in its transcendental
capacity to act upon the world as whole.  “The will,” he notes, “is an attitude of the subject
towards the world.” (NB, p. 78)  In the Tractatus, this meditation on the meaning of life and
the good and bad exercise of the will  is reformulated, but nonetheless bears the distinct
mark of these wartime reflections:
64 B. McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life, op cit., p. 221.
65 In a report recommending Wittgenstein for a decoration, which gives a picture of his duties and conduct,
it is written: “Ignoring the heavy artillery fire on the casemate and the exploding bombs he observed the
discharge of mortars and located them.  The Battery in fact succeeded in destroying two of the heavy-
calibre mortars by direct hits, as was confirmed by prisoners taken.  On the Battey Observation Post, Hill
417, he observed without intermission in the drumfire, although I several times shouted to him to take
cover.  By this distinctive behaviour he exercised a very calming effect on his comrades.” (Quoted in B.
McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life, op cit. p. 242)
66 Schopenhauer: “In my terms, the objective world, the world as representation, is not the only side of the
world, but, as it were, the external side of a world that has a completely different different side in its most
interior being, its kernel, in the thing in itself […] the will.” (A. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and
Representation, op cit., p. 53)
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“If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can only alter the limits of the world,
not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world.  It must, so to speak, wax
and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.
So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end.
Death is not an event in life: we do not life to experience death.
If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs
to those who life in the present.
Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no limit.” (T 6.43-6.4311)
Wittgenstein remarked at the time that he was initially composing these meditations on the
purpose of life in the Notebooks—which, as he notes in reference to Dostoevsky, is fulfilled
by the man who is happy (NB, p. 73)—in one of the coded remarks that he kept during the
war for his more private and personal reflections: “Oddly enough I cannot establish the
connexion with my mathematical modes of thought.”67  However, it would not take long for
the connection to be drawn and thus,  among the final remarks of the  Tractatus,  its  full
weight is brought to bare on the work:
“Not only is there no guarantee of the temporal immortality of the soul, that is to say its eternal
survival after death; but, in any case, this assumption completely fails to accomplish the purpose for
which it has always been intended.  Or is some riddle solved by my surviving forever?  Is not this
eternal life itself as much of a riddle as our present life?  The solution of the riddle of space and time
lies outside space and time.
(It is certainly not the solution of any problems of natural science that is required.)
How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher.  God does not
reveal himself in the world.
The facts all contribute only to setting the problem.” (T 6.4312-6.4321)
67 McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life, op cit., p. 245.
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We see then that without necessarily transgressing the Tractarian dictum that the content of
ethical propositions belongs to that sphere about which one cannot meaningfully speak, we
can nonetheless point towards his conception of ethics by focusing upon what we can speak
about: language, and its limits.
As we have seen, what characterises the logical scaffolding that permeates thought is above
all the manner in which the solutions to logico-mathematical problems are co-extensive with
the questions.  “In logic,” Wittgenstein remarks, “process and result are equivalent. (Hence
the absence of surprise).” (T 6.1261)  This absence of surprise follows, Wittgenstein argues,
from the complete  forseeability inherent  to any logical  notation: “It  is  possible—indeed
even according to the old conception of logic—to give in advance a description of all ‘true’
logical propositions.” (T 6.125, my emphasis)68  Logico-mathematical proofs only serve, in
this  sense,  to  make  our  inherently  obscure  language  more  perspicuous.   They  are,  in
Wittgenstein’s  words,  “merely  a  mechanical  expedient  for  recognising  tautologies  and
contradictions  in  complicated  cases.”  (T  6.1262).   They  do  not,  therefore,  represent  a
material advance in knowledge.  Likewise, neither does the successive application of an
operation to a given proposition or set of propositions generate anything substantially new:
“An operation  is  the  transition  from one  term to  the  next  in  a  series  of  forms.  //  The
operation and the series of forms are equivalent.” (NB, p. 81)  They are, he notes, rather
rules for dealing with signs.
It is in this sense that Wittgenstein outlines the general form of the proposition—expressed
in natural language thus: ‘This is how things stand’ (T 4.5)—via the introduction of his ‘N-
operator’.  The domain of this operation is guaranteed by the existence of propositions with
sense, and its completeness is assured by the fact that for any given set of propositions there
68 As  Wittgenstein  notes  towards  the  end  of  the  Notebooks:  “If  a  sentence  were  ever  going  to  be
constructable it would already be constructable. // We now need a clarification of the concept of the
atomic function and the concept “and so on”. // The concept “and so on”, symbolized by “...” is one of
the most important of all and like all the others infinitely fundamental.  // For it alone justifies us in
constructing logic and mathematics “so on” from the fundamental laws and primitive signs. // The “and
so on” makes its appearance right away at the very beginning of the old logic when it is said that after the
primitive signs have been given we can develop one sign after another “so on”.” (NB, p. 89)
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will be one and only one negation for each and every proposition in that set.  In this way it
would be possible,  were we given the complete set  of atomic propositions, to construct
every  proposition  that  belongs  to  the  sphere  of  facts  out  of  these  more  fundamental
constituents, positive as well as negative, independently of their truth or falsity.  This series
of logically articulated propositions would nonetheless represent only a formal, and thus a-
historical, development.  As Wittgenstein notes towards the end of the Notebooks:
“The fact that it is possible to erect the general form of the proposition means nothing but: every
possible form of proposition must be FORESEEABLE.
And that means: We can never come upon a form of proposition of which we could say: it could not
have been foreseen that there was such a thing as this.
For that would mean that we had had a new experience, and that it took that to make this form of
proposition possible.
Thus, it must be possible to erect the general form of the proposition, because the possible forms of
proposition must be a priori. Because the possible forms of proposition are a priori, the general form
of the proposition exists.
In this connexion it does not matter at all whether the given fundamental operations, through which
all propositions are supposed to arise, change the logical level of the proposition, or whether they
remain on the same level.
If a sentence were ever going to be constructable it would already be constructable” (NB, p. 89)69
We see here that towards the end of the Notebooks, Wittgenstein had already begun to intuit
that at the fulcrum between the two axes of the work—what can be said on the one hand and
69 In  the  Tractatus,  this  remark  is  formulated  thus:  “It  now seems  possible  to  give  the  most  general
propositional form: that is, to give a description of the propositions of any sign-language whatsoever in
such a way that every possible sense can be expressed by a symbol satisfying the description, and every
symbol satisfying the description can express a sense, provided that the names are suitably chosen. // It is
clear that only what is essential to the most general propositional form may be included in its description
—for otherwise it would not be the most general form. //  The existence of a general propositional form
is proved by the fact that there cannot be a proposition whose form could not have been foreseen (i.e.
constructed).  The general form of a proposition is: This is how things stand.” (T 4.5)
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what must be passed over in silence on the other—there is an implicit reference to time and
change, and thus to the potentially historical development of logical articulation.  
The threat that history poses to Wittgenstein’s notion of Sprachkritik is captured only a few
days  earlier  in  the  Notebooks,  although  it  was  not  initially  developed  at  that  time.
Wittgenstein notes there: “If the most general form of proposition could not be given, then
there would have to come a moment where we suddenly had a new experience, so to speak a
logical one.” (NB, p. 75)70  Such a ‘new experience’, Wittgenstein emphatically concludes,
is  impossible.   If  a  sentence were  every going to  be  constructable  it  would already be
constructable, and thus there is no sense in which we might come across a genuinely novel
propositional form that could not have been foreseen.  As Wittgenstein makes clear: “We
can only foresee what we ourselves construct.” (NB, p. 71; T 5.556)  This is to say that, as
spaces  of  diverse  logical  multiplicity  are  something  we  ourselves  construct,  the
development  of  logically  articulated propositions  and  only the  development  of  logically
articulated propositions will follow ‘in advance’.  Of course, on the other side of language—
that to which it is applied—lies the world, to which no such forseeability belongs.
By Wittgenstein’s account of aprioricity, novel notational developments such as those of
Frege and Russell are necessary for the resolution of philosophical problems.  They are not,
however, unrestricted for Wittgenstein, in the sense that Frege charges the ‘merely creative’
mathematician  who  would  invent  lawless  and  arbitrary  logical  forms  at  will.   Their
admissibility into the framework of logic will be determined by the extent to which they can
be made absolutely perspicuous.  As he notes: “If the introduction of a new device has
70 Concerning  ‘logical  experience’,  Russell  has  this  to  say:  “It  should  be  said,  to  begin  with,  that
‘acquaintance’ has, perhaps, a somewhat different meaning, where logical objects are concerned, from
that which it has when particulars are concerned.  Whether this is the case or not, it is impossible to
decide without more knowledge concerning the nature of logical objects than I possess.  It would seem
that logical objects cannot be regarded as ‘entities’, and that, therefore, what we shall call ‘acquaintance’
with them cannot really be a dual relation.  The difficulties which result are very formidable, but their
solution is sought in logic.  For the present, I am content to point out that there certainly is such a thing
as ‘logical experience’, by which I mean that kind of immediate knowledge, other than judgement, which
is  what  enables  us  to  understand  logical  terms.”  (B.  Russell,  Theory  of  Knowledge:  The  1913
Manuscript, ed. E.R. Eames and K. Blackwell (George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 97)
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proved necessary at a certain point, we must immediately ask ourselves, ‘At what point is
the employment  of  this  device  now  unavoidable?’ and its  place  in  logic  must be  made
clear.” (T 5.452)  Thus, when Wittgenstein criticises Frege and Russell for failing to exclude
all mistakes in their  respective  Begriffsschriften,  it  is  not because some contradiction or
other—such as that Russell had identified in Frege’s Axiom V—has arisen in their system
(neither,  it  is  worth noting,  when Wittgenstein charges Coffey for  failing to exclude all
mistakes in his review of Coffey’s  The Science of Logic71).  Rather, it is because certain
syntactical  features  of  their  notations  remain  unclear.  Furthermore,  Wittgenstein  was
critical  of  the  way  that  these  developments  were  introduced,  especially  regarding  their
insistence on the self-evidence of logical truths and laws of inference by which they sought
to justify their modifications to the Aristotelian framework of subject-predicate logic.  “Now
it becomes clear,” Wittgenstein notes, “why people have often felt as if it were for us to
‘postulate’ the ‘truths of logic’.  The reason is that we can postulate them in so far as we can
postulate an adequate notation.” (T 6.1223)
In  the  Notebooks, Wittgenstein  formulates  this  sentiment  thus:  “One  cannot  say  of  a
tautology that it is true,” i.e., in the substantially true sense of Russell and Frege, embodied
in their use of the judgement stroke or assertion sign, “for it is made so as to be true.” (NB,
p. 55)  It is in this sense that for Wittgenstein, Frege’s requirement that the truths of logic
resulting  from fruitful  definitions  cannot be  inspected  in  advance—and so  give  rise  to
substantially progressive logico-mathematical knowledge, which is nonetheless analytic in
character72—misses  the  point.   Unlike  the  case  of  empirical  truths,  because  we  can
71 Besides noting that Coffey “believes reality is changed by becoming an object of our thought”, which is
the sole philosophical thesis amongst the list of errors, the rest of those errors identified by Wittgenstein
are where Coffey “confounds”—in other words,  confuses—one logical form for another.  The remedy,
which we have sketched above, is naturally to employ an adequate sign language that makes such errors
impossible: “In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign-language that excludes them by
not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a superficially similar way signs that
have different modes of signification: that is to say, a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar
—by logical syntax.” (T 3.325)
72 As quoted above: “But the more fruitful type of definition is a matter of drawing boundary lines that
were not previously given at all.  What we shall be able to infer from it, cannot be inspected in advance;
here we are not simply taking out of the box what we have put into it.  The conclusions we draw from it
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‘postulate’ the truths of logic only insofar as we can construct an adequate notation, there is
no sense in which we might be genuinely left in the dark concerning some region of the
logical space that is coextensive with that notation.  
Nonetheless, Wittgenstein acknowledges that an adequate notation must first be constructed
according to which formal obscurities can be brought to light and therefore resolved (as
Wittgenstein’s employment of quantifiers in his treatment of the equality sign demonstrates,
where it is written out of the proposition for its lack of perspicuity73, or in his treatment of
alternative  notational  systems  for  generality,  where  the  Russellian  notation  is
conscientiously written in as syntactically adequate in comparison with the un-perspicuous
alternatives he explores74).  Once again, however, this progress is formal and not material,
extend our knowledge, and are therefore, on Kant’s view, to be regarded as synthetic; and yet they can be
proved by purely logical  means,  and are  thus  analytic.   The truth is  that  they are  contained in  the
definitions, but as plants are contained in their seeds, not as beams are contained in a house.” (FA §88)
73 Specifically, Wittgenstein remarks that the identity sign in particular “is not an essential constituent of
conceptual notation.” (T 5.533)  His point here is that when we try speak about such pseudo-objects—as
Frege does, in his definition of zero as the number equal to the extension of all  objects that are not
identical with themselves—we are inevitably led to reify the elements of our notation that are rather
“mere representational devices.” (T 4.242)  And here we pass from the legitimate but ultimately sinnlöse
elements of our notation to unsinnig claims about ‘objects’ as if this were some genuine class of entity in
the  world  about  which  we  could  truly  speak.   Specifically  in  terms  of  Frege’s  argument—though
Wittgenstein admits that there are certain cases in which we are tempted to use expressions of this form,
as when one “wants to  talk about  prototypes  (Urbilder)” (T 5.5351)—there is  not  some maximally
general class of things called objects about which we may sensically claim that they are all necessarily
identical with themselves.  Thus, Wittgenstein offers a more perspicuous representation of the identity-
sign as follows:
“Thus, for example, instead of ‘(x):fx ⊃ x = a ’ we write ‘(∃x).fx.⊃.fa:~(∃x,y).fx.fy’.
And the proposition, ‘Only one x satisfies f( )’, will read ‘(∃x).fx:~(∃x,y).fx.fy’.  
[…]
And now we see that in a correct conceptual notation pseudo-propositions like ‘a = a ’, ‘a = b.b = c.⊃
a = c’, ‘(x).x = x’, ‘(∃x).x = a ’, etc. cannot even be written down.” (T 5.532, 5.534)
74 As quoted above: “If, for example, we wanted to express what we now write as ‘(x).fx  ’ by putting an
affix in from of ‘fx’—for instance by writing ‘Gen.fx—it would not be adequate: we should not know
what was being generalized.  If we wanted to signalize it  with an affix ‘g’—for instance by writing
‘f(xg)’—that would not be adequate either: we should not know the scope of the generality sign.
If we were to try to do it by introducing a mark into the argument-pieces—for instance by writing
‘(G,G).F(G,G)’
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analogous to the development of long-form multiplication or Wittgenstein’s own truth-table
method.  They are merely mechanical expedients.  And in this sense—contra both Kant and
Frege—there  is  no  room  for  the  kinds  of  genuine  resistance  that  would  allow  for  a
substantial advance in logic-mathematical knowledge.  Our difficulties, Wittgenstein notes,
are only those ‘enormous difficulties of expression’ (NB, p. 40).  Having once determined
the syntactically adequate features of our notation, the rest will have to follow, as he says,
without further ado:  “Our fundamental principle is that whenever a question can be decided
by logic at all it must be possible to decide it without further ado.” (T 5.551)
This naturally raises the question: What cannot be decided by logic?  We have already
discussed how the truth or falsity of a  non-logical (i.e., empirical) proposition cannot be
determined  by  logic;  however,  if  this  were  all that  logic  could  not do,  the  distinction
between what is and what is not within the power of logic to decide would remain an empty
truism (from the point of view of the  Tractatus, at least).  Thus, the aim of the work, as
Wittgenstein makes clear in the preface, is two-fold.  It is not only to delimit those things
that can be said clearly (the propositions of natural science) but also to definitively place a
particular type of proposition-like sentence on the other side of that limit (that is to say, the
important ones, those of ethics and aesthetics).
Logical  necessity,  as  we  have  seen,  is  not  embedded  in  the  substantial  truth  of  some
particular  set  of  a  priori  true  propositions  but  rather  in  the  ability  to  draw  inferences
according  to  the  internal  relations  inherent  to  an  adequate  notation.   However,  this
application of logic to the world has its limits, which nonetheless provides a foothold for the
exercise of the will despite the infinite foreseeability of any given logical notation.  Notably,
there is no way to draw inferences from the existence of one situation or state of affairs to
the existence of another: “There is,” Wittgenstein notes, “no causal nexus to justify such an
inference.” (T 5.1361)  Wittgenstein concludes this chain of reasoning with the following
 —it would not be adequate: we should not be able to establish the identity of the variables.  And so on.
All these modes of signifying are inadequate because they lack the necessary logical multiplicity.” (T
4.0411)
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remark: “The freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing actions that still
lie in the future.” (T 6.1362)  In a non-psychological sense, we do not know what the future
will bring—even the fact that the sun will rise tomorrow remains a hypothesis from this
logical point of view (T 6.36311). 
In the sought-after  logically-founded causal  nexus that  Wittgenstein here rejects,  logical
laws would take on the superficial character of physical laws, which would set us off on the
entirely wrong track.  For the necessity that makes one thing happen after another, such as
that governed by the kinds of causal laws of Newtonian mechanics, is not an inner necessity
like that found in logic.  Every empirical eventuality that can be described can be imagined
otherwise, for it speaks not of the a priori structure of the world: “The laws of physics, with
all their logical apparatus, still speak, however indirectly, about the objects in the world.”
(6.3431)  
In  this  sense,  Wittgenstein  both  exalts  and admonishes  the  sciences.   For  although the
propositions of the natural sciences do indeed serve as the Tractarian model par excellence
of what can be said clearly—and so without the metaphysical confusions that so often infect
philosophy—the  scientific  world-view nonetheless  remains  fundamentally  flawed in  this
respect: 
“There  is  no  compulsion  making  one  thing  happen  because  another  has  happened.   The  only
necessity that exists is logical necessity.
The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of
nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.
Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, just as God and
Fate were treated in past ages.
And in fact both are right and both are wrong: though the view of the ancients is clearer in so far as
they have a clear and acknowledged terminus, which the modern system tries to make it look as if
everything were explained.” (T 6.37-6.372)
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The two world-views contrasted here—that of ‘past ages’ and the ‘modern conception’—are
both right and both wrong, Wittgenstein argues. The modern conception is right, on the one
hand, insofar as everything that is there to be explained can be explained.  However, it fails
on the other to acknowledge its own limits.  The world—which is all that is the case—can
only contribute to setting the ethical stage and cannot contribute to resolving the ‘problems
of life’: “We feel that even when all  possible scientific questions have been answered, the
problems of life remain completely untouched.” (T 6.52)  
Enamoured by its own potential for progress, the scientific world-view thus falls victim to
what Wittgenstein calls “the usual way of looking at things,” wherein the self “sees objects
as it were from the midst of them” (NB, p. 83)  In logic and mathematics, this usual way of
looking at  things  leads  to  the  worst  kinds  of  transgression:  attempting,  for  example,  as
Russell did, to logically bind the subject that judges with the object of its judgement (a piece
of nonsense which,  when resolved,  “shows that  there is  no such thing as the soul—the
subject, etc.—as it is presently conceived in the superficial psychology of today” (T 5.541)).
Similarly, regarding Frege’s judgement stroke—which would seek to re-inscribe particular a
priori judgements into the general framework of logic, a central component we recall of his
attack against the genetic fallacy of the psychological logicians—Wittgenstein remarks: 
“Frege’s ‘judgement stroke’ is logically quite meaningless: in the works of Frege (and Russell) it
simply indicates that these authors hold the propositions marked with this sign to be true.  Thus, [the
judgement  stroke]  is  no  more  a  component  part  of  a  proposition  than  is,  for  instance,  the
proposition’s number.  It is quite impossible for a proposition to state that it itself is true.” (T 4.442)
There can be no science of logic in this sense, for we cannot look at logic from the outside-
in, as it were.  There is no sense in which we might provide a description of logic as if some
state of affairs existed that would self-regulate its own capacity for truth.75  Frege’s attempt
75 As C. Diamond remarks: “If you think that the whole of logic is internal to referring expressions, you
will see the Russell confusion wherever anyone treats any part of logic as external to what we are talking
about.  Anyone who, like Frege, treats logical laws as holding of objects and functions will be imagining
a kind of reference to objects and functions which (on your view) is an illusion: such a criticism is
analogous to that which Frege could have directed against Russell.  Given Wittgenstein’s account of the
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to  refute  the  philosophical  absurdity  of  the  psychological  logician’s  cultural-historic
relativism is  thus,  on  Wittgenstein’s  account,  misguided.   Insofar  as  the  subject  is  not
thought of psychologically,  it  is  not just one more object amongst others,  which  assert,
believes  or says  something or other.76  There is, therefore, no sense in which the kind of
formal  knowledge  obtained  by  logico-philosophical  investigation  may  be  used  to
substantially counter an absurd world-view—absurd that is, and not false.  As Wittgenstein
notes in the Tractatus: “It used to be said that God could create anything except what would
be contrary to the laws of logic.—The truth is that we could not  say  what an ‘illogical’
world would look like.” (T 3.031) 
On Wittgenstein’s account, such misguided attempts to rectify descriptions of an ‘illogical
world’ will only lead to further philosophical obscurities, for example about the substantial
nature of necessity, ‘truth itself’ and the self-evidence according to which we are supposedly
familiar with particular a priori truths and the laws of inference that guide our reasoning
with  them.   Equally  nonsensical  as  the  view they  oppose,  these  are  rather  the  sort  of
metaphysically-inclined  speculations  that  Wittgenstein  sought  to  dissolve,  not  by  pitting
theory against theory, but rather by demonstrating that we—in both cases, to be sure—have
failed to give a meaning to certain signs in our propositions.
The so-called ‘question of the meaning of life’—the philosophical riddle par excellence—is
not therefore a genuine question.  Any question that is a genuine question must inhabit the
‘phenomenal  world’ of  Vorstellungen,  in  Schopenhauer’s  terminology,  ‘everything  that
happens  and everything  that  is  the  case’,  in  Wittgenstein’s.   We  need not  therefore  be
character of sentences, it will appear that anyone who thinks of logical truths as genuinely true, anyone
who thinks of logical truths as true because their truth conditions are met, will be in a confusion of the
same essential character as Russell’s: he will be supposing himself to have access to what he is talking
about, even though he is abstracting from the logical character of the signs he uses to say anything.  The
idea  of  a  science  of  logic  is,  on  Wittgenstein’s  account,  nothing  but  an  illusion.”  (C.  Diamond,
“Throwing Away the Ladder”, p. 201, in The Realist Spirit (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 179-
204.)
76 In terms of Russell’s  theory of judgement,  Wittgenstein thus has the following to say:  “The correct
explanation of the form of the proposition ‘A makes the judgement p’, must show that it is impossible for
a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. // (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement.)” (T 5.5422)
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troubled  by  it,  at  least  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  logically-informed  philosophy  of
language.77  Like  the  various  logico-mathematical  riddles,  the  meaning  of  life  is  not  a
problem to be  solved—but rather dissolved.  However, despite the parallels here between
the  ethics  and  logic,  unlike  logical  problems,  the  resolutions  of  which  will  follow  ‘in
advance’ and ‘without further ado’, Wittgenstein makes clear: “Man cannot make himself
happy without further ado.” (NB, p. 76)  The will must be exercised correctly for the world
to be seen aright—which is to say, from the ‘point of view of eternity’:
“The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life is the world seen sub
specie aeternitatis.  This is the connection between art and ethics.  The usual way of looking at
things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside.”
(NB, p. 83)
From this point of view, ethics and aesthetics are one—“the beautiful is what makes happy”
(NB, p. 86), for it is in the aesthetic encounter that the temporal liberation from willing in
the world is attained—and no question remains for which one might not be able to find an
answer, for “the view sub specie aeternitatis sees things with the whole of logical space.”
(NB, p. 83)
It might justifiably be argued that in the above characterisation of Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractarian
ethics’ certain  transgressions  have  been  made.   For  in  one  sense  mediations  upon  the
happiness  of  man  would  appear  to  transgress  Wittgenstein’s  demand  that  such  ethical
propositions belong amongst those that must be passed over in silence.  However, there is
another sense in which one might argue that the imperative—“Live happy!” (NB, p. 75)—is
indeed without content, and so satisfies the Tractarian condition.78  Like the propositions of
77 As Wittgenstein remarked early on in the Notebooks: “My method is not to sunder the hard from the soft,
but to see the hardness of the soft. // It is one of the chief skills of the philosopher not to occupy himself
with questions which do not concern him. // Russell’s method in his “Scientific method in philosophy” is
simply a retrogression from the method of physics.” (NB, p. 44) 
78 In this sense, one can see how the characterisation of what Wittgenstein means by the respective worlds
of the happy and unhappy man given by Diamond in her preface to  The Realistic Spirit is somewhat
misleading.  Diamond notes there, in relation the central character of a novel she discusses, that, “The
central character in that story is shown as, in Wittgenstein’s sense, unhappy.  The world does not meet his
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logic, which Wittgenstein reminds us are sinnlos and not unsinnig, there is a sense in which
such a demand may rather have been intended to be placed at the limit of language and not
within some mythical beyond.  Like the propositions of logic, which rest at the limits of
language because they deal not with how things are in the world, but however they are, it is
possible that Wittgenstein believed (or was tempted to believe, at least for a time) that this
ethical imperative treats not  how one wills but  however  one wills.  As Wittgenstein once
wondered: “Can one say: ‘Act in accordance to your conscience whatever that  may be?’”
(ibid.)79  Put even more forcefully, Wittgenstein remarks shortly thereafter: “Ethics does not
treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic.” (NB, p. 77)
In any case, whether it  is ultimately to be rejected as nonsensical or not,  Wittgenstein’s
ethical  imperative  stands  as  a  noteworthy alternative  to  the  traditional—in  other  words
content-full—Old-Testament-style  commandments  gestured  briefly  towards  in  the
Tractatus: 
expectations.” (C. Diamond, The Realistic Spirit  (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press:1991), p. 10.)  This is a
mischaracterisation  insofar  as  it  suggests  that  if the  world  could  somehow  meet  the  protagonists
expectations, it would make him happy.  This is to conceive of the will psychologically, and fails to do
justice to the transcendental place of the will that Wittgenstein is taking pains to describe here: for there
is nothing in the world that makes one happy.  Only oneself, and oneself alone, can make one happy.  To
borrow from the popular expression: the fact that the 1L carafe of wine has 500ml of wine in it, has no
bearing on the question of  whether  it  is  ‘half-empty’ or ‘half-full’.   I  do not  believe Wittgenstein’s
position on the transcendence of the will, and the worlds of the happy and sad man—who precisely do
live in the same world of facts, though the ethical significance of those facts are as different as can be—is
meant to encapsulate anything more mystical than this popular euphemism would suggest.
79 The Schopenhauerian root  of  the interrogative aspect  of  this  reflection—the operative word in what
follows  being  struggling—is  captured  in  a  comment  from  B.  Magee when  he  notes,  quoting  first
Wittgenstein’s remarks from the Notebooks (29.7.16): “ ‘Is it possible to will good, to will evil, and not
to will? // Or is only he happy who does not will? // “To love one’s Neighbour” would mean to will! //
But one can want and yet not be unhappy if the want does not attain fulfilment? (And that possibility
always exists.) // Is it, according to common conceptions, good to want  nothing  for one’s neighbour,
neither good nor evil? // And yet in a certain sense is seems that not wanting is the only good. // Here I
am  still  making  crude  mistakes!  No  doubt  of  that!’ Here,  plainly,  is  a  man  struggling  with  the
incompatibility between,  on the one hand,  Schopenhauer’s doctrine that  the most  ethically desirable
condition is  one in which the will  is  denied,  and therefore nothing is  wanted;  and on the other the
Schopenhauerian doctrine that compassion is the basis for morality—or the familiar ethical requirement
to love one’s neighbour” (B. Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983),
p. 287)
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“When an ethical law of the form, ‘Thou shalt...’, is laid down, one’s first thought is, ‘And what if I
do not do it?’ It is clear, however, that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the
usual sense of the terms.  So our question about the consequences of an action must be unimportant.
—At least those consequences should not be events.  For there must be something right about the
question we posed.  There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but
they must reside in the action itself.” (T 6.422)
Consider, in this regard, the following remark from the Notebooks: 
“I keep coming back to this! Simply the happy life is good, the unhappy bad.  And if I  now  ask
myself: But why should I live happily, then this of itself seems to me to be a tautological question;
the happy life seems to be justified, of itself, it seems that it is the only right life.” (NB, p. 78)
Whether one believes that such ethical reflections are just at the limit, or are rather over the
limit of sensical language, will depend on whether one believes this demand exemplifies—
as  Monk  would  seem  to  suggest—an  instance  of  succumbing  to  the  temptation  of
philosophical illusion, or whether it is rather one more armament to be used against them.  It
will depend on whether one believes such reflections have arisen as a symptom, possibly in
response to the pathological conditions of trench warfare that Wittgenstein was undergoing
at this time, or rather as the cure to a much more general philosophical malaise.
Though  Wittgenstein  would  later  write  on  the  flyleaf  of  Moritz  Schlick’s  copy  of  the
Tractatus  that “Every one of these propositions is an expression of an illness”80, there is
good reason  to  believe  that  at  least  for  a  time  he  felt  they  belonged  not  among  those
philosophical symptoms, brought on by a misguided psychological malaise (à la  PI) or a
superficial attention to the surface level of language (à la  TLP), but rather among those
remarks intended to relieve such tendencies.  For certainly, by this account, happiness is not
to be conceived of as sensical, i.e. as just one more empirical state of affairs in the world to
be confirmed or denied along with the existence of trees, rocks and all the rest.  And if such
80 Quoted in A. Maslow,  A Study in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus  (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1961), p. x.
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an ethical imperative were to be conceived as sinnlos, and not unsinnig, then this need not
mean anything more for ethics from the Tractarian point of view than it means for the logic:
that, despite the fact that there is nothing which is in itself good or bad in the world, any
stance one takes towards it will be infused with value.81
Centrally, from the point of view of the  Tractatus—and the great importance Wittgenstein
evidently accorded to  its  achievement at  the  time—this  would include,  in principle,  the
value of bothering to engage in Sprachkritik at all, rather than continuing to labour under the
influence of the various philosophical illusions to which one might be prone or letting others
belabour under theirs.82  Speaking of the will as an ‘attitude towards the world’ would be no
different than speaking of logic in terms of functions and objects: not as just another thing
out there in the world, but rather as a way of looking at the world as a whole.  Nothing
more, and nothing less, than an initial senseless step on the way towards a world that makes
sense.
V. The Myth of A-temporality
The question must now be posed: Isn’t this treatment of time, change, progress and history,
in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus rather beside the point?  After all, it is Wittgenstein himself who
writes in the penultimate section of the book:
81 “Things,” Wittgenstein notes in the  Notebooks, “acquire their ‘significance’ [Bedeutung] only through
their relation to my will” (NB, p. 84).  The translation of Bedeutung here by ‘significance’ is apt, for by
this he certainly does not intend anything like the ‘meaning’ that a name takes on insofar as it is used in
the context of a proposition (T 3.3), which Frege would describe in terms of reference, nor anything like
‘meaning as use’, insofar as the will is an actor within the world that makes use of this or that thing in
going about its daily business (PI §43).  
82 It is tempting to recall here, that alongside the aim of the  Tractatus,  what the work  deals with, and in
what its value consists, Wittgenstein notes in the preface that: “Its purpose would be achieved if it gave
pleasure to one who read it  and understood it.” (T, p. 3, my emphasis)  Given his discussion of the
respective worlds of the happy and sad man, at 6.43 and throughout the final pages of the Notebooks, we
might legitimately ask what sense of pleasure Wittgenstein is referring to here.
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“My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually
recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them.  (He
must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.” (T 6.54)
According to the various readings of the Tractatus that give this remark a privileged place in
any possible explication of the work, despite the appearance of content that any particular
passage may have, the work as a whole is self-refuting.  No exposition of the main themes in
it will therefore be warranted, because no exposition of the work’s main themes will make
sense.   For in a manner of speaking,  there are no themes in  the work—as Wittgenstein
remarks in the preface: “Perhaps the book will be understood only by someone who has
himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it—or at least similar thoughts.—So it
is  not  a  textbook.”  (T,  p.  3)   Here,  ‘seeing the  world  aright’ takes  on  a  very  different
significance than that sketched above, in terms of adopting the view sub specie aeternitatis,
for example.  Seeing the world aright, as Wittgenstein makes clear in this passage, means
being prepared to understanding the author of the work rather than his words.
In this sense, one might justifiably claim that if there is a ‘central theme’ at work in the
Tractatus, it is in fact none other than we ourselves, its readers.  And evidently, we have our
work cut out for us.  Indeed, it is C. Diamond who has most vocally charged Wittgenstein’s
expositors of ‘chickening out’, for failing precisely to take this self-refuting character of the
Tractatus at face value, and for attempting to extract themes from it that are not truly there
—such  as,  most  notably,  the  distinction  between  saying  and  showing  and  the
metaphysically-inclined positions to which Wittgenstein might appear to be committed as a
result of making this distinction.83  Alighting on such topics, as if Wittgenstein were indeed
83 As Diamond notes in “Throwing Away the Ladder”: “P.M.S. Hacker is an example.  He ascribes to
Wittgenstein what you might call a realism of possibility.  Each thing has, internal to it and independently
of language, fixed possibilities of occurrence in kinds of fact, possibilities shared by all members of the
category to which the things belong.  What we can say, what we can think, is that a thing has (or that it
has not) one of the properties that, as a member of its logical category, it can have; or that several things
stand (or do not stand) in one of the relations that as members of their logical categories they can stand
in.” (C. Diamond, The Realistic Spirit, op cit., p. 194)
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teaching us something in the  Tractatus,  is rather an instance of the kinds of philosophical
theorising that Wittgenstein sought in the work to rid us of.  It is a sign that those concerned
with expounding such a vision of language from within the architecture of the  Tractatus
have precisely failed to ‘throw away the ladder’, as Wittgenstein declares we must in order
to understand the spirit in which the book was written rather than the letter.
We have seen how the Tractatus cannot be considered a ‘progressive’ work in any sense of
the word.  Though he claimed to have found “on all essential points, the final solution to the
problems” of philosophy, Wittgenstein reminds us that the second thing in which the value
of the work lies is that “it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved.” (T,
p. 4)  This is not, however, to say that insofar as we the readers are its subject, there is not a
process to be undertaken.  There is.  But the end-point of that process is nothing more than
the conscientious return to where we, by the light of the Wittgenstein’s philosophy, always
already are: the ordinary, everyday world.  
Even those who have taken only a cursory glance at the Tractatus cannot fail to be struck by
its unusual style of composition: a numerical series of seven propositions, with similarly
structured expositions embedded within them to form various tree-shaped hierarchies, the
ordering of which is intended to “indicate the logical importance of the propositions.” (T, p.
5 fn.)  This peculiar form, which recalls Wittgenstein’s final characterisation of the work as
a ladder—ultimately to be cast aside after it has been climbed—is a stark reminder of the
process that we as its readers are intended to undertake.  His opening remark concerning
how little  is  achieved  when  we  have  done  so,  likewise  foreshadows  the  return  to  the
ordinary that we should expect, a voyage we would in all likelihood have been unwilling to
undertake at the outset if we had genuinely understood what that would entail. 
The use of nonsense in the  Tractatus  is thus not intended to point to features of reality,
language, thought, etc., which are there, but in some mysterious way such that they will not
permit themselves to be spoken of directly or conceived of clearly.  These statements are
rather, on Diamond’s reading, transitional remarks that are intended to lead us up the ladder
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of our own inclination towards using such nonsense as if it made sense, that is to say, as if it
were representative of a true state of affairs (or at least something like a state of affairs, but
one of a special shadowy kind that would resist our attempts to put it clearly into ordinary
language).  The result of throwing away the ladder would then would be the realisation, in
the final instance, that there is no way in which one can can make sense of the very remarks
one had only moments before adhered to—and often with a passion rarely seen outside of
those contexts reserved for the debate of political  convictions or long-standing religious
dogmas. 
As an example of this, we might take here Wittgenstein’s treatment of Frege’s analysis of
sentences in terms of function and argument.  As we have seen, such an analysis is central to
Wittgenstein’s notion of Sprachkritik, employed as it is in order to reveal the emptiness of
certain traditional philosophical problems (or what we might have once mistakenly taken for
philosophical problems).  When Wittgenstein notes, for example, that the sentence ‘Socrates
is identical’ makes no sense, he is employing the Frege-Russell conception of what it is to
be a  sensical  proposition in  order  to  show that  it  may  appear to  be  syntactically  well-
formed, but upon closer inspection has no meaningful core that will allow us to extract its
significance.  We do not know, for instance, if we are faced with the ‘is’ of the copula here,
or the ‘is’ of identity.  We do not know if this ‘identical’ is that of the equality sign, or some
other as yet unidentified concept, etc.  Although we might at first imagine that we are able to
understand the phrase ‘Socrates is  identical’—and here the Platonic parody presented at
4.003,  concerning  the  question  of  whether  the  true  is  more  or  less  identical  than  the
beautiful,  serves  as  a  particularly  poignant  example  because  of  its  distinctly  historical
resonance—upon closer inspection we discover that we do not even know  how to begin
making sense of it.  And any meaningful sentence we can derive from it, will succeed only
to the extent that it represents an entirely different sentence, bearing no resemblance to the
original except superficially.  The point is that ill-formed sentences, such as those typically
found in the  works  of  philosophy,  do not  express  thoughts  that  transcend the  limits  of
language.  As they stand, they are not thoughts at all.  And if we try to make some further
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determination here, we will soon find that they will fail to capture what it is we thought we
were thinking in the first place.  
This does not mean, however, that functions and arguments must on the other hand be real
objects  out there in the world, guaranteeing the sense of any reference to them and the
correctness of our analysis of propositions in terms of the truth-functional calculus.84  When
Wittgenstein notes in the Tractatus, that “Like Frege and Russell I construe a proposition as
a function of the expressions contained in it” (T 3.318), it is undoubtedly natural (according
to the traditional conception of the role of such propositions in philosophy) to understand
him as claiming that  there are indeed functions and objects, such that some  x  is one and
some y is the other.  This is in accordance with the traditional spirit of philosophical inquiry
that would attempt to speak about the world in a certain way under the influence of a certain
type of picture.  However, as Diamond makes clear, in Wittgenstein’s work such remarks
will not ‘come home to roost’, as it were.  They are rather ‘transitional’ remarks, meant to
84 As Diamond makes clear, such a conception is suggested, for example, by P.M.S. Hacker, when he notes:
“That ontological categories are objectively fixed, once and for all, independently of language, is an
assumption of the doctrine [of saying and showing].  Since the picture theory requires syntax to mirror
ontology, there are no options in language.” (P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press,  1972),  p.  23.)   As we also saw above,  such a conception is  also suggested in the
following remark from Anscombe: “Frege’s genius consisted in inventing a notation in which a formula
of a different layout is employed for universal propositions; and not just of a different layout, but the
right layout.” (An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, op cit., p. 139)  In such passages we find the
expression of an insistence to view possibility, necessity, etc., as set in some determinate, extra-logical
way: e.g., what is possible, what is necessary, what is sayable, and what is not, is so because of the way
ontological categories are themselves (necessarily) fixed.  I have tried to make it clear, throughout this
chapter, that such a notion of ‘correctness’, as it might be applied to a given language, logical notation,
etc., is foreign to Wittgenstein’s thought.
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lead  the  reader  along  a  path—that  of  speculative  metaphysics85—to  the  self-refuting
character of any such investigation, before ultimately being tossed aside.  As she notes:
“ ‘There is a distinction between functions and objects,  and it  comes out in the clear difference
between signs for functions and those for objects in a well-designed notation’: that is what you could
call a ‘transitional’ remark.  There is a transition to be made, after which the word ‘function’ will
have no place in the philosophical vocabulary because it is not needed: there is no work it is needed
for.  Something else does whatever job there genuinely is for a predicate like ‘function’ to do, the
something else being the general logical features of signs standing for functions.  A remark like
‘There is a fundamental distinction between functions and objects’ is thrown out once we get the
predicate ‘function’ out of the cleaned up philosophical vocabulary.”86
The use of the terms ‘transition’ and ‘transitional nonsense’ clearly indicates the temporal
aspect  of  Wittgenstein’s  demand  for  the  concrete  realisation  of  an  adequate  notation,
witnessed  in  his  application  of  Sprachkritik  to  philosophical  obscurities.   There  is  a
transition to  be  made  and  it  is  only  then,  after  such  time,  that  a  given  philosophical
vocabulary—applied, at first, only provisionally—will have no more application.  “We are
left  after  the  transition,”  Diamond  herself  continues,  gesturing  towards  this  temporal
character of  Sprachkritik, “with a logical notation that in a sense has to speak for itself.”
(ibid.)87  She concludes this reflection on the transitional character of Wittgenstein’s use of
nonsense thus:
85 Which Diamond aptly defines, in slight distinction to the metaphysical tradition of philosophy, as being
within  the  metaphysical  spirit:  “I  understand  by  metaphysics  the  laying  down  of  metaphysical
requirements, whether in the form about what there is […] or in the rather different form exhibited by the
Tractatus and also (I believe) in Frege’s work, as for example in his views about determinacy of concepts
and the possibility of logic.” (C. Diamond, The Realistic Spirit, op cit., p. 20)  On Diamond’s view, the
Tractatus  is therefore nonetheless metaphysical—which ultimately necessitates the change to the later
work upon Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy in 1930—for it “lays down philosophical requirements on
language and does not look at the phenomena of language.” (ibid.)
86 C. Diamond, The Realistic Spirit, op cit., p. 183.
87 This is, of course, a rephrasing of Wittgenstein’s own gesture towards such temporality in the Tractatus:
“The rules of logical syntax must go without saying, once we know how each individual sign signifies.”
(T 3.34)
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“If we try afterwards to say why it is a good notation, we know that we shall find ourselves saying
things which may help our listeners, but which we ourselves cannot regard as the expression of any
true thought, speakable or unspeakable.  When we say why the notation is a good one, when we
explain what  logical  distinctions and similarities it  makes perspicuous,  we are  in  a sense going
backwards, back to the stage at which we had been when grasping the point of the transition.” (ibid.)
For  Wittgenstein,  Diamond  argues,  the  provisional  replacement  of  terms  in  our
philosophical vocabulary is not merely an incidental achievement.  It is rather the principle
aim  of  philosophy,  conceived  as  Sprachkritik.  Moreover,  according  to  Diamond’s
Wittgenstein, it is not just some item or other but the whole of our philosophical vocabulary
that has to be replaced, including that employed in the Tractatus.  We cannot, to borrow a
phrase from Wittgenstein’s later reflections, swim up ‘the stream of life’ to some mythical
point in time where the adequacy of our notation might have been genuinely debated around
our ‘real needs’ at the time, for that need has been fulfilled: “In fact,” Wittgenstein notes,
“all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical
order.” (T 5.5562)
If one wished to claim that there is a single thread that runs through Wittgenstein’s thought,
this would be a good candidate: the application of  Sprachkritik  returns us to our ordinary,
everyday,  non-philosophical selves.   This  is  not to suggest,  however,  that  there is  not a
significant change in perspective between Wittgenstein’s thought as it is expressed in the
Tractatus and as it is expressed in his later work.  Given that Wittgenstein characterised the
earlier work in terms of the absolute truth of the remarks contained therein—as he notes in
the preface: “the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable
and  definitive”  (T,  p.  4)—it  is  important  to  note,  however,  that  Wittgenstein’s  later
confrontation  with  his  earlier  thoughts  was  not inspired  by  a  realisation  that  ‘thoughts
communicated’ in that earlier work were in fact false.  Rather, as he notes in Philosophical
Investigations:
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“(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5): “The general form of the proposition is: This is how things
are.”——That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times.  One thinks that
one is tracing the outline of the things nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round
the frame through which we look at it
A picture held is captive.  And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.” (PI §§114-115)
This is clearly not the kind of ‘picture’ Wittgenstein had described in the  Tractatus,  but
rather an illusion (PI §44)—or perhaps better, given his earlier characterisation of logic as
‘the great world-reflecting mirror’, a mirage.  No longer content to recognise in philosophy
mere confusions, arising from the misguided attention to the superficial surface of linguistic
form,  Wittgenstein  would  later  diagnose  in  his  earlier  thought  the  kind  of  speculative
metaphysics that arises from the ‘bewitchment’ with language (PI §109), a  metaphysical
spirit that exhibits itself in laying down extra-logical necessities (about, for example, what
kind of sentence a proposition must be in order to be a proposition at all).   
In  her  introduction  to  The  Realistic  Spirit,  Diamond  considers  Wittgenstein’s  early
adherence to this metaphysical spirit in terms of the adherence to a ‘mythology’: “In the
Tractatus,” she writes, “that myth of what it is for sense to be determinate is at the same
time a myth of essential changelessness.  There is no possibility of genuinely new thoughts
or sorts of thoughts.”88  His later criticisms of the Tractarian adherence to this mythology,
she therefore notes, must not be read as if the mythology at work in the Tractatus is a false
notion of how things are—for it is only according to the mythology that one might claim
such a view could be  true or  false  in the first place (as Wittgenstein himself did in the
preface  to  the  Tractatus,  despite  his  characterisation  of  truth  in  terms  of  propositional
bipolarity  within  the  work  itself).   Rather,  she  states,  with  Wittgenstein’s  shift  in
perspective, he attacked the blind adherence to the myth.  In the later work the mythology is
kept, she writes, but it is “recognized for what it is.”89
88 C. Diamond, The Realistic Spirit, op cit., p. 7.
89 C. Diamond, The Realistic Spirit, op cit., p. 4.
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Readings  such  as  Diamond’s  give  us  good  reason  to  suspect  that  Wittgenstein’s
characterisation of the kind of a-temporality that belongs not only to logic but also to the
ethical life—where eternal life belongs to those who live in the present, who have no fear in
the face of death or despair when confronted with the miseries of life—is only provisional.
She gives us good reason to suspect that its role in the  Tractatus  is strategic, intended to
disabuse us of the will to philosophise rather than being a misplaced instance of succumbing
to it. It is, by this reading, one more instance of the kind of transitional nonsense that is
meant to be rejected along with the other terms of our philosophical vocabulary.  But in
doing so, she nonetheless repeats the importance of adhering, from the point of view of the
Tractatus  at  least,  to  something like  the  view  sub specie  aeternitatis  for  Wittgenstein’s
conception of Sprachkritik at the time.  For in his preface to the work, Wittgenstein claims
that his aim is to draw the limits of language, and thereby to trace the limit of thought from
the  inside-out,  as  it  were.   Its  value  consists,  he  concludes,  in  having found ‘the  final
solution’ to the problems of philosophy, which would somehow seek to locate themselves
on the other side of that limit.  As Wittgenstein clearly intuited in the Notebooks, if the limits
of language were not fixed—by, for example, the general form of the proposition—if they
were in continual flux, it would not have been possible for Wittgenstein to have definitively
drawn them and there would be no final solution to the problems of philosophy.  To draw
the limits of language means nothing more and nothing less than to limit the possibility of
linguistic change.
It is interesting to note that Diamond, in displacing the a-temporal aspect of Wittgenstein’s
Tractarian  methodology,  finds  precisely  a  temporal  process  in  the  place  it  once
occupied―although indeed one of a seemingly non-metaphysical, everyday kind.  Consider
the following from Diamond, regarding what it  would mean to  not ‘chicken out’, in the
sense outlined above:
“What counts as not chickening out is then this, roughly: to throw the ladder away is, among other
things, to throw away in the end the attempt to take seriously the language of ‘features of reality’.  To
read Wittgenstein himself as not chickening out is to say that it is not, in reality, his view that there are
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features of reality that cannot be put into words but show themselves.  What  is  his view is that this
way of talking may be useful or even for a time essential, but it is in the end to be let go of and
honestly  taken  to  be  real  nonsense,  plain  nonsense,  which  we are  not  in  the  end to  think  of  as
corresponding to an ineffable truth.”90
In  order  to  make  sense  of  this  passage,  and  indeed  the  picture  it  presents  of  what
Wittgenstein  would  be  demanding  of  his  readers,  one  must  inquire  into  the  role  that
temporality  plays  within  it.   It  is  not  enough to  ask,  as  Diamond routinely  does,  why
nonsense  might  be  ‘useful  or  even for  a  time essential’;  that,  we  know,  is  in  order  to
disabuse one’s interlocutor of the metaphysical illusions they may be belabouring under at
any given moment.  Beyond that, however, one must also ask what is meant here by ‘ in the
end’ and what this would require of a language user,  never to fall  into the obscurity of
metaphysical  speculation  again.   And  how,  failing  that  intrinsic  sense  of  Tractarian
teleology,  are  we  to  distinguish  a  misplaced  instance  of  succumbing  to  philosophical
speculation, on the one hand, from the kind of strategic employment of transitional nonsense
intended to remedy such behaviour on the other?
It  is  difficult  to  say how clearly  Wittgenstein himself  intuited the  consequences  of  this
requirement  at  the  time.   Any answer  one  gives  here  will  depend on  how strictly  one
considers  the  internal  coherence of  the  work.   And further,  as  outlined  above,  such an
attempt will be complicated by the form of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and especially by its
provisional character, and indeed the provisional character of his entire life’s work, both
pre- and post-Tractarian.   Either way, as we will  see in what follows,  it  is  certainly no
coincidence that it is precisely this element of language―its shifting, changing and evolving
nature―that  comes  to  bear  so  heavily  in  his  later,  post-Tractarian  conception  of
Sprachkritik.  It is curious, nonetheless, that towards the end of the  Notebooks, precisely
there where his remarks on the necessity of adopting the view sub specie aeternitatis  find
their most articulate expression, Wittgenstein would once again seem to intuit exactly this
‘fork’ in the philosophical  road between the a-temporal and the temporal dimensions of
90 C. Diamond, The Realistic Spirit, op cit., p. 181.
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Sprachkritik.  “For,” as he notes there: “it is equally possible to take the bare present image
as the worthless momentary picture in the whole temporal world, and as the true world
among shadows.” (NB, p. 83)
VI. Concluding Remarks: “und so weiter”
As noted above, it may seem surprising that Wittgenstein—who after all denounced history
so strongly in the Notebooks with the cry: “What has history to do with me?  Mine is the
first and only world!” (NB, p. 82)—would by the same token be concerned with accounting
for the introduction of novel logical devices.  However, in this chapter we have seen that it
is  precisely because Wittgenstein felt  compelled to denounce the  logical  significance of
history,  while  at  the  same  time  knowing  full  well  that  he  himself  was  making  use  of
previously  unrecognisable  logical  forms  in  order  to  dissolve  philosophical  problems
according to the methodological standpoint of Sprachkritik, that such an account had to be
given.   What  Wittgenstein  required  was  a  conception  of  logic  that  would  permit  the
emergence of new logical forms while proving them nonetheless to be a-historical.
From the Tractarian perspective, the key difference between progress in natural science and
that in philosophy might be expressed thus: If Newton could claim to have stood ‘on the
shoulders of giants’, it was for him not only their successes that allowed him to see beyond
the  horizons  of  those  who had come before  him,  but  also  their  failures.   This  attitude
towards the successes and failures of the past can been seen in the works of Frege and
Russell as well, who themselves sought to contribute precisely to what they considered to be
the ‘science of logic’ in the traditional sense of the word.  In Frege’s case, this is exhibited
by his extensive historical elucidations in the Foundations in advance of the ‘real work’ in
the science of logic that would follow nine years later in his  Basic Laws.  It is similarly
suggested in Russell’s vast writings on the history of philosophy, as opposed to what can be
found in Principia Mathematica, for example.  
103
It is in this sense that I have claimed that logico-mathematical fallibility rests at the core of
the logicist program.  For, after all, it is this that allows one to separate good mathematics
from  the  bad:  good  logic  and  good  mathematics  delimit  the  concepts  required  for
establishing deductive truths that were not previously known.  They nonetheless avoid the
faults of the “merely creative” mathematicians―who conduct themselves, as Frege notes,
“like a god, who can create by his mere word whatever he wants” (FA §109)—by being
driven by the very nature of the case.  In other words, although fruitful definitions can draw
boundary lines that were not previously given, good mathematics carves up the conceptual
world  ‘at  its  joints’,  so to  speak.   Thus,  logic  and mathematics  can,  for  Frege  and for
Russell, provide genuinely progressive knowledge of the world that is nonetheless objective
in character—like any other science—and just as any other science admits approximation
and error without compromising its objectivity, so too does logic.  
However, for Wittgenstein—who denied the substantial truth of the a priori facts that Frege
and  Russell  aimed  at  articulating,  as  well  as  the  self-evidence  by  which  they  were
supposedly aware of them—no such progress is possible.  We have seen how Wittgenstein’s
understanding  of  logical  multiplicity  permits  the  development  of  novel  logical  spaces;
however, the adequacy of these novel logical spaces is not determined by an increasingly
accurate correspondence between the elements of our notation and a set of substantially true
a priori facts, but rather by its complete logical perspicuity.91  In this sense, insofar as logic
progresses at all,  this progress represent a mere  formal advance in knowledge and not a
material advance—analogous to long-form multiplication in mathematics or Wittgenstein’s
own use of the truth-table method in logic.92  I have suggested that it is in this sense that he
91 Thus  have  I  argued  that  comments  such  as  the  following  from Anscombe  demonstrate  a  tendency
towards conceiving of logic in Fregean or Russellian terms, rather than those of Wittgenstein: “Frege’s
genius  consisted  in  inventing  a  notation  in  which  a  formula  of  a  different  layout  is  employed  for
universal propositions; and not just of a different layout, but the right layout.” (G.E.M. Anscombe,  An
Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, op cit., p. 139)  In remarks such as these we see an emphasis on
the correctness of a given logical notation, rather than upon its perspicuity, the former being foreign to
Wittgenstein’s understanding of a priori truth.
92 In this regard it  is  worthwhile noting that,  while Wittgenstein’s N-operator is  not  a standard logical
operator  employed  today,  the  legacy  of  his  truth-table  method—a  schema  for  symbolizing  truth-
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claims at the opening of the Tractatus that a large part of the value of the work consists in
showing “how little is achieved” when the problems of philosophy are solved. (T, p. 4)
For Wittgenstein the task of philosophy is neither to build upon the successes of the past nor
to  correct  its  errors.   What  is  required  is  rather  to  recognise  what  is  adequate  in  the
application of logic here and now and expunge from it what is confused.  Within the realm
of this  confusion,  which is not even error,  there can be neither substantial  progress nor
revision.  If science can progress in a linear manner, moving towards an ever more accurate
understanding of the world, philosophy has only to abide by the formal framework that
permeates language and leave the rest aside.  This structure would seem, therefore, to admit
neither approximation nor improvement.  The provenance of the a priori given of logical
space leaves no room for serial successes.  There is only the clarity of “seeing the world
aright” (T 6.54) and the obscurity of speaking where we should rather be silent (T 7).
I have shown that the central difference between Wittgenstein’s conception of logic and that
of  Frege  or  Russell  falls  upon  how  one  conceives  of  the  logical  significance  of  the
development of a series or a logical operation.  It was, of course, Kant who traditionally
defined mathematical knowledge as synthetic a priori on the basis of the real constraints
imposed  upon  such  developments  by  the  spatio-temporal  realm  of  intuition.93  Frege
possibilities “in a way that can be easily understood” (T 4.31, my emphasis)—is taught to all first-year
students of logic.  As J. Floyd notes: “Consider a sentence structure of the following form:
(p & ~r) v (p & q ⊃ r)
This looks like a structure that would express a sentence with sense, a picture of reality, assuming that the
elementary components of the sentence themselves have sense.  But if we rewrite it in the form of a
truth-table,  as  the  Tractatus  says  we  can,  we  see  it  anew.   For  in  this  diagram  we  can  see  the
tautologousness of the original sentence form in the final column, which contains only T’s; the sentence’s
apparent sense, its ruling in and ruling out of states of affairs, vanishes.” (J. Floyd, “Wittgenstein on
Aspect-Perception, Logic, and Mathematics, p. 332. In W. Day and V. Krebs (eds.), Seeing Wittgenstein
Anew: New Essays on Aspect Seeing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 314-337.)
Logic, as Wittgenstein reminds us early in the Notebooks, is prior to all truth (NB, p. 14).
93 As Kant notes, ironically, in a particularly poetic passage: “The light dove cleaving the air in her free
flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that her flight would be still easier in airless space.”
(CPR A5/B9)  Of course, she might wish it, but this would not be the case.  In airless space no flight is
possible.  Analytic knowledge requires no such intuition because the consequent is already contained in
the antecedent.  In cases such as these there is no distance between the two terms—in other words, there
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critiqued Kant’s understanding of the synthetic nature of the a priori for, as he notes, having
defined aprioricity too narrowly, i.e. as that wherein the consequent is already ‘contained’ in
the antecedent.  Though Frege considered arithmetical judgements to be  analytic  a priori
truths, he nonetheless needed—for the same reason that Kant had before him—a medium of
resistance  that  would  provide  the  conditions  for  genuinely  progressive  knowledge  in
mathematics.  However, in order for the a priori truths of arithmetic to be analytic, rather
than synthetic, this medium had to be intrinsic to the very truths themselves and not a result
of some external synthesis of the truths in question and a pre-given space of representation
according to  which they are  constrained.   What Kant  missed,  Frege claims here,  is  the
power of ‘fruitful definitions’ to give rise to genuine advances in knowledge: 
“But  the  more  fruitful  type  of  definition  is  a  matter  of  drawing  boundary  lines  that  were  not
previously given at all.  What we shall be able to infer from it, cannot be inspected in advance; here
we are not simply taking out of the box what we have put into it.  The conclusions we draw from it
extend our knowledge, and are therefore, on Kant’s view, to be regarded as synthetic; and yet they
can be proved by purely logical means, and are thus analytic.  The truth is that they are contained in
the definitions, but as plants are contained in their seeds, not as beams are contained in a house.” (FA
§88, my emphasis)
Frege concludes this passage with the remark: “Often we need several definitions for the
proof of some proposition, which consequently is not contained in any one of them alone,
and yet does follow purely logically from all of them together.” (ibid.)  Thus, when we
establish a new mathematical definition we ‘graph’ it onto previously known truths, apply
the rules  of  inference to  our  new set  of  definitions,  and so genuinely discover  what  is
contained in this new series that was not previously given at all.
For  Wittgenstein,  who  conceived  of  the  adequacy  of  a  logical  notation  in  terms  of  its
complete perspicuity, no such resistance is possible.  As we have seen, what characterises
the logical scaffolding that permeates language is above all the manner in which the answers
is no friction, no resistance that allows for the ‘flight of knowledge’.  We are always already where we
want to be.
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to  logico-mathematical  problems  are  co-extensive  with  the  questions.   “In  logic,”
Wittgenstein remarks, “process and result are equivalent. (Hence the absence of surprise).”
(T  6.1261)   This  absence  of  surprise  follows,  Wittgenstein  argues,  from  the  complete
forseeability inherent to any logical notation: “It is possible—indeed even according to the
old conception of logic—to give in advance a description of all ‘true’ logical propositions.”
(T 6.125, my emphasis)  Logico-mathematical proofs only serve, in this sense, to make our
inherently  obscure  language  more  perspicuous.   They  are,  he  notes,  mere  mechanical
expedients (T 6.1262).  No small matter of definition, the debate hangs unsurprisingly on
the logical significance of history and the status of the temporal development of a series: 
“The fact that it is possible to erect the general form of the proposition means nothing but: every
possible form of proposition must be FORESEEABLE.
And that means: We can never come upon a form of proposition of which we could say: it could not
have been foreseen that there was such a thing as this.
For that would mean that we had had a new experience, and that it took that to make this form of
proposition possible.
Thus, it must be possible to erect the general form of the proposition, because the possible forms of
proposition must be a priori. Because the possible forms of proposition are a priori, the general form
of the proposition exists.” (NB, p. 89)94
We see here that towards the end of the Notebooks, Wittgenstein had begun to intuit that at
the fulcrum between the two axes of the work—what can be said on the one hand and what
must be passed over in silence on the other—there is an implicit  reference to time and
change, and thus to the potentially historical development of logical articulation.  It was this
94 In  the  Tractatus,  this  remark  is  formulated  thus:  “It  now seems  possible  to  give  the  most  general
propositional form: that is, to give a description of the propositions of any sign-language whatsoever in
such a way that every possible sense can be expressed by a symbol satisfying the description, and every
symbol satisfying the description can express a sense, provided that the names are suitably chosen. // It is
clear that only what is essential to the most general propositional form may be included in its description
—for otherwise it would not be the most general form. //  The existence of a general propositional form
is proved by the fact that there cannot be a proposition whose form could not have been foreseen (i.e.
constructed).  The general form of a proposition is: This is how things stand.” (T 4.5)
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potential that Wittgenstein resolutely denied throughout his work at this time.  The limits of
language had, for Wittgenstein, to be precisely fixed in this sense—by, for example, the
general form of the proposition, if not by the primitive elements of our logical notation.  For
if they were not, and the limits of language were in continual flux, it would not have been
possible for Wittgenstein to definitively draw them and there would have been no ‘final
solution’ to the problems of philosophy.
It is in this spirit that we should consider Wittgenstein’s last remarks of this period, those
composed towards the very end of the  Notebooks,  on the logical status of the expression
‘and  so  on’ (‘und  so  weiter’).   For  here,  it  is  no  surprise  that  Wittgenstein—whose
Grundgedank is concerned principally with restricting the possibility of logical articulation
to produce substantially true a priori truths—would claim that the sign ‘…’ (i.e. ‘and so on’)
is fundamental to logic, and further that its significance has been  under-appreciated.  He
thus  continues,  directly  after  having  wedded  the  necessity  of  the  general  form  of  the
proposition to the necessity for complete logical foreseeability:
“If a sentence were ever going to be constructable it would already be constructable.
We now need a clarification of the concept of the atomic function and the concept “and so on”.95
The concept “and so on”, symbolized by “…” is one of the most important of all and like all the
others infinitely fundamental.
For it alone justifies us in constructing logic and mathematics “so on” from the fundamental laws
and primitive signs.
95 Concerning  the  concept  ‘atomic  function’ and  the  role  that  it  (along  with  the  ‘and  so  on’ of  a
mathematical operation) might play in the foundation of a ‘new method’ in mathematics, Ramsey makes
the following relevant remark: “We must begin the description of the new method with the definition of
an atomic function of individuals, as the result of replacing by variables any of the names of individuals
in an atomic proposition expressed by using names alone; where if a name occurs more than once in the
proposition it may be replaced by the same or different variables, or left alone in different occurrences.
The values of an atomic function of individuals are thus atomic propositions.”  (F. P. Ramsey, “The
Foundations of Mathematics”, p. 366, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 2-25, 1926, pp.
338-384.) 
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The “and so on” makes its appearance right away at the very beginning of the old logic when it is
said that after the primitive signs have been given [nach der Angabe der Urzeichen] we can develop
one sign after another “so on”.
Without this concept we should be stuck at the primitive signs and could not go “on”.
The concept “and so on” and the concept of operation are equivalent.” (NB, p. 89-90)
It  is  undoubtedly significant  that  during  the  time he spent  on the  Russian  Front,  when
Wittgenstein  resumed  writing  on  15  April  1916  after  nearly  a  year  of  philosophical
inactivity, his remarks proceed as if nothing had changed in his thought.  Here, of course, is
where we find the full force of Wittgenstein’s ethical thought—answers, apparently to the
question posed at their outset: “What do I know about God and the purpose of life?” (NB, p.
72)—and  its  connections  to  the  logical  investigations  that  make  up  the  bulk  of  the
Notebooks  as well as the  Tractatus.  It is similarly significant that, having  completed his
ethical reflections—around 21 November 1916, by which time Wittgenstein had been sent
to Olmütz and was impressing upon Engelmann how in his work “logic and mysticism have
sprung from the same root”96—that once again logic takes centre stage, and once again it
does so as if nothing had changed in his thought.
I have tried to show above that despite the possibilities of alternate readings concerning the
significance of these ethical reflections, particularly in the preparatory Notebooks—as, e.g.,
an instance of succumbing to the ‘will to philosophise’, or as one more weapon meant to be
used in the struggle against such a tendency—a common concern for the higher value of an
a-temporal, timeless eternity shows itself in both his ethical and logical reflections.  In the
first case, this a-temporality expresses itself in the life of the ‘happy man’ who lives not in
time, but in the eternal present, who lives so that “life stops being problematic.” (NB, p. 74,
cf. T 6.4311)  In the second case, this a-temporality expresses itself in the equivalence of
process  and result  (T 6.1261),  where  our  fundamental  principle,  or  Grundsatz,  “is  that
whenever a question can be decided by logic at all it must be possible to decide it without
96 Cf. P. Engelmann, “Observations on the  Tractatus”, in P. Engelmann,  Letters from Wittgenstein  (New
York: Horizon Press, 1967), pp. 94-118.
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further ado.” (T 5.551, my emphasis)  Seeing the world aright, either in its ethical or logical
sense, is for Wittgenstein intimately connected to the view sub specie aeternitatis. 
Of course, when Wittgenstein would return to philosophy, ten years after the Tractatus had
been published, his focus had changed.  He recognised “grave errors” in his earlier work
(PI,  Preface)  and,  though  there  is  much  debate  about  what  precisely  those  were,  he
undoubtedly sought in his later work to remedy them.  In what follows we will begin to
explore some of the aspects of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy; particularly, we will look
more closely at the solipsism that is supposed to coincide with his earlier, Tractarian account
of the ‘metaphysical subject’, and by this light investigate further how Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy—wherein the self is conceived as imminent rather than transcendental—returns
to affirm the necessity of historical continuity, as a matter of rule-following and of knowing
precisely what it means to ‘go on’ in the same ways as before.
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CHAPTER 2. THE INHERITANCE OF LANGUAGE: KNOWING HOW TO 
‘GO ON’ IN THE INVESTIGATIONS
“Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of
little  streets  and squares,  of  old and new houses,  and of
houses  with  additions  from  various  periods;  and  this
surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight
streets and uniform houses.”
—Philosophical Investigations §1897
I.  The World as I Found It
The  Tractatus,  Wittgenstein reminds us in the preface, is not a book that is intended to
instruct: “Perhaps this book will only be understood by someone who has himself already
had  the  thoughts  that  are  expressed  in  it—or  at  least  similar  thoughts.—So it  is  not  a
textbook.” (T, p. 3)  One might legitimately ask then: In what sense the thoughts expressed
in the book—the truth of which, Wittgenstein notes, is “unassailable and definitive” (ibid.)
—do not permit instruction?  In what sense do they escape the communicative exchange of
ideas between an author and reader, or between a teacher and pupil?  Turning the phrase
slightly, we might ask in what sense they escape the transmission of knowledge from one
generation  to  another,  and  what  such  a  limited  role  of  instruction  has  to  do  with
Wittgenstein’s  discussion  of  solipsism—specifically,  his  infamous  cry  in  the  Notebooks
97 In the present context, it is worth recalling here an apropos comment Wittgenstein once made, as quoted
by a student of the Moral Sciences Club: “In teaching you philosophy I’m like a guide showing you how
to find your way round London… a rather bad guide.” (Quoted in D.A.T Gasking and A.C. Jackson,
“Wittgenstein as Teacher”, p. 52, in ed. K.T Fann,  Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy
(New York: Dell Publishing, 1968), pp. 49-55.)
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“What has history to do with me?  Mine is the first and only world!” and the remark that
immediately follows it: “I want to report the world as I found it.” (NB, p. 82)
When, in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein describes what he should have to include if were he to
write a book entitled The World as I Found It, he proceeds by noting a report on his body
and the external world insofar as he himself has explored it—i.e., those things which he has
discovered are subject to his will and those things that are not.  Despite his admission that
this would be a method for “isolating the subject, or rather of showing in an important sense
there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned” (T 5.631), it would appear that he
would also exclude all  history and ‘hearsay’.   As he notes in the full  passage from the
Notebooks from which the above was abstracted:
“What has history to do with me?  Mine is the first and only world!
I want to report how I found the world.
What others have told me about the world is a very small and incidental part of my experience of the world.
I have to judge the world, to measure things.” (NB, p. 82)
This is undoubtedly an enigmatic remark, from among the most difficult of Wittgenstein’s
earlier work.  For the significance of Wittgenstein’s discussion of solipsism in the Tractatus
is far from transparent, wrought as it is with interpretive difficulties.  We might particularly
recall here the seemingly self-defeating declaration that: “what the solipsist means is quite
correct; only it cannot be  said, but makes itself manifest.” (T 5.62)  Given Wittgenstein’s
preceding declaration that we cannot think what we cannot say (T 5.61), this reference—and
indeed, the entire discussion of solipsism in the Tractatus—appears doubly obscure.
Obviously, Wittgenstein has a particular idea of what it means to ‘say’ or to ‘speak about’
something in these passages, and throughout the work as a whole.  For there is clearly a
sense in which we can indeed very well  speak  things that, by the book’s own lights, we
cannot  think.   These  are,  most  notably,  the  propositions  of  logic  (tautologies  and
contradictions) and names.  Of course, by the Tractarian account, the propositions of logic
do not  really  say anything at  all.   Though they are  valid  propositions—in other  words,
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though they are derived from elementary propositions according to valid rules of inference
—these ‘limit case’ propositions do not represent states of affairs within the world.  They
are  not  about anything  in  particular,  and  thus  they  are  not  sensical in  this  restricted,
Tractarian sense.  Nor, however, do they fail to touch upon the world completely, and thus
neither are they nonsensical.  They are, he notes, rather senseless: “part of the symbolism,
much as ‘0’ is part of the symbolism in mathematics.” (T 4.4611)
Like logical place-holders, the propositions of logic mark the limits of logical space and,
thus, they do not form a substantial point within it:  “I know nothing about the weather,”
Wittgenstein notes in a telling observation, “when I know that it is either raining or not
raining.” (T 4.461)  (Likewise, to take an example from mathematics, we might claim that
we know nothing about apples when we know that adding two apples to two apples we get
four apples.)  Such pseudo-propositional signs, we might thus be led to conclude, can be
spoken but they cannot be said—in the sense that, although we might speak them aloud or
write them down on a piece of paper, they are not about things in the world.  They can be
applied to states of affairs in the world, but they do not refer to them.
Names, on the other hand, do refer.  They are correlated with objects, and it is the objects
themselves which are their meaning.  Names do not mean their ‘meaning’, as a dictionary
definition might suggest—definitions in logic,  Wittgenstein reminds us in the  Tractatus,
cannot ‘dissect’ a name (T 3.26), they are only rules for the substitution of signs in a logical
proposition  or  for  the  translation  of  the  signs  of  one  language  into  another  (T 3.343).
Names in this sense are always proper names, and they represent the particular objects to
which they refer—and that is all they can do.  As Wittgenstein remarks in the Tractatus:
“In a proposition a name is the representative of an object.
Objects can only be named.  Signs are their representatives.  I can only speak about them: I cannot put them
into words.
Propositions can only say how things are, not what they are.” (T 3.22-3.221)
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As such,  names are  arbitrary,  neither  right  nor  wrong,  neither  true  nor  false.   Like the
propositions of logic, names do not form a substantial point within logical space.  They
rather  anchor propositions  to  the  world.   And like  the  propositions  of  logic,  which  are
always true (tautologies) or always false (contradictions), names cannot determine reality in
any way.  We can speak them, but they do not say anything.  In other words, they are not
facts, which put states of affairs of the world into words and which, like a tableau vivant (T
4.0311), we are therefore able to affirm or to deny.  Propositions—and only propositions—
can can say how things are, not what they are.  
So,  assuming that  Wittgenstein understands the solipsist  as  one who is  neither spouting
logical propositions nor christening the objects around him, what does Wittgenstein mean
when he says that what the solipsist means is quite correct, only it cannot be said?  In order
to understand what Wittgenstein is alluding to here, it is first necessary to sketch in greater
detail the precise object of this critical remark.  It is necessary to sketch in greater detail
what Russell thought the solipsist  could say, and especially what he thought one could do
with such things as names and the propositions of logic.
Why Russell?   In  the  earliest  incarnations  of  Wittgenstein’s  pre-Tractarian  thought,  the
remarks on solipsism that are tied together in the  Tractatus (T 5.6-5.641) do not occur as
single, continuous meditation before their appearance in its more or less publication-ready
form.  In the Notebooks the first appearance is in May 1915, which includes a remark that
was later stricken from the final book:
“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. [≈T 5.6]
There really is only one world soul, which I for preference call my soul and as which alone I conceive what I
call the souls of others.
The above remark gives the key for deciding the way in which solipsism is a truth. [≈T 5.62]
I have long been conscious that it would be possible for me to write a book: “The world I found” [Was für eine
Welt ich vorfand]. [≈T 5.631]” (NB, p. 49)
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Here, the ‘above’ in ‘the above remark’, which provides the key to deciding the truth of
solipsism, makes a reference to the ‘one world soul’, from which alone I can conceive of the
souls of others.  As it stands this seems to be an enigmatic pronouncement; however, in the
Prototractatus the intended object of Wittgenstein’s remark is made clearer.98
In the Prototractatus, Wittgenstein’s discussion of solipsism stands much as it does in the
Tractatus, insofar as the chain of remarks is internally structured; however, the chain itself is
tied together with several others on the nature of logical analysis.  It falls squarely among
those of PTLP 5.33ff, which include meditations on the nature of identity and the use of the
identity  sign,  Russell’s  axiom of infinity,  and particularly  the  misguided attempt  to  use
logical notation for non-logical forms of expression, such as the following:
“There are certain cases in which one is tempted to use expressions of the form a = a or p ⊃ p and the like, and
in fact this happens when one would like to talk about prototypes [Urbilder], e.g. about proposition, thing, etc.
Thus in Russell’s Principles of Mathematics ‘p is a proposition’—which is nonsense—was given the symbolic
rendering ‘ p ⊃ p’, and placed as an hypothesis in from of certain propositions in order to exclude from their
argument everything but propositions
It is nonsense to place the hypothesis p ⊃ p in front of a proposition, in order to ensure that its arguments shall
have the right form, if only because with a non-proposition as argument the hypothesis becomes not false but
nonsensical,  and because arguments  of  the wrong kind make the proposition itself  nonsensical,  so that  it
preserves itself from wrong arguments just  as well, or as badly,  as the hypothesis without sense that was
appended for that purpose.” (PTLP 5.3342-5.3343 (=T 5.531))
Following this discussion of logical form, Wittgenstein’s discussion of solipsism begins in
the Prototractatus at 5.335 (“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” (=T
5.6)), and concludes at 5.34 (“We now have to answer  a priori  the question about all the
possible  forms  of  elementary  propositions”  (=T  5.55a)99).   The  context  in  which
98 For a detailed discussion of the Prototractatus and its relation to the Tractatus, see G.H von Wright, “The
Origin of the Tractatus”, in G.H. von Wright, Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), pp. 63-109.
99 The  most  interesting  difference  here,  in  relation  to  the  final  published  work,  is  that  at  the  end  of
Wittgenstein’s discussion of solipsism he does not  proceed to announce that  we need to answer the
question, but indeed answers it, giving the general form of the proposition (T 6).  In this way, what is in
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Wittgenstein’s discussion of solipsism occurs in the earlier  Prototractatus  makes it clear,
therefore, that Wittgenstein is directing these remarks, at least in part100, to Russell and his
conception of philosophy.101
As M. McGinn notes, during the period with which Wittgenstein was familiar with Russell’s
views and still committed to commenting upon them from the Tractarian point of view, i.e.
1912-1914102, Russell’s views on knowledge and what he thought philosophy in general, and
the  Prototractatus  the  next  step  in  the  argument,  following his  meditations  on  solipsism,  is  in  the
Tractatus rather an earlier preparatory step (i.e. T 5.55ff).
100Traditionally, Wittgenstein’s discussion of solipsism has been tied to the ‘spiritual’ Viennese context in
which Wittgenstein was raised, and to which Wittgenstein was to a great extent also responding in his
early work, having been inspired by figures such as Schopenhauer and Weininger.  This is correct, but it
misses the critical element of these remarks that will be sketched in greater detail here.  Cf. G.E.M.
Anscombe,  An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s  Tractatus (London: Hitchenson and Co., 1959), pp. 162-
169; B. McGuinness,  Approaches to Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 131-139; A. Janik,
Essays on Wittgenstein and Weininger (Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1985); P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 58-85.
101In  this  regard,  Diamond puts  forth  a  plausible  explanation  for  its  subsequent  rearrangement  in  the
published version, where the relevant passages on solipsism are removed from the discussion of the role
of logical analysis in philosophy.  She notes there: 
“My way of taking about what is in the book [the Tractatus] is meant to reflect Wittgenstein’s ideas
about his own authorship: there are lines of thought which he wanted a reader of his book to pursue for
himself.  In the case of the  Tractatus, one can add that there are lines of thought which he wanted
Russell—Russell in particular—to pursue.  In 1948, he said ‘Whatever the reader can do, leave to the
reader.’   While  the  remark  comes  from  1948,  it  reflects  a  view  of  writing  that  was  always
Wittgenstein’s:  the  reader  should  not  expect  to  have  things  done  for  him.”  (C.  Diamond,  “Does
Bismark have a Beetle in his Box: The Private Language Argument in the  Tractatus”, p. 263, in R.
Read and A. Crary (eds), The New Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 262-292.)  
Given  Wittgenstein’s  attitude  towards  instruction,  sketched  above,  I  believe  the  difference  between
Wittgenstein’s  position  in  the  Tractatus,  and  that  expressed  here  by  Diamond  regarding  the  ‘later
Wittgenstein’, from 1948, may represent a greater shift than she supposes.  Indeed, it may suggest that
Wittgenstein was not concerned with what a  reader  can do, but what an  author  can do, i.e. what an
author may or may not be capable of communicating to a reader.
102As McGuinness notes, Wittgenstein had at this time discussed the topic with Russell on a number of
occasions, and, in a letter written around Christmas 1914, he thanked Russell for sending him his ‘piece
about  sense  data’,  in  which  Russell  discusses  the  relation  between  the  subject  and  the  world.
McGuinness suggest that this is a reference to “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics” (in B. Russell,
Mysticism  and  Logic (London:  Unwinn  Paperbacks,  1976),  pp.  140-172.)   Cf,  B.F.  McGuinness,
Wittgenstein, A life: Young Ludwig 1889-1921 (London: Duckworth, 1988.), p. 159.
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specifically  logical  analysis,  could bring to  the  theory of  knowledge were  in  a  state  of
development: “However, there is a stable core of ideas that remains the basic starting point
for  his  reflections  throughout.”103  Principally,  she notes,  Russell  was committed  to  the
distinction  between  knowledge  by  acquaintance  and  knowledge  by  description.   By
‘knowledge  by acquaintance’ Russell  meant  the  particular  sensations  that  one  (and one
alone) can experience—in other words, a realm of private sense-data104—which we are thus
in a privileged position to know.  Furthermore, he believed that the structure of awareness is
such that one is not only necessarily aware of sense-data as they occur, but also of  being
aware of  them.   As  he  notes  in  “Knowledge  by  Acquaintance  and  Knowledge  by
Description”: 
“In introspection, we seem to be immediately aware of varying complexes, consisting of objects in various
cognitive and conative relations to ourselves.  When I see the sun, it often happens that I am aware of my
seeing the sun, in addition to being aware of the sun; and when I desire food, it often happens that I am aware
of my desire for food.  But it is hard to discover any state of mind in which I am aware of myself alone, as
opposed to a complex of which I am a constituent.”105 
In this sense, Russell was committed to the view that awareness arises out of one’s self-
awareness as being aware of sense-data:  a  two-place relation of  sense-data and the self
sensing the sense-data.
103M. McGinn, Elucidating the Tractatus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 259.  For a detailed survey of
Russell’s developing views on solipsism, cf. E. Marrou, “‘A somewhat curious discussion of solipsism’:
la  réponse  de  Wittgenstein  à  Russell  et  Frege”,  in  Ch.  Chauviré  (ed.)  Lire  le  Tractatus  logico-
philosophicus de Wittgenstein (Paris: Vrin, 2009), pp. 185-222. 
104In “The Relation of Sense-data to Physics”, Russell makes this notion of privacy (already assumed in his
earlier work) explicit: “so far as can be discovered, no sensibilie is ever a datum to two people at once.
The things seen by two different people are often closely similar, so similar, that the same words can be
used to denote them, without which communication with others concerning sensible objects would be
impossible.  But,  in spite of this  similarity,  it  would seem that some differences always arises from
difference in the point of view.  Thus each person, so far as his sense-data are concerned, lives in a
private world.” (B. Russell, Mysticism and Logic, op cit., p. 152.)
105B  Russell,  “Knowledge  by  Acquaintance  and  Knowledge  by  Description”,  p.  202,  in  B.  Russell,
Mysticism and Logic, op. cit., pp. 200-221. 
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By accepting that each person lives in a private world of sense-data, he was forced to admit
(as he put it) the ‘logical possibility of solipsism’.  In  The Problems of Philosophy, first
published in 1912, the Cartesian overtones of the position are clearly spelled out: 
“In one sense it must be admitted that we can never prove the existence of things other than ourselves and our
experiences.   No logical  absurdity  results  from the  hypothesis  that  the  world  consists  of  myself  and my
thoughts and feelings and sensations, and that everything else is mere fancy.  In dreams a very complicated
world may seem to be present, and yet on waking we find it a delusion; that is to say, we find that the sense-
data in the dream do not appear to have corresponded with such physical objects as we should naturally infer
from sense-data.”106
As Russell understood it then, the challenge that solipsism poses to the philosophical theory
of knowledge is to provide a good reason to accept that, despite the logical possibility of the
solipsist’s  position,  there  is a  world  beyond  one’s  own  private  experiences  and  that
particulars (including objects, relations, and to some extent universals) exist with which one
is not immediately acquainted: i.e., the things of the world which according to the dictates
of common sense give rise to those particulars with which we are directly acquainted.  The
challenge that solipsism poses to the philosopher is to provide a good reason to accept that
there is knowledge of those things with which we are not directly acquainted—that is to say,
real,  genuine  knowledge,  and  not  a  mere  hypothesis—that  can  be  arrived  at  through
description.
106B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 10.  In “Knowledge
by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”, Russell, like Frege, identifies solipsism with idealism,
a position that results, he notes from a ‘dislike of relations’: 
“The view seems to be that there is some mental existent which may be called the ‘idea’ of something
outside the mind of the person who has the idea, and that,  since judgement is a mental event,  its
constituents must be constituents of the mind of the person judging.  But in this view ideas become a
veil  between  us  and  outside  things—we  never  really,  in  knowledge,  attain  to  the  things  we  are
supposed to be knowing about, but only to the ideas of those things.  The relation between mind, idea,
and  object,  on  this  view,  us  utterly  obscure,  and,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  nothing  discoverable  by
introspection warrants the intrusion of the idea between the mind and the object.  I suspect that the
view is fostered by the dislike of relations, and that it is felt the mind could not know objects unless
there were something ‘in’ the mind which could be called the state of knowing the object.” (op cit., p.
155) 
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As is often the case in such discussions of the metaphysics of experience, it is interesting to
note that Russell uncritically qualifies the experience of sense-data by employing the notion
of one’s  present  experiences, i.e. as temporally, as well as spatially and logically present.
However,  one  of  the  interesting  consequences  of  his  extension  of  this  conception  of
knowledge  to  include  knowledge  by  description  is  its  ability—not  only  to  account  for
‘logically distant’ objects, such as those Wittgenstein was most obviously concerned with
critiquing, i.e. other peoples ascription of ‘I’ and their identification of essentially private
sense-data (red-patches, toothaches, etc.)—but also to account for ‘spatially’ and what we
might call  ‘temporally distant’ objects  as  well.107  In fact,  in terms of these ‘temporally
distant’ objects,  the  implicit  historical  dimension  of  Russell’s  theory  of  knowledge  by
description is brought out in his principle examples—those of Bismarck and Julius Caesar—
the first of which is reprised by Diamond in her article “Does Bismarck Have a Beetle in his
Box?”108
107As  Russell’s  abundant  use  of  temporally  qualified  examples—in  both  the  future  and  past  tenses—
suggests, there is no reason to assume that he did not see a perfect symmetry between the ‘spatially
distant’ objects  of  common  sense  and  physics,  and  the  ‘temporally  distant’ objects  of  history.   in
“Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description” Russell  notes  that  there  are  “various
stages of removal from acquaintance”, enumerating a list that treats spatially and temporally qualified
objects in an undifferentiated manner, e.g.: “there is Bismarck to the people who knew him, Bismarck to
those who only know of him through history, the man with the iron mask, the longest-lived of men.” (B.
Russell,  “Knowledge by Acquaintance and by Description”,  op.  cit.,  p.  153)  If  he did differentiate
between these different cases in some way, it appears at least to have been philosophically uninteresting
(perhaps representing for him an empirical, and not logical asymmetry).
108Diamond  here  draws  on  one  of  Russell’s  principle  examples  in  “Knowledge  by  Acquaintance  and
Knowledge by Description”, the German statesman, Otto von Bismarck.  This reference to ‘Bismarck’s
beetle’ draws on the discussion from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: 
“Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case!—Suppose everyone had a
box with something in it: we call it a “beetle”.  No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone
knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to
have something different in his box.  One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.—But
suppose the word the word “beetle” had a use in these people’s language?—If so it would not be used
as the name of a thing.  The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a
something: for the box might even be empty.” (PI §293)
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Diamond notes in her paper that in order to take Russell’s critique of solipsism seriously, as
Russell himself inevitably did at the time109, one has to suppose that each of us is directly
acquainted with his or her own self.  She invites us, as Russell did, to consider a statement
about another individual, such as the German statesman Otto von Bismarck (who, we recall,
died in 1898).  Since we are supposing that Bismarck has direct acquaintance with himself,
he will  be able to use the name ‘I’,  ascribable by direct acquaintance.  If he makes the
statement  ‘I  am  an  astute  diplomatist’,  it  is  he  himself  who  is  the  constituent  of  the
judgement, and as such he is in a unique position to either affirm or deny it.  “But you or I
or  anyone  else,”  Diamond  continues  in  line  with  Russell’s  position,  “can  think  about
Bismarck only via some description; we are not directly acquainted with the object which he
denotes by ‘I’.”  She explains:
“If we say ‘Bismarck was an astute diplomatist,’ an analysis of our proposition would show that we are not
directly designating Bismarck.  We designate him via some description, and we can see from the analysis that
Bismarck himself is not a constituent of the proposition.  Because the object Bismarck is known to Bismarck
by acquaintance,  but known to us only by description, our judgement about Bismarck is not the same as
Bismarck’s judgement about Bismarck.  Bismarck has available to him a proposition which he can understand
and which we cannot.  We can, however, know by description the proposition which Bismarck understands.”110
Like Russell’s argument for the existence of objects of common sense and physics that lie
outside of our present experience, because the object ‘Bismarck’ (or his own private sense-
data, like red patches, toothaches and the like) can be referred to by means of terms that do
lie within our experience (such as our own sense-data, and our awareness of universals), and
yet  when we look around we find  no  object  presently  answering  that  description,  “the
109It should be noted,  however, that  Russell  soon rejected the idea of knowledge of one’s self through
acquaintance, in favour of description.  This was initially formulated in Theory of Knowledge: The 1913
Manuscript, ed. E.R. Eames and K. Blackwell (London: George Allen and Unwinn), a text which he
shared with Wittgenstein (cf. R.W. Clark, The Life of Bertrand Russell (London: J. Cape, 1975), pp. 204-
7).  That Russell changed his position in this regard does not, it appears to me, significantly impact the
core of Wittgenstein’s critique.
110C. Diamond, “Does Bismarck have a Beetle in his Box?”, p. 265, in eds. R. Read and A. Crary, The New
Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 262-292.
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conclusion follows that there are objects not experienced.”111  Russell’s idea is that we can
know of  these  inferred  entities  on  the  basis  of  knowing  that  there  is  a  unique  object
(achieved through existential  quantification,  and therefore  without  it  being necessary to
predicate existence to an object with which we are not acquainted) that has some property or
other with which we  are  directly acquainted.112  The conclusion follows that solipsism—
despite its ‘logical possibility’—is wrong.
Wittgenstein’s  response to Russell’s  formulation of solipsism falls  principally along two
lines.  The first concerns Wittgenstein’s critique of Russell’s  account of knowledge of the
self-as-object, which stands in a composite relation with what is perceived and with which
one is therefore necessarily acquainted along with one’s experiences.  The second concerns
Russell’s  conception  of  the  task  of  philosophy,  and  the  role  that  such  things  as  logic
relations  and names  may play  in  the  sought-after  theory  of  knowledge  more  generally.
These two are not wholly unrelated.  For, regarding the first of these, the relation between
the world and the subject as necessarily aware of itself in its experience of the world relies
111B. Russell, The Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript (London: George Allen and Unwinn, 1984),
p. 34.  See also, pp. 10-11, and B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, op cit., pp. 23-24.
112Here is Russell’s argument from “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”: 
“It would seem that, when we make a statement about something only known by description, we often
intend to make our statement, not in the form of involving a description, but about the actual thing
described.  That is to say, when we say anything about Bismarck, we should like to, if we could, to
make the judgement which Bismarck alone can make, namely the judgement of which he himself is a
constituent.  In this we are necessarily defeated, since the actual Bismarck is unknown to us.  But we
know that there is an object  B called Bismarck, and that  B was an astute diplomatist.  We can thus
describe the proposition we should like to affirm, namely ‘B was an astute diplomatist’, where B is the
object which was Bismarck.” (op cit., p. 153)  
This is reprised in terms of Julius Caesar at a latter point in the paper: 
“Let our judgement be ‘Julius Caesar was assassinated.’  Then it becomes ‘the man whose name was
Julius  Caesar  was  assassinated’.   Here  Julius  Caesar is  a  noise  or  shape  with  which  we  are
acquainted, and all the other constituents of the judgement (neglecting the tense in ‘was’) are concepts
with  which  we  are  acquainted,  but  Julius  Caesar  himself  has  ceased  to  be  a  constituent  of  our
judgement.” (op cit., p. 156)
Besides allowing us access to the past, such knowledge by description also allows access to the future, as
Russell notes at the opening of the article: “I know that the candidate who gets the most votes will be
elected, though I do not know who is the candidate who will get the most votes.  The problem I wish to
consider is this: What do we know in these cases, where the subject is merely described.” (op cit., p. 148)
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upon  drawing  two  substantial boundaries:  an  internal,  and  an  external  boundary  of
experience (the ‘I’ as self-aware subject at its centre, and the limit of my experience of the
world at  the outer  edge,  marking a  realm beyond which the non-solipsistic  philosopher
would seek to gain epistemic access).  It is equivalent, Wittgenstein claims, to drawing the
visual field around the eye, in which (on the one hand) the eye is taken to be a constituent of
the visual field itself and (on the other) there is a clear terminus to the visual field.  As he
notes:
“Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?
You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field.  But really you do not see the eye.
And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.
For the form of the visual field is surely not like this
(T 5.633-5.6331)
At issue here is the attempt to cast logical necessities in an empirical light, masquerading
metaphysical  theories  as  scientific  hypotheses.   Indeed,  it  is  P.  Sullivan  who has  most
notably  and  most  eloquently  argued  that  the  two  different  limits  of  this  ‘two-limit
conception of experience’ advanced by Russell arise due to one and the same problem.113
This problem concerns not what one can or cannot  know, but what one can  understand.
More precisely, it  concerns what Russell might be able to expect from logic in the first
place.  Sullivan thus locates the pivotal point of Wittgenstein’s rejection of Russell’s view in
the remark that immediately follows that referred to above in the Tractatus:
“This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is at the same time a priori.
Whatever we see could be other than it is.
113P. Sullivan, “The ‘Truth’ in Solipsism, and Wittgenstein’s Rejection of the A Priori”, European Journal
of Philosophy, 4(2), 1996, pp. 195-219.
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Whatever we can describe at all could be other than it is.
There is no a priori order of things.” (T 5.634)
Drawing the ‘field of experience’ in terms of such substantial internal and external limits,
Russell  has  precisely  sought  an  a  priori  description  of  experience  (every  person  is,
necessarily,  aware  of  his  or  her  own self  as  being  aware  of  experience)  and  used  this
structure to derive a logical and a priori foundation for knowledge beyond that realm of our
immediate  experience  (knowledge  by  description  can  be  reformulated  in  terms  of
knowledge by acquaintance, allowing one to surpass the other limit). 
Briefly then, Wittgenstein’s  criticism of this  ‘two-limit  conception of knowledge’ is that
Russell’s  account  of  knowledge  by  acquaintance  is  nonsensical,  and  his  account  of
knowledge by description is unnecessary.  In the next remark Wittgenstein explains:
“Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism.
The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.”
(T 5.64)
In a certain sense one might argue that the two limits remain—there is still the self and the
world,  as  ‘internal’  and  ‘external’  limit  of  representation,  as  Wittgenstein  abundant
references to the self and the world throughout the  Tractatus (and especially in its final
pages) attest—but they are a function of language, purely formal notions without empirical
content.  In other words, they tell us nothing about the world and there is therefore nowhere
beyond them—i.e.,  there  is  no realm of facts  that  is  a  priori  inaccessible to  us—where
knowledge might seek to go via some logical manipulation.  As Wittgenstein states at the
opening of his meditations on solipsism: “The limits of my language mean the limits of my
world.” (T 5.6) 
Admittedly,  Wittgenstein’s  use  of  the  number  system  in  the  Tractatus—in  which  the
propositions n.1, n.2, n.3, etc. are comments on proposition n., and n.11, n.12 are comments
on proposition n.1, etc.—are not as consistently applied as he suggests at the opening of the
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work; however, it is generally recognised that we should in this case follow Wittgenstein’s
instructions for reading the work in this way.  For it is undoubtedly proposition 5.6 that
“provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.” (T 5.62)  However,
as we have seen, throughout the work Wittgenstein has characterised truth as a function of
meaningful  propositions.  In other words, he has defined meaning precisely (and on the
surface, solely) in terms of what one can say: propositions that are about things in the world.
So where does Wittgenstein sit, then, on the question of solipsism and the extent to which
there may be some truth to what the solipsist intends to communicate?
This question has elicited many answers, which nonetheless typically fall within two camps:
those which claim there is some kind of a positive (or ‘substantial’) truth to Wittgenstein’s
account  of  solipsism,  which  follows  from  his  rejection  of  Russell’s  formulation  (e.g.
Sullivan and McGinn), and those which claim there is solely a negative (or ‘therapeutic’)
truth  to  solipsism,  which is  thus  directly  solely  against  Russell  and similar  attempts  to
provide a logical foundation for knowledge based on an a priori metaphysics of experience
(e.g. Diamond).
The first possibility, as McGinn notes, is that once the relations between logic and world,
and between the subject and the world, are seen as internal—i.e. as inherent to the structure
of representation itself—then the ‘thinking subject’ will cease to function as just another
object  that is part  of the world (privileged or otherwise).   It  may, however,  continue to
function as an orientation towards the world:  “that is  to say, the thinking subject exists
insofar as it represents the world to itself.”114  Diamond, on the other hand, who identifies in
Wittgenstein’s early discussion of solipsism a foreshadowing of his later attack on private
114M. McGinn, Elucidating the Tractatus, op cit., p. 274.  This comment aims therefore at giving a positive
account of Wittgenstein discussion of the ‘metaphysical subject’, e.g.: 
“Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’. 
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which
psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it.” (T
5.641)
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language in  Philosophical Investigations, sees Wittgenstein’s account as solely critical of
the kind of epistemic privilege upon which Russell, among others, have relied in the theory
of knowledge.  In this restricted sense, the Tractarian discussion of solipsism simply shows
“that  no  role in language is played by the things with which Bismarck is acquainted and
which he can name in his language, but to which, according to Russell, we cannot refer by
the proper names of our language.”115  Diamond admits, however, that Wittgenstein’s attack
comes at a price.  The Tractarian argument does indeed provide an argument which shows
that ‘other people’s beetles’, as she phrases it, drop out of the picture.  But this approach
“may indeed leave us with our own beetles; the beetle population does not disappear,” she
notes, “until Wittgenstein develops powerful new coleptericides in the 1930s.”116  
It  is  not  my  intention  here  to  argue  for  the  merit  of  one  or  the  other  of  these  two
interpretations  of  solipsism  in  the  Tractatus.   For  it  appears  that  in  both  of  these
interpretations something interesting has been left aside, whichever the case may be.  This
regards what might be considered the capacity for instruction—we recall that Wittgenstein
makes it  clear  at  the  opening of  the  work  that  perhaps  it  “will  be  understood only  by
someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it” (T, p. 3)—and,
by extension,  the  very  heritability of  language itself.   For  whether  the  Tractarian ‘I’ is
understood transcendentally or not, ‘the world as I found it’ is indeed just that—found.  It is
not one that is built or constructed, neither is it communicated piecemeal from one person to
another.  As Wittgenstein would remark a little further on in the Notebooks, and likewise in
the  Tractatus when  the  subject  of  ethics  is  brought  to  bear  on  this  non-psychological
conception  of  the  self  that  Wittgenstein  has  here  sketched  in  response  to  Russell’s
formulation of solipsism: “The world must, so to speak, wax or wane as a whole.” (NB, p.
73, my emphasis)  In other words, if the subject’s capacity for comprehension is tied solely
to the possibilities inherent to its potential for  linguistic expression, it will inevitably find
itself in the midst of—or belonging to—the world.  ‘The world as I found it’ is one already
fully  populated  with  meaning.   Diamond  is  right  to  locate  here  an  important  shift  in
115C. Diamond, “Does Bismarck have a Beetle in his Box?”, op cit., p. 268.  
116Ibid.
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Wittgenstein’s thoughts about privacy in  Philosophical Investigations.  However, the role
and the importance of that shift in perspective—for Wittgenstein’s thought generally, and
specifically for his thought about the role that instruction might play in language and in
philosophy, including his own—remains to be clarified.
II. Majores homines
Wittgenstein seemed to intuit early on the apparent circularity of the relationship between
language and world as he had defined it, and the difficulty such a conception would pose to
the process of linguistic initiation.  Early in the Notebooks, for example, he remarks:
“How can I be told how the proposition represents?  Or can this not be said to me at all?  And if that is so can I
‘know’ it?  If it was supposed to be said to me, then this would have to be done by means of a proposition; but
the proposition could only show it.
What  can  be  said can  only  be  said by means  of  a  proposition,  and so nothing  that  is  necessary  for  the
understanding of all propositions can be said.” (NB, p. 25)
The key problem here is  one of ‘bootstrapping’:  How does a linguistic  novice come to
master a language, when all explanation must itself be given in the very language that the
novice has not yet mastered?  Wittgenstein’s solution to this problem at the time, as Sullivan
has argued,  did not come from of a resolution of this  circularity.   It  came rather when
Wittgenstein simply ceased to regard it as  problematic: “The jangling skeletal worry that
reality might outrun language is silenced only by conceiving of language directly as that
which embraces reality”117—or, indeed,  vice versa.  It would not be until many years later
that  Wittgenstein  would  make  what  could  justifiably  be  characterised  as  one  of  the
resounding mottos of his life’s work: “Explanations come to an end somewhere” (PI §1)
However, we can see that in the  Tractatus, a limit to the capacity of linguistic instruction
had already been laid out.  All explanations of language terminate in our simply seeing how
117Cf. P. Sullivan, “The ‘Truth’ in Solipsism and Wittgenstein’s Rejection of the A Priori”, op cit., p. 209.
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a proposition picks things out in the world.  That it is a matter of our apparently already
being able to understand the world in terms of the propositional forms that are used to
represent it—which is, of course, to say nothing less than one already thinks in language (T
3) before a language has been acquired—would not become a problem for Wittgenstein until
the later work was well under way.118
Naturally,  Wittgenstein  was  not  the  first  to  recognise  the  apparent  circularity  of  basic
linguistic  explanation.   Already in  Principia Mathematica,  Whitehead and Russell  were
forced to concede that the definitions of the ‘primitive ideas’ that would form the foundation
of their system presupposed a pre-given familiarity among the members of their readership,
noting:
“Following Peano, we shall call the undefined ideas and the undemonstrated propositions primitive ideas and
primitive  propositions respectively.  The primitive ideas are  explained  by means of descriptions intended to
point out to the reader what is meant; but the explanations do not constitute definitions, because they really
involve the ideas they explain.”119
118Even  in  the  1930’s,  Wittgenstein  continued  to  hold  onto  the  impossibility  of  linguistic  instruction,
claiming: “[A]ny kind of explanation of language presupposes a language already.  And in a certain
sense, the use of language is something that cannot be taught […] I cannot use language to get outside of
language.” (PR, 54)  As D. McManus notes, drawing an illuminating distinction between acquiring the
mastery of a first- and second-language: 
“The  most  obvious  candidate  for  the  role  of  an  ‘explanation’ which  would  ‘get  out  outside  of
language’ is the giving of an ostensive definition.  If we imagine learning a  sign  in that way, we
imagine learning that some particular sign is used to refer to what my first language calls ‘red’, say.
But  if  we  imagined that  an  ostensive  definition  might  teach  someone  a  symbol,  a  first-language
expression, as it were, we confront the problem of concept acquisition again: in order to see what is
being pointed at, the pupil must already have a mastery of the relevant symbol, which is precisely
what the ‘explanation’ was to ‘make possible’” (D. McManus,  The Enchantment of Words (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 107-108.) 
119A.N.  Whitehead  and  B.  Russell,  Principia  Mathematica,  vol.  1  (2nd Ed.)  (Cambridge:  Cambridge
University Press, 1927), *1.  It is precisely this point that Wittgenstein would attack in the Tractatus: “in
Russell  and  Whitehead’s  Principia  Mathematica  there  occur  definitions  and  primitive  propositions
expressed in words.  Why this sudden appearance of words?  It would require a justification, but none is
given, or could be given, since the procedure is in fact illicit.” (T 5.452)
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However, it was of course Frege who developed the notion most fully and most famously in
his account of ‘elucidation’.  Elucidation plays a central role in Frege’s project, appearing
already to some extent in his  Foundation of Arithmetic.120  Nonetheless,  it  is  in Frege’s
response to B. Kerry’s critical reception of this work that he spells out most clearly what is
at stake in ‘elucidating’ a linguistic form in order to bring about an adequate understanding,
not of what a particular language says, but of how it says it.  
It is worth dwelling on this text for a moment, for it is a delightful example of instruction.
Here, in the article entitled “On Concept and Object”121, we witness Frege (as teacher), who,
faced with Kerry (as reticent student), is forced to recede from the very ‘logical purity’ that
his  analysis  of  the  foundations  of  arithmetic  aspires  towards  (embodied  in  his
Begriffsschrift, or ‘concept script’) in order to bring about a correct understanding of the
script  itself  via  the  ‘impure’  medium  of  our  ordinary,  imprecise—and  indeed,  even
psychologistic—natural language. 
Frege here responds to Kerry’s criticism that he has not adequately distinguished between
‘concepts’ and ‘objects’ in his  Begriffsschrift and that any attempt to do so will run into
unresolvable difficulties.  For indeed—and Kerry is correct to point this out—Frege has, in
explicating the mechanics of his notation, made recourse to a number of linguistic forms
that are  specifically  forbidden by the  dictates of  that  very system.   In  particular,  Kerry
attempts to demonstrate that the distinction between concept and object is not absolute, for
at times it seems necessary to speak about concepts in manner that would make objects of
them.  His example: ‘The concept ‘horse’ is a concept easily obtained.’  Frege’s response to
Kerry is Zen-like, incorporating in equal measure simplicity and esoterica:
120E.g.: “When an author feels himself obliged to give a definition, yet cannot, then he tends to give at least
a description of the way in which we arrive at the object or concept concerned.  These cases can be easily
recognized by the fact that such explanations are never referred to again in the course of the subsequent
exposition.  For teaching purposes, introductory devices are certainly quite legitimate; only they should
always be clearly distinguished from definitions.” (FA, p. viii) 
121G.  Frege,  “On  Concept  and  Object”,  in  G.  Frege,  Collected  Papers  on  Mathematics,  Logic,  and
Philosophy, ed. B. McGuinness and trans. P. Geach  (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 182-194. 
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“It must be recognized that here we are confronted by an awkwardness of language, which I admit cannot be
avoided, if we say that the concept horse is not a concept, whereas, e.g., the city of Berlin is a city, and the
volcano Vesuvius is a volcano.  Language is here in a predicament that justifies the departure from custom.
The peculiarity of the case is indicated by Kerry himself, by means of the quotation-marks around ‘horse’; I
use italics to the same end.  There was no reason to mark out the words ‘Berlin’ and ‘Vesuvius’ in a similar
way.  In logical discussions about a concept one quite often needs to say something about a concept, and to
express this in the form usual for such predications—viz. to make what is said about the concept into the
content of a grammatical predicate.”122
Although by now a well-known example, ‘the concept horse paradox’ remains as humorous
and as  poignant  today as  it  must  have appeared at  the  time.123  Frege is  not,  however,
deterred  and  persists  unabashedly  to  employ  a  similarly  problematic  grammatical  form
when he informs his readers a little earlier in the same paper, instructing Kerry, e.g.: “A
concept (as I understand the word) is predicative.  On the other hand, a name of an object, a
proper name, is quite incapable of being used as a grammatical predicate.”124  He continues:
122G. Frege, “On Concept and Object”, op cit., p. 186.
123Cf.  K.  D.  Jolley,  The  Concept  ‘Horse’ Paradox  and  Wittgenstein’s  Conceptual  Investigations:  A
Prolegomena to Philosophical Investigations (Burlington, VA: Ashgate, 2007), for an extensive survey of
the paradox and its legacy.
124This passage resonates significantly with the terms in which Russell first approached Frege, regarding
the paradox he had discovered in Frege’s Axiom V.  In that exchange Russell first formulates the paradox
thus:
“You state that a function, too, can act as the indeterminate element.  This I formerly believed, but now
this view seems doubtful to me because of the following contradiction.  Let w be the predicate : to be a
predicate that cannot be predicated of itself.  Can  w be predicated of itself?  From each answer its
opposite follows. Therefore we must conclude that w is not a predicate.” (B. Russell, “Letter to Frege
(1902)”, in J. van Heijenoort (ed.) From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-
1931 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 124-125.)
If Russell had not continued (or better yet, had not been able to continue) as he did—i.e., “Likewise there
is no class (as a totality) of those classes which, each taken as a totality, do not belong to themselves.
From this I conclude that under certain circumstances a definable collection does not form a totality”
(ibid.)—Frege’s response would have sufficed to end the matter:
“Incidentally, it seem to me that the expression ‘a predicate is predicated of itself’ is not exact.  A
predicate is as a rule a first-level function, and this function requires an object as argument and cannot
have itself as argument (subject).” (G. Frege, “Letter to Russell (1902)”, in in J. van Heijenoort (ed.)
From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, op cit., p. 128.)
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“This admittedly needs elucidation, otherwise it might appear false.”125  Indeed it might not
just appear  false, but from a certain perspective—that of Frege’s own  Begriffsschrift, for
example—nonsensical.   Here in the antechamber to the most precise of all sciences, the
science  of  logic,  we  must  resort  to  metaphor  and  figurative  forms  of  expression  (for
example, to talk about objects as being ‘saturated’ and concepts being ‘unsaturated’).  It is,
as J. Conant notes, “the artful use of nonsense.”126  In other words, as Frege himself notes,
one must rely upon a reader who is ready to meet one ‘half-way’, “who does not begrudge a
pinch  of  salt”,  as  it  were.127  One  must  rely  upon  a  reader  who  is  content  to  take  a
grammatical hint in order to grasp exactly what exactly one is gesturing towards.  As Frege
remarks elsewhere:
“Theoretically, one may never achieve one’s goal this way.  In practice, however, we do manage to come to an
understanding about the meanings of words.  Of course we have to be able to count on a meeting of the minds,
on others guessing what we have in mind.  But all this precedes the construction of a system and does not
belong within a system.”128
Ironically, the potential for failure inherent to the use of elucidation that Frege highlights
here is the very possibility that later came to be realised when Wittgenstein sent him a copy
125G. Frege, “On Concept and Object”, op cit., p. 183.
126J. Conant, “Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and Early Wittgenstein”, in R. Read and A. Crary (eds.)
The New Wittgenstein  (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 174-217.  Here is Diamond’s take in a similar
question, although as I have tried to show, the explicitly temporal element of Diamond’s take introduces
a host of distinct (although not unrelated) issues: 
“A remark like ‘There is a fundamental distinction between functions and objects’ is thrown out once
we get the predicate ‘function’ out of the cleaned up philosophical vocabulary.  We are left after the
transition with a logical notation that in a sense has to speak for itself.  If we try afterwards to say why
it is a good notation, we know that we shall find ourselves saying things which may help our listeners,
but which we ourselves cannot regard as the expression of any true through, speakable or unspeakable.
When we say why the notion is a good one, when we explain what logical distinctions and similarities
it makes perspicuous, we are in a sense going backwards, back to the stage at which we had been
when  grasping  the  point  of  the  transition.”  (C.  Diamond,  “Throwing  Away  the  Ladder,”  in  C.
Diamond, The Realistic Spirit, op cit., p. 183.)
127G. Frege, “On Concept and Object”, op cit., p. 193.
128G. Frege, Posthumous Writings., ed. Hermes, Kambartel, and Kaulbach, trans. Long and White (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1979), p. 207
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of  the  Tractatus—a  work  which  Wittgenstein  himself  consistently  and  self-consciously
described as being composed solely of such elucidations (T 4.112, 6.54)—seeking his aid in
securing its publication.129
Two decades later, in Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein would include in the work
several  critical  remarks  directed  explicitly  towards  the  Tractatus and  the  conception  of
language  that  permeates  that  earlier  work  as  a  whole.   These  remarks  testify  to
Wittgenstein’s renewed interest in the diversity of linguistic expression, rather than its unity
(PI  §23),  his  critique  of  the  relationship  between  atomic  and  molecular  propositions,
apropos the limits of analysis (PI §46), and an attentiveness to what he later considered the
‘hardness of the logical must’: “this crystal,” i.e., the crystalline purity of logic, “does not
appear as an abstraction; but as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it were
the hardest thing there is.” (PI §97)130  Not content to stop simply at methodological issues,
in PI §144 Wittgenstein cuts to the very core of his earlier work—the general form of the
proposition:
“ “But this is how it is——” I say to myself over and over again.  I feel as though, if only I could fix my gaze
sharply on this fact, get it into focus, I could grasp the essence of the matter.
(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5): “The general form of the proposition: This is how things are.”——That
is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times.  One thinks that one is tracing the outline
of the thing’s nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at
it.
129Upon receiving Wittgenstein’s manuscript, Frege replied with criticism that were, according to J. Floyd,
“explicit, fairly detailed, and harsh.” (J. Floyd, “The Frege-Wittgenstein Correspondence: Interpretive
Themes”, in ed. E. De Pelligrino, Interactive Wittgenstein: Essays in the Memory of Georg Henrik von
Wright (New York: Springer, 2011), p. 83.)  The bulk of these demonstrate an unwillingness to accept the
first few propositions of the work (apparently the only ones that Frege read) as something other than the
establishment  of  a definition or  the recognition of a judgement,  both of which fail  to achieve their
respective ends in his esteem.
130Wittgenstein himself provides the relevant reference to the Tractatus here: “In fact, all the propositions of
our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order.—That utterly simple thing, which
we have to formulate here, is not a likeness of truth, but the truth itself in its entirety. // (Our problems
are not abstract, but perhaps the most concrete that there are.)” (T 5.5563)
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A picture held us captive.  And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to
repeat it to us inexorably.” (PI §§113-115)
If we wish to maintain that Wittgenstein’s critique of the way he had formulated such issues
in the  Tractatus figures prominently in his subsequent work, as it undoubtedly does, we
should not be surprised that each of these points appears in some way at the start of the
Investigations,  indeed  right  in  the  opening  quote  of  PI  §1,  taken  from  Augustine’s
Confessions.  For, as Baker and Hacker note, Wittgenstein had remarked early on that he
should like to begin his projected book with the description of a situation from which all the
material to follow could be obtained.131  Wittgenstein proceeds to cite a passage from the
early part of Augustine’s Confessions—itself an autobiography, which might very well have
131Cf. G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker,  Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1980), p. 64.  The remark comes from MS 108, written between between December 1929
and August 1930.  It is interesting to note that the fragment Wittgenstein had originally thought would
fulfil this stringent demand was: ‘A lamp is standing on my table.’  This naturally recalls numerous such
propositions from the analyses presented in the Notebooks, and especially the following, which provides
a wealth of interesting comparisons with Wittgenstein’s later approach to language in the Investigations
(possibly even prefiguring his imminent critique of some of the central notions in the Tractatus):  
“When  I  say,  “The  book  is  on  the  table”,  does  this  really  have  a  completely  clear  sense?  (An
EXTREMELY important question.) // But the sense must be clear, for after all we mean something by the
proposition, and as much as we certainly mean must surely be clear. // If the proposition “The book is
on  the  table”  has  a  clear  sense,  then,  I  must,  whatever  is  the  case,  be  able  to  say  whether  the
proposition is true or false.  There could, however, very well occur cases in which I should not be able
to say straight off whether the book is still to be called “lying on the table”. Then—? // Then is the
case here one of my knowing exactly what I want to say, but then making mistakes in expressing it? //
Or can this uncertainty TOO be included in the proposition. // But it may also be that the proposition
“The book is lying on the table” represents my sense completely, but that I am using the words, e.g.,
“lying on”, with a  special  reference here, and that elsewhere they have another reference.  What I
mean by the verb is perhaps a quite special relation which the book now actually has to the table. […]
It seems clear to me that what we MEAN must always be “sharp”. // Our expression of what we mean
can only be right or wrong.  And further the words can be applied consistently or inconsistently.  There
does not seem to be any other possibility.” (NB, pp. 67-68)
Whether or not it is significant that this is precisely the topic that Wittgenstein was dealing with before
he paused writing in his notebooks, upon being sent to the Russian Front, it is an interesting possibility.
The  last  remark  here  before  the  break,  significantly,  is:  “The  name compresses  its  whole  complex
reference into one.”(NB, p. 71) 
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been called The World as I Found It—which begins with an account of how he was initiated
into the common tongue of his elders:
“When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I  saw this and I
grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out.  Their intention
was shown by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the
face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our
state of mind in seeking, having rejecting, or avoiding something.  Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in
their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I
had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.”132
Though they are undoubtedly distinct in many respects, one cannot fail to notice the kinship
—no  doubt  alluded  to  conscientiously  by  Wittgenstein—between  the  idea  of  language
presented here and that presented in the  Tractatus.133  We will consider in what ways this
may or may not be the case below; however, before proceeding, it is important to note that
in the full passage from the Confessions Augustine proceeds to explicate not only what he
knows of his infancy but also in the majority of cases how he knows it: i.e. whether that be
by divine word, by what he has been told of his infancy from those who were there, or by
what he himself has observed in other infants.  He discusses, for example, the maladroit
expressions  of  his  earliest  desires  and his  infantile  manipulations  of  others  in  order  to
achieve these selfish aims: 
“Little by little I began to be aware where I was and wanted to manifest my wishes to those who could fulfil
them as I could not.  For my desires were internal; adults were external to me and had no means of entering my
soul.  So I threw my limbs about and uttered sounds, signs resembling my wishes, the small number of signs of
which I was capable but such signs as lay in my power to use: for there was no real resemblance.  When I did
not get my way, either because I was not understood or lest it be harmful to me, I used to be indignant with my
132Confessions, I, 8. (Anscombe’s translation from PI)
133Backer  and  Hacker  also  point  out  that  Wittgenstein  notes  in  MS111  that  Augustine’s  remarks  are
significant because they represent the conception of a “naturally clear-thinking person”—interestingly
qualified as one who is “temporally removed and does not belong to our intellectual milieu.” (Cf. G.P.
Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, op cit., p. 64)
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seniors for their disobedience, and with free people who were not slaves to my interest; and I would revenge
myself upon them by weeping.  That this is the way of infants I have learnt from those I have been able to
watch.  That is what I was like myself and, although they have not been aware of it, they have taught me more
than my nurses with all their knowledge of how I behaved.”134  
When  Augustine  begins  this  meditation  on  language-learning,  he  notes,  immediately
preceding the quote used by Wittgenstein in PI §1: “How I learned to talk I discovered only
later.”
One  might  legitimately  wonder  then:  How  did  he  come  to  discover  this  process  of
piecemeal initiation into the linguistic order of his elders?  Was it divine word, for example?
Was he told by those who were there?  Had he observed it himself in other infants of that
age?  Augustine’s answer to this question is complicated by doubts (aired, as we shall see, in
this very passage from the Confessions).  However, Wittgenstein’s response to this question
is nonetheless categorical.  And it would appear to be aimed at filling in precisely this gap:
“These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language.  It is this: the
individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.——In this picture of
language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning.  This meaning is correlated with
the word.  It is the object for which the word stands.
Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word.  If you describe the learning of
language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like “table”, “chair”, “bread”, and people’s
names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and the remaining kinds of words
as something that will take care of itself.” (PI §1)135
134Augustine, Confessions, trans. H. Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), I, 7.
135This passage is, of course, greatly quoted in the literature on Augustine’s philosophy of language.  It is
worth considering briefly some of the qualifications that scholars give to Wittgenstein’s account.  C.
Kirwan, for example, has argued that Wittgenstein here misunderstands Augustine’s adherence to this
picture—something like Wittgenstein’s own, earlier  ‘picture theory of language’—but that  he is  not,
however, altogether misrepresenting Augustine’s views because of that.  As he notes there: 
“Wittgenstein is right in stating that Augustine does not guard against this mistake, for ‘he does not
speak of their being any difference between kinds of words’; and we might add that Augustine’s own
example of a use of language, to express (state, enuntiare) his own desires, is so simple as not to be far
135
The conclusion that might be drawn here is the following: Indeed, Augustine has not really
learned of  such  a  process  at  all.   It  is  rather  a  ‘picture’—a  primitive  one  at  that,  as
Wittgenstein notes in PI §2—imposed upon his understanding of the nature of language and
of its acquisition, from the outside.  In other words, it is the kind of thing one might ‘repeat
to oneself countless times’, for it seems to lay within our language and language seems to
repeat to us inexorably.
The early stages of language-learning are of interest to Augustine, not for what he thinks he
has learnt—in terms of, e.g., this or that word—but for how he thinks he learnt it.  Language
is not just picked up all at once.  It is taught, by parents and elders, one word at a time.  But
how does that  succeed with infants,  when their  elders cannot but use language as their
medium of instruction?  This, as we have seen, was an early issue raised by Wittgenstein
already in the Notebooks, and resolved shortly after in the Tractatus by simply excluding the
question  from  the  sphere  of  his  interests  in  that  work.  Fifteen-hundred  years  earlier,
Augustine had himself raised this very question and his answer is similarly far from clear.
For  example,  elsewhere—such  as  De  magistro (or  On  the  Teacher,  a  work  that  was
away from mere naming.  Finally, and crucially, there is plenty of reason to think that Wittgenstein is
right in his implicit castigations of philosophers, and other theorists, for falling into the same mistake
when they start to think about language.  Many there have surely been who have been tempted to
adopt as their ‘picture of the essence of human language’ the picture of a system of names. // But
Augustine was not  one of them.   He knew better,  because he knew his grammar.”  (“Augustine’s
Philosophy of Language”, pp. 187-8, in eds. E Stump & N. Kretzmann, The Cambridge Companion to
Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 186-204.)  
However,  Kirwan  concludes  that  Augustine  did  put  faith  in  the  Stoic  doctrine  of  ‘speech-thought
isomorphism’, where speech is specifically conceived as a conglomerate of separate signs each of which
signify an ‘object’ (though they may not all be nouns).  Thus, the names of ‘objects’ are indeed primary
for Augustine, but not because he did not consider other types of words, rather because he understood all
words as  transparently  designatory  in  the  way  that  nouns  are.   The  example  Kirwan  gives,  which
Augustine himself considered in De magistro (apparently unknown to Wittgenstein): the conjunction si
[if].  This led Augustine, as it did the Stoics before him, to consider certain paradoxes (about, e.g., what
the word nihil might signify, etc.), which Wittgenstein undoubtedly would have rejected along the same
lines  as  the  independent  meanings  of  words  like  ‘if’,  ‘but’—not  to  mention  those  given  in  the
Investigations: “Think of exclamations alone, with their completely different functions. // Water! Away!
Ow! […] // Are you inclined still to call these words “names of objects”? […]”  Augustine, evidently,
may have answered ‘Yes’. 
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apparently unknown to Wittgenstein)—he concludes that there is no teacher but God, and it
is  God alone who can teach men knowledge.   Also here,  in the  very passage from the
Confessions that is in question, Augustine makes the following admission: “It was not that
my elders instructed me by presenting me with words in a certain order by formal teaching,
as  later  I  was  to  learn  to  alphabet.   I  myself  acquired  this  power  of  speech  with  the
intelligence which you gave me, my God.”136 
As H. Chadwick notes in his  introduction to Augustine’s  Confessions,  reading the work
today one cannot help but find so much that is ‘modern’ in the work, both philosophically
and socio-politically.137  Wittgenstein would, no doubt, have seen it the other way around.138
Nonetheless, given the context of its production, it would perhaps be too much to expect
from the work a fully consistent philosophical treatise on language and its acquisition.139
For it  was  not intended as  such; at  the same time,  one can hear distinct  echoes of this
account throughout various works that  were so intended—those of Russell,  for example.
Russell’s interest in the a priori connections between the constituents of experience can be
136Augustine, Confessions, op cit., I, 8.  Again, from De Magistro: “Therefore, even when I speak what is
true and one sees what is true, it is not I who teach you.  For one is being taught not by words but by the
realities themselves made manifest by the enlightening action of God from within.”
137H. Chadwick, “Introduction”, p. ix, in Augustine, Confessions, op cit., pp. ix-xxvi.
138We might recall here Wittgenstein’s remark from Culture and Value: 
“People say again and again that philosophy doesn’t really progress, that we are still occupied with the
same philosophical problems as were the Greeks.  But the people who say this don’t understand why it
has to be so.  It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the
same questions.  As long as there continues to be a verb ‘to be’ that looks as if it functions in the same
way as ‘to eat’ and ‘to drink’, as long as we continue to talk of a river of time, of an expanse of space,
etc. etc. people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at
something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up.
And what’s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because in so far as people think they
can see the “limits of human understanding”, they believe of course that they can see beyond these.”
(CV, p. 15 [MS 111; 24.8.31])
139A fact  that  Wittgenstein himself  surely recognised,  as  can be seen from the following remark from
“Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough”: “Was Augustine in error, then, when he called upon God on every
page of the Confessions? //  But—one might say—if he was not in error, surely the Buddhist holy man
was—or anyone else—whose religion gives expression to completely different views.  But none of them
was in error, except when he set forth a theory.” (PO, p. 119 [MS 110; 1931])
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connected with the question of how the meaning of simple words are learned.  It was his
view that the meanings of simple words can be learned only through direct acquaintance
with the things that they signify.  Those things, according to him, are their meaning.  By this
reading our publicly shared language would be contingently—possibly even parasitically—
related to each individual’s private language of sense-data.  Russell has told us, for example,
that there is a whole set of propositions that in principle only ‘I’ can understand.  If others
are to understand that to which I refer in these propositions (such as one’s own self, one’s
toothache,  this  red  present  patch,  etc.),  there  will  have  to  be  logical  relations  holding
between those two languages (that language which one does understand and that which one
does not) allowing one to infer from one to the other.
Though  Russell  would  later  remark  that  he  had  no  interest  in  connecting  his  earlier
philosophical thought with the socio-political work and educational theorising of his later
years140,  one  can here  discern  a  clear  argument  for  the  manner in  which a  language  is
learned.  Upon being born, each of us is endowed with a certain private (and indubitable)
language, which is grounded in the a priori structure of experience.  Properly speaking, this
would  be  our  ‘first  language’.   Through  our  negotiations  with  the  world,  we  begin
quantifying  over  the  propositions  of  those  languages  that  we  do  not  understand  (other
people’s private languages) on the basis of the language that we do understand (our private
language of sense data), and thus are we initiated into a community of speakers who do
likewise and come to share a common public language via our shared descriptions of the
world.141
Despite  Russell’s  resolute  atheism,  the  view  of  language  learning  that  he  advances  is
distinctly  reminiscent  of  Augustine’s  conception  of  learning  through  innate  human
140Cf. P.A. Schlipp (ed.), The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).
141For a brief discussion of this feature of Russell’s theory of knowledge by acquaintance, cf. D.  Pears,
“The Logical Independence of Elementary Propositions”, pp. 75-76, in I. Block (ed) Perspectives on the
Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), pp. 74-84; and D. Pears, Bertrand Russell
and the British Tradition of Philosophy (New York: Collins, 1967), passim.
138
intelligence,  which  can  ultimately  attain  knowledge  only  through  the  grace  of  God.142
Reconstructing a direct genealogy between these respective conceptions of knowledge is
beyond the scope of this work143; however, from this we might justifiably claim that they
share at least this much in common: all learning of a publicly shared language is, in essence,
the  learning  of  a  second  language (which  depends—as it  appears  to  have  done  in  the
Tractatus, despite Wittgenstein’s rejection of Russell’s theory of knowledge—on the perfect
transparency of signs144).  Like that of Russell, the Augustinian view of language-learning
presumes  a  coherent,  proto-linguistic  ‘self’,  which  only  subsequently  learns  to  speak a
publicly shared language.  According to such images, the linguistic novice is no tabula rasa.
We do not  become competent language users,  we simple  are.145  Whether we are so by
142In fact, in De magistro, Augustine goes so far as to assert that all knowledge is recollection, though he is
explicitly agnostic—here, as in the Confessions—about the Platonic doctrine of the pre-existence of the
soul.  From the Confessions, Augustine notes simply: “What, Lord, do I wish to say except that I do not
know whence I came to be in this mortal life or, as I may call it, this living death.  I do not know where I
came from.” (Augustine, Confessions, op cit., I, 6.)
143Backer and Hacker, however, make an interesting claim in this regard: 
“To state that Russell’s general account of language conforms to the Augustinian picture would be too
weak.  The whole purpose of his successive theories of meaning is to prove that language really does
so.   This  conformity is  deep,  not  apparent,  and must  be demonstrated.   Philosophical  analysis of
language is what reveals it.  The principle of acquaintance sums it up.  Finally, the Augustinian picture
informs Russell’s conception of an ideal language: that would be a language in which conformity to it
was visible because no sentence would appear except in completely analysed form.  The Augustinian
picture  functions  as  a  norm of  representation  in  Russell’s  description  of  language.”  (Backer  and
Hacker, Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, op cit., p. 57.)
144Though Wittgenstein’s discussion of the sign-symbol relation in the  Tractatus  obviously does not treat
the notion of second language acquisition in any direct way per se, we might easily regard passages such
as  those  on  the  nature  of  translation—i.e.,  the  translation  of  common  symbols  between  various
collections of arbitrary linguistic signs—as evidence for the kind of transparency of signs that allows for
a seamless initiation from one into another.  This notion of translation finds a wealth of examples in the
work: e.g., between a proposition and a picture (T 4.011), between an audible symphony and its score (T
4.0141), or between ordinary languages such as English and German (T 4.243).  “Like the two youths in
the fairy-tale, their two horses, and their lilies,” Wittgenstein notes in an illustrative example: “They are
all in a certain sense one.” (T 4014)  The connection with logic, and especially with the translation of our
everyday language into logical  notation,  is  clear.   Furthermore,  its  methodological  weight  would be
difficult to underestimate given the nature of his project.  This is discussed at length in 3.3ff.
145It is important to note that  this is no mere antiquated theory.   We might  recall  here specifically the
language-acquisition theories of cognitivists like Chomsky or Fodor.  According to Chomsky’s theory of
‘universal grammar’, a child is bombarded with what he calls ‘primary linguistic data’: 
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nature (as Russell might argue) or by divine intervention (as Augustine suggests) is of no
consequence, for it is a view that Wittgenstein set out to disabuse us of in the Investigations
regardless of its form:
“Someone coming into a strange country will sometimes learn the language of the inhabitants from ostensive
definitions that they give him; and he will often have to guess the meaning of these definitions; and will guess
sometimes right, sometimes wrong.
And now, I think, we can say: Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a
strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only
not this one.  Or again: as if the child could already think, only not yet speak.  And “think” would here mean
something like “talk to itself”.” (PI §32)
Undoubtedly, a dismissive tone may be perceived in remarks such as these, if one were to
look for it.   However,  to do so would be to fail  to appreciate the profound respect that
Wittgenstein  had  for  Augustine.146  In  passages  such  as  that  quoted  at  the  opening  of
Philosophical Investigations one can see why Wittgenstein held Augustine  in such high
regard.  For example, if in reporting his infancy Augustine had maintained a picture of the
‘self’ as one surrounded purely by private sense-data—“hermetically sealed” in the words of
G. Hagberg147—we might expect to find an introspective report, poised between the inner,
narrating self, and the present experience (perhaps even that of remembering) that yields
“On the basis of such data, the child constructs a grammar—that is, a theory of the language of which
the well-formed sentences  of  the  primarily  linguistic  data  constitute  a  small  sample.   To learn  a
language, then, the child must have a method for devising an appropriate grammar, given primary
linguistic data.  As a precondition for language learning, he must possess, first, a linguistic theory that
specifies the form of the grammar of a possible human language, and, second, a strategy for selecting a
grammar of the appropriate form that is compatible with the primary linguistic data.” (N. Chomsky,
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 25.)  For Fodor’s view, see J.A.
Fodor, The Language of Thought (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975).
146R.  Monk  reports  a  humorous  and  telling  example  of  the  kind  of  influence  that  Augustine  had  on
Wittgenstein: “He considered Confessions to be possibly ‘the most serious book ever written’.  He was
particularly fond of quoting a passage from Book I, which reads: ‘Yet woe betide those who are silent
about you!  For even those who are most gifted with speech cannot find words to describe you’, but
which Wittgenstein, in discussing it with Drury, preferred to render: ‘And woe to those who say nothing
concerning thee just because the chatterboxes talk a lot of nonsense.’” (R. Monk, The Duty of Genius, op
cit., p. 282.) 
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self-knowledge—and Augustine does, to some extent, provide just that in his account of his
infantile will.148  But this image is at the same time implicitly unsettled from the outset.  As
we saw above, for example, Augustine notes that he has learned more about his own infancy
from watching other infants than from what he remembers or has been told of what he does
not remember by those who were there.  It is in this spirit that we might consider remarks
such as the following: “I have personally watched and studied a jealous baby.  He could not
yet speak and, pale with jealousy and bitterness, glared at his brother sharing his mother’s
milk.  Who us unaware of this fact of experience?”149  It is thus not only, first, that aspects of
the infant’s inner or ‘private self’—i.e.,  his will,  his desires,  his jealousy and joy… his
thoughts?—are knowable to others before they are knowable to the infant itself through self-
reflection, but second, that this is itself a matter of the kind of ‘common knowledge’ that
antedates any purposeful self-expression of the infant.  Accordingly, it is only in reflecting
on the infancy of others that Augustine has deduced what his own pre-reflective life must
have been like. 
When Wittgenstein describes Augustine’s account of language and language-learning as a
‘primitive picture’ he evidently does not have in mind anything like those pictures described
in the Tractatus.  There, in the earlier work, he notes that we picture facts to ourselves: “A
picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of
affairs.” (T 2.11)  A picture is a model, which restricts reality to two possibilities:  true or
false.  In the Investigations, as Baker and Hacker note, a picture is rather something proto-
147G.  Hagberg,  Describing  Ourselves:  Wittgenstein  and  the  Autobiographical  Consciousness (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2008), p. 133.
148In his commentary to Augustine’s Confessions, J.J. O’Donnell remarks: 
“The weakness of W’s meditation is that it does not do justice to the ethical context in which A. is
careful to situate his own recollections: the aim of language-learning for the infant A. was not any
disinterested  attempt  to  utter  true  propositions  about  the  world,  but  a  much  more  self  interested
attempt to control the world and other people, using whatever rough-and-ready tools were at hand.
[…]   It  remains  true,  none  the  less,  that  the  Augustinian  view of  language-learning  presumes  a
coherent ‘self’ who learns to speak.” (J.J. O’Donnell, Augustine, Confessions, vol. II (Commentary on
Books 1-7) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 58.)
149Augustine, Confessions, op cit., I. 7.
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linguistic,  a  Weltanschauung.   It  establishes  the  what  might  be  considered  to  be  an
intellectual climate, that viewpoint from which an entire style of investigation proceeds.  It
motivates and directs our inquiries, suggesting to us the problems that require explanation
and what will inevitably count as a satisfactory solution to those problems once it has been
discovered.  It is thus that a picture can exert a fascination on us, and as Wittgenstein notes
in PI §115 may even ‘hold us captive’, for we will be unable to get outside of it if we cannot
see (if we cannot  accept) some possible alternative  as an alternative.150  Nonetheless, we
would not be giving Augustine his due were we to conclude, as Backer and Hacker do—
upon painstakingly developing the logical conclusions to be drawn from the ‘Augustinian
picture’ in an extended reductio—:
“Under Wittgenstein’s general supervision, our careful tending of the seed of Augustine’s picture of language
has  produced  a  striking  specimen  in  the  garden  of  philosophy—a  whole  Weltanschauung  encompassing
language, the mind, and the world (the Augustinian picture).  Wittgenstein did not admire this plant, though he
thought  it  to  be  of  colossal  importance.   He  saw it  as  a  weed,  so  important  a  weed  that  much  of  the
Investigations constitutes an elaborate campaign to eradicate it.  Such an expenditure of effort would have been
ridiculous unless  Wittgenstein had  thought  that  the  Augustinian  picture  was  a  pernicious and  widespread
weed.”151
In line with Wittgenstein’s later understanding of what it is that a picture might be and how
it can exert a pernicious effect on our thought, it is true that the Augustinian picture is, as
they note, “like an invisible force, evident only in its visible effects; like a prevailing wind
that affects the growth of a tree, it might show itself only in the asymmetric shape that it
gives to explicit theorizing.”152  And Augustine does indeed advance a primitive picture of
150It is in this sense that Backer and Hacker note, quite correctly: “Russell’s theory of descriptions is an
intellectual  triumph  precisely  because  it  shows  how  to  reconcile  certain  notoriously  recalcitrant
phenomena with the paradigm [towards which theories naturally gravitate, i.e. in Kuhn’s sense].  More
generally, the ingenuity of investigators and the sophistication of theories are judged by their success in
accommodating everything to the adamantine standards set by the paradigm.”  (G. Baker and P.M.S.
Hacker, Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, op cit., p. 47.)
151G. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, op cit., p. 45.
152G. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, op cit., p. 46.
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how a language is learnt, as Wittgenstein claims.  However, even here—in precisely this
‘pernicious and widespread weed’, fit only for ‘eradication’ in Baker and Hacker’s esteem—
another, more important and perhaps even more pernicious weed has already been dispelled
from the start: that of the introspective, epistemically independent solipsist.
As Wittgenstein never ceases to remind us, it can be useful to imagine a language more
primitive  than  our  own:  “It  disperses  the  fog  to  study  the  phenomena  of  language  in
primitive  kinds  of  application in  which one can command a clear  view of  the aim and
functioning of the words.” (PI §5)  This is an important qualification.  For, on the one hand,
it  helps  demonstrate  just  how how far  many contemporary  scholars  on  Augustine  have
misunderstood the purpose of the quotation at the opening of the Investigations (conflating,
as it were, Wittgenstein’s characterisation of Augustine’s allegory as a ‘primitive picture’
with something like an argument for its falsity, which is evidently not the case).153  On the
other hand, it also helps us to imagine just how Wittgenstein might very well have seen
something useful—a ‘grain of truth’, as it were, to continue with Backer and Hacker’s apt
botanical  metaphor—in  the  very  picture  that  Augustine  presents:  that  which  Augustine
interestingly and insightfully calls ‘the natural language of all peoples’.
III.  Learning and Unlearning
In §2 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein notes that Augustine’s concept of meaning rests on
a primitive understanding of the way language functions; however: “one can also say that it
is the idea of a language more primitive than ours.” (PI §2)  He continues thus:
153Here is a typical example:  “Wittgenstein argues that Augustine gives a false picture of the essence of
human language when he claims that the function of words consists in designating objects and when he
interprets sentences merely as the connections of such designations.” (J. Brachtendorf, “The Reception of
Augustine in Modern Philosophy”, p. 487, in ed. M. Vessey, A Companion to Augustine (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2012), pp. 478-491.)
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“Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right.  The language is meant to
serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B.  A is building with building stones: these are
blocks, pillars, slabs and beams.  B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them.  For this
purpose they use a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”.  A calls them out;—B
brings the stones which he has  learnt  to bring at  such-and-such a call.——Conceive of  this  as  a complete
primitive language.” (PI §2)
As  noted  above,  when  Wittgenstein  first  began  preparing  material  after  his  return  to
Cambridge in 1929 for what he planned to become his second publication, he felt it was
essential to begin with a fragment from which the rest of the work would follow naturally.
Despite the fact that at the opening of the Investigations, Wittgenstein has only just lightly
touched on the element of language-learning that pervades the quote taken from Augustine’s
Confessions—choosing rather, as he does, to focus initially on its primitive structure, seen
here  in  §2—we can  nonetheless  witness  his  attentiveness  to  the  pedagogical  aspect  of
Augustine’s picture of language in Wittgenstein’s remarks from the  Nachlaß  at this time.
From MS 111, where Wittgenstein initially begins to meditate on the relevant passage from
Augustine, the very first of these remarks is: “Augustine on the learning of language”154—
and, significantly, not Augustine on language.
But  it  is  not  for  this  reason alone that  we should expect  to  find that  the  image of  the
language-learner  is  one  that  is  woven  into  the  fabric  of  Philosophical  Investigations—
indeed, from beginning (PI §1) to end (PI §693)155—and, as Cavell has so eloquently shown,
154Volume IV of the Wiener Ausgabe, ed. M. Nedo (Vienna: Pringer-Verlag), p. 9.
155In this regard it is also noteworthy that, as M. O’C. Drury relates, in 1931 Wittgenstein had expressed to
him his wish to use as a motto for the  Investigations  a quotation from Shakespeare’s  King Lear: “I’ll
teach  you  differences”.   How easy  it  is  too  focus  perhaps  too  intently  on  the  ‘differences’ in  this
quotation, and miss the pedagogue himself who will do the teaching!  As I noted previously, Baker and
Hacker are correct to point out that: “It is striking how the Nestroy motto and [four of the six alternate
mottoes W. had expressed an interest in using] display a kind of family resemblance.  The image of husk
and core, appearance and reality, the revealed and the concealed run through them, even though they
alternate in evaluation.” (G. P.  Baker and P.M.S.  Hacker,  Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 16.)  They fail to note, however, that options such as the
one  quoted  here,  from  Shakespeare’s  King  Lear,  relate  precisely  to  Wittgenstein’s  post-Tractarian
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this is often explicitly tied to the image of the child.  Before embarking on his analysis of
the primitive language in PI §2, to which Wittgenstein would return throughout the first part
of the work, he notes, in fact, that: “A child uses such primitive forms of language when it
learns to talk.” (PI §5)  Given the critical characterisation of Wittgenstein’s reception of
Augustine sketched above—whether or not that characterisation is wholly justified—this
would appear indeed to be a strange concession to precisely what Augustine has claimed.
So where, we might then ask, has Augustine gone wrong exactly?  Wittgenstein does not
defer the answer: “Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training.” (ibid.)
It is not uncommon to regard ostensive definitions as establishing a link between language
and  the  extra-linguistic  world.   Though  the  term ‘ostension  definition’,  or  the  German
hinweisende  Definition, had  not  been  coined  at  the  time  the  Tractatus  was  written,
something like ostensive definition seems to figure centrally in Wittgenstein’s earlier work
from that period.  If one wished to make a connection between picture of language sketched
here at the opening of the Investigations and that sketched in the Tractatus, the samples of
the ostensive definitions given in Augustine’s narrative would seem to play a role analogous
to that of the  Gegenstände  in the  Tractatus: the simple objects to which the elements of
pictures correspond (T 2.13).  In each case they serve as simple, unanalysable points at
which language connects with reality—the this’s and thats which pin our propositions to the
world—and, as Wittgenstein notes in the Notebooks, it is this connection which is supposed
to guarantee the sense of the picture as a whole:  “The demand for simple things  is  the
demand for the determinacy of sense.” (NB, p.  63, cf.  T 3.23)   But how, then, is  this
connection established in the first place?  
As we have seen, from the Tractarian point of view, it is none too clear.  In this regard, A.
Kenny notes:
“At Tractatus 2.1513-4 Wittgenstein says that the correlations between the elements of a picture and things in
the world are ‘as it were the feelers of the picture’s elements, with which the picture touches reality’. However,
philosophical methodology, nor do they consider explicitly what these methodological remarks might
have in common with the other four.
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it is not said that the correlation is made by ostensive definition.  ‘Ostensive definition’ does not appear in the
index to the Tractatus, but this is unsurprising since the expression was not yet in use as a technical term.  (I
owe this point to Dr. P. Hacker.156)  But no other term appears which could be a non-technical equivalent.
Hindeuten and hinweisen appear in 5.461, 2.02331, 5.02, 5.522, but not in the appropriate sense.157  The nearest
to an allusion to ostensive definition is the passage at 3.263”158
We saw above that Wittgenstein has described the work of philosophy as consisting solely
of  elucidations  (T 4.112),  and  that  indeed  his  work  in  the  Tractatus  is  to  be  properly
understood as such (T 6.54).  The passage that Kenny refers to here (i.e. T 3.263) is, of
course, the other place where ‘elucidation’ figures in the Tractatus:
“The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by means of elucidations.  Elucidations are propositions
that contain the primitive signs.  So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already
known.” (T 3.263)
It  is  clear  that  these  two uses  of  the  term ‘elucidation’ are  intended  to  serve  different
functions in the Tractatus, the one being logical and the other methodological.  However, if
we consider Wittgenstein’s remarks in the opening of the Tractatus, that the book will only
be understood by those who have already had the thoughts that are expressed in, we can see
that  they  nonetheless  share  a  certain  resemblance.   Furthermore,  in  terms  of  the
propaedeutic function of elucidating the meaning of simple terms, the present passage—
which  concerns  only  the  logical  service  that  elucidations  are  supposed  to  perform  as
156Kenny is here referring to Hacker’s paper, “Frege and Wittgenstein on Elucidations”, Mind, 84(4), 1975,
pp. 601-609.
157This ‘appropriate sense’ being the form of the expression that Wittgenstein (and others) accepted by the
time he was composing Philosophical Investigations, as found e.g. in the following: 
“An important part of the training will consist in the teacher’s pointing to the objects, directing the
child’s attention to them, and at the same time uttering a word; for instance, the word “slab” as he
points to that shape.  (I do not yet want to call this “ostensive definition” [“hinweisende Erklärung”,
oder  “Definition”],  because the child  cannot  yet  ask what  the  name is.   I  will  call  it  “ostensive
teaching of words” [hinweisendes Lehren der Wörter”].——I say that it will form an important par of
the training, because it is so with human beings; not because it could not be imagined otherwise.” (PI
§6) 
158A. Kenny, The Legacy of Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 14.
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opposed to the global methodological role of elucidations in the opening and closing of the
work—remains as obscure as the former.159  Whatever the moral we are ultimately meant to
derive from this, one thing that Wittgenstein is definitively not saying here is that we first
learn the meanings of names by ostensive definition, and then, having successfully hooked
those names onto things in the world, we subsequently proceed to put them together in
meaningful sentences.  And this is, of course, what one would expect.  It is none other than
Frege’s ‘context principle’, formulated in the Tractatus thus: “Only propositions have sense;
only  in  the  nexus  of  a  proposition  does  a  name  have  meaning  [Bedeutung].” (T  3.3)
Whatever our understanding of the meaning of simple names, the point here is that it stands
or falls with our understanding of the meaningful propositions in which the names figure.
How this might be so, however, is another matter, one that would seem to be unanswerable
from the point of view of the Tractatus.  And this, of course, shows an essential difference
between  Frege  and  Wittgenstein’s  respective  uses  of  elucidation.   The  Fregean  use  of
elucidation belongs to the propaedeutic of science, and as such it can rely on our everyday,
pre-scientific  language for an elucidation of its central features.   Although the primitive
terms of his  Begriffsschrift  cannot be explained from within the script itself, they can be
rendered intelligible in ordinary language—despite the fact that, because of this, no rigorous
definition can therefore be provided.  Such recourse to everyday language in the service of
elucidation was not a means available to Wittgenstein, for unlike Frege his concern was with
language in general. 
By  the  time  Wittgenstein  returned  to  Cambridge,  he  came  to  realise  that  ostensive
definitions  could  not  serve  the  purpose  he  seemed  to  have  previously—if  obscurely—
imagined for them.  As he later noted in conversation with Waismann: “When I wrote the
159M. Black, for example, notes that he finds this passage ‘disturbing’, stating: “It is impossible to explain a
name’s meaning explicitly: the only way to convey the meaning is to use the name in a proposition, thus
presupposing  that  the  meaning  is  already  understood.   On  this  view,  the  achievement  of  common
reference  by  speaker  and  bearer  becomes  something  mysterious.”  (M.  Black,  A  Companion  to
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, op cit., p. 15.)  Ultimately, it is doubtful that Wittgenstein intended this remark
about language-learning to be mysterious; more plausible is that he felt it was something that belonged to
the realm of psychology, and not logic.
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Tractatus I was unclear about logical analysis and ostensive definition.  I then thought that
there  is  a  ‘linking up of  language and reality’.”160  As an illustration of  the  difficulties
Wittgenstein came to identify in his early understanding of ostension, we might consider the
kinds  of  objects  that  are  supposed  to  populate  Augustine’s  world:  those  things
corresponding to nouns, Wittgenstein suggests in PI §1, such as ‘table’, ‘chair’, ‘bread’, etc.
Among these  objects  there  might  be,  for  example,  a  table.   It  would  have been likely,
therefore,  that Augustine’s elders had occasion to point  at  this  thing and utter the word
‘table’.  But how could Augustine learn by observing such behaviour that this name was to
be associated in fact with  the table, and not rather to its  material, its  colour,  shape,  size,
number, and so on?  Pointing alone cannot serve to specify the intended definiendum, for the
gesture will be the same for each of these different things—for which even the general term
‘object’ will increasingly and inevitably fail to suffice161—and there seems to be no strictly
logical way in which they might be distinguished from one another.  
As Wittgenstein notes, following his remark on Augustine’s idea of the infant as one who
has arrived in a ‘strange country’—that is, as one who already has a language, only not that
of his elders, and therefore has to guess what is intended—:
“Suppose, however, someone were to object: “It is not true that you must already be master of a language in
order to understand an ostensive definition: all you need—of course!—is to know or guess what the person
giving the explanation is point to.  That is, whether for example to the shape of the object, or to its colour, or to
160Quoted  in:  F.  Waismann,  Ludwig  Wittgenstein  and  the  Vienna  Circle,  ed.  B.  McGuinness,  trans.  J.
Schulte and B. McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), pp. 209-210.
161In the opening paragraph of The Blue Book, Wittgenstein provides a short list which contains a few even
more exotic examples,  familiar  words for which one would struggle to find ‘universals’ even if  one
thought, as Russell apparently did, that it would be worthwhile to do so: 
“Augustine, in describing his learning of language, says that he was taught to speak by learning the
names of things.  It is clear that whoever says this has in mind the way in which a child learns such
words as “man”, “sugar”, “table”, etc.  He does not primarily think of such words as “today”, “not”,
“but”, “perhaps”.” (BlB, p. 77)  
Similarly, in the Investigations, Wittgenstein would later note: “Think of exclamations alone, with their
completely different functions. // Water! // Away! // Ow! // Help! // Fine! // No! // Are you inclined still to
call these words “names of objects?” ” (PI §27)
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its number, and so on.”——And what does ‘pointing to its shape’, ‘pointing to its colour’ consist in?  Pointing
to a piece of paper.—And now to its shape—now to its colour—now to its number (that sounds queer).—How
did you do it?—You will say that you ‘meant’ a different thing each time you pointed.  And if I ask how this is
done, you will say you concentrated your attention on the colour, the shape, etc.  But I ask you: how is that
done?” (PI §33)
Furthermore, even if we suppose that the child has guessed correctly in the given case and
the name is indeed correctly ascribed to the intended object, how is ostension to teach the
grammatical role that this name is then supposed to play in a well-formed sentence?  We
might take, for example, even the case of ostension itself.  As Wittgenstein notes early on in
the  Investigations, while still in direct dialogue with the picture of language sketched by
Augustine in PI §1: 
“Are “there” and “this” also taught ostensively?—Imagine how one might perhaps teach their use.  One will
point to places and things—but in this case the pointing occurs in the use of the words too and not merely in
learning the use.—” (PI §9)162
On the  surface,  the  simple  point  is  this:  ostension,  along with  all  of  the  other  diverse
activities that make language use successful, cannot be contained solely in the relationship
between name and object.  As Wittgenstein would put it later on in the Investigations: “A
great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to
make sense.” (PI §257)  
162This recalls a noteworthy remark in the Notebooks, which finally serves to illustrate that there is some
role for ostension in the Tractatus, and just how far Wittgenstein had come in rejecting this view by the
time he was composing Philosophical Investigations: “What seems to be given us a priori is the concept:
This.—Identical with the concept of the  object.” (NB, p. 61)  Wittgenstein’s use of italics here for the
indexical ‘this’ would suggest indeed, that ostension is what he has in mind here.  This stylistic feature is
not one that would be abandoned in the Investigations: “The definition of the number two, “That is called
‘two’”—pointing at two nuts—is perfectly exact.—But how how can two be defined like that?  The
person one gives the definition to doesn’t know what one wants to call “two”; he will suppose that “two”
is the name given to this group of nuts!” (PI §28)
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When teaching a language, we do not tell language-learners which things in the world the
words of our common language refer to,  as if  we only needed to attach labels  to those
objects that are otherwise already present to the young learners mind (PI §26).  Rather, we
teach them what things there are.  We initiate them into a world, one where we do things
with words—which they might thus be said to  inherit.  As Wittgenstein notes, concerning
his own ‘primitive language-game’, sketched initially in PI §2:
“In languages (2)  and (8)  there was no such thing as asking something’s  name.   This,  with its  correlate,
ostensive definition, is, we might say, a language-game on its own.  That is really to say: we are brought up,
trained, to ask: “What is that called?”—upon which the name is given.  And there is also a language-game of
inventing a name from something, and hence saying, “This is ….” and then using the new name.  (Thus, for
example, children give names to their dolls and then talk about them and to them.  Think in this connection
how singular is the use of a person’s name to call him!)” (PI §27)
Cavell has summarised this point well in The Claim of Reason, when he notes: “In ‘learning
language’ you learn not merely what the names of things are, but what a name is; not merely
what the form of expression is for expressing a wish, but what expressing a wish is; not
merely what the word for ‘father’ is, but what a father is; not merely what the word for
‘love’ is, but what love is.”163  
From the  point  of  view  of  the  Tractatus,  and  the  necessity  of  employing  well-formed
sentences for meaningful speech to even begin, we might also perceive in this pedagogical
focus a model for the achievement of syntactic comprehension: i.e, learning ‘what a father
is’—an ‘object’, by the Tractarian framework—we learn how to address him, how to speak
about him, etc.  Learning ‘what love is’—a ‘relation’, according to the Tractatus—we learn
how to speak of it in a meaningful way and without ‘crossing our categories’, as it were.
While  Wittgenstein’s  later  notion  of  grammar  would  complicate  this  strict  categorical
understanding of objects and relations, etc., in his subsequent appeal to grammar the same
attention to well-formed sentences is given.  Despite dramatically expanding the sphere of
163S. Cavell,  The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1979), p. 177.
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meaningful utterances, Wittgenstein’s adherence to the ‘context principle’ never wavered (so
long as one applies it to competent speakers, such as philosophers, for example) and thus, in
this sense, it remained an essential element of the critique of metaphysics (now understood
not simply to mean metaphysics itself, but rather the ill-formed speech of metaphysicians)
that would run throughout his work, early and late, despite the change in compositional
form that occurred between his two major works.
However,  in  the  Investigations, there  is  never  solely  one  point  being  made  and  our
interpretations of it are rarely, if ever, meant to be simple in just this sense.  On one level
Wittgenstein is indeed offering an alternative to what might be considered a paradigmatic
case  of  the  kind of  accounts  that  can often found in philosophical  works—a ‘primitive
picture’ at best, a ‘pernicious and widespread weed’ in the philosopher’s garden at worst.
Whether or not this is a fair characterisation of Augustine’s overall view, it is a picture of
language that is nonetheless present in diverse forms throughout the history of philosophy,
right up to and including that of Russell, possibly even the  Tractatus  itself, and beyond.
Wittgenstein’s  explicit  task  is  thus,  as  we  have  seen,  to  get  his  readers  to  accept  his
alternative account as an alternative.  His aim is to enable us to shift our perspective.  But
then what exactly are we to do with this alternative once it has been accepted as a viable
alternative?
For indeed, on another level,  a more global methodological point is also being made: a
critique directed at philosophy as a whole, in all its guises, regardless of what the object of
its  fascination  may  be.   It  is,  as  Wittgenstein  notes  in  PI  §192,  the  very  tendency  of
philosophers to seek ‘super-expresssions’ or ‘philosophical superlatives’ in their attempts to
find  something  that  would  qualify  as  an  acceptable  explanation  of  the  phenomena  that
perplex them, whatever it may be.  It is the ‘craving for generality’ that leads them to a
contempt of particulars, due to their rough and irregular form.
Before  concluding  this  section,  let  us  consider  an  example.   In  PI  §143,  Wittgenstein
introduces  his  discussion  of  rule-following,  around  which  the  great  bulk  of  the
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Investigations revolves.  The example under consideration here is—once again—that of a
young learner, and his reaction to a given order.  Wittgenstein supposes that it is an order
that we, as competent language users, are familiar with, but which the learner in question
does not yet fully understand.  The order: “to write down a series of signs according to a
certain formation rule”, e.g., that of the natural numbers.  He thus begins by asking how an
instructor might bring the pupil to understand what this notational form requires:
“First of all series of numbers will be written down for him and he will be required to copy them. (Do not balk
at the expression “series of numbers”; it is not being used wrongly here.)  And here already there is a normal
and an abnormal leaner’s reaction.—At first perhaps we guide his hand in writing out the series 0 to 9; but then
the possibility of getting him to understand will depend on his going on the write it down independently.—And
here we can imagine, e.g., that he does copy out the figures independently, but not in the right order: he writes
sometimes one sometimes another at random.  And then communication stops at  that  point.—Or again, he
makes  ‘mistakes’ in  the  order.—The difference  between  this  and  the  first  case  will  of  course  be  one  of
frequency.—Or he makes a systematic mistake; for example, he copies every other number, or he copies the
series 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, …. like this: 1, 0, 3, 2, 5, 4, …… Here we shall almost be tempted to say that he has
understood wrong.” (PI §143)
Evidently, the pupil may make infrequent or systematic errors; however, he might also write
numbers down at random.  He might respond abnormally to the instructor’s attempts at
explanation—including,  in  this  case:  guiding  the  pupil’s  hand,  repeating  his  own
expressions before the pupil, attempting to get the pupil to ‘repeat after me’, as one can
often hear it said in any number of diverse pedagogical contexts—in which case the pupil’s
capacity to learn will come to an end.  Now, if such abnormal reactions were to become the
norm—for this particular pupil, for an entire community, or for humanity at large—then our
usual attempts at explanation would lose their point.  What would normally count as an
explanation in these circumstances would cease to do so.  The fact is, however, that in most
cases such techniques work just fine and in these cases we simply are not troubled by the
apparent lack of logical foundations at all.
152
Wittgenstein is nowhere denying that the correct apprehension of a rule or an ostensive
definition cannot (or does not) function in many cases (or even in the majority of cases).
Neither is he denying that particular portions of our publicly shared language might very
well be learned in precisely the way that Augustine describes.  In fact, he notes in relation to
the language-game sketched in PI §2: “An important part of the training will consist in the
teacher’s pointing to the objects, directing the child’s attention to them, and at the same time
uttering a word.” (PI §6)  What he is denying, however, is that what will count as a correct
guess or an incorrect guess in any particular case is determined by a set of abstract and
external ‘super criteria’, timeless and immutable, determining in each instance the correct
application  of  the  rule.   It  is  a  conception  that  has  been  termed,  if  somewhat
euphemistically, the ‘Platonic conception of rules’.  According to this notion, familiar from
the case of the philosophy of mathematics especially, it is the rule itself —or, in the case of
ostension,  the  object itself—that  will  be  the  criteria  for  its  own  correct  application  or
ascription.  Furthermore, its role as arbitrator of our adherence will exist independently of
whether the rule is followed once, twice, or always, and independently of any exceptions
one may or may not encounter in a given particular instance.  Indeed, the rule will exist
independently of whether or not it is ever followed, or even whether there is anyone there to
follow it, etc.  By this conception, when we follow rules we only execute what has already
been made present to the mind in the act of grasping the rule.  Once again, we have here an
image of the language-speaker very much akin to Russell’s solipsist, insofar as the correct
use of language is necessarily tied to the direct apprehension of the object, rule, etc. which is
only subsequently referred to or obeyed in our public acts of discourse.
Now, despite Wittgenstein rejection of Russell’s image of solipsism—which was already
subjected  to  a  devastating  critique  in  the  Tractatus—he  evidently  recognised  that  the
apparent privacy of sensations presents a unique case of training in the new sense devised in
Philosophical Investigations.   We can see this if we consider that nearly a hundred remarks
in direct succession are devoted precisely to this topic: PI §§243-315, now christened the
153
‘Private Language Argument’.  In PI §244, for example, Wittgenstein begins his reflections
on sensation language thus:
“How do words  refer  to  sensations?—There  doesn’t  seem to  be  any  problem here;  don’t  we  talk  about
sensations every day, and give them names?  But how is the connection between the name and the thing set
up?  This question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations?—of
the word “pain” for example.  Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural,
expressions of the sensation and used in their place.  A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk
to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences.  They teach the child new pain-behaviour.
“So you are saying that the word ‘pain’ really means crying?”—On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain
replaces crying and does not describe it.” (PI §244)
Unlike  words  such  as  ‘table’  and  ‘chair’,  words  without  such  immediate,  primitive
expressions—there  is,  for  example,  no  characteristic  ‘table-behaviour’—the  natural
expressions that result from these sensations may be given a linguistic replacement.  This is
surely  a  stark  reminder  of  the  kind of  diversity  Wittgenstein asks  us  to  be  attentive  to
throughout  the  Investigations.   For  unlike  the  use  of  words  such  as  ‘table’ (as  in  the
expression ‘This is a table’), what Wittgenstein is suggesting here is that a word like ‘pain’
(as in the expression ‘I am in pain’) need not be a description.  It may, for example, function
as a linguistic proxy for the sensation’s more primitive expression  (like a cry, a shout,
grimace or groan).  
It may, certainly… but must it?  In Insight and Illusion, Hacker gives the following account
of  our use of  (and our learning the use of)  basic  sensation words that  is  founded on a
particular interpretation of this paragraph.  He notes there:
“The framework for this language-game consists in the shared human disposition to react to injury by groaning
or  crying  out  in  pain  and  assuaging  the  injured  limb.   For  the  beginning  of  such  language-games  with
psychological expressions lies in natural human behaviour in certain circumstances, in our groans of pain, our
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gasps of surprise, our trying to obtain what we want, our trembling when in danger, and our paroxysms of
anger. (But not all psychological expressions are like this.)”164
Despite  this  last  caveat,  Hacker  seems  to  be  presenting  on  Wittgenstein’s  behalf  a
comprehensive  theory  of  how at  least  some  language-games  develop  and  how a  child
becomes initiated into them: the child hurts itself, moans, we teach it to replace its groans
with a linguistic expression such as ‘I am in pain’, ‘it hurts’, and so on.  He goes on to
explain that the relation between natural behaviour and linguistic expression will vary from
concept to concept, and that some sensation words (such as a tickling feeling, for example)
might have no characteristic natural behaviour at all.  Nonetheless, he concludes: “It is an
indispensable guide, but each concept needs careful scrutiny in its own right.”165  
But in fact, just how indispensable it is will depend on whether any scrutiny at all regarding
the  biological  roots  of  this  or  that  aspect  of  our  language—careful  or  otherwise—is
important for  the kind of  project  that  Wittgenstein was engaged in.   It  is,  for example,
difficult to reconcile Hacker’s gloss of PI §244 with methodological remarks such as: “We
must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place” (PI §109), or:
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains for deduces anything.—
Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain.  For what is hidden, for
example, is of no interest to us.” (PI §126)  For indeed, what Hacker appears to be offering
in this interpretation of PI §244 is precisely an  explanation of our capacity to use certain
kinds of sensation language correctly, and not a description of its correct use.
We will return to explore the significance of such methodological remarks shortly; however,
in this regard it is important to note that if one reads PI §244 carefully one will notice that,
when  Wittgenstein  introduces  this  example  of  the  linguistic  replacement  for  natural
behaviour, he qualifies the case in a significant manner.  What Wittgenstein is presenting us
with here is, he notes: one possibility.  This is an important qualification, for it suggests that
164P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion (Revised Edition) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 293.
165P.M.S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion (Revised Edition), op cit., p. 297.
155
the  account  of  language-learning  described  in  this  passage,  and  indeed  throughout  the
Investigations, may  be  intended  for  a  different  purpose  than  the  one  that  Hacker  has
described.  The danger that follows from Hacker’s interpretation (and others like it166) is that
it relies precisely on a failure to consider this qualification of the account that follows and
thus continues the search for foundations to linguistic phenomena—i.e., some foundation or
other,  to this or that phenomena—although the Tractarian search for  the  foundation has
nonetheless been abandoned.167  For in fact, if Wittgenstein considered the case of sensation
166The reading I have highlighted here is certainly not unique to Hacker, and I have taken his interpretation
only as an example of how many people have understood Wittgenstein’s appeal to the ‘natural’ in the
Investigations.   D.  Pears,  for  example,  suggests  that  Wittgenstein’s  resolution of  the  ‘rule-following
paradox’ “is achieved by going outside language and showing how [an intention to do ‘the same again’]
rests on pre-existing independent structures.” (D. Pears, “Wittgenstein’s Naturalism”, p. 419, The Monist,
78(3), (1995), pp. 411-423.)  He goes on, incredibly, to conclude that Wittgenstein “might have included
in his naturalistic investigations, the material studied by neurologists and psychologists” (ibid, p. 423).
N.  Malcolm  uses  PI  §244  to  reconstruct  how  we  acquire  our  talk  about  causal  relationships—cf.
“Wittgenstein:  The Relation of  Language to  Instinctive Behaviour”,  in  N.  Malcolm,  Wittgensteinian
Themes  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell  University Press, 1995) and “Language as Expressive Behaviour, in N.
Malcolm, Nothing is Hidden (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986)—and V. Krebs goes one step further when
he says of this passage that: “Although he is speaking of a specific language-game, it is every word, not
just psychological words, that must be appropriated in this way if language is to be meaningful; if, that is,
it is to serve as a means of communication for the speaker.” (V. Krebs, “The Subtle Body of Language
and the Lost Sense of Philosophy”, p. 147, Philosophical Investigations, 23, 2000, pp. 147-155.)  These
are all interesting possibilities in their own right, though hardly stand on two legs if they are intended to
be a thorough exposition of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.  I am reminded here of Janik’s apt remark: “We
should  bear  in  mind  that  our  problems  often  arise  from  his  solutions.”  (A.  Janik,  “Nyiri  on  the
Conservatism of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy”, in A. Janik,  Essays on Wittgenstein and Weininger
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1985), p. 133.)  
167This point has been made at length in K. Dromm’s  Wittgenstein on Rules and Nature. The weight of
Dromm’s  reading  rests  in  Nozick’s  conception  of  ‘philosophical  explanations’  (cf.  R.  Nozick,
Philosophical  Explanations  (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press,  1981).   He  remarks,  for
example: 
“We do not use these explanations to expand our knowledge, but to make coherent or plausible the
things we  already know.  They ease a  tension,  among other  things,  relieving the anxiety or  other
distress that tension might cause.” (K. Dromm, Wittgenstein on rules and Nature (London: Continuum,
2008), p. 33.)  
Thus, Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘general facts of nature’, ‘primitive responses’ or ‘instinctual reactions’
is not meant to be taken as a thesis about our common biological origin.  Philosophical explanation, as
opposed to the ordinary garden-variety or scientific kind, do not need to be true to serve their purposes;
they are to be thought of as therapies, justified by their ability to cure us of our misplaced philosophical
convictions.  According to Dromm: 
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language to be a special case, as I have suggested above, it is highly doubtful that this is
because sensation language needs something like a ‘special kind’ of foundation in order to
be  made  sense  of—one  that  would  be  required  given  the  lack  of  our  usual  ostensive
possibilities,  for  example.   The evidence for this  is  now widely available;  however,  we
might consider here a very characteristic remark that Wittgenstein once made to a student of
his:
“I used to say at one time that, in order to get clear how a certain sentence is used, it is a good idea to ask
oneself the question: ‘How would one try to verify such an assertion?’  But that’s just one way among others of
getting clear about the use of a word or a sentence.  For example, another question which is often very useful
to ask oneself is: ‘How is this word learned?’  ‘How would one set about teaching a child the use of this
word?’  But some people have turned this suggestion into a dogma—as if I’d been advancing a theory about
meaning.”168
It is much more likely, therefore, that if the case of sensation language is a special one  it is
because in such instances we are  particularly attracted to a particular picture of how our
language functions.  It is perhaps because it is the last bastion of the solipsist—who might
agree, e.g., that things like tables, chairs, etc., do indeed exist ‘out there’ in the world, but
still: ‘Only I know this pain’—that Wittgenstein is concerned with addressing here and not
any  supposed  biological  imperative  within  the  mechanisms  of  language-learning.   It  is
perhaps  rather  an  exemplar—and  undoubtedly  just  one  among  many,  no  matter  how
“Philosophical explanations are a kind of fiction, and like any fiction, they might well be true. Also,
they are not meant to inform.  Rather, they are intended to provoke our imagination.  Fictions do this
so as to entertain, but sometimes also to instruct, and instruction can take many other forms besides
informing.” (ibid, p. 34)
168Quoted in D.A.T. Gasking and A.C. Jackson, “Wittgenstein as Teacher”,  op cit.,  p. 54.  However, in
defence of those still tend to find theses in the Investigations, Wittgenstein’s later remark in On Certainty
would seem to indicate a certain degree of plausibility to their account of PI §244: “I myself wrote in my
book that children learn to understand a word in such and such a way.  Do I know that, or do I believe it?
Why in such a case of I  write  not  “I  believe etc.” but  simply the indicative sentence?” (OC §290)
Whether  Wittgenstein  therefore  intended the  original  remark  to  be,  in  fact,  a  thesis,  or  whether  he
changed his mind about the role such fine distinctions should play in his philosophy is an interesting
question,  which  unfortunately  cannot  be  developed  here.   The  question  remains:  why  indeed  did
Wittgenstein write ‘simply the indicative sentence’?
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stubborn—of  the  kinds  of  problems  that  Wittgenstein  sought  not  to  solve  with  his
philosophy, but rather dissolve… not to learn, but to unlearn.
IV.  The Investigations as a Pedagogical Work
In a well-known passage of the Investigations, Wittgenstein compares language to an
‘ancient city’: “a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of
houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of
new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.” (PI §18)  I would
suggest that this is like Wittgenstein’s own writing in the Investigations itself and thus
serves as a useful guide to reading the work.  We might recall here, for example, this
particularly noteworthy remark from the preface:
“I have written down these thoughts as remarks, short paragraphs, of which there is sometimes a fairly long
chain about the same subject, while I sometimes make a sudden change, jumping from one topic to another.—
It was my intention at first to bring all this together in a book whose form I pictured differently at different
times.  But the essential thing was that the thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in a natural
order and without breaks.
After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realised that I should never
succeed.  The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon
crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination.——And this was, of
course, connected with the very nature of the investigation.  For this compels us to travel over a wide field of
thought criss-cross in every direction.—The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of
sketches of landscape which were made in the course of these long and involved journeyings.” (PI, Preface)
Mixing our metaphors somewhat, we might consider those remarks from among the ‘fairly
long chains’ that  Wittgenstein refers  to here—such as his  treatment of the ‘Augustinian
picture of language’ and the subsequent private-language argument that develops out of this
—to be like the more straight and regular thoroughfares; we might likewise consider those
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more singular, but just as well-known passages—such as PI §43: “For a large class of cases
—though not for all—in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the
meaning of a word is its use in the language”—to be like the market-places in the centre of
town, where many stop to do their daily business or to gossip; we might consider those
remarks from among the last of the book to be like the irregularly lighted edge of town, less
visited by the casual tourist; and so on.
By the light of this metaphor, however, we should be reluctant to describe Wittgenstein’s
frequent methodological breaks as just one more kind of ‘jump’ among others, just one more
kind of  ‘sudden change’ between  the  more  overt  subjects  dealt  with  in  the  book:  “the
concepts  of  meaning,  of  understanding,  of  a  proposition,  of  logic,  the  foundations  of
mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things”, by Wittgenstein’s own reckoning
(PI, Preface).  We should rather view them as something akin to  road signs, marking the
essential routes and noting the detours that one must attend to if one is not to loose one’s
way in this ‘maze’—intended, as it were, to keep his readers ‘on the straight and narrow’,
though language (including Wittgenstein’s own) is rarely if ever either.
The methodological  significance to be drawn from Wittgenstein discussion of language-
learning  can  clearly  been  seen,  if  we  consider  how,  when  Wittgenstein  introduces  his
account of rule-following in PI §143—before continuing to PI §145, where we are meant to
continue by supposing that the pupil now writes the series 0 to 9 “to our satisfaction”—he
distinctly pauses in order to re-orient the reader in PI §144.  In that first remark, PI §143, we
recall that Wittgenstein notes that the pupils ‘capacity to learn may come to end’, if for
example he reacts to our explanation abnormally: a case similar to that in which “a person
naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand looking in the direction of the line
from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip.” (PI §185)  Wittgenstein then pauses, in
order to interrogate his own use of language in this particular passage:
“What do I mean when I say “the pupil’s capacity to learn may come to an end here”?  Do I say this from my
own experiences?   Of  course  not.   (Even  if  I  had  such  experience.)   Then  what  am I  doing  with  this
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proposition?  Well, I should like to say: “Yes, it’s true, you can imagine that too, that might happen to!”—But
was I trying to draw someone’s attention to the fact that he is capable of imagining that?——I wanted to put
that picture before him, and his acceptance of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given
case differently: that is, to compare it with  this  rather than  that  set of pictures.  I have changed his  way of
looking at things.  (Indian mathematicians: “look at this.”)” (PI §144)169
The picture of philosophy that is sketched in the Investigations is not a flattering one, and in
the many personal recollections that we have of Wittgenstein from this period we know that
he was not shy about expressing his outright antipathy for it.  Within the pages of the work
itself, Wittgenstein compares the philosopher to one who has forgotten the purpose of what
he is doing (PI §127), to an idling engine (PI §132), to a fly stuck in a fly-bottle (PI §309).
Perhaps most famously, he compares the philosopher’s treatment of a question to an illness
(PI §255).170  
169This source of this appendix is sketched in greater detail in MS 220, reprinted in  Zettel: “I once read
somewhere that a geometrical figure, with the words “Look at this”, serves as a proof for certain Indian
mathematicians.  This looking too effects an alteration in one’s way of seeing.)” (Z §461)  According to
Baker and Hacker, the text Wittgenstein is referring to here may be von Hartmann’s Philosophy of the
Unconscious, which contains the following remark: 
“It is in ethno-psychological respects extremely characteristic that the treatment of geometry among
Greeks aims at a rigorous discursive mode of proof, and sedulously ignores the most obvious intuitive
demonstrations; whereas that of the Hindoos, in spite of an endowment for arithmetic far surpassing
the Greeks, is yet entirely based on direct intuition, and is usually confined to an artificial construction
in support of intuition, to which the one word ‘see!’ is appended.”  
A useful comparison might be made to a characteristic remark from Wittgenstein’s Nachlaß, MS 161, 6,
where he first draws a geometrical proof and then notes: “How does this proof convince me?  It convinces
my eyes.” (Cf. G. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein, Understanding and Meaning, op cit., p. 623.)
170But then who is the philosopher here, and what is the disease: the question itself or the treatment of the
question? The original remark reads:  Der Philosoph behandelt eine Frage; wie eine Krankheit.  To be
sure,  Anscombe’s  translation  of  Wittgenstein’s  original  remark—“The  philosopher’s  treatment  of  a
question  is  like  the  treatment  of  an  illness”—fails  to  do  justice  to  the  ambiguity  of  the  original.
Anscombe’s version suggests that we should understand this remark as stating: the philosopher treats a
question as one treats an illness.  However, the original also allows for the possibility that it is not the
question but the philosopher’s treatment of it that is like a disease.  Like the infamous ‘Ink-Blot’ tests of
cognitive science, which Wittgenstein was highly interested in, whether one choose one interpretation or
the other  will  inevitably say more about  the  interpretor  than the originator  of  the  remark.   (For  an
insightful discussion of this passage, cf. S. Mulhall, Wittgenstein’s Private Language (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2007), pp. 89-95.)    
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From out  of  the  treatment  of  language-learning  in  the  Investigations,  I  believe  another
metaphor  for  the  philosopher  presents  itself:  that  of  the  abnormal  learner,  one  whose
capacity to carry on independently has been brought to an abrupt end by a refusal to accept
our ordinary, everyday explanations for any number of things.  Wittgenstein’s discussion of
the deviant pupil in PI §143 shows the interdependency of  the normative and the normal.
By the light of this comparison, it also shows the deviance of the philosopher, who refuses
to  participate  in  the  everyday  kinds  of  linguistic  performances  that  keep  our  language
functioning smoothly.  As Wittgenstein notes:
“When we give an order, it can look as if the ultimate thing sought by the order had to remain unexpressed, as
there is always a gulf between an order and its execution.  Say I want someone to make a particular movement,
say to raise his arm.  To make this clear, I do the movement.  This picture seems unambiguous till we ask: how
does he know that  he is to make that  movement?—How does he know at all what use he is to make of the
signs I give him, whatever they are?—Perhaps I shall now try to supplement the order by means of further
signs, by pointing from myself to him, making encouraging gestures, etc.  Here it looks as if the order were
beginning to stammer.” (PI §433)
A sign-post, an arrow for instance, can be regarded as a simple rule—but even the signpost
begins to stammer when we ask, as philosophers: How should I interpret that arrow now?
The philosopher portrayed in the Investigations is, in this sense, like one who insists on the
possibility of following the arrow ‘from tip to tail’, so to speak.
It is important, Wittgenstein notes, that an arrow can point the other way; however, to insist
upon this fact in every case or upon turning left where the arrow points right merely because
it is possible—or, likewise, to throw up one’s hands in an expression of helpless, sceptical
indecision before every crossroad—would be a strange kind of pathology.  It would be to
find oneself held captive by a queer picture of meaning and understanding.  A man will be
imprisoned in room with an unlocked door, Wittgenstein once remarked, “as long as it does
not  occur  to  him  to  pull  rather  than  push  it.”  (CV,  p.  42  [MS  125;  18.5.1942])
Wittgenstein’s discussion of language-learning in the Investigations highlights how certain
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tendencies  to  go on in  certain kinds  of  ways—that is  to  say  both the right way of the
satisfactory pupil,  and the wrong way of the one who has failed to understand, like the
deviant pupil or the philosopher—have been learned in particular psycho-social contexts.
They can, therefore, be unlearned—with the right approach.171
As Wittgenstein reminds us, it is often useful to ask ourselves how a word or technique has
been learned.   So where,  we might  then ask,  do we find the  source of  these  maladroit
philosophical inclinations?  “A main cause of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet: one
nourishes one’s thinking with only one kind of example.” (PI §593)  In the Investigations,
just as it ever was in the  Tractatus, the source of our misunderstanding is the failure to
command a ‘clear view’ of language.  However, in the later work it is not a matter of seeing
what is essential in language, but rather attending to diverse sorts of examples drawn from
different contexts.  ‘What is a proposition?’—we might ask, as Wittgenstein himself had
asked earlier in the Tractatus.  In that work the answer was: “a proposition is a picture of
reality”  (T 4.01).   It  is  the expression of  a fact,  whatever  can be true or  false.   In  the
Investigations, the emphasis shifts dramatically.  The answer becomes: ‘Well…  this, this,
and  this… and  maybe this  too in some cases, but definitely not  that’, and so on.  “Asked
what a proposition is,” Wittgenstein explains, “we shall give examples and will include what
one may call inductively defined series of propositions.” (PI §135)  It is interesting to note,
given the widespread perception that Wittgenstein denies the power of ostensive definition
171Indeed, we can see that this ‘unlearning’ is meant to be understood in precisely the context of ‘training’
wherein proper, ordinary learning occurs if we consider the following remark from Moore, recounting
what Wittgenstein had told his students during his lectures upon his return to Cambridge in 1930.  Moore
notes that Wittgenstein described himself as having discovered a ‘new method’ of philosophising, and
that “it was now possible for the first time that there should be ‘skilful’ philosophers, though of course
there had in the past been ‘great’ philosophers.” (PO, p 113).  Moore continues:
“He went on to say that, though philosophy had now been ‘reduced to a matter of skill’, yet this skill,
like other skills, is very difficult to acquire.  One difficulty was that it required a ‘sort of thinking’ to
which we are not accustomed and to which we have not been trained—a sort of thinking very different
from what is required in the sciences.  And he said that the required skill could not be acquired merely
by hearing lectures: discussion was essential.  As regards his own work, he said it did not matter
whether his results were true or not: what mattered was that ‘a method had been found’.”  (ibid., my
emphasis)
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to communicate sound understanding, that when he asks himself in the Investigations what a
proposition is, the answer is in fact found by providing precisely an  ostensive definition.
However, it is not a single, sole act of ascription that guarantees the answer has been given
correctly, indubitably and once and for all.  It is rather a series that develops with familiarity
over time, one that is defined as much by what it excludes as by what it includes, and which
is therefore subject to alteration and the potential for incertitude in any given case.  As
Wittgenstein  remarks  in  one  of  the  key  methodological  remarks  that  feature  in  the
Investigations:
“But how many kinds of sentences are there?  Say assertion, question, and command?—There are countless
kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call “symbols”, “words”, “sentences”.  And this multiplicity
is not something fixed, given once and for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may
say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.  (We can get a rough picture of this
from the changes in mathematics).
Here the terms “language-game” is meant to bring to prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part
of an activity, or of a form of life.” (PI §23)
“—It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and the ways they
are used,” Wittgenstein concludes in a parenthetical remark, “with what logicians have said
about  the  structure  of  language.  (Including  the  author  of  the  Tractatus  Logico-
Philosophicus.)” (ibid.)
Despite  its  explicit  disavowal  of  all  dogmatic  metaphysical  expressions,  Wittgenstein’s
earlier  approach  in  the  Tractatus nonetheless  remains  tied  to  the  tradition  that  it  had
attempted to overturn—although perhaps only insofar as it places itself at the very limits of
that conception.  It belongs to the philosophical tradition that is, as Whitehead so aptly put
it,  merely  “a  footnote  to  Plato.”172  It  should  not  be  surprising,  therefore,  that  when
172A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, Corrected Edition, ed. D.R Griffin and
D.W. Sherburne (New York:  Free Press, 1979), p. 39.  Of course,  Wittgenstein’s student Wasfi Hijab
would  later  add,  in  a  comical  quip:  “until  Wittgenstein.”  (Quoted  in  D.  Edmonds  and  J.  Eidinow,
Wittgenstein’s Poker, op cit., p. 9.)
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Wittgenstein began composing the Investigations he defined his approach in terms opposed
to those of Plato, in both form and content.  In the Investigations he points out, for example,
that  the  Socratic  question  What  is  knowledge? in  the  Theaetetus is  the  demand  for  a
definition—i.e.,  the  demand  for  an  essence—where  no  particular  usage  of  the  word
‘knowledge’ has been provided.  For in asking the question, Socrates “does not even regard
it  as  a  preliminary  answer to  enumerate  cases  of  knowledge.”  (BlB,  p.  20)   Which,  of
course, is to say that he fails to give us examples.173
It  is  important  to  note  that  by  introducing  such  considerations  into  his  later  work
Wittgenstein was not rejecting his earlier account of, e.g., what a proposition is, as he was
not  rejecting Augustine’s  account  of  ostensive definition in  PI  §1 of  the  Investigations.
Rather, he was attempting to circumscribe it by the light of its application.  In other words,
he was attempting to give such accounts a reason, where none had previously been given.
173In fact, in the dialogue, it is Theaetetus himself who attempts to respond to Socrates’ question precisely
by giving diverse examples of the kinds of knowledge we might have, a strategy Socrates denies him the
validity of:
“THEAETETUS: Then I think that the things Theodorus teaches are knowledge—I mean geometry and
the subjects you enumerated just now.  Then again there are the crafts such as cobbling, whether you
take them together or separately.  They must be knowledge, surely. 
SOCRATES: That is certainly a frank and indeed a generous answer, my dear lad.  I asked you from
one thing and you have given me many; I wanted something simple, and I have got a variety.
THEAETETUS: And what does that mean, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Nothing, I dare say.  But I’ll tell you what I think.  When you talk about cobbling, you
mean just knowledge of the making of shoes?
THEAETETUS: Yes, that’s all I mean by it.
SOCRATES: And when you talk about carpentering, you means imply the knowledge of of the making
of wooden furniture?
THEAETETUS: Yes, that’s all I mean, again.
SOCRATES: And in both cases you are putting into your definition what the knowledge is of?
THEAETETUS: Yes. 
SOCRATES: But that is not what you were asked, Theaetetus.  You were not asked to say what one
may have knowledge of, or how many branches of knowledge there are.  It was not with any idea of
counting these up that the question was asked; we wanted to know what knowledge itself is.—Or am I
talking nonsense?” 
(Plato,  Theaetetus,  trans  M.J.  Levett  and  M.  Burnyeat,  in  Complete  Works,  ed.  J.M.  Cooper
(Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), pp. 162-163.) 
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We might recall here Wittgenstein’s qualification that if one sought a definition of those
things we wish to call ‘games’, one can delimit the concept for particular purposes (limiting
oneself  to  boardgames,  for  example,  as  in  PI  §3).   In  the  Investigations Wittgenstein
proceeds to note that earlier, in the Tractatus, he had in fact done just that: 
“At bottom, giving “This is how things are” as the general form of the proposition is the same as giving the
definition: a proposition is whatever can be true or false.  For instead of “This is how things are” I could have
said “This is true”. (Or again “This is false”.)  But we have: 
‘p’ is true = p
‘p’ is false = not-p
And to  say  that  a  proposition  is  whatever  can  be  true  or  false  amounts  to  saying:  we call  something  a
proposition when in our language we apply the calculus of truth functions to it.” (PI §136)
So, indeed, we can put a limit around such things, selecting a sample from those
among those of  our  ‘inductively defined series’—when,  for  example,  we wish to
apply  a  truth-functional  calculus  to  propositional  language,  which  is  entirely
legitimate.  But whether it will be useful to do so—and if so, in precisely which cases
—is a different matter entirely.
It  is  this question  that  occupied  Wittgenstein  in  Philosophical  Investigations,  not
simply with regard to the nature of propositional language, ostensive definitions, and
so on, but with regard to the overall practice of philosophy itself.  We might consider
here particularly one of the well-frequented remarks from the Investigations:
“It is not our aim to refine or complete a system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity.  But this means that the philosophical problems
should completely disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to.—The one
that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring  itself  in question.—
Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems
are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
165
There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.” (PI §133)
Indeed, as Wittgenstein himself makes clear, the Tractatus was not a text that was intended
to instruct.  “The correct method in philosophy,” he notes, “would really be the following: to
say nothing except what can be said”—a method singularly, and fantastically renounced
within the work itself.  Wittgenstein continues: “Although it would not be satisfying to the
other person—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—this
method would be the only strictly correct one.” (T 6.53)  But what about  Philosophical
Investigations  and the method he proposes there,  a  method of philosophising that  treats
problems, not a single problem, by providing a series of examples—which, as he notes, can
be broken off?
Wittgenstein is not generally considered a ‘philosopher of education’, and rightly so. Except
for a few remarks he wrote little about the subject.174  His own technique in the classroom
often mystified and frustrated his students.  At times he was even abusive.175  It is clear,
174Little that is, except for the preface to the Wörterbuch he produced while teaching gradeschool children
in Austria.  Interestingly, Bartley claims that Wittgenstein was influenced by Glöckel’s school-reform
movement—which attacked the old ‘drill’ schools of the Hapsbergs in favour of a doctrine of ‘learning
by  doing’—though Wittgenstein’s  preface  to  the  Wörterbuch  shows precisely  the  opposite,  with  its
almost authoritarian overtones.  We might consider here, especially the following remark:
“In this distressing situation I made up my mind to dictate to my students (the forth grade of a school
with five grades) a dictionary.  This dictionary contained about 2,500 entries.  A dictionary of an even
smaller  size  would  not  have served  its  purpose.   He  who works at  the  practical  level  is  able  to
understand the difficulties of this work.  Because the result should be that each student receives a clean
and, if at all possible, correct copy of the dictionary, and in order to reach that goal the teacher has to
control  almost  ever word each student  has written.  […] When, after  sever months  of  work [eine
mehrmonatliche Arbeit = Wittgenstein’s own notorious grammatical slip],  this little dictionary was
finished it appeared that the work had been worthwhile: the improvement of spelling was astonishing.
The orthographic conscience had been awakened!” (PO, p. 19)  
In  this  regard,  it  is  interesting  to  compare  Wittgenstein’s  different  position  on  the  propaedeutic  of
language—guiding the learner’s hand, getting him to repeat an expression, etc.—and the  pedagogy  of
language—giving examples,  posing rhetorical  questions, etc.—explored throughout the  Investigations.
(Cf. W.W. Bartley, Wittgenstein (London: Quartet Books, 1974), p. 105 et passim.)
175Finia  Pascal  relates  a  now infamous incident,  which occurred while  Wittgenstein was working as  a
schoolteacher in rural Austria: “During the short period when he was teaching at a village school in
Austria, he had hit a little girl in his class and hurt her (my memory is, without details, of a physically
violent act).  When she ran to the headmaster to complain, Wittgenstein denied he had done it.  The event
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however, that he thought very seriously about education.  As we have seen, he frequently
used pedagogical examples and analogies to make philosophical points.  Indeed, one could
even  argue  that  Wittgenstein’s  style  of  writing  and  doing  philosophy  is  fundamentally
pedagogical: that is, it aims at teaching a way of thinking about philosophical problems and
—in many instances—at unlearning certain bad philosophical habits.
Dialogue is frequently considered the quintessential pedagogical form of philosophy.  It is
taken to define both a style of philosophising, based upon a give-and-take of question and
answer,  and  a  process  of  inquiry.   Wittgenstein’s  way  of  ‘doing  philosophy’ in  the
Investigations is pedagogical in this sense, though it differs from traditional attempts to do
philosophy in this vein, even those that were consciously practised as a kind of pedagogical
technique.  It is aporetic, but not Socratic.  It is dialogical, but not in the traditional sense.  It
is no surprise, then, that Wittgenstein writes: “Reading the Socratic dialogues one has the
feeling; what a frightful waste of time!  What’s the point of these arguments that prove
nothing  and  clarify  nothing.”  (CV,  p.  14  [MS  111;  30.7.1931])   Or,  moreover,  that
Wittgenstein expresses his impatience with the game of Socratic rhetoric, and the injustice
of his approach:
“Socrates keeps reducing the sophist to silence—but does he have right on his side when he does this? Well, it
is true that the sophist does not know what he thinks he knows; but that is no triumph for Socrates. It can’t be a
case of “You see! You don’t know it!”—nor yet, triumphantly, of “So none of us knows anything!” ” (CV, p. 56
[MS 133; 19.1.1946])
stood out as a crisis in his early manhood.” (F. Pascal, “Wittgenstein: A Personal Memoir”, pp. 48-49, in
C.G. Luckhardt (ed), Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1979), p. 23-
61.)  Though he certainly never struck any of his students at Cambridge, Wittgenstein’s scorn must at
times have had as terrible an effect upon its intended receiver, if not more so.
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From  a  certain  perspective  Wittgenstein’s  approach  can  be  seen  as  Socratic.176  Like
Socrates, he is not, for example, saying that his interlocutor’s claims is false.  He rather aims
to bring out how his interlocutor does not know himself what his claim is, what it is he
actually wants to say, or means to say.  However, where Socrates professed his ignorance
and sought to disabuse others of their mistaken beliefs, Wittgenstein, through his dialogical
form of reasoning, sought to reveal how in most cases we already know all that we need to
know. He sought to guide us back to the ‘rough ground’ where we can walk for ourselves, to
unlearn the kinds of artificial ignorance that philosophy imposes upon itself in its attempts
to solve problems that were never genuinely posed to begin with.  
Wittgenstein admits in the preface to Philosophical Investigations that: “It is not impossible
that it should fall to the lot of this work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to
bring  light  into  one  brain  or  another—but,  of  course,  it  is  not  likely.”  (PI,  Preface)
However, given the characterisation presented here, and the analogy of language-learning
with learning to philosophise in the new way that Wittgenstein was attempting to bring
about, it might indeed be claimed that this is its aim: to teach us to attend to differences
among the particulars (rather than gloss over them), to heed examples (rather than ideals), to
nourish our thought on the diversity of the everyday:
“When philosophers  use a word—“knowledge”, “being”,  “object”,  “I”,  “proposition”,  “name”—and try to
grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the
language which is its original home?—
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.” (PI §116)
Wittgenstein’s  later  work  deals  with  many  subjects:  “the  concepts  of  meaning,  of
understanding,  of  a  proposition,  of  logic,  the  foundations  of  mathematics,  states  of
176In a remark that  bears an uncanny resemblance to Wittgenstein’s critique of Socratic dialogues as a
‘waste of time’, Wittgenstein too would note: “I still find my way of philosophizing new, and it keeps
striking me so afresh; that is why I need to repeat myself so often. It will have become second nature to a
new generation, to whom the repetitions will be boring. I find them necessary.” (CV, p. 1 [MS 105; 1929)
Is it only a matter of waiting until we may someday find Wittgenstein’s repetitions—which return over
and over again to that which we see so clearly, and find nothing problematic therein—a terrible waste of
time?  
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consciousness,  and”,  he  notes,  “other  things.”  (PI,  Preface)   Against  philosophers  who
would traditionally seek the essence of these things, what we would do under Wittgenstein’s
tutelage is to ask if the word is ever actually used that way outside of philosophy.  What we
would do is bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.  What then, we
might ask, is so relevant to the future of philosophy—as Wittgenstein conceived of it—
about a word’s ‘everyday’ use?  What is characteristic about the original home from which it
is derived?  It is one in which explanations come to an end somewhere, one in which our
usual attempts at explanation do not loose their point.  It is one in which we know how to go
on.
V.  Concluding Remarks: Is There A Future for Philosophy?
This chapter  began with an exploration of  Wittgenstein’s  discussion of  solipsism in the
Tractatus.   We saw there that  even though Wittgenstein had already subjected Russell’s
formulation of the problem to a devastating critique, elements of the solipsistic world-view
remain tied to the work—and this despite Wittgenstein’s claim that “solipsism, when its
implications are strictly thought out, coincides with pure realism.” (T 5.64)  ‘The world as I
found it’, so to speak, remains the world that I—and I alone—found.  As Wittgenstein notes
in the Notebooks, for example:
“What has history to do with me?  Mine is the first and only world!
I want to report how I found the world.
What others have told me about the world is a very small and incidental part of my experience of the world.
I have to judge the world, to measure things.” (NB, p. 82)
Furthermore, shifting the emphasis of this declaration slightly, we have also seen that the
‘world as I found it’ is  indeed also just  that:  found.   It  is a world fully populated with
meaning, without the capacity for the piecemeal instruction inherent in linguistic initiation.
This is surely a strange form of realism, the clarificatory weight of which will inevitably fall
on how we are to conceive of Wittgenstein’s reference to the ‘pure’  realism with which
solipsism is supposed to coincide.  In this chapter we thus surveyed a selection of possible
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answers to this question—‘resolute’ and ‘not-so-resolute’, as it were.177  Whichever way one
takes this notion, the logical, Tractarian conception of language poses a number of problems
from  the  point  of  view  of  language-learning,  most  notably  those  concerned  with  the
mechanisms that would appear to be necessary for the elucidation of the simple terms that
figure in our propositions and the apparent necessity of our having to acquire, at some point
in time, an understanding of them.  By extension, this would also pose a problem for our
identification of the objects to which the simple terms in our propositions are supposed to
correspond.  The paradoxical nature of this ‘bootstrapping’ is expressed in the Tractatus as
follows: 
“The meaning of primitive signs can be explained by means of elucidations.  Elucidations are propositions that
contain primitive signs.  So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already known.” (T
3.262, my emphasis)178
In Wittgenstein’s early work, it appears that this circularity is supposed to be resolved by a
notion akin to that of ‘ostensive definition’.  Despite the fact that the Tractarian notion of
ostension is only obscurely expressed in the work—a failing for which Wittgenstein cannot
be faulted, as the term had not yet come into existence at the time—several remarks attest to
its significant logical role.  Principally, we might here consider the following remark from
177Those  provided,  for  example,  by  McGinn  and  Diamond,  the  first  of  whom  is  willing  to  read  in
Wittgenstein’s remarks on solipsism some remnant of transcendental metaphysics, the latter of whom
denies this—although Diamond nonetheless admits that elements of unclarity remain in Wittgenstein
Tractarian critique of Russell that would not be resolved until Wittgenstein returned to the question in the
1930’s with his new programme in hand.
178This expression is,  of  course,  none other than a rephrasal  of  Frege’s ‘context  principle’.  Ultimately,
whether or not one sees this as paradoxical will depend on how far one is willing to accept Wittgenstein’s
characterisation of the ‘metaphysical self’—and thus sensical language-use—as non-psychological.  M.
Black, as we have seen, describes this passage as ‘disturbing’, noting: “It  is impossible to explain a
name’s meaning explicitly: the only way to convey the meaning is to use the name in a proposition, thus
presupposing  that  the  meaning  is  already  understood.   On  this  view,  the  achievement  of  common
reference  by  speaker  and  bearer  becomes  something  mysterious.”  (M.  Black,  A  Companion  to
Wittgenstein’s  Tractatus,  op  cit.,  p.  15.)   It  is  a  claim  to  which  Kenny  responds  humorously,  if
ambiguously: “no more disturbing than artificial respiration.” (A. Kenny, The Legacy of Wittgenstein, op
cit., p. 14.)  In any case, as it has been shown above, Wittgenstein’s appeal to elucidation in this context
is  not immune to critical interrogation in the same ways that Frege’s appeal to the context principle is
(hence, Wittgenstein’s own evolution post-1930’s), since Wittgenstein seeks to elucidate language ‘as
such’ and not some restricted part of it, as Frege does.
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the Notebooks: “What seems to be given us a priori is the concept: This.—Identical with the
concept of the object.” (NB, p. 61)179
When Wittgenstein  returned to  Cambridge  nearly  ten  years  after  the  publication  of  the
Tractatus, he recognised that the notion of ostensive definitions could not serve the logical
function he had earlier envisioned.  As he would remark in a conversation with Waismann
from this period, for example: “When I wrote the  Tractatus  I was unclear about logical
analysis and ostensive definition.  I then thought that there is a ‘linking up of language and
reality’.”180  Language-learning is not dealt with in the Tractatus in any clear way and even
the role of ostensive definition is only obscurely formulated there; so, it is interesting to note
that  when  Wittgenstein  wrote  the  Investigations  he  chose  a  passage  from  Augustine’s
Confessions  that  highlighted  precisely  these  difficulties  in  his  earlier  conception.
Furthermore, this passage from Augustine also helped to pave the way to the novel form of
philosophy that Wittgenstein sought to develop in his later work.  For, as we have seen,
when Wittgenstein describes the Augustinian picture of language—which is undoubtedly
akin to that of the Tractarian—as a ‘primitive picture’ (PI §2), he is not thereby rejecting it
as  false.  He is rather circumscribing its application, demanding reasons where none had
previously been given—which is to say: where none had been given, not where none could
be given.
Solipsism,  ostensive  definition  and  language-learning  are  three  themes  that  are  woven
throughout Wittgenstein’s work, early and late.  In the Tractatus,  ostension was conceived
as an a priori connection between between the elements of a picture and the objects to which
they corresponded.  As a consequence, Wittgenstein was able to relegate language-learning
to the domain of psychology—effectively excluded it from those areas of interest to the
179As  we  have  seen,  the  use  of  italics  here—i.e.  in  the  indexical  ‘this’—is  typically  intended  by
Wittgenstein to indicate the ostensive act.  It is a particular stylistic feature found consistently throughout
his writings, early and late.  E.g.: “The definition of the number two, “That is called ‘two’”—pointing at
two nuts—is perfectly exact.—But how how can two be defined like that?  The person one gives the
definition to doesn’t know what one wants to call “two”; he will suppose that “two” is the name given to
this group of nuts!” (PI §28)
180F. Waismann, Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, op cit., pp. 209-210.
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logical framework outlined there—and solipsism, as Wittgenstein conceived it in opposition
to Russell, served as the inevitable conclusion to the non-psychological conception of the
self that figures centrally in the work.  As Wittgenstein concludes his remarks on solipsism:
“Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology
deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it.” (T 5.641)
In the Investigations, on the other hand, the philosophical self is precisely the human self—
the human being, of body and soul.  It is the familiar, all-too-human self that is prone to
confusions, to lapses in attention, to failures in judgement—that finds itself sometimes held
captive by a picture of itself and its place in the world.  It is these very human confusions
that Wittgenstein sets out diagnose and treat in his later work.  As we have seen, this is only
possible insofar as these confusions illustrate a  systematic error (consistently reading an
arrow from ‘tip  to  tail’,  as  it  were.)181  I  have  further  argued  that  philosophy  itself—
traditionally conceived, with its ‘craving for generality’ and ‘contempt for the particular’—
is just such a systematic error, a bad habit that in Wittgenstein’s esteem must be unlearned
rather than refuted.
No longer the self-sufficient ‘I’ of the  Tractatus,  which must itself measure the world—
whose encounters with others make up a small and insignificant part of its experience—the
philosopher is portrayed in the  Investigations  as one who has, in fact, already inherited a
world through the learned use of our publicly shared language.  This language, this world, is
‘in order as it is’ in the Investigations just as much as it ever was in the Tractatus.  However,
far from merely attending to the superficial structure of language—and thus speaking where
he should rather be silent—the philosopher portrayed in the Investigations is one who has
181As Wittgenstein notes in regard to infamous deviant pupil, who adds two up to 1000, and then proceeds
to add 4, and insisted he was going on in the same way as before: “Such a case would present similarities
with one in which a person naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the
direction of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip.” (PI §185)
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wilfully, perhaps even irresponsibly, chosen to abrogate the knowledge that comes with that
inheritance  in  favour  of  a  self-imposed  and  artificial  ignorance.   The  philosopher  is
portrayed  as  something  like  a  child,  who  has  just  recently  learned  how  easily  it  can
aggravate its parents by repeatedly asking ‘Why?’—over and over again—and accepting no
answer  as  final.182  Unlike  the  child,  however,  the  malcontent  philosopher  in  the
Investigations has long since ceased to gain any pleasure from this incessant inquiring.
Aligning the image of the language-learner with that of the philosopher in the Investigations
thus plays a duel role.  On the one hand, Wittgenstein wishes to draw our attention to the
way words are learned as a means for providing one kind of criteria for what counts—and
what  should  count—as an acceptable understanding of a word, rule, definition, etc.  For
example, when we get stuck in philosophical difficulties—such as when we look for precise
‘essences’ corresponding to the loose and amorphous concepts of our language, a difficulty
that will inevitably arise if we cannot accept that these concepts are unproblematically loose
and  amorphous—Wittgenstein  offers  the  following  counsel:  “In  such  a  difficulty  ask
yourself: How did we  learn  the meaning of this word (“good” for instance)?  From what
sort of examples?  In what language-games?  Then it will be easier for you to see that the
word must have a family of meanings.” (PI §77)  On the other hand, throughout the work
182As Moore notes in his account of the lectures of Wittgenstein he attended in the early 1930s, regarding
Wittgenstein’s ‘new method’ oh philosophy: 
“He said that the ‘new subject’ consisted in ‘something like putting in order our notions as to what can
be said about the world’ […] He said we were also ‘in a muddle’ about things, which we had to try to
clear up; that we had to follow a certain instinct which leads us to to ask certain questions, though we
don’t even understand what these questions mean; that our asking them results from ‘a vague mental
unease’, like that which leads children to ask ‘Why?’; and that this unease can only be cured ‘either by
showing that a particular question is not permitted, or by answering it’.” (PO, p. 114) 
Furthermore, K.E. Tranøy relates the following telling anecdote of Wittgenstein’s own attitude towards
belligerent children, that is worth recalling briefly here: 
“The two children of the von Wrights were quite small at the time, between five and ten years old.
Wittgenstein did not always think their parents handled the task of child-raising in the right way.  On
one occasion he summed up his reactions in the following memorable sentence: ‘When you say NO to
a child, you should be like a wall and not like a door’.” (K.E. Tranøy, “Wittgenstein in Cambridge
1949-51.  Some Personal  Recollections”,  p.  15,  in  Essays on Wittgenstein in Honour of  G.H.  von
Wright (Acta Philosophica Fennica, 28, 1976), pp. 11-21.)   
173
Wittgenstein appears to embody this allegorical role himself—he, like the teacher, and we
his readers like students who will ideally become increasing prepared to accept his examples
as legitimate examples… examples that can, Wittgenstein reminds us, be broken off.  This is
not to say that it was a role he coveted.183  However, there is more than a family resemblance
between  Wittgenstein’s  use  of  pedagogical  examples  in  the  Investigations  and  the
pedagogical  style of the work as a whole.   Along with the rest,  such examples help to
demonstrate a method for knowing how to go on.  However,  as Wittgenstein shows us,
knowing how to ‘go on’ often means knowing precisely  when to stop… and sometimes it
means knowing when to change direction, to turn around, to retrace our steps, etc.
Before concluding, it is important to note that this conception of philosophy has a strong
bearing on how we are to understand the historical significance of philosophical works.  For,
insofar as philosophical problems arise due to the concrete psycho-social circumstances of
particular individuals—those discussed here, and throughout philosophical works in general
—one  is  not  automatically  justified  in  claiming  that  their  works  are  of  a  universal,
transhistoric value, nor that they will inevitably transcend the cultural milieu from whence
they  came.   When  we  do  philosophy:  “we  are  talking  about  the  spatial  and  temporal
phenomena of language,” Wittgenstein notes in the  Investigations, “not about some non-
spatial, non-temporal phantasm.” (PI §108)  However, he also interjects an important note in
the margins beside this remark, significant too for being one of the few corrections that
Wittgenstein had made to the final typescript of the Investigations by the time of his death:
“Only it is possible to be interested in a phenomena in a variety of ways.” (ibid.)  Seen from
the point of view of its grammar—if no longer its ‘logical structure’184—language can be
183Lest we assume that Wittgenstein took any lasting satisfaction from his perceived need to fulfil this role
in his work, it is good to consider a remark such as the following—characteristic, and in no way unique
among the many personal recollections we have of Wittgenstein from those who knew him personally—:
“I thought that when I had resigned my professorship at Cambridge I had at least got rid of my vanity.
But now I find I am becoming vain about the style in which I am able to write my present book”, i.e.
Philosophical  Investigations.   (Quoted  in  M.  O’C.  Drury,  “Some  Notes  on  Conversations  with
Wittgenstein”, p. 23, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 28, 1976, p. 22-40.)
184Whether or not the ‘logical structure of language’ Wittgenstein had sought to identify and isolate in the
Tractatus  is to be understood in a similarly historically-conditioned sense is, as we have seen, a more
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conceived as a historically-situated and historically-conditioned phenomena.  As such, the
philosophy of language is an equally situated and conditioned undertaking.  But then once
again, we might here ask: Must that be so?
Philosophy, for Wittgenstein, is a struggle with language.  Language is both the source of
our  confusions  and  the  means  by  which  we  elevate  them.   This  tension,  and  how
Wittgenstein sought to resolve it, is captured wonderfully in the Kantian overtones of his
formulation of the task of philosophy in the  Tractatus:  “All philosophy is a critique of
language [Sprachkritik].” (T 4.0031)  Though Wittgenstein would later begin to move away
from the transcendental conception of his earlier work, this same concern for this duality of
language—as both ‘sinner’ and ‘saint’, as it were—is woven throughout the Investigations
as well: “Philosophy,” Wittgenstein notes there, “is the battle against the bewitchment of our
intelligence by means of language.” (PI §109)  Strangely, it is perhaps the ambiguity of this
remark that makes it such an accurate depiction of the very kinds of difficulties we can get
stuck in when we philosophise, and—more importantly—the kinds of things Wittgenstein
asks us to attend if we are to get ourself ‘unstuck’.
However,  it  also  shows  us  that  what  Wittgenstein  has  to  say  about  philosophy  is  no
exception  to  the  rule.   It  would  be  a  mistake  to  think  that  if  Wittgenstein  himself
philosophises in the precise manner that he does, then this is because it is an exemplar of
what  philosophy  must or  even  should be.   Rather,  if  Wittgenstein  felt  compelled  to
philosophise in just the way that he did, it is because the problems he was dealing with
complicated question.  I  have explored this at length elsewhere.  However,  I believe we might  well
summarise  the difficulties  we are presented with here via a  strange,  and in  my opinion paradoxical
remark from Diamond’s essay entitled “Throwing away the Ladder”: 
“A remark like ‘There is a fundamental distinction between functions and objects’ is thrown out once
we get the predicate ‘function’ out of the cleaned up philosophical vocabulary.  We are left after the
transition with a logical notation that in a sense has to speak for itself.  If we try afterwards to say why
it is a good notation, we know that we shall find ourselves saying things which may help our listeners,
but which we ourselves cannot regard as the expression of any true through, speakable or unspeakable.
When we say why the notion is a good one, when we explain what logical distinctions and similarities
it makes perspicuous, we are in a sense going backwards, back to the stage at which we had been
when  grasping  the  point  of  the  transition.”  (C.  Diamond,  “Throwing  Away  the  Ladder,”  in  C.
Diamond, The Realistic Spirit, op cit., p. 183.) 
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figure  strongly  within  the  philosophical  tradition,  the  very  tradition  upon  which
Wittgenstein wished to have a  direct influence.  As he notes in the  Investigations: “Your
questions refer to words; so I have to talk about words.” (PI §120)  Indeed, O. Kuusela is
correct to note, in his short chapter on the historicity of philosophy:
“[Wittgenstein’s] conception of clarificatory rules as objects of comparison, that is to say, is an adjustment of
these philosophical practices, whereby his aim is to solve the problems of dogmatism and injustice to which
these practices give rise.  But had we not inherited from our philosophical tradition the problematic conception
of the unity of concepts that provides the ground for philosophical theories and, subsequently, the motivation
for Wittgenstein’s methodological adjustment, there might not be any need for the adjustment.”185
It  is  of  course  noteworthy  for  our  understanding  of  the  evolution  of  Wittgenstein’s
philosophical  methodology  that  he  begins  the  Investigations  with  a  passage  from
Augustine’s  Confessions,  where in the  Tractatus  he had previously claimed: “the reason
why I give no sources is that it is a matter of indifference to me whether the thoughts that I
have had have been anticipated by someone else.” (T, p. 4)  Just how significant it is for
philosophy in general, however, is another question.186
Nonetheless, we can see that Wittgenstein was attentive to the importance of this question
regarding the historical continuation of philosophy—regardless of whether this reference to
philosophy is to be viewed in a positive or negative light—when he notes in one of his
early-1930s lectures:
185O. Kuusela, The Struggle Against Dogmatism: Wittgenstein and the Concept of Philosophy (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 273.
186Mulhall,  following  Cavell,  has  suggested  that  beginning  the  Investigations  in  this  way  makes
Wittgenstein post-Tractarian philosophy essentially concerned with entering into a dialogue with the past
(cf. S. Mulhall,  Inheritance and Originality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), pp. 29-35).  I wonder, in
the light of all that we have said here, if that is really the case; for, as Wittgenstein notes in Part II of the
Investigations: “we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes.” (PI, p. 230)  Furthermore,
as I  discussed above,  this  was in fact  what  Wittgenstein had planned for a long time before finally
agreeing to open the work with the passage from Augustine: “A lamp is standing on my table.” I believe
the analysis found in the  Investigations that follows could have followed this alternate remark just as
they presently do.  Would we, however, have been as inclined to follow along with them if they had?
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“Why do we wish to call  our  present activity philosophy, when we also call  Plato’s activity philosophy?
Perhaps because of a certain analogy between them, or perhaps because of the continuous development of the
subject.  Or the new activity may take the place of the old because it removes mental discomforts the old was
supposed to.”187
In  his  subsequent  account  of  these  lectures,  Moore  further  relates  being  “a  good  deal
surprised by some of the things he said about the difference between ‘philosophy’ in the
sense in which he was doing might be called ‘philosophy’.” (PO, p. 113)  He notes that
Wittgenstein had remarked that what he was doing was a “new subject”, not merely a stage
in the “continuous development” philosophy, and that:
“There was now, in philosophy, a ‘kink’ in the ‘development of human thought’, comparable to that which
occurred when Galileo and his contemporaries invented dynamics; that a ‘new method’ had been discovered,
as had happened when ‘chemistry was developed out of alchemy’188; and that it was now possible for the first
time that there should be ‘skilful philosophers’, though of course there had in the past be ‘great philosophers’.”
(Ibid.)
There may appear to be a tension between these remarks, when for example Wittgenstein
claims that his is a ‘new method’ and that it has a ‘historical continuity’ with what we have
187A. Ambrose (ed.), Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932-1935; From the Notes of Alice Ambrose and
Margaret  Macdonald (Amherst,  NY:  Prometheus  Books),  pp.  27-28.  Similarly,  in  The  Blue  Book,
Wittgenstein would make a remark that clearly shows that philosophy itself is no exception to the picture
of language that he sketches in the  Investigations  and should be subjected to the same scrutiny as any
other concept commonly employed in the practice: 
“The use of expressions constructed on analogical patterns stresses analogies between cases often far
apart.  And by doing this these expressions may be extremely useful.  It is, in most cases, impossible to
show an exact point where the analogy begins to mislead us.  Every particular notation stresses some
particular point of view.  If, e.g., we call our investigations “philosophy”, this title, on the one hand,
seems appropriate, on the other hand it certainly has mislead people.  (One might say that the subject
we are dealing with is one of the heirs of the subject which used to be called “philosophy”.)” (BlB, p.
28) 
188It is interest to compare this remark with that made by Wittgenstein, in his 1912 review of P. Coffey’s
The Science of Logic.  There, Wittgenstein remarks that: “The author has not taken the slightest notice of
the great work of the modern mathematical logicians—work which has brought about an advance in
Logic comparable only to that which made Astronomy out of Astrology, and Chemistry out of Alchemy.”
(PO, p. 3)
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traditionally called philosophy; or alternately, when he claims that there is  no continuity,
that there is merely an analogical resemblance; or that what he does deserves the name
philosophy because it ‘replaces’ what had previously gone by that name.  However, as we
have  seen,  Wittgenstein’s  method  is  one  of  aligning  pictures  in  order  to  shift one’s
understanding of a problem, not to  fix it in place.  His attempts at giving us a picture of
philosophy, including his own, are likewise not intended to tell us what it must be, once and
for all—for how could it, unless Wittgenstein were prepared to make an exception for this
one sole concept alone?  As Kuusela points out: “We cannot say that philosophy is always a
struggle with language simply because it has to be that for us now.”189
However, at the same time, Wittgenstein is aware of the tension that surrounds this picture
of  history  and  the  historical  development  of  linguistic  phenomena,  such  as  that  of
philosophy, but by no means of philosophy alone.  For here, as is often the case in our
attempts to think historically, the familiar spectre of relativism is evoked once again: Is the
very  claim  which  acknowledges  that  philosophy  is  historically-conditioned,  itself
historically-conditioned?  If so, is it therefore just one more position to be adopted only
transitionally, just one more picture in a parade of others like it that will someday be cast
aside in favour of one more amicable to the philosophers of the future?  And if that is so,
why do we not begin the hard work of rejecting it now, so that we might get a head-start on
the form of philosophy to come?
Here  it  is  difficult  not  to  recall  the  troubled  (and  troubling,  in  light  of  the  historical
dimension of philosophy sketched here) question Wittgenstein poses to himself at the end of
PI §122: 
“A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our
words.—Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity.  A perspicuous representation produces
just that understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’.  Hence the importance of finding and
inventing intermediate cases 
189O. Kuusela, The Struggle Against Dogmatism, op cit., p. 274.
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The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us.  It earmarks the
form of the account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung?’)” (PI §122)
In a following chapter, we will return to look more closely at Wittgenstein’s understanding
of  perspicuous  representation,  the  origins  of  the  idea,  and  at  what  Wittgenstein  hoped
achieving such perspicuity would deliver unto philosophy.  We have already seen, however,
that this danger—of viewing everything as just one more Weltanschauung, impermanent and
therefore subject to change—was in fact articulated early on in the analytic tradition, by
none other than Frege, when he notes in his Foundations of Arithmetic:
“The historical approach, with its aim of detecting how things begin and of arriving from these origins at a
knowledge of their nature, is certainly perfectly legitimate; but it also has its limitations.  If everything were in
continual flux, and nothing maintained itself fixed for all time, there would no longer be any possibility of
getting to know anything about the world and everything would be plunged in confusion.  We suppose, it
would seem, that concepts sprout in the individual mind like leaves on a tree, and we think we discover their
nature by studying their birth: we seek to define them psychologically, in terms of the nature of the human
mind.  But this account makes everything subjective and if we follow it through to the end, does away with
truth.  What we know as the history of concepts is really a history of either our knowledge of concepts or the
meaning of words.” (FA, p. vi-vii)
I have shown earlier that Wittgenstein was attentive to this problematic aspect of historicism
in the  Tractatus, when he argued that history had no relevance to the logical structure of
language despite the apparent evolution of our logical forms over time.  However, when
Wittgenstein returned to philosophy in the 1930’s, with his novel understanding of grammar
in hand, this question returned with him—thus demanding a similarly novel response in
accordance  with  that  new conception.   Kuusela  has  pointed  out,  for  example,  that  the
problem of the transhistorical claims about what philosophy  must be—which are hardly
relieved by the claim that there is nothing at all that philosophy must be, if this claim itself
must  be  transhistorically  so—appears  in  a  number  of  remarks  from  Wittgenstein.   A
noteworthy example is found in MS 132, from 1946, when Wittgenstein had begun to move
179
away from the analyses of the  Investigations,  toward precisely the kind of treatment of
relativism that one finds, e.g., among the remarks collected under the title On Certainty—a
treatment which is, as we will see shortly, often cast in terms of the historical development
of knowledge.  This remark is as follows:
“Do we have to deal with mistakes and difficulties that are as old as our language?  Are they, so to speak
sicknesses  that  are  bound together  with  the  use  of  a  language,  or  are  they  special,  characteristic  of  our
civilisation? … Or also: is the preoccupation with the means of language that penetrate our whole philosophy
an age-old feature of all philosophy, and age-old struggle?  Or is it new like science.  Or like this as well: does
philosophizing always waver between metaphysics and a critique of language?”190
Kuusela concludes by noting that  it  is  far from apparent that  Wittgenstein intended this
rhetorical question to be answered one way or the other.  “Rather,” he notes correctly, “it
seems important that he leaves the question unanswered.”191
Before returning to those 1930’s-era considerations, we will first take a closer look in the
following chapter at how Wittgenstein’s understanding of the ‘logical must’ evolved in his
latest, and indeed even his last remarks.  For in On Certainty Wittgenstein ceases to impugn
its role in our reasoning, but rather seeks to re-inscribe its function in a description of the
way  in  which  we  do  in  fact  reason,  despite  what  he  had  earlier  considered  to  be  its
philosophical dubiousness.  In his post-Investigations thought Wittgenstein becomes even
more interested in language-learning in terms of the creation of a space for judgement, i.e.
of judging whether or not one is going on in the same way.   Through training, the novice
comes to see an activity as one guided by rules, which means the learner does not see it as
something that  simply happens, but rather as something that  must happen.  In doing so he
comes to see the obviousness of the outcome. 
It is perhaps unsurprising then that in the novel approach of this period Wittgenstein should
turn here to the work of G.E. Moore, in particular “A Defence of Common Sense” and
190MS 132, 7-8; 1946, quoted in O. Kuusela, The Struggle Against Dogmatism, op cit., p. 274.
191O. Kuusela, The Struggle Against Dogmatism, op cit., p. 274.
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“Proof of an External World”.  In his last remarks, collected in On Certainty, Wittgenstein
devotes  a  great  amount  of  effort  to  the  task of  articulating just  what  is  so powerful  in
Moore’s  subtle  account  of  knowledge  in  terms  of  the  obviousness of  foundational
knowledge claims, as  well as  what is  mistaken in it.   What may perhaps be surprising,
however, is the manner in which he does so.  We will see that in his attempt to ‘demystify’
scepticism—as opposed to its ‘dissolution’ found in his earlier work—Wittgenstein returns
to affirm the possibility of a genuine sceptical doubt rooted in the historicist insights that he
was developing then.  We will also see, however, that the point remains principally an anti-
philosophical one: our present forms of knowledge are in no way threatened by that insight.
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CHAPTER 3. THE RIVERBED OF THOUGHT MAY SHIFT: THE 
DEMYSTIFICATION OF HISTORICISM IN ON CERTAINTY
“Light gradually dawns over the whole.” 
—On Certainty §141
I. The Idea of a ‘Third Wittgenstein’
At one time, the Tractatus was seen as a cursory and ultimately faulty step along the way to
Wittgenstein’s more mature thought in the Philosophical Investigations.  Such a view is no
longer in fashion, and rightly so.  Today it is generally accepted that the Tractatus is rather a
work that stands alone and succeeds or fails on its own terms regardless of Wittgenstein’s
later  criticisms  of  his  earlier  work.   Wittgenstein’s  admission  in  the  preface  to  the
Philosophical  Investigations,  that  his  earlier  work  contained  “grave  errors”  is  certainly
important, but its broader significance is complicated by the fact that he does not clearly
explicate what he believed those errors were.
Recently,  this  traditional  division  between  the  early  and  later  works—along  with  the
recognition  that  the  Tractatus  is  far  from  a  mere  cursory  step  on  the  way  to  the
Investigations—has led to a growing body of literature on the contours of the limits between
them.   Out  of  this  discussion  has  developed  an  important  and  enormously  influential
reading,  the  ‘Resolute  Reading’.   Granted,  one  should  perhaps  rather  speak  here  of
‘Resolute  Readings’,  for resolute readers are far from making up a unified and singular
whole.  Nonetheless, adherents to this approach will by and large claim that the greatest
difference between ‘Wittgenstein I’ and ‘Wittgenstein II’ is the form of the expression; the
core message of his philosophy remains essentially the same throughout, despite a shift in
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some  matters  of  emphasis  and  formulation  (hence,  a  ‘mono-Wittgensteinianism’,  but  a
‘mild’ one, as J. Conant has characterised it192). For Wittgenstein, of no matter what period,
it is argued, philosophy is an activity and not a body of doctrine.  Its principle aim is not the
solution,  but the dissolution of  philosophical  problems—that  is  to  say,  all  philosophical
problems, including those that Wittgenstein’s own work might appear at moments to present
us with, including, for example, the saying/showing distinction in the earlier work, or the
notions rule-following, forms of life, etc., in the latter.
We clearly find echoes of this sentiment in both of Wittgenstein’s magna opera.  As he notes
in the Tractatus, the correct method of philosophy would be to say nothing but that which
can be said; because the questions of philosophy are not false, but nonsensical, “we cannot
give answers to questions of this kind, but only point out that they are nonsensical.” (T
4.003)  Similarly, Wittgenstein would later ask in the Investigations: “What is your aim in
philosophy?  To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.” (PI §309)  Though the form of
these two remarks is clearly different, one can nonetheless discern here a clear commitment
to the kind of project  Wittgenstein envisioned for  his  philosophy from the start.   Thus,
resolute  readers  suggest  that  in  many  important  respects  the  entirety  of  Wittgenstein’s
philosophy  succeeds  or  fails  according  to  the  conditions  first  set  out  in  the  Tractatus.
Specifically, this reading suggests that if there is anything shown in Wittgenstein’s work—
early, as well as late—it is only the very worldly tendency of philosophers (especially those
who read Wittgenstein) to get wrapped up in such nonsense.193
192J. Conant, “Mild Mono-Wittgensteinianism”, in A. Crary (ed.), Wittgenstein and the Moral Life: Essays
in Honor of Cora Diamond (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), pp. 31-142.  Cf. especially J. Conant,
“Wittgenstein’s later Criticisms of the Tractatus”, in A. Pichler and S. Säätelä (eds.),  Wittgenstein: The
Philosopher and his Works  (Frankurt: Ontos Verlag, 2006), pp. 172-204, for a concise enumeration of
some  possible  candidates  for  positions  Wittgenstein  was  committed  to  throughout  his  work.  (By
‘positions’ we are to understand here not a philosophical doctrine, but rather a consistent methodological
perspective regarding the aim of his philosophy, and the manner this aim is to be realised.) 
193For a summary of the main themes surrounding this debate, see A. Crary & R. Read (eds.)  The New
Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 2000), the contributors of which challenge what I have here called the
‘traditional  view’,  held  most  notably  by  P.M.S.  Hacker  and  the  (early)  G.  Baker.   Concerning  the
characterisation of this reading above, Crary notes: 
“This volume contains papers on Wittgenstein which (with one exception which I will mention below
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Undoubtedly the question of the continuity and/or discontinuity of Wittgenstein’s thought is
a difficult one, and perhaps no answer upon which all scholars can agree will ever be found.
Today, the matter has been even further complicated by an ‘additional Wittgenstein’ being
thrown into the fray, a  third  Wittgenstein, represented by the great body of unpublished
remarks written post-1945 after the final composition of  Philosophical Investigations  had
been  more  or  less  determined.   This  body  of  work  thus  includes,  among  other  as  yet
unpublished  remarks  from  the  Nachlaß,  those  collected  in  On  Certainty,  Remarks  on
Colour, the majority of the remarks in Zettel, and the various writings on the philosophy of
psychology, a body of work which includes Part II of Philosophical Investigations.
This  reading  has  been  championed  in  particular  by  Danièle  Moyal-Sharrock,  whose
collected edition  The  Third  Wittgenstein explores the possibility of attributing a new and
unique  philosophical  programme to  Wittgenstein’s  ‘latest’—and indeed,  even his  last—
remarks.194  As G.H von Wright notes: “As late as two days before his death he wrote down
thoughts  that  are  equal  to  the  best  he  produced.”195  And  indeed,  who  can  doubt  the
directness and power of remarks such as the following, from those composed just a few
short days before Wittgenstein’s death:
“Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man
declares the other a fool and a heretic.
[P.M.S. Hacker’s “Was He Trying to Whistle It?”]) share certain fundamental and—with respect to
received views about Wittgenstein’s thought—quite unorthodox assumptions about his conception of
the aim of philosophy.  This is not to say that the papers form a homogeneous body of work.  They are
concerned with different  periods and regions of his thought,  and they diverge from each other to
various extents in their emphases and styles, and in the views they attribute to him.  Nevertheless,
without regard to the period (or periods) of his work with which they are concerned, they agree in
suggesting  that  Wittgenstein’s  primary  aim in  philosophy—to use  a  word  he  himself  employs  in
characterizing his later philosophical procedures—a therapeutic  one. […] It would not be wrong to
say that  what is most  striking about the papers in this volume has to do with their suggestion of
significant continuity in Wittgenstein’s thought.” (A. Crary, “Introduction”, in The New Wittgenstein,
op cit., p. 1)  
194D. Moyal-Sharrock (ed.) The Third Wittgenstein (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2004).
195G.H. von Wright, Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), p. 31.
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I said I would ‘combat’ the other man,—but wouldn’t I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do
they go?  At  the  end of  reasons comes  persuasion. (Think of  what  happens when missionaries
convert natives.)” (OC §§611-612)
Equal to the best he had ever produced?  Certainly.  But are they the same?  Moyal-Sharrock
suggests that the answer is ‘No’:
“To say, as von Wright does, that from 1946 to his death in 1951, Wittgenstein took ‘new directions’
is not to say that he had never before broached the subjects that were to occupy him in these years—
that is, epistemology, the philosophy of psychology, and the philosophy of colour196—but that he was
now to take them on fully, devoting to them the concentrated and sustained attention that generated
the formidable originality and depth of the wholly self-sustaining works that are On Certainty, Last
Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology and Remarks on Colour.  Where he had earlier grappled
with the subject, Wittgenstein had not achieved a perspicuous enough presentation of it: one capable
of laying the problems to rest.”197
In  the  great  body  of  work  from  this  ‘third-’,  post-Investigations Wittgenstein,  Moyal-
Sharrock identifies a number of defining traits, which she argues are not completely absent
in Wittgenstein’s earlier thought, but which nonetheless are not explored there to the same
extent.  This includes, principally, his attempt to highlight the confusion between knowledge
and  knowledge claims.  It is a distinction that would, on her reading, drive a categorical
wedge  between  what  we  might  typically  consider  ‘knowledge’  from  the  traditional
epistemological standpoint (i.e., things that one can justifiably claim to know) and what is
196Indeed, a noteworthy remark from Anscombe is surprisingly pertinent in this regard, and indicative of the
immense difficulties scholars face trying to reconstruct  Wittgenstein’s intellectual  genealogy.   In the
preface to the Notebooks 1914-1918, she notes: 
“At the 20th of December 1914 there was a rough line of adjacent crayoned patches, using 7 colours.
This was treated as a mere doodle in the first edition, and so it may be.  But, having regard to the
subject matter of meaning and negation, which is the topic of the surrounding text, it is possible that
there is here an anticipation of Philosophical Investigations §48.  A representation of it is printed on
the dust cover of this edition.” (NB, Preface to the Second Edition)
197D. Moyal-Sharrock, “Introduction: The Idea of a Third Wittgenstein”, p. 2. In D. Moyal-Sharrock (ed.)
The Third Wittgenstein (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 1-24.
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termed by Moyal-Sharrock as ‘foundational-’ or ‘primitive certainty’, which would in turn
result  in a refusal  to admit the latter within the domain of epistemology as it  has been
traditionally conceived.  From this, most notably, follows a redefinition of certainty as an
ungrounded way of acting in the world.  As Wittgenstein notes in On Certainty, in response
to  the  question  regarding  what  would  count  as  a  test  for  the  apparently  contingent
propositions that would by this account be ‘foundational’:
“What counts as its test?—“But is this an adequate test?  And, if so, must it not be recognizable as
such in logic?”—As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime.  But the end is not an
ungrounded proposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.” (OC §110)
“This, of course,” Moyal-Sharrock notes, “will have major repercussions for philosophy, for
if our basic beliefs are conceptually commensurate with our acts, there is no longer a logical
gap between our beliefs and our actions.”198
The result—at least insofar as Wittgenstein’s well-known remarks on the traditional problem
of scepticism in On Certainty are concerned, which is Moyal-Sharrock’s focus—is not only
the ‘dissolution’ of scepticism, as can already be found in the  Investigations and possibly
even in the Tractatus before it, but also what Moyal-Sharrock calls its ‘demystification’.199
More  generally,  however,  this  demystification  of  scepticism  follows  from  a  wider
development in Wittgenstein’s thought, regarding the treatment of philosophical problems
in  toto,  which  can  also  be  seen  in  his  post-Investigations remarks  on  colour,  aspect-
perception, psychology and (albeit to a lesser extent) the foundations of mathematics.  It is a
renewed appreciation for the grammatical role of experience and the apparently contingent a
posteriori propositions that have traditionally been accepted as the hallmark of empirical
knowledge.  As she notes:
“It  may be said,  then,  that  the  single track of  Wittgenstein’s philosophy is  the  discernment  and




Tractatus  to  On Certainty, and the way traversed, though single-tracked, was interrupted by turns.
If, from the Tractatus to Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein redefined, for himself and for us,
the  nature  of ‘grammar’, from the  Investigations  to  On Certainty he redefined its  extension.  The
second Wittgenstein realized not only that grammar is not a  Begriffsschrift fixed in advance of its
use, but also that it replaces metaphysics: where what once seemed a metaphysical impossibility (for
example, ‘A patch cannot be red and green at the same time’, ‘A machine cannot think’) now appears
to  be  only  the  expression  of  a  rule  of  grammar.   The  third  Wittgenstein  further  realized  that
contingent facts such as the world existing or my sitting here can also belong to grammar.  This is a
‘new direction’; indeed, it is something even the third Wittgenstein finds difficult to recognize.”200
We should not be surprised that the ‘third Wittgenstein’, along with the demystification of
scepticism  and  his  investigation  into  the  grammatical  status  of  contingent  a  posteriori
knowledge—which,  unlike  the  a  priori,  is  by  most  everyone’s  reckoning  a  temporally-
determined form of knowledge—would also terminate several key chains of thought with
references to time, change and history as well.  For here grammar is thrown back into the
‘stream of life’,  so to speak; for example,  a concluding remark to the first  of the three
sections that make up the complete text (OC §§1-65):
“If  we imagine the facts otherwise than as they are,  certain language-games lose  some of  their
importance, while others become important.  And in this way there is an alteration—a gradual one—
in the use of the vocabulary of a language.” (OC §63)201
As we have seen, Wittgenstein had already touched on the subject of historical change in
Philosophical Investigations, where he notes for example that the multiplicity of linguistic
forms that he was then becoming interested in is “not something fixed, given once and for
200Ibid., p. 4.
201This passage resonates strongly with that of sec. xii, Part II, of the  Investigations, where Wittgenstein
composed one of the strongest formulations of his post-Tractarian method: “I am not saying: if such-and-
such facts for nature were different people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis).
But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different
ones would mean not realizing something that we realize—then let him imagine certain very general
facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the
usual ones will become intelligible to him.” (PI, p. 230)
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all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence,
and others become obsolete and get forgotten.” (PI §23)  However, what we witness in these
last  remarks from  On Certainty  is not only a recognition of the historical  dimension of
language and its  consequent  potential  for  change,  but  also an acknowledgement  of  this
change as a potentially legitimate source of sceptical doubt.  Hence, the need not only for a
refutation of the significance of history as a sceptical concern—which, as we have seen,
already operative in Wittgenstein’s earliest work202—but rather, as Moyal-Sharrock claims,
its demystification.
The legitimacy of this doubt stems from the possibility that, despite our ways of acting in
the large majority of cases as if everything were fixed and stable, the potential exists for a
genuine (which is to say, non-philosophical) experience that it all might somehow have been
different—that  if,  for  example,  certain  general  facts  of  our  natural  history  had  been
otherwise, our contemporary concepts and language-games would differ in corresponding
ways203—with our contemporary view all the while retaining its status as a grammatical
structure  that  cannot,  therefore,  simply be  abrogated  by  the  light  of  that  insight,  as  an
adherent to the traditional practice of philosophical scepticism might wish.  
Indeed, as Wittgenstein recognised in  On Certainty: “In order to make a  mistake, a man
must already judge in conformity with mankind.” (OC §156, my emphasis)  This remark
clearly recalls many of those from Philosophical Investigations, especially those that belong
to  what  has  come  to  be  called  the  Private  Language  Argument.  But  in  On Certainty
202For  example,  we might  compare here especially  Wittgenstein’s  solipsistic rejection of  history in the
preparatory wartime Notebooks—“What has history to do with me?  Mine is the first and only world!”
(NB, p. 82)—with his well-known admission in the Tractatus that it is none other than solipsism which,
when it’s implications are ‘strictly followed out’,  coincides with ‘pure realism’ (T 5.64).  As I  have
shown earlier,  this  manoeuvre succeeds or fails  to the extent  that  Wittgenstein can circumscribe the
significance of historical change at the level of our logical notation.  It is none other than the general
form of the proposition, which, if it could not be given, “then there would have to come a moment where
we suddenly had a new experience, so to speak a logical one. // That is, of course, impossible.” (NB, p.
75)
203Cf. J. Medina, “Wittgenstein’s Social Naturalism: The Idea of  Second Nature  after the  Philosophical
Investigations”, in. D. Moyal-Sharrock, The Third Wittgenstein, op cit., pp. 79-92.
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Wittgenstein goes one step further, for: “mightn’t I be  crazy and not be doubting what I
absolutely ought to doubt?” (OC §223, my emphasis)  Such a question is evidently not
intended to be a mere rhetorical device, destined to be cast aside due to some inherent fault
in its grammatical formulation as is patently the case in the Tractatus and presumably so in
the Investigations.204  For, at first sight, it appears to be a strange concession to precisely the
kinds of account that have been given in the traditional philosophical programme, both in
terms of its content and its tone.  Indeed, it feels as if a remark such as this might have been
taken straight out of Descartes’ Meditations  itself.205  This would also appear to be a very
un-Wittgensteinian concession.  Whether this is the case—and if so, to what extent—will
therefore need to be addressed in more detail.
204It  is  undoubtedly  significant  that  this  method  has  been  rightly  called  Wittgenstein’s  ‘therapeutic
approach’ to the dissolution of philosophical problems—a reference to remarks such as PI §133 (“There
is not  a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies”) and PI §255
(“The philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness”), among others, from the
Investigations.   The therapeutic impetus of  Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be understood against  the
background of  his  own psychological  problems.  Throughout  many years  of  his  life  he  himself  felt
threatened  by  insanity.   If  one  takes  his  (as  well  as  others’)  descriptions  of  himself  seriously,  this
characterisation seem justified.
205Though the passage from On Certainty  above has indeed a superficial similarity to Descartes probing
self-doubt in the Mediations, it is interesting to note, however, that although Descartes briefly raises the
possibility of such an objection against his own capacity for judgement in the first meditation, it is just as
quickly dismissed:
“And how could I deny that these hands and this body are mine, were it not perhaps that I compare
myself to certain persons, devoid of sense, whose cerebella are so troubled and clouded by the violent
vapours of black bile, that they constantly assure us that they think they are kings when actually the
are quite poor, or that they are clothed in purple when they are without covering, or who imagine that
they have an earthenware head or are nothing but pumpkins or are made of glass.  But they are mad,
and I should not be any less were I to follow examples so extravagant.” (R. Descartes, Mediations on
First  Philosophy,  in  ed. S.  Tweyman,  René  Descartes:  Meditations  on  Fist  Philosophy In  Focus
(London: Routledge, 1993.)
Madness  obviously presents  a very different  case  than that  of  perceptual  illusions in  regards  to  the
establishment of a first philosophy.  For, significantly, if he had imagined he were mad, Descartes would
not have been able to even start his inquiry.  With such a doubt as this, he would have undermined the
basis for the whole enterprise.   The task he sets for himself  in the  Mediations cannot,  in principle,
concern how a madman might  find a foundation for  the sciences:  a madman—unlike the otherwise
perfectly sane victim of an ‘evil genius’—can do nothing of the sort. 
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Accordingly, a central point of contention between readers of Wittgenstein’s latest remarks,
such as those collected in On Certainty, is the precise role that therapy should occupy in our
understanding of Wittgenstein’s late philosophical programme.  As Moyal-Sharrock notes,
in Wittgenstein’s ultimate re-engagement with traditional philosophical topics—i.e. with the
content rather  than  solely  with  the  method  of  philosophy—we  witness  a  renewed
commitment to the subject of philosophy and a loss of interest in the therapeutic enterprise
that had earlier guided his investigations.  She quotes G. Frongia and B. McGuinness on this
point:
“[T]he publications drawn from Wittgenstein’s writings in the years immediately before his death have
tended to complicate the picture of his intellectual development.  Particular attention has been devoted 
to On Certainty […] and here commentators have seen a pronounced change in Wittgenstein’s attitude 
towards constructive and systematic ways of doing philosophy.  Certainty there seems to be a loss of 
interest in the ‘therapeutic’ aim of removing ‘mental cramps’, which alone was allowed to philosophy 
by Wittgenstein’s ‘analytic’ interpreters.”206
We might then ask here the question: In what sense Wittgenstein’s last remarks—which by
Moyal-Sharrock’s  own admission  aim to  demystify  scepticism—are  not supposed  to  be
therapeutic in the earlier sense of the Investigations, if not also the Tractatus?  Has not this
‘demystification’ been part of Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach from the start?  
In  one sense,  the answer to  this  question is  ‘yes’;  for  the  demystification of  traditional
philosophical  problems  was  always  one  of  the  initial  steps  taken  in  the  therapeutic
programme.  We might consider here such ironic caricatures in Philosophical Investigations
directed against the sublimation of philosophical attempts at explicating some phenomenon
or  other—such  as  those  that  follow in  the  footsteps  of  Augustine’s  picture  of  infantile
206G. Frongia and B. McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Bibliographical Guide (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 35.
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language-learning207—where, for example, Wittgenstein mocks somewhat this prototypical
account of meaning in terms of a humorous encounter at none other than the greengrocer’s:
“Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping.  I give him a slip of paper
marked “five red apples”.   He takes  the  slip  to  the  shopkeeper,  who opens the drawer  marked
“apples”; then he looks up the word “red” in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he
say the series of cardinal numbers—I assume that he knows them by heart—up to the word “five”
and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as the same out of the drawer.——It is in
this and similar ways that one operates with words.——“But how does he know where and how he
is to look up the word ‘red’ and what he is to do with the word ‘five’?”——Well, I assume that he
acts as I have described.  Explanations come to an end somewhere.—But what is the meaning of the
word “five”?—No such think was in question here, only how the words “five” is used.” (PI §1)
Wittgenstein’s  objective  here,  and  in  the  many  passages  like  it  that  are  spread  widely
throughout  the  Investigations208,  is  to  demonstrate  that  in  the  kinds  of  everyday  lived
interaction he describes, such philosophical demands for explanation will first of all appear
ridiculous,  and  will  furthermore  ultimately  get  us  no  further  than  we  were  before  our
‘philosophical explanation’ of such ordinary phenomena had been provided anyway.209  The
207As I have suggested earlier, however, it is not so much  Augustine’s picture that Wittgenstein criticises
here, but rather those like it that are intended to offer a definitive philosophical account of meaning and
language-learning, based on the incorrigibility of ostensive definition.  This account, as we have seen,
has more in common with that of Russell, for example—or more contemporaneously, that of cognitive
linguists like N. Chomsky—than with Augustine.
208Examples could easily be expanded  ad infinitum.   We might  consider just  two of the more popular
examples, such as the ‘builders’ of what Wittgenstein had come to call ‘language-game (2)’ (cf. PI §2ff)
or the ‘beetle in the box’ of the Private Language Argument (PI §293).  It is an interesting question, given
the wide-spread theoretical weight that the term has taken on in discourses that extend even far beyond
Wittgenstein scholarship, whether Wittgenstein’s comparison of language to game is similarly intended
to mock philosophical styles of discourse in such a way.
209R.  Read  makes  a  similar  point  in  his  attempt  to  read  a  therapeutic  approach  in  On  Certainty:
“Wittgenstein’s remarks are purpose-relative, and therapeutic.  It is a matter of trying to reorient oneself
in relation to what one always already understands in practice, just by virtue of being a language-user, a
human being.” (R. Read, “‘The First Shall be Last and the Last shall be First…’” p. 315, in D. Moyal-
Sharrock and W.H. Brenner (eds.)  Readings of Wittgenstein’s  On Certainty (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005), pp. 302-321.)
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phenomena in question need not be of such an ‘everyday nature’, for that matter.  As early
as 1918, Wittgenstein notes in the Tractatus, for example:
“Not only is there guarantee of the temporal immortality of the human soul, that is to say of its
eternal survival after death; but,  in any case, this assumption completely fails to accomplish the
purpose for which it has always been intended.  Or is some riddle solved by my surviving for ever?
Is not this eternal life itself as much of a riddle as our present life?” (T 6.4312)
We see then that even in some of his earliest remarks Wittgenstein had already begun to
destabilise  traditional  philosophical  accounts  by  characterising  them  as  being  no  less
mysterious,  and  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases  probably  a  lot  more  so,  than  the  very
phenomena of which they were designed to make some sort of sense.  Nonetheless, it is
clear that this feature of his methodology is particularly present in the Investigations, where
Wittgenstein takes great pains to demonstrate that the kinds of linguistic phenomena put into
question by the philosophical cannon never actually demanded an explanation in the first
place.  Thus, he notes in one of the passages that might serve as a resounding motto for the
work as a whole: “the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the
fixed point of our real need.” (PI §108)
However, what makes the ‘demystification’ of scepticism in On Certainty unique from the
point of view of Wittgenstein’s entire oeuvre is that it rather keeps the sceptical doubt  in
place—on the sole condition that it is part of a ‘lived’ or genuine experience—that sceptical
expressions arise from a ‘real need’, as it were—and not as a philosophical pseudo-problem
to be resolved by epistemological speculation.  The aim, therefore, is no longer to claim that
a certain  form of  expression fails  to  perform what  it  is  intended to,  given the  logic  or
grammar  of  our  language,  but  rather  to  probe  its  source  as  a  potentially  legitimate
expression within the wider Lebenswelt of which it may be a part, if only in principle.  From
the perspective of On Certainty, it is not so much the form of the philosophical expression
of sceptical doubt—or, for that matter, of certainty—that fails to meet the conditions for
establishing its legitimacy, but rather the lived context in which it is uttered.
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What we discover here is indeed a surprising admission on Wittgenstein’s part, which is by
most accounts exactly what philosophers would traditionally have claimed from the start:
philosophical  problems  have  their  root  in  genuinely  troubling  experiences,  which
philosophers in their theorising  genuinely attempt to overcome or resolve.  Wittgenstein’s
critique, then, is not geared towards interrogating the sense of a given expression, but rather
recognising that it may at particular times arise from a legitimate experience, one which
remains  legitimate  insofar  as  its  expression  belongs  to  unreflective  speech,  and  thus—
though he does not bar the expression itself—he effectively bars it from certain forms of
philosophical  speculation.   For,  as  a  genuinely  lived  experience,  it  is  not  material  for
philosophical thought.  One’s certainty cannot simply be abrogated at will and neither, on
the other hand, can a legitimate sceptical doubt be so easily overcome.
A useful  way  to  frame  this  point  is  in  terms  of  what  has  elsewhere  been  called  the
‘pedagogical style’ of the Investigations.  As such, Wittgenstein’s understanding of grammar
may  be  characterised  as  one  in  which  learning  can  be  conceived  to  some  extent  as
constitutive of the content that is learned.  In the words of Cavell: “In ‘learning language’
you learn not merely what the names of things are, but what a name is; not merely what the
form of expression is for expressing a wish, but what expressing a wish is; not merely what
the word for ‘father’ is, but what a father is; not merely what the word for ‘love’ is, but what
love  is.”210 Meredith  Williams  has  characterised  this  well  in  terms  of  the  epistemic
commitments that the very act of learning a technique involves, with regards to knowing
how to go on with language and to the ways in which we do things with our words in the
world.  “The key,” she notes, “is the shared sense of the obvious that provides the back-
ground  necessary  for  any  meaningful  use  of  language  or  rule-following.”211  This
understanding is, she argues, most eloquently illustrated in Wittgenstein’s  Remarks on the
Foundations of Mathematics, where, for example, he introduces an illustrative account of
210S. Cavell,  The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1979), p. 177.
211M.  Williams,  Wittgenstein,  Mind  and  Meaning:  Towards  a  Social  Conception  of  Mind  (London:
Routledge, 1999), p. 208.
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‘the  determination  of  a  concept’.   He  discusses  there  a  pupil  who  is  learning  a  new
mathematical technique.  Upon mastering the technique, the pupil in Wittgenstein’s account
tells us “I saw that it must be like that…” (RFM VI.7)  This ‘must’, Wittgenstein continues,
signifies that the pupil has come to see the outcome as one that is essential to the process:
“This must shows that he has adopted a concept.
This must shows that he has gone in a circle.
He has read off from the process, not a proposition of natural science but, instead of the that, the
determination of a concept.” (RFM VI.8)
As Williams aptly notes, the metaphor of ‘travelling in a circle’ helps to locate the problem
that Wittgenstein is addressing here: Instead of indicating a painful or destructive regress—
where indeed a quite traditional and characteristic manoeuvre of critical philosophy would
be  plainly  visible—the  very  fact  of  travelling  in  a  circle  becomes  rather  the  principle
indication of the rule’s validity.  As Wittgenstein notes: “He does not say: I realise that this
happens.  Rather: that it must be like that.” (RFM VI.7)  The pupil, in other words, comes to
see the result as self-evident.
We  have  seen  earlier  that  there  is  both  a  positive  and  a  critical  side  to  Wittgenstein’s
discussion of pedagogy in the Investigations.  He puts his considerations of the role of the
language-learner forth as ‘one possibility’, from which it does not follow that it is the only
possibility,  even  for  a  restricted  subset  of  language  (such  as  sensation  language,  for
example).212  To take such a conclusion from Wittgenstein’s work in the Investigations is to
212Previously I advanced this claim against the interpretation of ‘nature’ and of ‘natural expressions’ in
Hacker’s Insight and Illusion, a work which represents just one example of the widespread tendency to
draw strong theses  from Wittgenstein’s  philosophy,  of  which  he  probably  would  have  disapproved.
Hacker claims, e.g.: 
“The framework for this language-game consists in the shared human disposition to react to injury by
groaning or crying out in pain and assuaging the injured limb.  For the beginning of such language-
games with psychological expressions lies in natural human behaviour in certain circumstances, in our
groans of pain, our gasps of surprise, our trying to obtain what we want, our trembling when in danger,
and our  paroxysms of  anger.  (But  not  all  psychological  expressions  are  like  this.)”  (Insight  and
Illusion, op cit., p. 296 ) 
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miss the important critique he offers against foundational accounts of any sort.  It is to fall
victim to the same metaphysically-inclined spirit that Wittgenstein himself identified in the
Tractatus and that in his later work he sought to overcome through a morphological focus
on plurality, diversity and family resemblances (as opposed to a unitary, essentialist picture
of  phenomena,  be  that  linguistic  phenomena  or  any  other).   It  is,  as  he  claims  in  the
Investigations, to find oneself ‘held captive by a picture’.
However,  far  from  impugning the  role  of  the  ‘logical  must’  in  his  latest  remarks,
Wittgenstein seeks rather to re-inscribe its function in a description of the way in which we
often  do  indeed  reason,  despite  what  he  had  earlier  considered  to  be  its  philosophical
dubiousness.   And how could it  be  otherwise?  For  after  all,  throughout  Wittgenstein’s
oeuvre  he  has  repeatedly  called  for  a  recognition  of  the  limits  of  explanation  and  a
circumscription of the kinds of reasoning that requires a solid foundation at all.  Within the
Tractatus, as we have seen, Wittgenstein had already rejected any and all attempts, such as
those of Frege and Russell, to posit self-evident logical truths; as Wittgenstein notes in a
remark the clearly points towards Frege’s account of logico-mathematical fallibility: “If the
truth of a proposition does not follow from the fact that it is self-evident to us, then its self-
evidence in no way justifies our belief in its truth.” (T 5.1363)213  This critique is carried
over into the Investigations in terms of his rejection of any and all attempts at explanation
that are based on an appeal to a rule that is self-regulating or self-interpreting, and which
would therefore carry within itself all of the criteria necessary for its own continual correct
application.  “Explanations,” he notes right at the opening of the Investigations, “come to an
end somewhere.” (PI §1)
Despite Hacker’s qualification here, he nonetheless concludes: “It is an  indispensable guide, but each
concept needs careful scrutiny in its own right.” (Ibid., p. 297)  This is not to say that these are not
interesting phenomena for philosophical speculation of the traditional sort; however, such an account
clearly poses problems when advanced as an understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.  
213As we saw previously, this is not to claim that there is nothing which justifies our belief in the truth of
logical and mathematical laws; however, self-evidence is not it.
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This line of argumentation is by now becoming quite familiar to us.  What remains to be
characterised, however, is Wittgenstein’s shifting understanding of the circumstances under
which training and language-learning is “overlooked as mere history.”214  For as we have
also seen, it is in these terms that Wittgenstein had himself once rejected learning as ‘mere
history’, and therefore as something that could not possibly be enlightening for the kind of
grammatical investigation that he wished to undertake.  For it is in precisely these terms that
in  the  1930’s—though  he  had  already  begun  to  concern  himself  with  the  nature  of
temporality  and  time-consciousness  in  terms  of  the  specious  present—Wittgenstein
nonetheless continued along the lines drawn in the Tractatus, maintaining that history (if not
time,  exactly)  was to  remain outside  of  the  domains  he sought  to  elucidate.215  History
remained then primarily a matter of psychology, rather than grammar.
In the  Investigations,  however,  Wittgenstein began to characterise learning as something
more than ‘mere’ empirical  psychology,  and the  cumulative  processes  of  transmitting  a
language from one generation to another as something more than the ‘mere’ history of our
common tongue.  Nonetheless, this understanding had not yet achieved its full status as a
grammatical one.  It remained primarily of a methodological, or therapeutic, importance.  In
his  post-Investigations thought  Wittgenstein becomes even more interested  in  language-
learning in terms of the creation of a space for judgement, i.e. of judging whether or not one
is going on in the same way.   Through training, the novice comes to see an activity as one
guided by rules, which means the learner does not see it as something that simply happens,
but rather as something that must happen.  In doing so he comes to see the obviousness of
the outcome.  But this obviousness is not expressed in the explicit propositional form.  It is
rather expressed in a competent speaker’s lived reactions and it  is here,  as Wittgenstein
214Wittgenstein: “But couldn’t we imagine that someone without any training should see a sum that was set
to do, and straight-away find himself in the mental state that in the normal course of things is only
produced by training and practice?  So that he knew he could calculate although he had never calculated.
(One  might,  then,  it  seems,  say:  The  training  would  merely  be  history,  and  merely  as  a  matter  of
empirical fact would it be necessary for the production of knowledge.” (RFM VI.33)
215We clearly see traces of Wittgenstein’s early Fregean anti-psychologism in such remarks as those found
in the 1930-1932 courses, e.g.: “The history of how we came to know what [a word] means is irrelevant;
what remains is our understanding.” (L. Wittgenstein, Cambridge Courses, 1930-1932, op cit., p. 26.)
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notes in Zettel, that his earlier account of rule-following meets an important limit: “For just
when one says “But don’t you see…?” the rule is no use, it is what is explained, not what
does  the  explaining.”  (Z  §302)   Learning  thus  achieves  its  full  grammatical  status  in
Wittgenstein’s reflections.
We saw earlier that it was precisely this sense of the obvious that Wittgenstein sought in his
work  to  question  through  his  use  of  the  morphological  method.   The  object  of  this
methodology was directed towards philosophical accounts of the kind of phenomena widely
accepted  by  philosophers  as  those  that  require  a  foundational  account.   In  this  way,
Wittgenstein  sought  to  make  our  familiar  philosophical  accounts  appear  strange  and
disconnected from our actual forms of life—our real needs, as it were.  He likewise sought
in a certain sense to turn the strange into something familiar, in an attempt to rejuvenate a
more appropriate form of philosophical thought and move it in new and more profitable
directions.  In Wittgenstein’s last remarks he continues this approach; however, he does so
not in order to come to terms with how we should think about problems, philosophical or
otherwise, but rather with how we do.
It is perhaps unsurprising then that in the novel approach of this period Wittgenstein should
turn here to the work of G.E. Moore, in particular “A Defence of Common Sense” and
“Proof of an External World”.  In his last remarks, collected in On Certainty, Wittgenstein
devotes  a  great  amount  of  effort  to  the  task of  articulating just  what  is  so powerful  in
Moore’s  subtle  account  of  knowledge  in  terms  of  the  obviousness of  foundational
knowledge claims, as well as what is mistaken in it.  Before continuing to Wittgenstein’s
formulation of the issues involved here, let us therefore first take a closer look at Moore’s
own.
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II.  Moore and Wittgenstein on the ‘Authority’ of Ordinary Language
At the opening of Moore’s first presentation, “A Defence of Common Sense,” he notes that
in what follows he will “state, one by one, some of the most important points in which my
philosophical  position  differs  from positions  which  have  been  taken  up  by  some  other
philosophers.”216  Accordingly, there follows a list—defined by him as belonging to ‘class
(1)’—of well  over  twenty or  so propositions,  all  of  which Moore claims to know with
certainty.  This list includes propositions such as: There exists at present a living human
body, which is his body; this body was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed
continuously ever since, though not without undergoing changes; every since it was born, it
has been either in contact with or not far from the surface of the earth; the earth has existed
for many years before this body was born; and for many of these years, a large number of
human bodies have also lived and died upon it; he is a human being, and has had at different
times since his body was born, many different experiences; etc.  With the proposition in
‘Class (2)’, Moore further asserts that not only he himself, but that most of us have also at
some time or another known these same propositions to be true of ourselves, with the same
certainty as he does.
Propositions such as these may seem, he notes, to be “such obvious truisms as not to be
worth stating”217  Indeed, in every respect they are.  However, the philosophical target of this
list is soon made apparent.  There are, he explains, two points wherein an objection to such
a list might be posed by ‘some philosophers’ (as he continues to qualify consistently).  It is a
lengthy explication,  but  one  worth  repeating  in  extension  nonetheless.   For  the  unique
character of Moore’s language and the kind of exacting way in which he expresses himself
is not merely an accidental feature of the kind of argument he seeks to advance, nor of the
kind that he seeks to reject.  This qualification is, therefore, as follows:
216G.E. Moore, “A Defence of Common Sense”, p. 32, in G.E. Moore,  Philosophical Papers  (London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1959), pp. 32-59.
217G.E. Moore, “A Defence of Common Sense”, op cit, p. 32.
198
“The first point is this.  Some philosophers seem to have thought it legitimate to use the word ‘true’
in such a sense that a proposition which is partially false my nevertheless also be true; and some of
these, therefore, would perhaps say that propositions like those enumerated in (1) are, in their view,
true, when all the time they believe that every such proposition is partially false.  I wish, therefore, to
make it quite plain that I am not using ‘true’ in any such sense.  I am using it in such a sense (and I
think this is the ordinary usage) that if a proposition is partially false, it follows that it is  not true,
though, of course, it may be partially true.  I am maintaining, in short, that all the propositions in (1),
and also many propositions corresponding to each of these, are  wholly  true; I am asserting this in
asserting (2).  And hence any philosopher, who does in fact believe, with regard to any or all of these
classes of propositions, that every proposition of the class in question is partially false, is, in fact,
disagreeing with me and holding a view incompatible with (2), even though he may think himself
justified in saying that he believes some propositions belonging to all of these classes to be ‘true’.”
Moore continues directly:
And the second point is this.  Some philosophers seem to have thought it legitimate to use such
expressions as, e.g. ‘The earth has existed for may years past’, as if they expressed something which
they really believed, when in fact they believe that every proposition, which such an expression
would ordinarily be understood to express, is, at least partially, false; and all they really believe is
that there is some other set of propositions, related in a certain way to those which such expressions
do actually express, which, unlike these, really are true.  That is to say, they use the expression ‘The
earth has existed for many years past’ to express, not what it would ordinarily be understood to
express, but the proposition that some proposition, related to this in a certain way, is true; when all
the time they believe that the proposition, which this expression would ordinarily be understood to
express, is, at least partially, false.  I wish, therefore, to make it quite plain that I was not using the
expressions I listed in (1) in any such subtle sense.  I mean by each of them precisely what ever
reader, in reading them, will have understood me to mean.  And if any philosopher, therefore, who
holds that any of these expressions, if understood in its popular manner, expresses a proposition
which embodies some popular error, is disagreeing with me and hold a view incompatible with (2),
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even though he may hold that there is some other, true, proposition which the expression in question
might be legitimately used to express.”218
Now, despite the fact that Moore has given this exhaustive explication of what it is that he
intends  to  accomplish  by  proposing  such  a  list  of  propositions,  as  opposed  to  ‘some
philosophers’, it is easy to miss the main thrust of his argument in this passage, as well as in
the others like it that make up the paper.  When his exacting use of language is examined
more closely, what is revealed is a surprisingly subtle argument.  It  is an argument that
patently does not concern the truth or falsity of the propositions laid out there (the kind of
thing we would traditionally expect from a refutation of scepticism, as Moore “Defence” is
evidently intended to be).  Rather, it is an argument regarding the kind of language in which
these propositions are expressed.  For what Moore is arguing for here is, first of all, not the
truth of the assertions made, but rather the  legitimate use of the words employed in his
assertions.   It  is  this  legitimacy  that  demands  the  lengthy  explication  to  follow  in  the
presentation.  The key here, as he notes, is that it is in the ordinary sense of the words used
that he has asserted of these propositions that he knows them to be true, with certainty—and
it  is  the  words’ ordinary  meanings  that  ‘some philosophers’ would,  in  Moore’s  esteem,
erroneously call into question.219
In Norman Malcolm’s celebrated reconstruction of Moore’s argument, “Moore and Ordinary
Language”, the case is made clear; however, it is made so not in relation to some nameless
philosopher,  but  to  Russell  and specifically  to  the  views expressed by him in his  1927
Outline of Philosophy.  For Russell makes there a number of the kinds of colourful and
shocking claims for which he was well-known220, one of which Malcolm singles out as an
218G.E. Moore, “A Defence of Common Sense”, op cit, pp. 35-36.
219As A.R. White has argued: “[Moore’s] lack of interest in searching for the truth of those common sense
statements which he submitted to philosophical examination stemmed not only from his prior interest in
their analysis, but also from his opinion that it is justifiable to take their truth for granted, and queer of
philosophers to doubt it.” (A. R. White, G.E. Moore (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1958), p. 9.)
220In his extended review of the book, H.A. Prichard describes the work as one which positively “bristles
with controversial statements.” (H.A. Prichard, “Mr. Bertrand Russell’s Outline of Philosophy”, p. 265,
Mind, 37(147), 1928, pp. 265-282.)  In a significant manner, a propos the arguments of Moore that will
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example of the kind of claim that Moore attempts in his work to refute.  For example, at his
most flamboyant, Russell notes that when a physiologist observes a living brain: 
“It is natural to suppose that what the physiologist sees is in the brain he is observing.  But if we are
speaking of physical space, what the physiologists sees is in his own brain.  It is in no sense in the
brain that  he  is  observing,  though it  is  in the precept  of  that  brain,  which occupies  part  of  the
physiologist’s perceptual space.”221
Putting  aside  any  critical  evaluation  of  Russell’s  Theory  of  Neutral  Monism,  Malcolm
proceeds to investigate, in the spirit of Moore, the kind of claim that such a statement may
be said to represent more generally.  First and foremost, it is not, he notes, an  empirical
statement.  Russell means to imply here not that when some particular physiologist observes
some particular brain he is being deceived in supposing that it is in fact a brain that he is
observing  (through  an  elaborate  construction  of  mirrors,  for  example).   Neither  is  he
implying that  in  the  past  physiologists  in  general  were  mistaken about  what  they  were
observing (according to an outdated empirical model that has been disproved by more recent
innovations in brain science,  for example).   In fact,  Malcolm claims that  Russell is not
disagreeing with the facts of the matter at all, but rather with the way in which we talk about
the facts at hand:
be expounded in what follows, it  is I think worth noting that Prichard makes the following relevant
remark: 
“I  have,  in  reading  it,  found  myself  again  and  again  reminded  of  a  phrase  applied  by  a  non-
philosophical colleague to certain philosophers, viz., ‘Those who say they believe what no man really
can’.  I have found myself constantly wondering whether even Mr. Russell himself believes a fraction
of the things which he implies that he does, and whether he could not best render his great acuteness of
use to the world by scrapping all his present views and, in a Cartesian manner, making a fresh start.”
(Ibid., p. 265-266)  
I would submit that it is Moore’s genius in the two presentations under discussion here to have taken this
very kind of  criticism out  of  the  literary or  biographical  sphere,  and put  it  rather  at  the  heart  of  a
genuinely philosophical critique.  Turning such a character critique into a philosophical one is clearly in
line with Wittgenstein’s general programme as well, hence his great interest in precisely these works of
Moore.
221B. Russell, Outline of Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979), p. 110.
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“In the normal sort of circumstances in which a person would ordinarily say that he sees the postman,
Russell would agree with him as to what the particular circumstances of the situation were.  Russell
would not disagree with him about any question of empirical fact; yet Russell would still say that
what he really saw was not the postman, but part of his own brain.  It appears then they they disagree,
not about any empirical facts, but about what language shall be used to describe those facts.  Russell
was saying that it is really a more correct way of speaking to say that you see a part of you brain,
than to say that you see the postman.”222
The difference—which,  undoubtedly,  hangs on the meaning of how one employs words
such as ‘really’ here, in the kind of familiar philosophical use of the phrase ‘What one really
sees is…’223—is not as fine as one might initially suppose.  To see this, it is useful to take a
case from the history of philosophy.
Many have  supposed that  Moore had David Hume in mind when he  wrote  his  article,
although there is good reason to suppose that Moore was rather directing his attack against a
widely adopted style of doing philosophy rather than a particular philosopher.  Nonetheless,
Hume may be said to have provided in many significant respects the ‘official theory’ of
knowledge claims that Moore is broadly calling into question in his work.  The crux of this
‘official  theory’ is  that  it  considers  all  such claims as propositions  that  fall  into one or
another of two categories, which are exhaustive and mutually exclusive.  Historically, there
222N. Malcolm, “Moore and Ordinary Language”, p. 350, in P.A. Schilpp (ed.),  The Philosophy of G.E.
Moore (New York: Tudor, 1952), pp. 345-368.
223Section xi of Part II of the Investigations is, in fact, devoted to calling precisely this use of ‘really’, in
such  expressions  as  ‘What  one  really  sees  is…’ that  are  found  commonly  in  Gestalt-psychology.
Wittgenstein certainly does not wish to deny, for example, that in some cases Gestalt figures provide a
relevant framework for approaching a unique kind of experience; however, it is patently not the case this
framework will provide an absolute or universal means for describing any such experience at all.  Eg.:
“It would have made as little sense for me to say “Now I am seeing it as…” as to say at the sight of a
knife and fork “Now I am seeing this as a knife and fork”.  This expression would bot be understood.
—Any more than: “Now it’s a knife and fork” or “It can be a fork too.”
One doesn’t ‘take’ what one knows as the cutlery at a meal for cutlery; any more than one ordinarily
tries to move one’s mouth as one ears, or aims at moving it.” (PI, p. 195)
This style of reasoning is clearly related to Moore’s own here.
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have  been  different  names  and  different  conceptions  associated  with  each  of  these
categories.   Hume himself  distinguished between  propositions  expressing  a  relationship
between ideas and propositions relating to matters of fact; Kant, as we have seen, created a
third,  cross-categorical  square,  which provided him with the  synthetic  a  priori  truths of
mathematics.  This list could go on.  However, broadly conceived, these two categories are
generally comprised of a priori (necessary, analytic, deductive, and so forth) propositions,
on the one hand, and a posteriori (contingent, synthetic, inductive, etc.) on the other.
Hume, and many subsequent philosophers, saw in this division—however it is expressed—a
number of strange and important consequences for a philosophical theory of knowledge.
Specifically, they contended that propositions belonging to the category of a posteriori or
contingent propositions are never certain, and they supported this contention on the basis of
an appeal to experience, memory, dreams, or to various kinds of deceptions, all of which
had turned out to be false in the past and therefore might turn out to be false in the future,
etc.  Regardless of the means, the common denominator of these contentions is that the
experiential  aspect  of  a  posteriori  propositions  is,  in  its  very  essence,  unreliable.   By
contrast, a priori propositions will never be contradicted by any possible experience and so
they, at least, are certain.224  A priori propositions were thus taken as the paradigm for what
might truly be considered reliable in any theory of knowledge.  They provided the standard
for certainty, according to which all propositions must in turn be measured, a standard to
which a posteriori truths will naturally be found to fall short.
224This is, of course, a position that is also found in Descartes.  One of the things that Descartes set out to
do with his  cogito was to establish precisely that there are a priori truths.  For this purpose one needs
only  one  example,  upon which  his  ‘first  philosophy’ can  be  established  and subsequently  built  up.
Wittgenstein would himself  gesture towards the role of just  such a ‘foundational  proposition’ in the
works of Frege, when he notes in On Certainty:
“ “I cannot doubt this proposition without giving up all judgement.”
But what sort of proposition is this? (It is reminiscent of what Frege said about the law of identity.)  It
is certainty no empirical proposition.  It does not belong to psychology.  It has rather the character of a
rule.” (OC §494) 
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Though Hume may be taken as one of the more extreme and most celebrated proponents of
such a view,  his  epistemology is  far  from a mere outmoded appendix in  the history of
modern philosophy.  Malcolm points out that among the more contemporary philosophers
who have maintained such a view is A.J. Ayer, who in his  The Foundations of Empirical
Knowledge notes, for example:
“We do indeed verify many such propositions [a posteriori, contingent propositions about matters of
fact] to an extent that makes it highly probably that they are true; but since the series of relevant
tests, being infinite, can never be exhausted, this probability can never amount to logical certainty
[…]
It must be admitted then that there is a sense in which it is true to say that we can never be sure, with
regard to any proposition implying the existence of a material thing, that we are not somehow being
deceived; but at the same time one may object to this statement on the ground that it is misleading.
It is misleading because it suggests that the state of ‘being sure’ is one the attainment of which is
conceivable, but unfortunately not within our power.  But, in fact, the conception of such a state is
self-contradictory.  For in order to be sure, in this sense, that we were not being deceived, we should
have to have completed an infinite series of verifications; and it is an analytic proposition that one
cannot run through all the members of an infinite series. […] Accordingly, what we should say, if we
wish to avoid misunderstanding, is not that we can never be certain that any of the propositions in
which we express our perceptual judgements are true, but rather that the notion of certainty does not
apply to propositions of this kind.  It applies to the a priori propositions of logical and mathematics,
and the fact that it does apply to them is an essential mark of distinction between them and empirical
propositions.”225  
From the point of view of the content of Moore’s own assertions, he might thus easily be
charged with begging the question.  In fact, one might even claim that he has invited this
charge when he writes, for example, that he will provide a set of assertions that “are, in fact,
225A.J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (London: Macmillian, 1969), pp. 44-45, Malcolm’s
italics.
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a set of propositions, every one of which (in my opinion) I know to be true.”226  Nonetheless,
Moore highlights here that it is only seen as such from a particular perspective—i.e. the
philosophical  one,  such  as  that  which Ayer  adopts  here—the  broader  validity  of  which
Moore himself is attempting to circumscribe.  
For, unlike Moore, the reason that Ayer is so confident in his claim that it has never been
and will never be correct to say of an a posteriori proposition that one knows it for certain, is
that he thinks such a claim is self-contradictory.227  On Ayer’s account Moore cannot claim
that he knows for certain that  p, when  p  is an a posteriori proposition, for it is in fact a
necessary feature of such propositions that  they are in no case certain.   Like a married
bachelor or round square, certainty just does not fit the kind of propositions Moore proposes
here.  Not only is it incorrect to consider such propositions to be known for certain, but
further, it is ‘strictly speaking’ logically inconceivable.  Here, once again, we see that the
weight  of  such  a  claim  rests  on  how  one  is  to  understand  the  significance  of  such
qualifications  as  ‘really’,  ‘truly’,  ‘strictly  speaking’,  and  the  like,  frequently  found  in
philosophical works. 
Moore’s strategic reply to this style of philosophising is to remind us that—on the contrary
—there is an ordinary use of the phrase ‘to know for certain’, which we apply to a posteriori
propositions all of the time.  It is therefore philosophers such as Ayer who are wrong to say
that the notion of certainty does not apply to propositions of this kind.  For, as Malcolm
226G.E. Moore, “A Defence of Common Sense”, op cit., p. 32, my emphasis.
227Here we find a familiar appeal to what might be called the ‘a priori nature of experience’, one which (as
we have seen) Russell also appealed to in his attack on solipsism.  By accepting that each person lives in
a private world of sense-data, he was forced to admit (as he put it) the ‘logical possibility of solipsism’.
In  The Problems of  Philosophy,  first  published in  1912,  the Cartesian overtones  of the  position are
clearly spelled out: 
“In one sense it must be admitted that we can never prove the existence of things other than ourselves
and our experiences.   No logical  absurdity results  from the hypothesis  that  the world consists  of
myself and my thoughts and feelings and sensations, and that everything else is mere fancy.  In dreams
a very complicated world may seem to be present, and yet on waking we find it a delusion; that is to
say, we find that the sense-data in the dream do not appear to have corresponded with such physical
objects as we should naturally infer from sense-data.” (B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, op cit.,
p. 10.)
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makes clear,  Ayer’s account rests on the assumption that  it  makes sense to speak of an
ordinary expression as being self-contradictory—and as being  therefore illegitimate.  This
assumption, Malcolm notes, is mistaken and he launches a surprisingly subtle argument for
why.  He responds thus:
“The reason that no ordinary expression is self-contradictory, is that a self-contradictory expression is
an expression which would  never  be used to describe  any  sort  of  situation.   It  does not  have a
descriptive usage.  Any ordinary expression is an expression which would be used to describe a
certain sort of situation; and since it would be used to describe a certain sort of situation, it  does
describe that sort of situation.  A self-contradictory expression, on the contrary, describes nothing.  It
is  possible,  of  course,  to  construct  out  of  ordinary  expressions  an  expression  which  is  self-
contradictory.  But the expression so constructed is not itself an ordinary expression—i.e., not an
expression which has a descriptive use.”228
This idea—that no ordinary proposition is self-contradictory—is, he continues in an ironic
vein, rather a tautology.  For ordinary utterances can appear contradictory without thereby
falsifying  themselves:  “That  is  to  say,”  he  concludes,  “ordinary  language  is  correct
language.”229
This  is  undoubtedly  a  quick  summary  of  Moore’s  position,  which  would  have  to  be
expanded  were  Moore’s  unique  and  subtle  manner  of  argumentation  what  is  really  in
question here.  However,  I  would like to highlight a particular feature of this  discourse
surrounding Moore and the strategy of his “Defence,” among other works of his, for which
this short survey will nonetheless suffice.  It is a feature that concerns what might be called
species and genera of knowledge, a distinction that can be further outlined by returning to a
passage  referred  to  earlier.   For  Malcolm,  following  his  argument  for  the  non-self-
contradictoriness of  ordinary language,  proceeds to give an illuminating example of  the
normal use of apparently self-contradictory expressions, such as when one says ‘It is and it
228N. Malcolm, “Moore on Ordinary Language”, op cit., p. 359.
229N. Malcolm, “Moore on Ordinary Language”, op cit., p. 362.
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isn’t…’, which he notes may have descriptive uses in certain ordinary, concrete cases (vague
ones, for example, such as ‘It is and it isn’t raining’ in cases of light misting, etc.).  This
case recalls clearly the example from Mauthner, discussed previously, where he notes that
no apparently tautological expression in language—by which, of course, Mauthner always
means ordinary language—is ever tautological in the stricter, logical sense.  Concerning the
uselessness of providing a logical analysis of such instances of ordinary language, he notes
in his Beiträge, for example: “If someone says ‘cheese is cheese’ or ‘schnapps is schnapps’
or ‘a word is a word’, then this utterance is not a special case of the general formula ‘A is
A’”230  Likewise, in Malcolm’s reconstruction of Moore’s argument, if someone says ‘It is
and it isn’t raining’, then this utterance is not a special case of the contradiction ‘A and ~A’,
which must therefore be expunged from our language according to the dictates of the Law
of Non-Contradiction (in order to ‘avoid misunderstandings’, as Ayer puts it).
The  question  that  I  wish  to  highlight  here,  which  was  formulated  by  Mauthner  before
Moore’s “Defence” and was presumably unknown to him, is nonetheless one that they both
share: What does it mean to speak of a claim as a ‘special case’ of another one in this sense?
Turning the question somewhat, we might likewise ask: What does it mean to speak of an
ordinary expression, such as ‘Schnapps is schnapps’, as a species of the generic expression
‘A = A’, or ‘It is and it isn’t raining’ as a species of the generic expression ‘A and ~A’?  It is
this question, I believe, that Moore is attempting (albeit in a disguised manner) to call our
attention to.
As we have seen, Moore’s first task is to demonstrate that, in fact, there is an ordinary use of
the  phrase  ‘know  for  certain’,  which  is  properly  applied  to  empirical,  a  posteriori
statements.  However, this is not the end of the story.  For if this were all that Moore were
suggesting, there would ultimately be no need to refute ‘some philosophers’.  We might just
230F. Mauthner, Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache (vol. III: Zur Grammatik und Logic), op cit. , p. 359,
my translation.  Likewise, in his Wörterbuch, Mauthner notes: “In reality there is no equality; in living
nature there is no identity.  The proposition A = A is so true, that in the whole world it is true for nothing
but  itself.   It  is  the  principle  of  absolute  identity,  but  the  principle  is  only applicable  to  itself.”  (F.
Mauthner, Wörterbuch der Philosophie, op cit.,  p. 2 [entry ‘A = A’], my translation.) 
207
as well let them have their paradoxes, and be done with it.  But this is not simply the case,
for Moore’s common-sense view of the world implies not only that the common-sense view
exists in parallel to that of ‘some philosophers’.  He is not only implying, for example, that
there are two different uses of the expressions ‘true’, ‘to know for certain’, etc., and that
both uses  are  equally legitimate  in  and of  themselves.   Rather,  he  is  claiming that  our
ordinary language is deeper, more primitive and conceptually prior to that other view.  For it
is this ordinary view which forms the foundation of the refined and regimented descriptions
of reality that are found, for example, in the sciences, in logic and mathematics, as well as in
philosophy, and not the other way around.  In the case under consideration here, it is rather
the expressions of logic—such as ‘A = A’ or ‘A and ~A’—which are species of their more
generic, ordinary equivalents.    Moore’s claim is not only that our ordinary use of such
expressions is a legitimate use, but that if it is to be compared to the extra-ordinary claims of
philosophy, it is ordinary language that will turn out to be  authoritative.  Inconsistencies
with ordinary use mark a philosophical doctrine as incorrectly expressed, misleading, and
possibly even absurd; inconsistencies with the beliefs of the common sense view of the
world mark it as false.231
231In his early survey of the Moore/Wittgenstein debate, Avrum Stroll provides a good example of just how
this  might  be  so,  particularly  in  the  case  of  the  natural  sciences.   Discussing  Moore’s  decline  in
reputation among analytic philosophers following World War II, he notes the pervasive scientism that
was popular at the time (and continues to be so in many important circles today).  He discusses, for
example,  what  he  calls  Moore’s  ‘pre-technical’,  ‘pre-scientific’  world  view  that  is,  in  his  view,
autonomous and to a great extent immune to revision by such technical sub-domains.  The common
sense view that Stroll takes as his example is the following:
“A simple example of a proposition that is part of the common sense view is  people die.  This is a
proposition virtually every adult knows to be true, but it is not one belonging to any science.  One
might say that it stands in a presupposition relation to such sciences as biology and medicine.  It is not
something scientists  merely assume as a hypothesis; rather they, like everybody else,  know  it to be
true.   But  presupposing it,  they may ask such questions as,  How and why do people die?  Such
questions  and  their  answers  belong  to  science;  but  those  answers  must  be  consistent  with  the
knowledge that people do die.  No scientific theory that denied such a proposition is acceptable; and
that, in effect, is what it means to say that the common sense view is not open to scientific revision.”
(A. Stroll, Moore and Wittgenstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 16.)
It is easy for this statement to be misconstrued.  It is certainly the case, for example, that at one time
everyone thought that the earth was flat, when it was actually round.  Everyone was mistaken.  However,
the way in which they were mistaken regards what the empirical facts are.  It is not a matter of using
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This is certainly not to say that it is impossible or illegitimate to create precise and technical
variants  of  the  expressions  of  our  ordinary  language,  and use  these  in  correspondingly
precise  and  technical  ways.   However,  as  the  common  sense  view  of  the  world  has
conceptual priority, our technical language (be it scientific, philosophical, or what have you)
will never be able to ‘give the lie’ to our ordinary uses of the terms in questions (as Russell
and Ayer would contend, for example).  There is no sense in which ‘some philosophers’
might thus be able to extract a technical form of a given expression from its prior ordinary
use, and subsequently  proceed to measure the adequacy of the original according to the
artificial standards of its progeny.  It is a theme that runs throughout Moore’s work: our
ordinary  use  of  words  can  never  be  called  into  question  on  the  basis  of  philosophical
accounts of their meaning.  For to use a technical term is not to refine our ordinary language
by  subtracting from it  what is  vague, unclear,  or imprecise,  and so to arrive at  what is
essential in language.  It is, as A.R. White aptly expresses the matter, rather “to depart from
it by way of addition.”232  The addition depends, in turn, upon the foundation to which it has
been added.
While such a stance towards the authority of ordinary language may easily be overlooked in
the first of Moore’s presentations under consideration here—as he claims to be advancing in
the  first  instance  only  a  defence  of  common  sense,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  may  be
incompletely interpreted in the more modest terms of its mere legitimacy—the authoritative
standpoint that Moore is after can be witnessed especially clearly in the second presentation
to  be  considered  here,  his  “Proof  of  an  External  World.”   In  this  presentation  Moore
proceeds to address a familiar and long-standing claim of Kant’s, from the preface to the
second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, namely that:
language ‘incorrectly’,  in  the  sense that  we have been discussing;  they were using perfectly correct
language to describe what they (mistakenly) thought was the case.  In the case of the proposition people
die, we are rather dealing with the kind of thing Wittgenstein would later describe in  On Certainty in
these terms: as a change in “our whole way of seeing nature”  would be necessary in order to ‘disprove’
the statement (OC §291).
232A.R. White, G.E. Moore (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1958), p. 26, my emphasis.
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“However harmless idealism may be considered in respect  of  the essential  aims of metaphysics
(though, in fact, it is not this harmless), it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason
in general  that  the existence of things outside us  (from which we derive the whole  material  of
knowledge, even for our inner sense) must be accepted merely on  faith, and that if anyone thinks
good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.” (CPR,
Bxxxix)
As in Moore’s earlier work, rather than discussing the validity of the proof that Kant gives
in his work, Moore claims that he wishes to discuss, firstly, “the question as to what sort of
proof this of Kant’s is,” and secondly, “whether (contrary to Kant’s own opinion) there may
not perhaps be other proofs, of the same or of a different sort, which are also satisfactory.” 233
He thus proceeds to extensively analyse the meaning of Kant’s claim concerning ‘things
outside of us’ in terms of things to be met with in space, possible objects to be met with in
space, things belonging to the ‘external world’, etc. and to give what he calls a ‘perfectly
rigorous proof’—i.e., a proof in which 1. the premises are different from the conclusion, 2.
the  premises  are  known to be true,  and 3.  the  conclusion follows from the premises—
namely: 
“I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist.  How?  By holding up my two hands, and
saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as I make a
certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’.  And if, by doing this, I have proved ipso facto the
existence of external things, you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways: there
is no need to multiply examples.”234
In other words: 1. If two hands exist, the external world exists; 2. here is one hand and here
is another; therefore, 3. the external world exists. Q.E.D.
233G.E.  Moore,  “Proof  of  an External  World”,  p.  128,  in  G.E.  Moore,  Philosophical  Papers  (London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1959), pp. 127-150.
234G.E. Moore, “Proof of an External World”,  op cit.,  p. 145-146.  One cannot but be reminded here of
Johnson’s famous ‘refutation’ of Berkeley’s idealism: the eighteenth-century scholar is supposed to have
kicked a stone and to have claimed ‘I refute it thus!’
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There are, he admits, a couple of remaining points according to which ‘some philosophers’
will still feel that he has not given a satisfactory proof of the point in question.  The first of
these is, he supposes, that some philosophers will not want a proof of the second premise
that Moore has given—that ‘Here is one hand and here is another’—but rather a more
general statement as to how any proposition of this sort may be proved.  Moore continues,
significantly: “This, of course, I haven’t given; and I do not believe it can be given: if this is
what is meant by proof of the existence of external things, I do not believe that any proof of
the existence of external things is possible.”235  The second point of question is that some
philosophers may claim that if he cannot prove the premisses of his argument, then his proof
is not in fact conclusive, as Moore has claimed:
“This view that, if I cannot prove such things as these, I do not know them, is, I think, the view that
Kant was expressing in the sentence which I quoted at the beginning of this lecture, when he implies
that so long as we have no proof of the existence of external things, their existence must be accepted
merely on  faith.  He means to say, I think that if I cannot prove that there is a hand here, I must
accept  it  merely as a matter  of  faith—I cannot know it.   Such a view, though it  has been very
common among philosophers can, I think, be shown to be wrong—though shown only by the use of
premisses which are not known to be true, unless we do know of the existence of external things. I
can know things, which I cannot prove; and among things which I certainty did know, even if (as I
think) I could not prove them, were the premisses of my two proofs.”236 
One  can  readily  witness  in  this  line  of  argumentation  the  kind  of  strategy  that  Moore
advances throughout his work, which does something like the following: If what is meant by
proof  of  the  existence  of  external  things  concerns  a  general  statement  about  how any
propositions of the sort given can be known to be true, for certain, then no proof will be
forthcoming.  However, Moore’s claim is that this patently is not what is meant in ordinary
circumstances by the word ‘proof’—where in all kinds of cases, proof, and even additional
235G.E. Moore, “Proof of an External World”, op cit., p. 149.
236G.E. Moore, “Proof of an External World”, op cit., p. 150.
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proof, may be demanded and provided.237  The kind of proof required by the philosophers
addressed by Moore is not one of those cases.  Such a condition is, he notes, an absurdity,
and thus not only is it unnecessary but also unwarranted.  The philosophical demand for an
additional,  more ‘rigorous’ form of  proof  is  thus  superseded by the  ways in  which we
ordinarily call for and deliver proof, which is perfectly rigorous as it stands in and of itself.
One can see in Moore’s appeal to the authority of ordinary language certain resemblances to
Wittgenstein’s  own,  which  began to feature  particularly  prominently in  his  work  in  the
1930’s and continued until the time he was composing the Investigations.  It is certainly true
that  Wittgenstein  had  already  written  in  the  Tractatus  that  “all  the  propositions  of  our
everyday language are, just as they stand, in perfect logical order” (T 5.5563), but it must
nonetheless  be  admitted  that  the  methodological  importance  of  that  standpoint  remains
rather  more  obscure  in  Wittgenstein’s  earlier  thought  than  it  does  in  the  later.   It  is  a
situation that  is  further complicated by the criticism he would later make of the earlier
work’s reformist thrust, which was connected to the idea that meaningful language must
have a clear and simple limit, and furthermore, that language must abide by the conditions
that limit imposes upon it in order to be meaningful.  The commitment that Wittgenstein
later made with regard to ordinary language, by contrast, demonstrates a great extension of
what might be considered as belonging to the ‘linguistic order’ of meaningful language,
which approaches much more closely what one would typically consider to be precisely the
un-limited character of the ordinary.238
237As Moore notes in an example that recalls the very ordinary sorts of cases in which proof is demanded:
“My proof, then, of the existence of things outside of us did satisfy three of the conditions necessary for a
rigorous proof.  Are there any other conditions necessary for a rigorous proof, such that perhaps it did not
satisfy one of them?  Perhaps there may be; I do not known; but I do want to emphasize that, so far as I
can see, we all of us do constantly take proofs of this sort as absolutely conclusive proofs of certain
conclusions—as finally settling certain questions, as to which we were previously in doubt.  Suppose, for
instance, it were a question whether there were as many as three misprints on a certain page in a certain
book.  A says there are, B is inclined to doubt it.  How could A prove that he is right?  Surely he could
prove it  by taking the book, turning to the page, and pointing to three separate places on it,  saying
‘There’s one misprint here, another here, and another here’; surely that is a method by which it might be
proved!” (G.E. Moore, “Proof of an External World”, op cit., p. 147.)) 
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We might consider, for example, Wittgenstein’s return to his earlier, Tractarian notion of
analysis, where in the Investigations he notes:
“This finds expression in questions as to the essence of language, of propositions, of thought.—For
we too in these investigations are trying to understand the essence of language—its function, its
structure,—yet  this  is  not  what  those questions have in view.   For they see in  the essence,  not
something that  already lies  open to  view and that  becomes surveyable  by a  rearrangement,  but
something that lies beneath the surface.  Something that lies within, which we see when we look into
something, and which an analysis gets out.
‘The essence is  hidden from is’:  this  is the form our problem now assumes.   We ask:  ‘What is
language?’, “What is a proposition?”  And the answer to these questions is to be given once and for
all; and independently of any future experience.” (PI §92)
This is clearly not  what Wittgenstein intends for his later investigations into the nature of
language.  Accordingly, he continues a short moment later:
“We see that what we call “sentence” and “language” has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is
the family of structures more or less related to one another.——But what becomes of logic now?  Its
rigour seems be giving way here.—But in that case doesn’t logic altogether disappear?—For how
can it  lose any of its rigour?  Of course not by our bargaining any of its rigour out  of  it.—the
preconceived idea of the crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination
around. […]
We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomena of language, not about some non-spatial,
non-temporal phantasm. […]” (PI §108)
238Besides  the  many  examples  of  this  that  can  be  found  in  the  Investigations—several  of  which  are
explicitly drawn in opposition to the view advanced in the Tractatus, e.g. PI §23—the most colourful is
perhaps that provided by Malcolm in his Memoir, in a well-known anecdote that concerns the influence
of Pierro Sraffa on Wittgenstein’s post-Tractarian thought.  Malcolm relates a story about the “feeling of
absurdity”  that  resulted  in  Wittgenstein  regarding  the  logico-grammatical  status  of  (what  Malcolm
euphemistically describes as) “a gesture, familiar to Neapolitans as meaning something like disgust or
contempt,” which Sraffa made to Wittgenstein during one of the frequent occasions they had discussing
the central tenants of the Tractatus. (N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, op cit., p. 69.)
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Nonetheless, it must also be admitted that Wittgenstein’s post-Tractarian interest in ordinary
language was principally of a methodological importance, and he would have been reticent
to accept what Moore considered to be authoritative about ordinary language, particularly
insofar as that may be taken as a genuine philosophical standpoint.   When Wittgenstein
notes, for example, that—
“When philosophers use a word—“knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “propositions”, “name”—and
try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in
this way in the language-game which is its original home?—
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.” (PI §116)
—he does so in order to illuminate the abuse of language by philosophers, in a negative
sense, not in order to posit a positive philosophical theory that would replace them.  If such
remarks are intended to combat the philosophical impulse, they do not do so on the same
playing-field that philosophy supposes.  
Recalling  our  earlier  analysis  of  what  can  be  called  the  ‘pedagogical  style’  of  the
Investigations, we might also consider here particularly the examples of language-learning
and  those  cases  of  the  explanation  of  meaning  to  the  linguistic  novice  that  feature
prominently in the  Investigations.  As we saw earlier, learning—including the question of
how one might teach the meaning of a word or expression to a child—provides an example
of the kinds of things that Wittgenstein felt one should be prepared to accept as criteria for
the correct use of words.  However, it would be incorrect to conclude—as we saw Hacker
has done—that the biological order of our natural reactions, though they may in principle be
used effectively to  bootstrap a  young learners  knowledge in  the  great  many cases,  will
provide an essential guide to our  philosophical conception of meaning (even for a certain
subset of words,  such as those associated with sensations for example).   While it  is  an
interesting idea in its own right, particularly from an empirical standpoint, such an account
is difficult (if not impossible) to square with Wittgenstein’s own admission that he at least is
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interested primarily in describing linguistic phenomena and not in providing an explanation
of their efficaciousness.
Despite the  significant  shifts  in thought  that  are characteristic  of  each of  Wittgenstein’s
major periods, this is true for On Certainty as much as it ever was for the Investigations.  It
can  be  seen  clearly  from  the  fact  that  from  Wittgenstein’s  perspective  Moore’s  two
presentations exhibit a profound difference in philosophical insight.  We know, for example,
that Wittgenstein greatly admired the first of these two presentations and that he thought the
second was severely misguided.239  Given what I have described earlier as the consistent
application of a style of reasoning throughout Moore’s works, to what might we attribute
this difference in Wittgenstein’s estimation of the two presentations?
In  a  manner  of  speaking,  one  need  look  no  further  than  the  two  titles  of  Moore’s
presentations.  In Moore’s “Defence” he had precisely made no effort  to  prove  that the
common sense view of the world that he was expounding was true.  He simply asserted that
he knew it was.  The power of Moore’s approach at that time lay in the vigour of those
assertions,  which  would  thus  ideally  have  had  the  effect  of  inclining  his  audience  to
naturally agree with him, that, indeed, he knew what he asserted to be true with certainty,
and that,  indeed,  they knew it  to  be  true  of  themselves  as  well.   When and where  his
assertions failed to do so, this would for Wittgenstein say more about those who were failed
to be convinced than it would about Moore’s attempt to convince them.  In a manner of
speaking, one might say that Moore had shifted the burden of proof to the sceptic.  
Furthermore, in his “Defence”, Moore noted at the outset that the propositions to be offered
were such ‘obvious truism’ so as not to be worth stating at all.  The implication here is that
‘some  philosophers’ had  strayed  from  the  common-sense  view  and  therefore  required
something of a reminder of what they certainly already knew for themselves to be true.  But
a reminder is not a proof.  For Wittgenstein, the danger inherent in Moore’s later attempt to
return to his earlier claim—let us not forget, that among those various propositions put forth
239Cf. N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, op cit., pp. 33 et passim.  
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in  Moore’s  earlier  “Defence”  are  included  those  that  assert  precisely  the  existence  of
external  objects—is  that  in  doing so,  in  order  to  provide  a  proof  of  the  much grander
philosophical claim concerning the ‘existence of the external world’, Moore risks giving the
sceptic’s  question  too much linguistic  currency.   As  in  Wittgenstein’s  Investigations-era
critique  of  Russell’s  attack  on  solipsism, Moore’s  attempt  to  block  the  sceptic’s  doubt
remains intimately tied to the object of its refutation by acknowledging that there is at least
a legitimate doubt there to be countered.  Moore, like Russell before him, thus unwittingly
committed himself to the very framework that he sought to refute.  That is not to say, of
course, that he committed himself to it its truth, but rather to the idea that the sceptic’s doubt
might somehow make sense. 
This manner of critique is not unique to Wittgenstein’s later works; it naturally recalls, for
example, the famous concluding remarks of the Tractatus: 
“The correct method of philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing that can be said, i.e.
propositions of natural science—i.e. Something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then,
whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had
failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions.  Although it would not be satisfying to
the other person—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy— this method
would be the only strictly correct one.” (T 6.53) 
In the Tractatus, as we have seen, Wittgenstein had already sought to circumscribe truth and
falsity within the space of sensical propositions.  For a proposition to be sensical it had be
‘bipolar’, i.e., it had either to be true or false.  Propositions that do not meet this condition
on Wittgenstein’s  Tractarian account are  not  therefore  false,  but  rather  nonsensical.   Of
course,  in  Wittgenstein’s  earlier  approach  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  consider  the
propositions  of  logic—tautologies  and  contradictions—as  a  unique  case  of  un-sensical
language  (being  always  true  or  always  false,  respectively).   As  testified  by  the  great
attraction that the Tractatus continues to exert upon us to this day, there remains something
strange and powerful in this account of propositional language.  Nonetheless, Wittgenstein
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himself was not fully satisfied by the approach he had taken earlier.  When he returned to
philosophy ten years after the publication of the earlier work, his focus had shifted.  He
recognised  that  his  earlier  ‘picture  theory  of  language’ provided an  incomplete  picture,
being  not  but  ein  Stilleben or  a  still-life,  what  the  French edition  of  the  Investigations
accurately translates in the still more suggestive terms of une nature morte (PI §526).  He
thus sought a more complete description of language in terms of its dynamism—which is to
say, as a way of life or as a way of living with words.  Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘game’
found throughout the work, he reminds us, is, of course, “meant to bring into prominence
the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.” (PI §23)
Naturally, this is not to say that with this change of perspective Wittgenstein discovered a
renewed commitment to the practice of philosophy—quite the contrary.  But the focus of his
criticism of philosophy shifted in a corresponding manner.  Philosophical propositions never
ceased for Wittgenstein to exemplify the kind of nonsense he sought to expunge from our
language.  However,  the reason given for their  senselessness in the  Investigations is  no
longer that they fail to meet the transcendental criteria laid out in the earlier work.  Rather,
the propositions of philosophy had later to be expunged for their impotence.  Wittgenstein
thus likens the philosopher to one who has forgotten the purpose of what he is doing, to an
idling  engine,  to  a  fly  stick  in  a  fly-bottle.   Perhaps  most  famously  he  compares  the
philosopher’s  use  of  a  question  to  a  disease,  which  thus  requires  not  a  solution,  but
treatment.   The aim of his philosophy, he states,  consists in assembling reminders for a
purpose.
A useful example of  just  such a reminder can be found in Malcolm’s reconstruction of
Moore’s earlier argument of the “Defence.”  He highlights there specifically the request that
‘some philosophers’ (such as Russell and Ayer, among others) make to their readers, when
they claim that we should—‘properly speaking’, ‘if we wish to avoid misunderstandings’,
etc.—substitute the expressions of their revised systems for those of our ordinary language.
Though they would not disagree with anyone in any particular case about a given matter of
fact, they claim it is nonetheless ‘more correct’ to speak in the manner they proscribe.  But
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what then, Malcolm asks, might we expect to gain from such a substitution?  “It is important
to  see  that  by  such  a  move,”  he  correctly  notes,  “we  should  have  gained  nothing
whatsoever.”240   For, not only would this be no improvement in any empirically relevant
way—our  sciences,  for  example,  would  not  be  more  efficacious  because  of  it—but
furthermore, in our revised system we would need to introduce new words to perform the
very function of those that our old words had already performed perfectly well to begin
with.241  The revision of our language would, ultimately, have accomplished nothing.  In just
what  sense,  then,  their  substitutions  would  be  more  proper  or  should  help  us  avoid
misunderstandings, is left indeterminate.
A humorous mockery of this kind of ‘revisionist reasoning’ is provided by Karl Kraus, who
once remarked that he and his compatriot Adolf Loos, despite their different pursuits, were
essentially engaged in the same endeavour.  Both of them—Loos, through his innovative
architectural designs, and Kraus, through his critical and satirical essays on contemporary
Viennese society—had done nothing more than show that there is a distinction between an
urn and a chamber pot, and that it is this distinction above all others that gives culture its
footing.  He continues: “The others, those who fail to make this distinction, are divided into
those who use the urn as a chamber pot and those who use the chamber pot as urn.”242  
Borrowing from the language of Kraus, Moore’s critique of philosophical language in his
“Defence” might thus be rephrased in a colourful way: philosophers, in their abrogation of
ordinary language, have mistaken the urn for the chamber pot.  They have, in other words,
mistaken the decorative language of the philosophical tradition for something functional,
and proceeded to relegate what is truly functional in language to a mere appendage, at worst
naïve,  at  best  a  folksy  and quaint  superstition.   However,  by the  light  of  this  analogy,
240N. Malcolm, “Moore on Ordinary Language”, op cit., p. 364.
241If, as Ayer claims, we can ‘properly speaking’ speak only of a posteriori propositions as ‘more’ or ‘less
probable’, for example, this question of degree would have to mapped one-to-one for all of those ‘loose
expressions’ that already do this work in our language (e.g. ‘I am certain that’s a tree’, ‘I think that’s a
tree’, ‘It could be a tree’, etc.)
242Quoted in A. Janik and S. Toulmin, Wittgenstein’s Vienna, op cit., p. 89.
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Wittgenstein’s critique of Moore’s subsequent attack on scepticism in his “Proof”, is that
Moore himself has in turn mistaken the chamber pot for the urn.  In other words, if the kinds
of propositions that Moore puts forth as premises for his ‘proof’—i.e. ‘Here is one hand
and  here  is  another’—function  at  all,  they  do  not  do  so  in  the  transparent  and
straightforward way that Moore’s argument presupposes.  This certainly does not mean that
one cannot use a chamber pot as an urn, or vice verse.  Indeed, one can.  But doing so will
ultimately tell us more about  the people who do that  than it will about chamber pots and
urns.
III. “It stands fast for me that…”
Of course, if in Wittgenstein’s esteem the propositions of Moore’s proof do not function in
the straightforward, transparent way that Moore intends, this naturally raises the question:
How do they function?  Wittgenstein’s answer to this question is repeatedly reformulated
within the pages of On Certainty; however, not all the answers he provides there are equally
clear,  nor  are  they  necessarily  consistent  with  one  another.   This  makes  a  complete
reconstruction of his argument problematic.  It is a situation further complicated by two
intrinsic features of the work: its status as a provisional, unfinished text, and its evolutive
character.243  While  these  features  are  by  no  means  unique  to  On Certainty,  the  work
nonetheless  presents  its  readers  with  particular  difficulty  here  due  to  its  relentless
purposiveness and its halting, discontinuous composition.  
At first glance, Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty indeed appear to be composed just as
they had previously been in e.g. the  Investigations,  touching now on one topic,  now on
243Despite these characteristics, which might call its coherence into question from a certain point of view,
Anscombe and von Wright clearly have no qualms about calling the remarks collected here precisely a
“work”, as they notes: “These were not the only things Wittgenstein wrote during this period.  He wrote
i.a. a fair amount on colour-concepts, and this material he did excerpt and polish, reducing it to a small
compass. […]  It seemed appropriate to publish this work by itself.  It is not a selection; Wittgenstein
marked it off in his notebooks as a separate topic, which he apparently took up at four separate periods
during this eighteen months.  It constitutes a single sustained treatment of the topic.” (OC, Preface)
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another,  as  they  do.   However,  in  his  earlier  work  this  feature  allowed one  equally  to
contemplate each remark as a single unity of intrinsic significance or as a part of the greater
whole, which lent his earlier thought a dialectical force that his last remarks lack.  With On
Certainty, by contrast, one has the feeling that no single remark will ever suffice.  Like the
text itself, there will never be a final word.  Unlike the Investigations, which Wittgenstein
had described in the preface to that work as ‘an album’, composed of a series of landscape
sketches,  one  has  the  impression  that  On  Certainty  resembles  more  closely  a  cubist
portrait.244  Each of the remarks in On Certainty is only a small part of a greater picture that
is difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct according to standards of coherence which are
essentially  foreign  to  his  thought—for  such  standards  as  it  does  have  are,  “of  course,
connected with the very nature of the investigation.” (PI, Preface)
It will help, therefore, to return once more to Wittgenstein’s earlier work and to a response
he  made  to  a  criticism  that  Moore  presented  him  with  while  attending  Wittgenstein’s
lectures between 1929 and 1933.  For, though the topics dealt with in these two periods
differ  greatly,  the  two cases  nonetheless  present  a  number of  important  methodological
parallels that may help us orient Wittgenstein’s later response to Moore and to the general 
244Stroll describes Wittgenstein’s style in On Certainty as that of a ‘broken text’ (A. Stroll, “Understanding
On Certainty: Entry 194”, in R. Haller and K Puhl (eds), Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy.  A
reassessment after 50 years / Wittgenstein und die Zukunft der Philosophie.  Eine Neubewertung nach 50
Jahren (Vienna: öbvhpt, 2002), pp. 446-456.)  I am much more inclined, however, to feel that insofar as
Wittgenstein’s writings of any period are ‘broken’, it is only when seen from the perspective of a straight
linearity that was not amenable to his thought, which has rather a cubist concern for representing spatial
and temporal flux in a single momentary image.  As Wittgenstein notes early on in Culture and Value: 
“Each of the sentences I write is trying to say the whole thing, i.e. the same thing over and over again;
it is as though they were all simply views of one object seen from different angles.” (CV, p. 7 [MS
109; 6.11.1930])
In this sense, it is fair to claim that Wittgenstein’s work is broken only insofar one might claim the same
of Braque’s Violin and Candlestick or Duchamp’s Nude Descending a Staircase, and that the latter two’s
work would be improved upon as much Wittgenstein’s own by making it ‘unbroken’ or more coherent
according to conventional standards. 
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subject of sceptical doubt.245  
In 1954 and 1955 Moore published a synopsis of the notes he had taken during this time,
entitled “Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-33”,  for the journal  Mind.246  Moore,  as we have
seen, had a keen ear for language-use that struck him as ‘out of the ordinary’, so to speak.
We thus see here once again the very same charge arise in his synopsis of Wittgenstein’s
lectures, this time in response to Wittgenstein’s 1930-era notion of ‘grammar’ or ‘rules of
grammar’, which he was then developing in order to re-orient his earlier notion of logical
form in the Tractatus.  Moore writes there:
“With regard to the expressions “rules of grammar” or “grammatical rules” he pointed out near the
beginning of (I)247,  where he first introduced the former expression, that when he said “grammar
should not allow me to say ‘greenish-red’”, he was “making things belong to it”; and he immediately
went on to say that the arrangement of colours in the colour octahedron “is really a part of grammar,
not  of  psychology”;  that  “There  is  such  a  colour  as  a  greenish  blue”  is  “grammar”;  and  that
Euclidean Geometry is also “a part of grammar”.  In the interval between (II) and (III) I wrote a
short paper for him in which I said that I did not understand how he was using the expression “rule
of grammar” and gave reasons for thinking that he was not using it in its ordinary sense; but he,
though he expressed approval of my paper, insisted at that time that he was using the expression in
its ordinary sense.  Later, however, in (III), he said that “any explanation of the use of language” was
“grammar”,  but  that if I  explained the meaning of “flows” by pointing at a river “we shouldn’t
245Stroll has in fact suggested that  On Certainty  can be read, in its  entirety, as a continuation of the very
discussions that Wittgenstein and Moore were having over a decade earlier. (Cf. A. Stroll,  Moore and
Wittgenstein on Certainty, op cit., passim.)  Whether or not this is the case is an interesting and important
question, which, unfortunately, will only be elaborated obliquely here. 
246These  have  been  reprinted  in  Moore’s  collection  Philosophical  Papers,  as  well  as  Wittgenstein’s
Philosophical Occasions.  References to the work will refer to the Philosophical Occasions pagination.
247This number system refers to the three lectures Moore attended at the time, as he notes at the opening of
his synopsis: “My lecture-notes may be naturally divided into three groups, to which I will refer as (I),
(II) and (III). (I) contains the notes of his lectures in the Lent and May terms of 1930; (II) those of his
lectures in the academic year 1930-1931; and (III) those of lectures which he gave in the May term of
1930, after I had resumed attending, as well as those lectures he have in the academic year 1930-33.  The
distinction between the three groups is of some important, since, as will be seen, he sometimes in later
lectures corrected what he had said in earlier ones.” (PO, p. 50)
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naturally call  this a rule of grammar”.  This seems to suggest that by that time he was doubtful
whether he was using “rule of grammar” in quite the ordinary sense; and the same seems to be
suggested by his saying, earlier in (III), that we should be using his “jargon” if we said that whether
a sentence made sense or not depended on “whether or not it was constructed according to the rules
of grammar”.” (PO, p. 69)
Moore’s charge here, which is in all  essential respects comparable to that which can be
found in his “Defence of Common Sense” as well as in his “Proof of an External World”, is
that  when  Wittgenstein  suggests  that  we  should  consider  the  propositions  of  logic,
mathematics, or colour comparability, etc., as ‘rules of grammar’, this is patently not what
we ordinarily mean by ‘rules of grammar’—as found, for example, in grammar textbooks
and foreign language classes.  Returning to the original source lecture-notes, the difference
is made clear.  Moore poses two examples to Wittgenstein:
“(1) Where there is no doubt. “Three men was working.”  Here it is clear what the rule is and how it
has been broken.
(2) “Different colours cannot be in the same place in a visual field at the same time.”  This differs
from example (1).
Are the two examples rules of grammar in the same sense?  If we say “Two colours can’t be in the
same place”, we may mean that we can’t imagine it, that it is inconceivable or unthinkable, or that it
is logically (as distinct for physically) impossible.”248
Such deviation from the ordinary use, as we have seen, would have suggested to Moore that
Wittgenstein’s use of the expression ‘rule of grammar’ is either misleading—in such cases
as  Wittgenstein’s  use  of  the  expression  is  merely  inconsistent  with  common usage—or
indeed outright false—in such cases as Wittgenstein’s use marks an inconsistency with the
dictates of the common sense view.249 
248L. Wittgenstein,  Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1930-1932.  ed. D. Lee (Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1980), p. 97.
249In Malcolm’s reconstruction of Moore’s argument, he suggests that Moore felt Wittgenstein’s use of the
expression ‘grammatical rule’ belonged to the second case.  He lists, for example, twelve propositions by
a nameless philosopher and paraphrases the response he supposes Moore would make on each of these
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When Moore first made these objections,  as  he himself notes,  Wittgenstein replied that,
indeed, he felt the two cases were ‘rules of grammar’ in an identical sense; however, as is so
often the case in Wittgenstein’s reflections, the matter is not thereby settled once and for all.
For he continues:
“Grammatical rules are all of the same kind, but it is not the same mistake if a man breaks the one as
if he breaks another.  If he uses “was” instead of “were” it causes no confusion; but in the other
example the analogy with physical space (c.f. two people in the  same chair) does cause confusion.
When we say we can’t think of two colours in the same place, we make the mistake of thinking this
is a proposition, though it is not; and we would never try to say it if we were not mislead by an
analogy.  It is misleading to use the word “can’t” because it suggests a wrong analogy.  We should
say, “It has not sense to say - - -”
The rule about red and blue ((2) above) is a rule about the is of the word ‘and’; and we would only
say that ‘was’ ((1) above) makes nonsense if someone said it posed a philosophical problem.”250
Let us consider Wittgenstein’s response more carefully.  For in it, a number of important
features stand out, which will help us to better understand his response to Moore’s use of the
expression ‘I know…’ and the position that ultimately developed out of it in On Certainty.  
occasions.  The twelfth is, in fact, a reprisal of precisely Wittgenstein’s statement:
“(12) Philosopher: “A priori statements are really rules of grammar.
Moore: “That 6 times 9 equals 54 is an a priori statement, but it is most certainly wrong to call it a rule
of grammar.” (N. Malcolm, “Moore and Ordinary Language”, op cit., p. 348, my emphasis.)
I am unable to find another example of where Moore refers to such a statement, and so I assume that
Malcolm is referring to Moore’s paper, which is no longer in existence as far as I know.  Moore, for his
part, responds in his reply to Malcolm, that of the twelve propositions Malcolm provides: 
“I think he is quite right that in every case I should approve of a statement of the kind he attributes to
me as a good argument against the “philosophical statement” in question.” (G.E. Moore, A Reply to
My Critics, p. 668. In P.A. Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, op cit., pp. 533-688.)
However, it is worth noting that in Moore’s earlier synopsis of Wittgenstein’s lectures, he states rather a
more modest claim, that Wittgenstein’s use of the expression ‘rule of grammar’ belongs rather to the first
of the two cases above—that it is misleading, and not false—stating that:
“I still think that he was not using the expression “rules of grammar” in an ordinary sense, and I am
still unable to form any clear idea as to how he was using it.” (PO, p. 69)
250L. Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1930-1932, op cit., p. 98.
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First, Wittgenstein states that although the ‘grammatical rules’ themselves are of the same
kind, the mistakes made when breaking them are not.  This would clearly seem to go against
the so-called ‘official theory’ of knowledge sketched above; for what difference at the level
of mistake would not reflect a corresponding difference at the level of the rules themselves?
Some mistakes, Wittgenstein thus clarifies, give rise not only to mere errors—such as those
that  would  be  promptly  corrected  in  a  grammar  class—but  rather  to  confusions.
Specifically, the kind of ‘confusions’ that Wittgenstein is interested in here are those that
have been appropriated over the ages by the philosophical tradition:  “It is just that some
have been the subject of philosophical discussion and some have not,” Wittgenstein notes.251
Accordingly, what makes the second breakage nonsense, whereas the first is only a mistake,
is that this particular breakage is posed as a philosophical problem to be solved rather than
simply corrected.  Of course, no mere correction will  prove sufficient,  in Wittgenstein’s
esteem, for this type of rule-breakage has been firmly embedded in a philosophical tradition
from whose grip we find it very difficult to release ourselves.
Secondly, it is essential to note that the dissolution of such conceptual confusions is not, as
Moore would claim, to clarify the precise meaning of this or that expression (whereby, for
example, it will ideally be shown that what we ordinarily mean by a given expression has
the capacity to falsify its philosophical variant).  Rather, for Wittgenstein, such corrections
require ‘therapy’.  In other words, they require not a solution, but dissolution.  How is this
therapeutic task to be realised?  While this particular aspect of Wittgenstein’s morphological
methodology  would  undoubtedly  be  most  clearly  expressed  within  the  pages  of  the
Investigations, we nonetheless witness a similar approach being taken here, fifteen years
before his second  magnum opus  would be published: the task is realised by finding and
inventing  ‘intermediary  cases’  (Zwischengliedern),  identifying  ‘family  resemblances’
(Familienähnlichkeiten),  and  holding  diverse  linguistic  phenomena  up  as  ‘objects  of
251Ibid.
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comparison’  (Vergleichsobjekte),  in  order  to  achieve  a  perspicuous  representation
(übersichtliche Darstellung).252
Of principle importance here is that Moore’s difficulties arise from  a false analogy.  For
example, Moore’s insistence on what we might mean by the expression ‘cannot’—i.e., that
when we say ‘Two colours  cannot be in the same place at the same time’, we must mean
either 1. that we cannot imagine it, 2. that it is inconceivable or unthinkable, or 3. that it is
logically impossible—this shows to Wittgenstein’s mind that it is rather Moore himself who
is being mislead by an expression:
“We are inclined to say that we can’t imagine or think something, and imply that we could express it
correctly if we had the experience.  To say that something is “logically impossible” sounds like a
proposition.  So if we say we can’t think of red and blue together in the same visual space, we have a
feeling  of  trying  to  do  so,  as  if  we  were  talking  about  the  physical  world;  we  somehow clear
ourselves and think it can be done.”253
The use of the word ‘cannot’, Wittgenstein notes, draws a misleading comparison between
the case of colour incompatibility and similar cases in the physical world.  His response to
such a misleading analogy is, therefore, to put forth a new, better, more perspicuous one.  In
one of  Wittgenstein’s  signature  manoeuvres,  he  suggests  that  the  case is  rather  like  the
following:  “Compare  using  the  same board  and the  same pieces  we use  for  chess,  but
making moves which the rules do not provide for.”254  For here, Wittgenstein emphasises,
we would be rather more inclined to say: “It makes no sense to say that…”  As in the case of
a chess-move forbidden by the rules of the game, we do not say here that one cannot move
in such and such a way—in the sense that it is ‘unimaginable’ that someone would attempt
252Wittgenstein: “A main source of failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of our use
of our words.—Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity.  A perspicuous representation produces
just that sort of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’.  Hence the importance of finding
and  inventing  intermediate  cases.  //  The  concept  of  perspicuous  representation  is  of  fundamental
importance for us.  It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things.” (PI §122)
253L. Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1930-1932, op cit., p. 98.
254Ibid.
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to move the pieces around the board in such a manner, that it is ‘logically impossible’ to do
so, etc.—but that one is merely playing the game wrongly if one does.255
In this familiar manoeuvre of Wittgenstein’s, we can clearly recognise something similar to
the traditional philosophical approach discussed above: i.e. the one in which we substitute
one expression for another.  As we saw above, what exactly is at stake in such a substitution
is put forth clearly by none other than Ayer.  In his attempt to outline a solid foundation for
our understanding of  empirical  knowledge,  Ayer notes that  we are  incorrect to think of
empirical  propositions  as  ‘certain’,  for  the  notion  of  certainty  simply  does  not  fit
propositions of this  kind.  Rather,  for him, certainty is restricted to the domain of non-
empirical, a priori knowledge.  “Accordingly,” he claims, “what we should say, if we wish
to avoid misunderstanding, is…”256  However, though Ayer and Wittgenstein share a similar
interest in the substitution of one expression for another, the likeness ends there.  For, unlike
Ayer,  when  Wittgenstein  says  that  we  should  consider  a  priori  statements  as  ‘rules  of
255A third feature, no less significant than the two outlined here, is that of Wittgenstein’s worry that his
philosophy was destined to produce only a sort of ‘jargon’.  This worry is highlighted, I believe, when
Wittgenstein notes right at the opening of his reply to Moore: 
“The right expression is “It does not have any sense to say---”; but we usually express it badly by
speaking of a rule of grammar.” (L. Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1930-1932, op
cit., p. 97.)
Likewise, it further recalls a remark recorded by Malcolm in his Memoir:
“In his lectures he would sometimes exclaim in a time of real suffering ‘I am a dreadful teacher!’ He
once concluded a years’ lectures with this sentence: ‘The only seed that I am likely to sow is a certain
jargon.’” (N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, op cit, p. 63.)
I  noted earlier  that  an important  feature  of  Wittgenstein’s  post-Tractarian methodology involved the
demystification or  de-sublimation of  philosophical  accounts of phenomena via  humorous—and even
ridiculous—analogies.   Besides  the  greengrocer  of  PI  §1,  quoted  above,  we  might  consider  such
examples as  the ‘builders’ of  ‘Language-game (2)’,  the  ‘beetle in  the box’ of the  Private Language
Argument, and so forth.  It is an important question, given the central role that terms such as ‘language-
game’ or ‘rule of grammar’ have taken on in discourses well beyond that of Wittgenstein scholarship,
whether—and if so, to what extent—these latter expressions were likewise intended to be a humorous
mockery of philosophical expressions.  In other words, to what extent were they intended to be cast aside
after  having fulfilled their  purpose,  rather than to replace their  more traditional  equivalents,  as they
currently  have  in  some  domains  of  discourse.   In  this  respect,  I  believe  it  is  significant  that  in
Wittgenstein’s very last remarks these signature terms rarely appear.
256A.J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, op cit. p. 45.
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grammar’,  he  is  not  putting  forth  a  theory  regarding what—as  a  matter  of  fact—these
propositions are.  Rather, he is claiming that considering them as such will help us to release
the grips  of  a certain kind of  philosophical  picture,  one which will  inevitably result  in
conceptual confusions if we insist too strongly upon its veracity.
As Wittgenstein would later attempt to clarify in the second part of the  Investigations—
where he notes that if we let ourselves “imagine certain very general facts of nature to be
different from what we are used to, the formation of concepts different from the usual ones
will become intelligible” (PI, p. 239)—he is here attempting to turn the whole axis of our
investigation around.  It  is not the case, for example, that the notion ‘rule of grammar’
serves  as  a  generic  kind,  of  which  statements  like  ‘All  bachelors  are  unmarried  men’,
‘2+2=4’ and ‘There cannot be two colours in one place at the same time’ would be three
different species.  Rather, there are certain  similarities between these three cases and it is
these similarities that Wittgenstein wishes to call our attention to, so that some aspects of
one case may shed a new light on a confusing-inducing aspects of another.  If Moore has
sought  (contra  ‘some  philosophers’)  to  invert  the  traditional  hierarchy  of  ordinary
expressions and their corresponding philosophical refinements, Wittgenstein seeks rather to
‘level  the  playing field’,  as  it  were,  thus  allowing us  to  move  horizontally through the
various domains of our discourse with greater ease.
In  On Certainty  this global approach to the dissolution of philosophical problems, which
can undoubtedly be found throughout Wittgenstein’s post-Tractarian work, is extended to
include a number of a posteriori propositions, such as those Moore claims that he knows for
certain.  As he notes in On Certainty:  
“If I were to say “I have never been on the moon—but I may be mistaken”, that would be idiotic.257
257This clearly recalls Ayer’s claim, discussed in greater detail above, that we can ‘properly speaking’ speak
only of a posteriori propositions as ‘more’ or ‘less probable’.  It is a claim that Moore himself attacked
strongly in his work; Wittgenstein, however, takes this critique one step further by claiming that Ayer’s
position is not just ‘wrong’, absurd’, etc., but indeed foolish.  
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For even the thought that I might have been transported there, by unknown means, in my sleep,
would not give me any right to speak of a possible mistake here.  I play the game wrong if I do.” (OC
§662)
What Wittgenstein discovers here is a rather surprising similarity between certain aspects of
these a posteriori propositions and that more familiar aspect of a priori propositions, alluded
to by Ayer himself along with most everyone else of the philosophical tradition, i.e. it does
not make any sense to doubt them.  And, as Wittgenstein had once insisted on the bi-polarity
of sensical propositions in the Tractatus, he further concludes in an analogous manner that if
it does not make sense to doubt them, neither does it make sense  to assert them.  If it is
unreasonable to claim that ‘I have never been to the moon—but I may be mistaken’, on the
one hand, no less unreasonable is it to to claim, on the other, that ‘I have never been to the
moon—and about this I can’t be mistaken’.
It is thus not the case, as Moore claims, that one might simply assert what one knows to be
true—about, for example, the fact that he has never been far from the earth’s surface, the
existence of his hands, that he has two parents, etc., etc.—for in such cases “the expression
“I know” gets  misused” (OC §6).   This  misuse is  no mere inconsistency with ordinary
usage; it is no mere empirical irregularity.  It is rather a description of the language game
and as such it belongs to logic (OC §628), and—belonging to logic—it must therefore abide
by the same limitations that are imposed upon those more familiar elements of the ‘logic of
our language’, a priori propositions.  Wittgenstein continues:
“If “I know etc.” is conceived as a grammatical proposition, of course the “I” cannot be important.
And it properly means “There is no such thing as a doubt in this case” or “The expression ‘I do not
know’ makes no sense in this case”.  And of course it follows from this that “I know” makes no
sense either.” (OC §58)
Examining our use of such expressions Wittgenstein thus discovers that in order to release
the grip of  the  philosophical  paradigm of certainty—i.e.,  the  one in  which I  cannot be
making a mistake,  which is undoubtedly shared by realists and relativists alike—we should
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rather claim that certain propositions  stand fast for us.  As he notes there: “Instead of “I
know…”, couldn’t Moore have said: “It stands fast for me that…”? And further: “It stands
fast for me and many others…” (OC §116)  Put otherwise: “I should like to say: Moore does
not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him, as also for me; regarding it as
absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and enquiry.” (OC §151)  What is revealed
here is that, far from exhibiting a kind of certainty that properly belongs to either the realm
of a priori propositions (à la Ayer) or also that of a posteriori propositions (à la Moore), what
might  be  euphemistically  called  ‘foundational  certainty’  belongs  to  no  category  of
propositions at all:
“Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is not certain
propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e.  it is not a kind of  seeing on our part;  it is our
acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.
If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false.”  (OC §§204-205)
As has been argued by Stroll, Moyal-Sharrock, and others, it is above all this feature of such
foundational certainty that removes it from the normal traffic of knowledge and doubt—
which shunts it “onto the unused siding” of language, so to speak (OC §210)258—essentially
removing it from the sphere of philosophical scrutiny.
So, despite their different aims, Wittgenstein does indeed share a common methodological
starting  point  with  that  of  traditional  philosophy,  insofar  as  the  substitution  of  one
expression for another may be assumed to shed a new light on some misleading aspects of
another.   However,  as  Malcolm  himself  reminds  us  in  his  reconstruction  of  Moore’s
argument  contra philosophers  such as Russell  and Ayer,  the question we must  then ask
ourselves is this: What does one hope to achieve by such a substitution of terms?  Put in
258As Wittgenstein would remark in the  Remarks of Philosophy of Psychology: “The  facts  of our natural
history that throw light on our problem, are difficult for us to find out, for our talk passes them by, it is
occupied with other things. (In the same way we tell someone: “Go into the shop and buy…”—not: “Put
your left foot in front of your right foot, etc. etc. then put coins down on the counter, etc. etc.”)” (RPP, I,
§78)
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more familiar Wittgensteinian terms, we might rephrase this question thus: What kind of
problem is this analogy meant to elucidate?
To understand this problem better it is useful to consider the kinds of striking metaphors
Wittgenstein peppers throughout his remarks, where he speaks, for example, at once about
the  ‘foundations’  of  such  basic  judgements,  beliefs,  etc.,  but  also  about  their
‘foundationlessness’.  One of the most striking of such metaphors is to be found towards the
beginning of Wittgenstein’s notebooks.  He writes there, and I quote at length:
“The propositions presenting what Moore ‘knows’ are all of such a kind that it is difficult to imagine
why anyone should believe the contrary.  E.g. the proposition that Moore has spent his whole life in
proximity to the earth.—Once more I can speak of myself here instead of Moore.  What could induce
me to believe the opposite?  Either a memory, or having been told.—Everything that I have seen or
heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth.  Nothing in my picture
of the world speaks in favour of the opposite.
But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it
because  I  am  satisfied  of  its  correctness.   No:  it  is  the  inherited  background  against  which  I
distinguish between true and false.
The propositions describing the world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology.  And their role
is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any
explicit rules.
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened
and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that
this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.
The mythology my change back into a  state  of  flux [wieder in  Fluβ geraten], the  river-bed of
thoughts may shift.  But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the
shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.” (OC §§93-97)
This is an arresting metaphor, clearly among the most powerful in Wittgenstein’s oeuvre.
But what is the message we are meant to take from it?  
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As J. Schulte notes, a first step in the right direction is to see that this image casts a new
light on the relationship between change and tradition.259  The flowing waters of the river
stand in a similar relationship to the river-bed itself as our fluctuating surface judgements
stand in relation to the imperceptibly shifting traditions within which we have been brought
up (our “world-view” or “the inherited background against which I distinguish true from
false”, as Wittgenstein calls it).  Schulte is correct to note, perhaps in homage to Moore, that
the ‘inherited background’ of which Wittgenstein speaks here is not exactly what we would
ordinarily call ‘tradition’.260  Even less so can we understand what Wittgenstein means by
‘world-picture’ here via an appeal to some ordinary use of  that expression.  Nonetheless,
certain  undeniable  similarities  present  themselves  between  what  we  might  here  call
‘tradition’, if only for the sake of convenience, and what Wittgenstein calls our ‘inherited
background’ or ‘world-picture’.  
I  take it  that these similarities  are,  at  least in part,  responsible for the peculiar force of
Wittgenstein’s having described this world-picture as ‘a kind of mythology’.  We cannot
presume that he does so lightly here.  For, as we have seen, Wittgenstein’s work had been
motivated from the very outset by his interest in what he—following Paul Ernst261—has
called the “mythology” which is “laid down in our language” (PO, p. 199 [TS 213, p. 434;
1933]).   For  the  sake  of  clarity,  let  us  repeat  here  the  passage  that  aroused the  young
259J. Schulte, “Within a System”, in D. Moyal-Sharrock and W. Brenner (eds.), Readings of On Certainty,
op cit., pp. 59-75.
260As Schulte notes, for example: “That Wittgenstein does not want to speak about tradition, or traditions, in
that sense is clear from the examples he does discuss.  These examples are in many cases taken from
G.E. Moore or modelled on Moore’s examples.  […] In spite  of the  frequent  use of the first-person
pronoun none of these or the other examples discussed by Wittgenstein is as specific or unstable as those
forming large parts of what we should normally count as tradition.” (J. Schulte, “Within a System”, op
cit., p. 62.)
261As Wittgenstein once noted, regarding the source of the notion ‘misunderstanding the logic of language’
mobilized at the heart of his Tractarian project:
“Should my book ever be published its foreword must contain an acknowledgement to the Foreword
of Paul Ernst to his edition of the Grimms’ Fairy Tales, which I should have acknowledged already in
the Log. Phil. Abhandlung as the source of the expression ‘misunderstanding the logic of language’.”
(Quoted by W. Künne, “Paul Ernst and Ludwig Wittgenstein”, op cit., pp. 151-166.)
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Wittgenstein’s interest so greatly that it would direct the course of his research for many
decades to come:
“The overwhelming majority by far of motifs and material that can still be used today certainly does
not originate in reality.  It is often the extremely ancient legacy of peoples, occurring in enigmatic
and still not adequately explained form among the most distant and different peoples, originating
from changes of language, when later ages no longer understood the logic of the language of the past
and interpreted it through fabrications; through changes in views about the connection of the world,
about  death,  the  soul,  the  afterlife,  God,  etc.,  by  rationalistically  interpreting  uncomprehended
remnants  of  previous  beliefs;  through  the  migration  of  this  material  to  other  peoples,  through
retelling in changed circumstances and through adaptation to the new.  The process is essentially
always this:  a problem that  is  unsolvable by means of the experience of reality is  solved by an
invented, rationalised story.”262
We saw earlier that there are two remarkable respects in which Wittgenstein follows Ernst
here.  The first is the overwhelming emphasis Ernst lays on the historical aspect of that
misunderstanding,  this  being  precisely  what  Wittgenstein  initially  picked  up  on  in  the
Tractatus.   In other words, Wittgenstein recognised that,  given the potential of language
about the world to shift, it is necessary to employ a sound logic to gain a clear view of its
internal structure and thus help us avoid the contingent historical accidents that have given
rise to incomplete signs and muddled meanings over time.263  However, as we have also
seen, in order for Wittgenstein to advance such a framework it was necessary for him to
delimit  the  possibility  for  the  ‘limits  of  language’ themselves  to  shift.   Were  such  a
262Quoted by W. Künne, “Paul Ernst and Ludwig Wittgenstein”, op cit.
263For example, in this regard, it is interesting to note that Wittgenstein was faced with a strange conundrum
in the Tractatus: the very capacity of language that he criticises in the work as the source of “the most
fundamental confusions” (T 3.324) in philosophy―i.e. the fact that in everyday language “it happens
that the same word has different symbols, or that two words that have different modes of signification are
employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way” (T 3.323)―this belongs to the very
essence of the proposition.  In other words, if it is an historical accident that “the word ‘is’ figures as the
copula,  as  a  sign for  identity,  and as  an expression for  existence” (ibid.),  a  result  of  piling diverse
everyday uses upon one another without making a corresponding alteration in the sign used, then this
capacity is written into the nature of the signs themselves.
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delimitation of the limits not possible, he would not have been able to definitively draw
them and there would have been no ‘final solution’ to the problems of philosophy.
The second remarkable point is that when Wittgenstein returned to philosophy in the 1930’s
he also carried with him the converse idea inherent to Ernst’s remark here, which he had
conscientiously  suppressed  in  his  earlier  thought:  i.e.  that  along  with  the  various
misunderstandings of  the  logic  of  our  language,  so  too  in  certain  cases  is  a  correct
understanding historically situated.  This can clearly be seen in several of the remarks from
the Big Typescript and also in those that Wittgenstein dedicated to Frazer’s Golden Bough
from around the same time.264  It  is,  furthermore, a sentiment that  would be reprised in
264A particularly noteworthy remark, which concerns just what Wittgenstein might mean by ‘mythology’
here  and how this  had  been  adapted  from Ernst’s  remark—falling,  as  it  does,  under  Wittgenstein’s
subtitle THE MYTHOLOGY IN THE FORMS OF OUR LANGUAGE ((PAUL ERNST)) in The Big Typescript—, is
that which concerns his iconic analysis of the ‘Cornwolf’ ritual:
“In ancient rites we find the use of an extremely well-developed language of gestures.
And when I read Frazer, I would like to say again and again: All these processes, these changes of
meaning, we have right in front of us even in our language of words.  If what is hidden in the last sheaf
is called the ‘Cornwolf’, as well as the sheaf itself, and also the man who binds it, then we recognize
in this a linguistic process we know well.” (PO, p. 197 [TS 213, p. 433; 1933])
I thus strongly disagree with Schulte here, when he notes that via Wittgenstein’s identification of the
natives’ magic  with  a  kind  of  mythology,  Wittgenstein  intends  to  evaluate  their  religious  beliefs
pejoratively.  As Schulte states:
“In practically all other passages of his writings where he uses the word or one of its cognates it bears
a  clearly  negative  or  pejorative  connotation,  amounting  to  something  like  ‘a  mere  fiction’ or
‘misleading fantasy’.  Even in his ‘Remarks on Frazer’s  Golden Bough’, where he makes his well-
known statement that ‘An entire mythology is stored within our language’, a connection with magic,
superstition  and  potentially  misleading  features  of  our  language  is  clearly  in  view.”  (J.  Schulte,
“Within a System”, op cit., 63.)
This  is  surely  a  gross  misunderstanding  of  what  Wittgenstein  was  attempting  to  elucidate  in  these
remarks.  In fact, nothing could be further  from the truth.  For it is, Wittgenstein argues there,  Frazer
who is being mislead by his pejorative stance towards what he perceives as the naïve ‘superstitions’ of
the natives.  This position is repeated time and again in Wittgenstein’s remarks on the Golden Bough and
I will not go into them in further detail here.  Let the following passage from Culture and Value suffice,
which, though it was penned during the post-Investigations  era that we are concerned with here, also
strongly recalls Wittgenstein’s earlier critique of Frazer:
“It is true that we can compare a picture that is firmly rooted in us to a superstition; but it is equally
true that we always eventually have to reach some firm ground, either a picture or something else, so
that  a  picture  which  is  at  the  root  of  all  our  thinking  is  to  be  respected  and  not  treated  as  a
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Philosophical Investigations.  He speaks there of our language as an ‘ancient city’ (PI §18)
and notes—in a  remark  that  clearly  prefigures  his  considerations  in  On Certainty—that
according to the fluctuations of scientific definitions, “what today counts as an observed
concomitant of a phenomena will tomorrow be used to define it.” (PI §79)  He likewise
notes there that we extend a concept “as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre” (PI
§67) and clarifies that his reference to “changes in mathematics” is meant to “bring into
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life.”
(PI §23)  Perhaps most significantly, he appeals throughout the work to the ‘natural history’
of mankind.  For example, in the following celebrated remark:
“What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural  history of human beings;  we are not
contributing  curiosities  however,  but  observations  which  no  one  has  doubted,  but  which  have
escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes.” (PI §415)
These  historical  considerations  already go a  long way towards  suggesting that  in  some
significant respects, what Wittgenstein had earlier thought of as the fixed and stable ‘limits
of language’—particularly the propositions of logic and mathematics—can indeed shift in
important and significant ways over time.  However, as we have seen, these considerations
played  a  primarily  therapeutic  role  there  in  the  Investigations and  thus  they  made  no
allowance  for  a  possible  acknowledgement  of  the  sceptical  conclusion  that  some
philosophers would be inclined to draw from them.
Frege, as we have seen, is one such philosopher.  We saw earlier how for Frege the history
of mathematics—insofar as it is history—can only ever be the history of error.  What is true
a priori is eternally so and, therefore, strictly speaking, can have no history.  As he notes in
the Introduction to the Foundations:
“If everything were in continual flux, and nothing maintained itself fixed for all time, there would no
longer be any possibility of getting to know anything about  the world and everything would be
plunged in confusion […] [T]his account makes everything subjective and if we follow it through to
superstition.” (CV, p. 83 [MS 138; 20.5.1949])
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the end, does away with truth.  What we know as the history of concepts is really a history of either
our knowledge of concepts or the meaning of words.” (FA, p. vi-vii)
In his Introduction to the Basic Laws he would reprise this challenge to the view sub specie
humanitatus of the truth of logical laws, as held for example by by B. Erdmann, who suffers
from having mistaken the stable truths of logic for  the shifting ‘takings-for-true’ of  our
meandering personal psychology:
“If being true is independent of being acknowledged by somebody or other, then the laws of truth are
not psychological laws: they are boundary stones set in an eternal foundation, which our thoughts
can overflow, but never displace.  It is because of this that they have authority for our thought if it
would attain truth.   They do not  bear  the relation to thought that  the  laws of  grammar bear to
language; they do not make explicit the nature of our human thinking and change as it changes.”
(BA, p.13)
We have looked at these remarks in more detail elsewhere, and so we will not return to the
many interesting elements this view presents for an understanding of the foundations of
arithmetic specifically.  However, it is fair to claim that in these remarks Frege presents a
clear image of what such a ‘foundation’ is at all, more generally, and that this image is,
furthermore,  one  thoroughly  shared  by  diverse  members  of  the  philosophical  tradition,
realist  as  well  as  relativist,  then  as  well  as  now.   For,  by  the  light  of  this  analogy,
foundations  consist  of  a  rock-like  material,  solid,  and equally hard  throughout.   It  is  a
homogeneous  body  of  more  or  less  certified  knowledge,  which,  by  virtue  of  its
homogeneity,  does  most—even all—of  the  work.   It  is  the  very  kind  of  imagery  that
Wittgenstein’s metaphorical comparisons of knowledge with the flowing waters of a river
are intended to mitigate against.
What makes Wittgenstein’s last remarks so striking in this respect is the heterogeneity of the
foundations that he evokes there, and, furthermore, that these heterogeneous elements exist
in an ecology of mutual dependence.  In a remark that clearly recalls Frege’s reliance on the
Law of Identity in his search for a foundations for arithmetic, Wittgenstein notes:
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“When we first being to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole
system of propositions.
(Light dawns gradually over the whole.)
It is not a single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises
give one another mutual support.” (OC §141-142)265
As Wittgenstein stresses here, a river-bed can fulfil its function only by grace of the fact that
it does not consist of a material of uniform hardness: some parts consist of rock, others
consist of clay or even highly mobile grains of sand.  As in the case of knowledge, he
suggests that these diverse elements—the foundational support, that which is supported by
that foundation, and every variety of strata in between—form an interdependent system.  It
is  for  this  reason that  certain elements  of  each may change their  roles  without  thereby
destabilising the whole.  As Wittgenstein notes, continuing his meditations on the river-bed
metaphor: 
“But if someone were to say “So logic too is an empirical science” he would be wrong.  Yet this is
right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another
as a rule of testing.
And  the  bank  of  the  river  consists  partly  of  hard  rock,  subject  to  no  alteration  or  only  to  an
imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or
deposited.” (OC §98-99)
Wittgenstein certainly does not want to ignore the unique status of logical and mathematical
propositions in this analogy.  But he does emphasise that even their stability is perhaps a
relative  one,  rather  than absolute,  and that  insofar  as the  foundations are  susceptible to
265We see too, from the following remark, that Wittgenstein did not have Frege far from his thoughts in
many of these remarks: 
“ “I cannot doubt this proposition without giving up all judgement.”
But what sort of proposition is that? (It is reminiscent of what Frege said about the law of identity.)  It
is certainty no empirical proposition.  It does not belong to psychology.  It has rather the character of a
rule.” (OC §494)
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change it will in all likelihood be an imperceptible one.266  It would, therefore, be a mistake
to  imagine  that  within  this  interdependent  system  there  is  no  limit  whatsoever to  the
possibilities of alteration in the course of knowledge.  However, as in the case of the ever-
so-slowly shifting course of the river-bed, that limit will depend just as much upon the time
given to change its course as it will upon the hardness of the material over which the waters
of the river flow.
It is important to note in this respect that we do not therefore  simply  have the freedom to
chose whether the status of a given proposition is open to doubt or not, which is to say, we
do not simply have the freedom to decide whether a proposition plays a role analogous to
something tested by experience or rather to a rule of testing.   Far from  eliminating the
normative,  Wittgenstein’s  offers  an  account  of  normativity  according  to  which  we  are
constrained, but not altogether determined by past tradition.  Language is here thrown back
into the stream of life, yes, but it is a life that is always already there, firmly in place and full
of meaning, which we are thus not capable of freely abrogating at will.  Even if the potential
exists for a proposition to be treated at one time as something to test by experience and at
another as a rule of testing, as Wittgenstein suggests here, it is not the case that we may
simply turn an empirical proposition into a postulate, or vice versa.  This, as Wittgenstein
never ceases to remind us, is something that tends to be forgotten by philosophers—from
Descartes to Russell… and perhaps even to the author of the Tractatus himself.267
266Except, perhaps, in times of great upheaval.  We must not also forget here that in certain cases hardness
will itself be a disadvantage, and fluidity will rather be called for.  As Schulte aptly notes: “What is hard
cannot be altered as easily as what is fluid.  Hard things tend to preserve their shapes while the shapes of
fluid ones are unstable.  But hard things have the drawback of breaking under sufficient pressure while
fluid things are more adaptable.” (J. Schulte, “Within a System”, op cit., p. 65.)
267We might consider Wittgenstein’s discussion of Newtonian mechanics in the Tractatus as an instance of
overestimating our ability to impose just such a desired form upon our description the world.  E.g.:
“Newtonian mechanics, for example, imposes a unified form on the description of the world.  Let us
imagine a white surface with irregular black spots on it.  We then say that whatever kind of picture these
make, I can always approximate as closely as I wish to the description of it by covering the surface with
a sufficiently fine square mesh, and then saying of every square whether it is black or white.  In this way
I shall have imposed a unified form on the description of the surface.  The form is optional, since I could
have achieved the same results by using a net with a triangular or hexagonal mesh.  Possibly the use of a
triangular  mesh would have made the description simpler:  that  is  to  say,  it  might  be that  we could
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In order to see briefly how this is so, and thus outline a little more clearly just how far
Wittgenstein had come from his earliest conceptions of relevance and/or irrelevance of time,
change and history to the practice of philosophy, which he never ceased to conceive of in
terms of Sprachkritik, we might consider here how Wittgenstein wonders at one moment in
his final reflections on the matter:
“Isn’t what I am saying: any empirical proposition can be transformed into a postulate—and then
become a norm of description.  But I am suspicious of this.  The sentence is too general.  One almost
wants  to  say  “any  empirical  proposition  can,  theoretically,  be  transformed…”,  but  what  does
“theoretically” mean here?  It sounds all to reminiscent of the Tractatus.” (OC §321)
Reminiscent of the Tractatus?  How could such a remark be reminiscent of a work, which,
by all accounts, places a perfectly stable and impermeable limit on the meaningful use of
language?  Two interesting possibilities present themselves, which unfortunately cannot be
developed further here but which may nonetheless be indicated.  The first concerns the role
of natural science in the Tractatus, where Wittgenstein characterises Newtonian mechanics
as an ‘optional’ net or mesh, which imposes a unified description of the world by the very
nature of its grid-like structure (T 6.341).  To what extent exactly the form of the net is
indeed optional, as he states, is an important question, which has no place in the architecture
of the Tractatus, as it is presented there.  A second interesting case is given a little further
on, in the passage where Wittgenstein discusses Kant’s problem of the incongruence of the
right and left hands: “A right-hand glove could be put on the left hand, if it could be turned
round in four-dimensional space.” (T 6.36111)  Undoubtedly the weight of this last remark
falls upon what exactly is to be understood by the ‘if…’ here.  Once again, it is a question
that has no place within the Tractarian framework as it stands.  
describe the surface more accurately with a coarse triangular mesh than with a fine square mesh (or
conversely),  and so on.  The different nets correspond to different systems for describing the world.
Mechanics determines one form of description of the wold by saying that all propositions used in the
description of the world must be obtained in a given way from a given set of propositions―the axioms of
mechanics.  It thus supplies the bricks for building the edifice of science, and it says, ‘Any building that
you want to erect, whatever it may be, must somehow be constructed with these bricks, and with these
alone.” (T 6.341)
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Though the two cases present two different problems—the one dealing with the form of
empirical statements, the other with the aprioricity of geometry—ultimately, both of these
examples come down to the same point: the ‘metaphysical subject’ of the Tractatus is one
without an inheritance, free to impose some form or other upon the world as it sees fit, so
long as the transcendental limits of language are recognised and the conditions of sensical
language use are met.  As we have seen, however, after Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy,
that subject returned with him but now, like Wittgenstein himself, it had become historically
conditioned, the subject of training and tradition—a ‘rule-following subject’ who inherits a
world along with its language—and who therefore cannot simply alter its view of the world
all at once, immediately and ‘without further ado’.
Later, in Wittgenstein’s last remarks, his use of foundational analogies is meant to remind us
rather that in the vast majority of cases we simply  do not doubt  the daily realities of the
world around us and that the ‘propositions’ which support that which we do doubt—and
conversely, what we might also be said to ‘know’—belong to the logic of our language by
virtue of the way they function in our language.  This is true of some of those propositions
that we would typically consider to be a priori, as well as some of those we would typically
consider  to  be  a  posteriori.268  That  is  to  say,  it  is  true  of  some of  them,  but  not  all.
Undoubtedly, it  is an insight that has the potential to blur the distinction between them;
however,  Wittgenstein  recognised  as  much  and  he  repeatedly  resisted  drawing  this
conclusion.   And for  good reason.   Even in  the  Investigations,  when Wittgenstein  first
acknowledged  the  threat  of  relativism  inherent  to  the  overwhelming  emphasis  he  was
beginning to place on community—particularly in regards to the formation and regulation of
the rule-following subject—he also acknowledges that the application of logic retains its
role  despite  its  reliance  upon  something  that  looks  all  too  suspiciously  like  ‘human
agreement’ here:
268Briefly,  this  similarity  regarding their  incontestability  is  emphasised by Malcolm,  when he notes  in
relation to OC §54 and §56: “Wittgenstein is pointing out an analogy between propositions of arithmetic
and  empirical  propositions.   In  each  of  these  domains  of  language  the  truth  of  some  propositions
becomes fixed, unshakable: the idea that one might be mistaken becomes inconceivable.” (N. Malcolm,
Nothing is Hidden, op cit., p. 210.)
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“Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question whether a rule has been
obeyed or not.  People don’t come to blows over it, for example.  This is part of the framework on
which the working of language is based (for example, in giving descriptions).
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?”—It is what human
beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use.  That is not agreement in
opinions but in form of life.
If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but
also (queer as this may sound) in judgements.  This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.—It is
one thing to describe methods of measurement, and other to obtain and state results of measurement.
But  what  we  call  “measuring”  is  partly  determined  by  a  certain  consistency  in  results  of
measurement.” (PI §§240-242) 
We see from such remarks that far from seeking to annul our usual distinctions between
types  of  propositional  language,  Wittgenstein  wishes  rather  to  multiply them.   The
foundations he speaks of are embedded in human action, which are much more versatile
medium than the standard model of foundations would allow for.  They are distinguished
not so much by their form—be that a priori or a posteriori, or what have you—but rather by
the roles that they play in our lives, and those roles are many, uncountable even.
Is Wittgenstein thereby claiming that  everything is impermanent,  subject to change,  and
thus, as Frege would have it, that there is no objective truth?  Hardly.  The point of these
considerations  is  rather  to  remove  that  familiar  prejudice  which  tends  to  give  solidity
precedence over fluidity, stability precedence over mobility, and the eternal precedence over
the historical.  It is a reminder that our systems of knowledge work perfectly well without
the rock-hard foundations that have been sought after by philosophers throughout the ages,
that Archimedean point of absolute indubitable truth.  It is a reminder that they stand fast for
us,  for  the  moment  at  least,  despite  what  ‘some  philosophers’  would  consider  their
foundationlessness—and, moreover, that this should be enough to satisfy us.  Indeed, it is a
reminder that in the vast majority of cases, it is.
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IV. Concluding Remarks: Between Mistake and Madness
In this chapter, we have surveyed Wittgenstein’s response to Moore’s use of the expression
‘I  know…’ in  his  two presentations,  “A Defence of Common Sense” and “Proof of  the
External World.”  Where Moore had sought to invert the traditional hierarchy of ordinary
expressions  and  their  corresponding  philosophical  refinements,  in  On  Certainty
Wittgenstein  responds  rather  by  turning  the  whole  axis  of  the  investigation  around,
‘levelling  the  playing  field’,  as  it  were,  with  the  hopes  of  allowing  us  to  thus  move
horizontally through the various domains of our discourse with greater ease.
Despite  Moore’s  claim  that  he  is  using  the  words  ‘I  know…’ in  the  ‘ordinary  sense’,
Wittgenstein suggests  that  to  list  such ‘foundational  knowledge’ straight  off  like  that  is
rather to misuse the expression.  This misuse is no mere inconsistency with ordinary usage,
in Moore’s sense.  For in these cases the expression serves as a description of the language
game, and as such it belongs not to the sphere of empirical knowledge, as it has traditionally
been conceived, but to logic.  Though Moore’s assertions have the superficial appearance of
standard a posteriori empirical propositions, Wittgenstein suggests that because they belong
to the logic of our language they must abide by the same limitations that are imposed upon
those more familiar elements of that logic, i.e. a priori propositions.  In other words, like a
priori propositions,  it makes no sense to doubt them.  In order to highlight the similarities
between these two sorts of propositions, a posteriori and a priori, Wittgenstein claims that
Moore should thus not state that he ‘knows, with certainty, that…’ but rather: ‘It stands fast
for him that…’.  It is an analogy meant to release the grip of a certain philosophical picture
of  certainty,  shared  by  Moore  and  the  sceptic  alike,  that  certainty  belongs  to  those
expressions about which one cannot  make a mistake—and that only this kind of certainty
will satisfy the conditions of truly reliable knowledge, one way or the other.
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As discussed at the opening of this chapter, in Wittgenstein’s last remarks he takes pains to
emphasise  that  the  kind  of  certainty  Moore  is  after  in  his  presentations  is  neither
straightforwardly nor transparently propositional, though the assertions he advances appear
to have the form of empirical propositions.  In doing so, Wittgenstein wishes to make a
distinction—very  much  like  that  assumed by  the  ‘official  theory’ of  knowledge  claims
outlined  above—between  what  he  describes  in  the  work  as  ‘subjective’ and  ‘objective
certainty’.  As he notes in OC §194:
“With the word “certain” we express complete conviction, the total absence of doubt, and thereby we
seek to convince other people.  That is subjective certainty.
But when is something objectively certain?  When a mistake is not possible.  But what kind of
possibility is that?  Mustn’t a mistake be logically excluded?” (OC §194)  
In Stroll’s “Understanding  On Certainty: Entry 194”, he argues, in fact, that this passage
provides an essential pivot for leveraging our understanding of the work as a whole.269
Whether or not that is the case is an interesting question that will not be addressed here;
nonetheless, the passage does provide a number of fruitful elements that may help to orient
more generally the kind of approach Wittgenstein is after here.  For as stated at the opening
of this chapter, what makes Wittgenstein’s treatment of scepticism in the remarks collected
in On Certainty  unique is that—as opposed to its ‘dissolution’, according to the approach
employed in his earlier,  Investigations-era thought—the ‘demystification of scepticism’ at
work here keeps the sceptical doubt, perhaps rather surprisingly, in place.
A concluding look at OC §194 helps demonstrate how this might be so.  For as Stroll notes,
for example, Wittgenstein has here italicised ‘logic’ in his final question, which suggests
that he is speaking of a kind of mistake that is impossible in a different sense from that of
the  more  strict  ‘logical  impossibility’  of,  e.g.,  the  Tractatus.   What  other  sense  of
‘impossible’ might  Wittgenstein have in mind here?  Wittgenstein does not withhold an
answer to this question.  Immediately following the remark quoted above he notes:
269A. Stroll, “Understanding On Certainty: Entry 194”, op cit, passim.
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“If I believe that I am sitting in my room when I am not, then I shall not be said to have made a
mistake.  But what is the essential difference between this case and a mistake?” (OC §195)  
The  difference,  as  Wittgenstein  characterises  it  elsewhere  in  his  ruminations  in  On
Certainty, is that found between what one would ordinarily consider a mistake—i.e. one in
which “a man must already judge in conformity with mankind” about a great number of
things (OC §156)—and something more akin to what one might consider a form of madness
or mental disturbance.  This idea finds a wealth of expression throughout On Certainty.  For
example:
“For months I have lived at address A, I have read the name of the street and the number of the
house countless times, have received countless letters here and given countless people the address.
If I am wrong about it, the mistake is hardly less than if I were (wrongly) to believe I was writing
Chinese and not German.
If my friend were to imagine one day that he had been living for a long time past in such and such a
place, etc. etc., I should not call this a mistake, but rather a mental disturbance, perhaps a transient
one.
Not every false belief of this sort is a mistake.
But what  is  the difference between mistake and mental  disturbance?  Or what  is  the difference
between my treating it as a mistake and my treating it as a mental disturbance?
Can we say: a mistake doesn’t only have a cause, it also has a ground? i.e., roughly: when someone
makes a mistake, this can be fitted into what he knows aright.” (OC §§70-74)
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Despite  some  of  the  significant  changes  that  Wittgenstein’s  consideration  of  certainty
undergoes throughout the development of the text270, further on he explicitly likens Moore’s
expressions to just this kind of case:
“There are, however, certain types of cases in which I rightly say I cannot be making a mistake, and
Moore has given a few examples of such cases.
I can enumerate various typical cases, but not give any common characteristic.  (N.N. cannot be
mistaken about his having flown from America to England a few days ago.  Only if he is mad can he
take anything else to be possible.)” (OC §675)
These ruminations of the relative status of a mistake and something more akin to a form of
madness are not unique to On Certainty.  Indeed, examples of such reasoning drawn from
the texts throughout Wittgenstein’s post-Investigations work could be multiplied, and they
are by no means all unsympathetic towards moments of genuine madness.271  
270As Stroll notes, one of the most significant shifts in the work is a shift in focus from propositional to non-
propositional  accounts  of  knowledge,  and  a  consequent  move  away  from  literal  to  metaphorical
language: “The work gradually shifts its focus from Moore to the actual roles played in ‘the language-
game’ by such ‘practices’ as doubting, asserting, and knowing, etc., and from these considerations a new
understanding of the nature of certainty slowly emerges.  Knowledge and certainty are revealed to be
independent concepts that play related but different roles in communication and in other forms of human
interaction.  Eventually Wittgenstein’s focus is turned upon certainty itself, and this notion is explored
relentlessly  in  a  series  of  brilliant  metaphors:  ‘the  scaffolding  of  our  thoughts’,  ‘bedrock’,  ‘the
substratum of all my inquiring and asserting’, ‘being anchored’, ‘standing fast’ and so forth.” (A. Stroll,
“Understanding  On Certainty: Entry 194”,  op cit.,  p. 449.  Cf. A. Stroll, “Wittgenstein’s Foundational
Metaphors”, in D. Moyal-Sharrock (ed.) The Third Wittgenstein, op cit., pp. 13-24.)
271We might recall here, for example, Wittgenstein’s remark in Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology,
where he notes:
“The feeling of the unreality of one’s surroundings. This feeling I have had once, and many have it
before to onset of mental illness.  Everything seems somehow not  real; but not as if one saw things
unclear or blurred; everything looks quite as usual. And how do I know that others have felt what I
have?  Because he uses the same words as I find appropriate. 
But why do I choose precisely the word “unreality” to express it? … I chose it because of its meaning.
But surely I did not learn to use the word to mean:  a feeling.  No; but  I  learned to use it  with a
particular meaning and now I use it spontaneously like this” (RPP I, 125)
When Wittgenstein indicts the philosophical sceptic’s hyperbolic sense of ‘unreality’ in  On Certainty,
therefore,  that  is  not  to  say that  he  would doubt  the sense of the equivalent  expression,  when used
spontaneously—which  is  to  say,  genuinely—by  one  really  undergoing  such  a  sensation.  “Just  try,”
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However, we are here clearly given to understand that the anti-philosophical reminder being
made with this comparison is two-fold.  For, on the one hand, were something like a genuine
sceptical  doubt  to  be  advanced,  it  would  not  appear  to  the  casual  observer  to  be  an
exploration  of  knowledge  claims  based  on  the  foundations  of  a  well-conceived
epistemological  framework,  but rather a foundation-less  form of insanity.   On the other
hand, however, equally insane would appear the philosopher’s attempt to counter a genuine
sceptical doubt by simply asserting, as Moore has done, that in fact ‘I do know…’.   As
Wittgenstein remarks: 
“I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden;  he says again and again “I  know that’s a tree”,
pointing to a tree that is near us.  Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: “This fellow
isn’t insane.  We are only doing philosophy.” (OC §467)
Propositions such as ‘Here is one hand and here is another’ certainly do not appear at first
sight to be nonsense, and yet, when we imagine a use for such a proposition, nowhere do we
find one that will  suggest it  might function in  either of the manners that  Moore  or the
sceptic wish it to.  If the existence of the world is open to doubt or assertion, it is not open to
such straightforward doubt and straightforward assertion of the philosophical kind.
We have seen that in characterising our ‘foundational knowledge’ as something that rather
‘stands  fast  for  us’,  Wittgenstein  also  opens  up  several  positive  characteristics  for
understanding the  interdependent  system of  knowledge evoked in  this  analogy.   I  have
developed one of those analogies.  Certainly, there are others, perhaps even more profitable
metaphors  to  explore  (e.g.,  the  case  of  persuasion and  conversion,  which  clearly
reconfigures Wittgenstein’s earlier understanding of language-learning, where we no longer
find a linguistic novice and a master, but two competing ‘masters’, face to face).272  I have
Wittgenstein writes in Philosophical Investigations, “—in a real case—to doubt someone else’s fear or
pain” (PI §303, my emphasis).  Or their sense of unreality, as it were.
272Ruminations such as the following may suggest that Wittgenstein was in his last remarks beginning to
develop something that might even be called an ethics of discourse: “Is it wrong for me to be guided in
my actions by the propositions of physics?  Am I to say I have no good ground for doings so?  Isn’t it
precisely this what we call a ‘good ground’? // Supposing we met people people who did not regard that
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suggested,  however,  that  with  the  metaphor  of  the  river  and the  river-bed Wittgenstein
wishes at least to destabilise the philosophical prejudice for foundations of absolute solidity,
eternal and immutable.  Whether or not Wittgenstein would draw the inevitable historicist
consequences  from this  insight can only be a matter  of speculation;  for,  as  I  have also
suggested, a complete reconstruction of the work is hindered by its status as provisional,
unfinished text.
Nonetheless, it must be admitted that Wittgenstein’s imagery does at least suggest that  he
may have  become  increasingly  willing  to  recognise  the  possibility  of  significant,  even
radical historical change.  Just how far one will wish to extract a philosophical position from
this  possibility  is  another  matter.   For,  despite  the  potential  for  historical  change  that
Wittgenstein’s imagery suggests, he also provides a clear means for resisting what some
would claim are the sceptical consequences of that historicism.  Once those propositions we
would typically consider to be a posteriori are admitted to the logic of our language, we can
see that the sceptic’s doubts do not make sense.  However, for all that, Wittgenstein does not
deny the possibility of a genuine, non-sceptical doubt: at times a proposition that is not open
to doubt, removed from the traffic of language, as it were, may return once more and find
itself called into question.  If only in a temporary moment of loss of self, what had once
‘stood fast’ for one may cease to do so, and so much that is familiar may seem to simply
wash away.  Furthermore, Wittgenstein’s imagery may even suggest that it will perhaps be
profitable  at  some time  or  another  to  attempt  to  do  so  oneself—be one  a  philosopher,
mathematician, religious leader, or anyone else whose thought finds its home at the limits of
language—in order perhaps to shift the river-bed of thought in a new and more profitable
direction, if only one grain of sand at a time, altering ever so slightly the limits of language
in a manner that will, hopefully, be judged favourably by history.  
as a telling reason.  Now, how do we imagine this? Instead of the physicist, they consult an oracle.  (And
for that we consider them primitive.)  Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by it?—If
we call this “wrong” aren’t we using our language-game as a base from which to combat theirs? //And
are we right or wrong to combat it?  Of course there are all sorts of slogans which will be used to support
our proceedings.” (OC §§608-610)
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Whether or not Wittgenstein would ultimately agree with this or not, what he certainly does
reminds  us  of  here,  however,  is  that  one  had  better  not  attempt  to  do  so  lightly.   To
genuinely call those things into doubt that few, if any of us do, is not to provide oneself with
a  philosophically  well-founded  expression  of  a  deep  epistemological  uncertainty.   It  is
rather,  as  Wittgenstein  makes  clear  in  On  Certainty,  to  risk  isolation,  persecution  or
incarceration—to risk being called a fool or a heretic—possibly, it may even be to court
madness.  Is scepticism thereby dissolved?  To a certain extent, yes.  However, it is not clear
that  it  has  been  dissolved  any  more  effectively  here  than  it  had  already  been  in  the
Investigations, if not in the Tractatus before that.  Is scepticism thereby demystified…?
In the following chapter, I will begin to address the significance of this unanswered question
in  a  more  detailed  examination  of  Wittgenstein’s  general  philosophical  methodology.
Against claims that Wittgenstein was uninterested in accounting for history, I argue that in
his use of the morphological method we clearly witness a deep concern for the historical
dimensions of thought and language―plotting the course of that river, so to speak.  Here, a
number of parallels to Goethe’s approach towards history are drawn.  Both were suspicious
of history as an empirical discipline; however, they were also reluctant to take present forms
of knowledge as absolute and inescapable.  Both likewise addressed this tension through the
employment of the morphological method, as a way of questioning the present, through a
renewed appreciation of the past, in order to enlarge the horizon of future possibilities in
thought, while avoiding expressions of historicist relativism as well as dogmatic claims of





CHAPTER 4. DESCRIPTIVE APPROACHES TO HISTORY: WITTGENSTEIN 
AND GOETHE ON THE MORPHOLOGICAL METHOD
“Who knows the laws according to which society develops? I am 
quite sure they are a closed book even to the cleverest of men”
—Culture and Value, p. 60 [MS 134; 13.4.1947]
I. Making Sense of History from within the Stream of Life 
In his earliest work, Wittgenstein famously claimed “to have found, on all essential points,
the final solution to the problems [of philosophy].” (T, p. 4)  Looking back, we know that
this confidence would not be long-lived.  Upon Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy in 1929,
after a nearly ten-year hiatus following the publication of the  Tractatus, his approach to
philosophy had radically changed.  He began to recognize “grave errors” in that earlier work
(PI, Preface) and vigorously set out to correct them.  These ruminations would ultimately
lead Wittgenstein to recognize the need for a higher vantage point  from which to view
language—what  he  described  as  a  ‘synoptic  view’  or  ‘perspicuous  representation’
(übersichtliche Darstellung).  As Wittgenstein states in Philosophical Investigations:
“A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of our words.—
Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity (Übersichtlichkeit).  A perspicuous representation
(übersichtliche  Darstellung)  produces  just  that  understanding  which  consists  of  ‘seeing
connections’.  Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases.
The  concept  of  a  perspicuous  representation (übersichtliche  Darstellung)  is  of  fundamental
significance for us.  It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things.”  (PI §122)
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Where Wittgenstein had once sought abstract unity, he later emphasised everyday forms of
concrete diversity, difference and variety.  In the place of the general form of the proposition
outlined  in  the  Tractatus,  Wittgenstein  sought  to  construct  a  complex  collage  of
observations on the basis of the lived experience of linguistic interaction.  With this, he
hoped,  we  might  see  comparisons  between  these  observations  and,  in  seeing  these
comparisons, understand what language is by attending to the work it does in our everyday
life.  Crucially, the emphasis on the fluid immanency of language use that this change in
perspective implied, brought with it a new understanding of how language functions as a
living practice and thus, as a practice, how it evolves over time:
“But how many kinds of sentences are there?  Say assertion, question, and command?—There are
countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call “symbols”, “words”, “sentences”.
And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once and for all; but new types of language, new
language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.
(We can get a rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.)” (PI §23)
We can see here just how far Wittgenstein had evolved from his earlier Fregean inspirations.
But the path that brought Wittgenstein from his earlier Tractarian transcendentalism to here
—a place where new types of language, new language-games as it were, arise and flourish
for  a  period of  time,  while  others  are  ignored and get  forgotten,  and,  moreover,  where
changes in mathematics provide a singular (if ‘rough’) illustration of this process—was not
a straight one.  Indeed, one might even describe this path as meandering, were it not for the
vigour with which he advanced upon it.
We saw above that in Wittgenstein’s very last remarks, i.e. those composed shortly before
his death, he came to see the so-called ‘hardness of the logical must’ and the necessity with
which it is associated as gradual rather than discrete; he came to see especially certainty as a
way of acting, and thus as something that may transition (if only very slowly) between that
which we readily call  into question,  that  which we take for  granted (although we need
perhaps not do so), and that which were we to doubt it we would transgress the bounds of
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sense (with philosophical nonsense representing only the most benign consequence of such
transgression).   In  these  last  remarks  Wittgenstein thus  blurred the  traditional  epistemic
boundaries between a priori and a posteriori knowledge and he also did so via one of the
most vivid and arresting metaphors of his entire oeuvre—that of the river and the river-bed:
“The propositions describing the world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology.  And their role
is like that of the rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning
any explicit rules.
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened
and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that
this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.
The mythology my change back into a  state  of  flux [wieder in  Fluβ geraten], the  river-bed of
thoughts may shift.  But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the
shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.” (OC §§95-97)
We examined the significance of this passage above.  However, what remained unstated
there was that this is not Wittgenstein’s first mobilization of what we readily recognize as
the Heraclitean image of the ‘river of time’ or the ‘flux of the world’ within which we
flow.273  For  indeed,  when  Wittgenstein  first  returned  to  philosophy,  just  as  he  was
abandoning his  earlier framework and groping around for what would soon become the
foundations  of  his  mature  work—as  the  river-bed  of  Wittgenstein’s  own  thought  was
shifting, so to speak—not only does the Heraclitean river-image first appear in connection to
273I use ‘Heraclitean’ as an adjective here, because it is by no means clear that Wittgenstein read Heraclitus
directly, or was even familiar with its the original formulation.  N. Venturinha has, additionally, given us
good reason to believe, contra D. Stern, that Wittgenstein had not even necessarily begun pondering the
Heraclitean  image  via  Plato’s  Theaetetus,  which  does  indeed  appear  here  in  connection  with  these
ruminations, but, as Venturinha shows,  after the first appearances of the Heraclitean imagery.  For my
part,  I  see  no  reason  to  assume that  Wittgenstein  had  more  familiarity  with  the  imagery  than  that
provided by its popular understanding, which seems rich enough in itself to engender his subsequent
reflections. (Cf. D. Stern, “Heraclitus’ and Wittgenstein’s River Images: Stepping into the Same River”,
The Monist, 74(4), 1991, pp. 579-604; N. Venturinha, “Wittgenstein on Heraclitus and Phenomenology”,
in ed. I. Somavilla and J. Thompson, Wittgenstein und der Antike (Berlin: Pererga, 2012), pp. 85-110.)
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his  renewed  conception  but  it  provides  a  surprisingly  consistent  touchstone  among the
otherwise dramatic changes that his thoughts were undergoing at the time.
There are already several thorough genealogies of the series of remarks Wittgenstein made
with regards to the flux of the world or the flow of time during this period, and we will not
survey the whole chain here.274  However, a few examples will nonetheless help trace its
decisive role in the development of what would become Wittgenstein’s mature thought.  For
what  is  most  striking  in  this  regard  is  how,  upon returning to  philosophy,  Wittgenstein
initially retains traces of that  key Tractarian conception―that that which belongs to the
essence of the world cannot be put into words.  However, this now takes on a distinctive
temporal tone, which was by all means lacking in that earlier work.  This new focus on the
temporal aspect of the essence of the world was no mere fleeting interest for Wittgenstein.
The  point  is  in  fact  approached  repeatedly  and  from  various  angles  throughout  the
manuscripts  of  early 1930’s  (i.e.  MSS 107-115),  where  we principally  find  remarks  on
temporality  in  relation  to  verificationism,  the  specious  present  and  the  general
phenomenology of  time-consciousness.275  It  is  interesting to  note,  moreover,  that  when
Wittgenstein  selected  the  best  of  these  remarks  for  inclusion  in  the  so-called  ‘Big
Typescript’ (TS 213; 1933), we find several references to the Heraclitean river-image spread
274Cf. the footnote above, also especially D. Perrin,  Le flux et l’instant: Wittgenstein aux prises avec le
mythe du présent (Paris: J. Vrin, 2007).
275The first appearance of the river imagery is in MS 107, where Wittgenstein notes “The immediate is
grasped in constant flow [in ständigem Fluβ begriffen]. (It actually has the form of a stream [die Form
eines Stroms])” (11.10.29).  A short while later, this is reprised: “The stream of life, or the stream of the
world, flows on and our propositions are so speak verified only by means of instants. // Only the present
verifies our propositions. // So they must be constructed that they can be verified by it.” (1.12.29).  As is
more  often  than  not  the  case,  Wittgenstein’s  metaphysical  speculations  here  find  a  clear  parallel
expression in his biographical context.  Indeed, one might legitimately wonder which stands as a sign for
the other as primary in his concerns, and whether anything metaphysical was in fact ever meant in the
first place.  The above remark, for example, is prefaced by the personal reflection: “I feel today such a
particular poverty of problems around me; a sure sign that the most important and hardest problems lie
before me.” Compare this with the subsequent remark from Schlick on their collaboration at this time:
“He has indeed the marvellous gift of always seeing everything as if for the first time.  But this, I
believe, also shows how difficult any collaboration is, since he always follows the inspiration of the
moment and demolishes what he has previously devised.” (Quoted in  Wiener Ausgabe, op cit.,  vol.
8.1, p. vii.)
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throughout  the  work―e.g.,  in  the  chapters  ‘Thinking.  Thought’,  ‘Idealism,  etc.’,  and
‘Philosophy’.   This  attests  to  the fact  that  even though Wittgenstein was already in the
process of rejecting the phenomenological aspect expressed in the earliest of these remarks,
the imagery itself remained central to his conception of philosophy at the time.  Thus, it is in
the  last  of  these  chapters  (entitled  simply  ‘Philosophy’)  that  the  bulk  of  Wittgenstein’s
remarks on the ‘river of time’ find a place, and where they are most intimately entwined
with the nature of the task he had set before himself―a novel conception of philosophy,
which he would continuously develop until the appearance of Philosophical Investigations,
and indeed beyond.  
Compare, for example, the following Tractarian-sounding remark:
“Language cannot express what belongs to the essence of the world.  Therefore it cannot say that
everything flows.  Language can only say what we could imagine differently.
That everything flows must lie in how language touches reality.  Or better: that everything flows
must lie in the nature of language.  And, let’s remember: in everyday life we don’t notice that―as
little as we notice the blurred edges of our visual field (“because we are so used to it”, some will
say).  How, on what occasion, do we think we start  noticing it? Isn’t  it  when we want to form
sentences contrary to the grammar of time?” (PO, p. 189 [TS 213, p. 427; 1933])276
And this, the first part of which would later find its way into the Investigations itself:
“What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their correct use in language.
(The man who said that one cannot step into the same river twice said something wrong; one can
step into the same river twice.)
276In this context it is interesting to note that Venturinha has altered the translation of the last two sentences
here.   The  original  reads:  “Wie,  bei  welcher  Gelegenheit,  glauben  wir  den  darauf  aufmerksam  zu
werden? Ist es nicht, wenn wir Sätze gegen die Grammatik der Zeit bilden wollen.”  The above passage
is  quoted  here  following the  translation  provided  in  Philosophical  Occasions. Venturinha,  however,
translates it as “when we want to form sentences contrary to the present time” (my emphasis).  He does
not, however, develop the historicist implications of that possibility.  Cf. N. Venturinha, “Wittgenstein on
Heraclitus and Phenomenology”, op cit., p. 103).
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And this is what the solution of all philosophical difficulties looks like.  Their answers, if they are
correct, must be homespun and ordinary.  But one must look at them in the proper spirit, and then it
doesn’t matter.” (PO, p. 167-169 [TS 213, p. 421; 1933])277
Placing  these  remarks  side-by-side,  we  see  the  clear  indication  of  a  bridge  spanning
Wittgenstein’s  early  and  later  work―where,  for  example,  the  metaphysical  difficulties
suggested by the ‘river of time’ metaphor are, in the first case, indicative of the ‘strictly
speaking’ unspeakable  essence of  the world and are,  in the second,  exactly  the kind of
philosophical nonsense to be rejected outright by ‘correct language use’, which is to say
‘homespun and ordinary’.
We see here once more that what Wittgenstein had initially rejected in the Tractatus―“We
cannot compare a process with ‘the passage of time’―there is no such thing―but only with
another  process  (such as  the  working of  a  chronometer)”  (T 6.3611)―returns,  but  in  a
modified form.  In other words, Wittgenstein’s first ruminations on the ‘river of time’ in the
early 1930’s, though temporalized far beyond the capacity of the Tractarian framework, are
nonetheless still  abstracted along the lines of that earlier work from any real,  embodied
language use.  That everything flows, he claims, must lie in how ‘language’ touches reality:
not your language,  or my language,  or any particular use of language in particular,  but
language itself―where propositions are only verified ‘at an instant’ and must therefore be
constructed in such and such a way as to be capable of such and such verification… and so
forth.  How different are such essentialist formulations from those that would later appear in
277Cf.  in  particular  PI  §116:  “When  philosophers  use  a  word—“knowledge”,  “being”,  “object”,  “I”,
“proposition”, “name”—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the
word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?— // What we do is
to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.” In this context one might also make
an enlightening comparison with PI §435, which is noteworthy for making reference (if only obliquely)
to the very Heraclitean issues with which Wittgenstein was so engaged upon his return to philosophy in
the 1930’s: “If it is asked: “How do sentences manage to represent?”—the answer might be: “Don’t you
know? You certainly see it, when you use them.” For nothing is concealed.  // How do sentences do it?—
Don’t you know? For nothing is hidden. // But given this answer: “But you know how sentences do it, for
nothing is concealed” one would like to retort “Yes, but it all goes by so quick, and I should like to see it
as it were laid open to view.”.”
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the Investigations, where we―Wittgenstein’s real readers―are asked in the first person to
bring words ‘home’ from their metaphysical use, where ‘the man’ who said one cannot step
into the same river twice is obviously wrong.  For indeed,  one can.  The point here, of
course, is that the ordinarily unproblematic expressions provided for by the grammar of our
language (when we say,  for  example,  that  ‘a river flows’)  only become philosophically
interesting if we remove them from the particular, concrete linguistic exchanges that give
such expressions  significance in  the  first  place  (when we later  claim, for  example,  that
‘everything flows’).  The meaning of ‘to flow’ in the first case is clear.  In the second it
seems to float  before us,  shimmering but somehow just  out of  reach.   The problem, of
course, is not with the word itself but with its strange and unnatural use.  It is unclear what
we are supposed to do with such a phrase, except perhaps to marvel at it in some way.278  As
Wittgenstein remarks  emphatically  in  Philosophical  Investigations:  “Every sign  by itself
seems dead―What gives it life?―In use it is alive.  Is life breathed into it there―Or is the
use  its life?” (PI §432)  And thus, the remark with which we began this chapter, PI §23,
continues: “Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that
the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.”279
278Wittgenstein  refers  directly  to  the  tension inherent  to  this  employment  of  the  Heraclitean metaphor
already in the Big Typescript, where he notes:
“That “everything flows” seems to hinder us in expressing the truth, for it’s as if we can’t grasp it,
since it slips away from us.
But (and this is  the point)  this  doesn’t  prevent  us from expressing something.—we know what it
means to want to pin down something in a description that’s fleeting.  This happens, for instance,
when we forget the one thing as we’re trying to describe the other.  But that isn’t what this is all about.
And that’s the way the expression “fleeting” is to be used.
But one is inclined to respond to the answer “you know how the proposition does it; after all, nothing
is concealed” by saying: “Yes, but everything goes by so quickly, and I’d like to see it with all of its
parts spread out, as it were”.
But here too we’re mistaken.   For in this process nothing that happens escapes us because of its
speed.” (TS 213, p 212; 1933)
The above remarks appear in the Big Typescript  in the chapter “Thought. Thinking.”, which makes the
handwritten parenthetical remark, placed in the margins beside the first two of those above, even more
suggestive: i.e., “doesn’t belong here, but rather to the consideration of time or to solipsism.”  
279This remark tellingly concludes,  moreover,  with one of  Wittgenstein’s more definitive  invitations to
compare the novel method presented here with that presented earlier in the Tractatus: “It is interesting to
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One  cannot  read  the  Investigations  without  being  struck  by  the  uncanny  parallelisms
between the topics Wittgenstein deals with there and the manner in which he deals with
them―from ‘learning’ to ‘reading’,  for example, or ‘following an order’.   What we see
here,  time and time again,  is  that  Wittgenstein  attempts  to  recreate  the  kinds  of  living
situations  in  which  these  activities  function  and  correlate  them  with  their  abstract
philosophical counterparts―concepts such as ‘meaning’, ‘understanding’, or ‘privacy’, for
example.  Thus, time and time again, what we encounter there takes the distinct form of a
dialogue―such as that in PI §23 itself, to name just one among innumerable others with
even greater and more fragmentary voices still.  Now, were we to look for a term of art
among Wittgenstein’s remarks in the  Investigations  to capture the inspiration behind this
dialogic process, we would search in vain.280  However, Nachlaß sources from the time give
a clear indication of what this might be.  For Wittgenstein is drawing here on none other
than  the  river-image  itself.   Having  abandoned  the  specious  present  adduced  from the
phenomenological  epoché,  the  Heraclitean river-imagery remains  embedded in the work
nonetheless―both in terms of  what the work treats and  how it treats it―as the ‘flow of
conversation’ that  guarantees  the  everyday  coherence  of  our  expressions  and  the  very
compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and the ways the they are used, the multiplicity of kinds
of words and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the
author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)”
280Two notable attempts to characterise just what Wittgenstein was attempting to achieve with the unusual
manner of writing he employed in the Investigations include those of A. Pichler and his notion of ‘criss-
cross’ or ‘album’ writing (cf. A. Pichler, “The Philosophical Investigations and Syncretistic Writing”, in
ed.  N.  Venturinha,  The  Textual  Genesis  of  Wittgenstein’s  Philosophical  Investigations  (New  York:
Routledge, 2013), pp. 65-80), A. Pichler, “Ludwig Wittgenstein and us typical Western Scientists”, in
eds. S.S. Greve and J. Macha, Wittgenstein and the Creativity of Language (London: Palgrave, 2015), pp.
55-75; A. Pichler, “Wittgenstein’s albums:  Philosophical Investigations  and  Philosophical Remarks  as
alternatives to the ‘spirit of progress’ in philosophy”, in ed. A.R. Moreno,  Wittgenstein – Como ler o
album?  (Campinas:  CLE, 2009),  pp.  57-97.)  and N. Venturinha (cf.  N.  Venturinha,  “Introduction:  A
Composite Work of Art”,  in ed.  N. Venturinha,  The Textual  Genesis of  Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp.  1-18.)  While these are excellent characterizations of
just what is so unique and effective in Wittgenstein’s strange form of philosophical composition, they fail
to adequately emphasize what I consider the essentially temporal aspect of the work, both in terms of its
production and its reception.
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ordinary relationship between a speaker and the world.  From  Zettel  (TS 233), we might
take the following illustrative example:
“We only speak of ‘thinking’ in quite particular circumstances.
How then can the sense and the truth (or the truth and the sense) of sentences collapse together?
(Stand or fall together?)
And isn’t it as if you wanted to say: “If such-and-such is not the case, then it makes no sense to say it
is the case?”
Like this, e.g.: “If all moves were always false, it would make no sense to speak of a ‘false move’.”
But that is only paradoxical way of putting it.  The non-paradoxical way would be: “The general
description… makes no sense”.
Do no say “one cannot”, but say instead: “it doesn’t exist in this game”. Not: “one can’t castle in
draughts” but―“there is no castling in draughts”; and instead of “I can’t exhibit my sensation”―“in
the use of the word ‘sensation’, there is no such thing as exhibiting what one has got”; instead of
“one cannot enumerate all the cardinal numbers”―“there is no such thing here as enumerating all
the members”.
Conversation flows on, the application and interpretation of words, and only in its course [ im Fluß]
do words have their meaning.
“He has gone away” “Why?”―What did you mean, when you uttered the word “why?”  What did
you think of?” (Z §§130-135)281
281Stern makes the following observation on this series of remarks: “In the final paragraph, Wittgenstein
first states his thesis that words only have meaning in the flow, the river, of conversation , and then
illustrates it with a break in the conversation.” (D. Stern, “Heraclitus’ and Wittgenstein’s River Images”,
op cit., p. 549.)  For my part, when we look at this technique of ‘breakage’ from the general point of view
of Wittgenstein’s engagement with the Heraclitean river-image, I find it strongly recalls Wittgenstein’s
very first  mobilization of the imagery.  There, I noted above, it  is not clear whether Wittgenstein is
referring to the philosophical problem of ‘temporal flux’ or the methodology of his investigation into it.
In this context, it is particularly noteworthy that the passage in question is accompanied by a drawing,
which appear to be a river (a series of horizontal lines, fading at different lengths to the left) which
abruptly halts at a single, vertical line (on the right, at the mid-point).  Whether it is the specious present
or something else that marks the ‘halting’ of the river is, from this perspective at least, unclear.
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Conversation flows on, Wittgenstein notes here, and it is from within the midst of that flow
that  words  take  on  meaning,  i.e.,  that  ‘ordinary  and  homespun’ meaning  intended  to
counteract the impetus towards the impersonal and a-temporal  philosophical  abstraction.
Born of Wittgenstein’s first attempts to temporalize his thought via the Heraclitean river-
image, dialogic form would thus become a pillar of his mature philosophical methodology,
one of the key precepts woven into the very fabric of  Philosophical Investigations as we
know it today.
Despite  the  fact  that  it  is  not  stated  explicitly  within  the  pages  of  the Investigations,
Wittgenstein remarked on numerous occasions, in writing as well as in conversation with
those close to him, that an expression has meaning only in the stream of life: Ein Ausdruck
hat nur in Strom des Lebens Bedeutung.  Norman Malcolm relates, in fact, that in discussing
the metaphor with Wittgenstein, it struck him then as it later did upon recollection “as being
especially noteworthy and as summing up a good deal of his philosophy.”282  And he does so
with good reason.  For here, the river-image reminds us that when we are speaking about
language,  we  are  not  speaking  about  some  “non-spatial,  non-temporal  phantasm”  (PI
§108)283; it also reminds us that when we are speaking about language, we are still speaking
a language.  We can no more remove our words from the traffic of that language than we
can remove ourselves.  This demand, to look for the meaning of a word within the stream of
life, expresses the necessity of maintaining a view ‘from somewhere’ rather than ‘nowhere’.
It is the reminder of a purpose.  But of course, whenever we speak about time―even in this
ordinary  manner,  where  it  is  not  something  like  ‘time  itself’  that  flows  but  rather
‘conversation’, along with Wittgenstein’s seemingly banal observation that language only
attains its full potential when it is actually used in a living exchange―the many well-known
282N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (London: Oxford University Press, 1980). p. 93.
283In order not to  overstate the implicit critical aspect of Wittgenstein’s later attempts to temporalize his
philosophy in regards to the earlier, it is important to note that this remark, which nonetheless begins
with critical gesture towards the earlier work, contains a handwritten note in the margin: “Only it is
possible to be interested in a phenomena in a variety of ways.”  This clearly recalls,  of course, the
following remark from the 1916 notebooks: “it is equally possible to take the bare present image as the
worthless momentary picture in the whole temporal world, and as the true world among shadows.” (NB,
p. 83)
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paradoxes associated with temporality are never far behind.  And here too, one is all too
easily led to a troubling conclusion.  Indeed, it is the Heraclitean conclusion that threatens
Wittgenstein’s  insight,  as  it  has  threatened  so  many  before.   For,  were  it  an  accurate
description of the world, the strong version of the Heraclitean image would seem to imply
that speech can never really find a stable footing, and that we should in truth be unable to
say anything coherent about the world at all.284
Now of course, though Wittgenstein recognizes that communication can (and in fact clearly
does) sometimes break down, he grants the general stability of our speech; indeed, given his
refusal to accept the coherence of anything like a ‘private language’, one could even claim
that this idea serves as the cornerstone of his mature philosophy.  Nonetheless, one must
also grant that any stability one does find will only ever be relatively so.  For in his attempt
to bring linguistic exchange to the forefront and return the philosopher to living language
use,  Wittgenstein appears to have replaced both the inherent instability of the ‘specious
present’ and the super stability of the view ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ with the mere relative
stability  of  something  like  a  temporal  ‘period’,  wherein  a  linguistic  expression  is  only
284This was, of course, already at the heart of Socrates’ rejection of Heraclitus’ ‘doctrine’ in the Theaetetus.
As Theodorus responds to Socrates: “Indeed, how could it be possible to [speak of] any other thing of
that kind, if it’s always slipping away while one is speaking; as it must be, given that it’s all in flux?” It is
a reference that, as Stern points out, is not merely of Hellenistic interest.  In 1944, as Wittgenstein was
putting the first part of the  Investigations  into publishable form, he noted to Drury that “Plato in this
dialogue is occupied with the same problems I am writing about.” (M. O’C. Drury, “Conversations with
Wittgenstein”,  op cit., p. 163.)  He later sent Drury a copy of the  Theaetetus.  Though Wittgenstein’s
references to the dialogue in the Investigations concern the naming of simples (cf. PI §46, 48), the role of
Heraclitus  in  this  debate  could  not  have  gone  unnoticed.   In  the  present  context,  the  following  is
particularly relevant.  For at this point in the dialogue, Socrates suggests a more thorough restatement of
the Heraclitean view; Theodorus responds that the Heracliteans themselves are no help here:
“Because, in literal conformity with their texts, they keep moving; as for stopping an argument or a
question and, without moving, giving an answer and asking a question in turn, there’s less than none of
that in them […] If you ask one of them a question, they draw out enigmatic little expressions from
their quiver, so to speak, and shoot one off; and if you try to get hold of an account of what that one
meant, you’re transfixed by another novel set of metaphors.” (Plato,  Theaetetus, op cit., 179d-180a.)
Even  if  Wittgenstein  had  already  rejected  the  Heraclitean  aspects  of  the  specious  present  in  the
metaphysical or phenomenological sense, one might wonder nonetheless, given all we have discussed
above, how much he conscientiously incorporated into the methodology of the work’s composition more
generally.
260
significant for the time-being―adopted for the moment, just to be abandoned latter as time
flows on and novel needs arise.  Now, so long as our gaze remains fixed upon our present
exchanges  and  on  our  present  needs,  this  would  seem  to  present  no  problem.   As
Wittgenstein makes clear in one of the better known dialogic moments of the Investigations:
“ “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?”―It is what
human beings  say  that  is  true and false;  and they agree in  the  language  they use.   That  is  not
agreement in opinions but in form of life.” (PI §241)
By drawing on the  complex web of  social  convention,  sensical  speech is,  Wittgenstein
suggests here, immanent to the mutual interaction of like-minded participants; being of like-
mind, these participants share the dynamic background of meaning that Wittgenstein called
a ‘form of life’.  Truth, thus conceived, is simply neither private nor permanent.  
But if Wittgenstein thus helps us escape the metaphysical quagmires of both the specious
present (one the one hand) and the eternal ‘view from nowhere’ (on the other), it would
appear that he only does so temporarily.  For in such a case, a natural question arises: How
are  we  to  make  sense  of  statements  made  outside  the  present  ‘flow’ of  our  immanent
linguistic  interaction―for  example,  the  statements  of  past  epochs  (made  by  those  with
whom we no longer share a common ‘form of life’, as it were) or statements concerning
epochs  to  come  (made  in  reference  to  a  form  of  life  of  which  we  do  not  yet  fully
partake)―without  reducing  them out  of  hand  to  error  or  plain  nonsense?   And  in  the
absence of this understanding, how are we to grasp the ways in which sense transitions, how
it develops, grows old and decays, how our previous linguistic practices become ‘obsolete’
and new ones ‘come into existence’ as PI §23 indicates?
The ‘rough picture’ of change presented in the Investigations soon becomes problematic if
we attempt to grasp it more clearly.  On the surface, Wittgenstein seems to have remedied
his earlier errors, at least in part, by substituting the real, socially-engaged individual for the
abstract and aloof metaphysical  subject―the communal ‘we’ for the solipsistic ‘I’,  as  it
were.   And  indeed,  he  has.   But  a  conundrum  remains  buried  within  this  change  of
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perspective nonetheless.  The problem is that if we are going to ground sensical language
use in terms of its spatio-temporal immanency, the difference that make dialogue what it
truly is can only be experienced first-hand.  This difference would exhibit itself in certain
forms of semi- or partial agreement, for example, or in an inability for one person to fully
comprehend what another is saying.  But in the inevitable absence of an interlocutor, our
ability to make sense of past statements can only be determined by the degree to which they
accord with those of the present.  In other words, there is no possibility to swim  up ‘the
stream of  life’,  and  so  certain  forms  of  history  would  seem to  impossible.   Naturally,
historical  statements  of  the  sort  ‘Caesar  crossed  the  Rubicon’ make  sense,  their  forms
having ‘floated downstream’ along with us, so to speak.  But the intellectual history of the
past—its arts, sciences, religions and philosophies, for example, which find their home at
the limits of language—would be inaccessible to the present insofar as the form of their
expression had changed over the ages.  By this account, we would be unable to chart our
disagreements, to make sense of deviations from the current standard, and to adjust them in
response, and so it would appear necessary by this account to explain deviation away as
simple error, mere nonsense―or ‘chicanery’, as it were.285
285Briefly, an example of such a difficulty can be drawn from Wittgenstein’s own attempts to put into words
a sentiment to which he could no longer give adequate expression.  From among his first attempts to
compose a foreward in the early 1930’s, we find for example the following:
“I would like to say ‘This book is written to the glory of God’, but nowadays that would be chicanery,
that is, it would not be rightly understood.  It means the book is written in good will, and in so far as it
is not so written, but out of vanity, etc., the author would wish to see it condemned.  He cannot be free
it of these impurities further than he himself is free of them.” (PR, Foreword, my emphasis)
Diamond  summarizes  this  difficult  well,  in  remark  that  evokes  her  understanding  of  ‘transitional
nonsense’ and what it means to ‘throw away’ the Tractarian ladder.  As she notes, when we come to see a
game in a new way (such that a familiar game “A”, e.g., can now be won every time by applying a
simple trick, so that it becomes a slightly altered version of its earlier self, game “B”), she notes: 
“The player of A who is led to play B, to see in it the game he was playing before, can no longer go on
playing A ‘naively’; he cannot play as he did before.  If, having come to see A in this new way, he
conscientiously tries to play A as he did before, this will no longer be doing the same thing; he will be
merely going through the motions, he will not mean what he says in giving discordant results as he did
before (not because the psychological accompaniments are different).  But this is as different from
what it was before as was the wearing of togas in revolutionary France from wearing them in ancient
Rome.  That it is a matter of convention whether we wear togas or not is not to say whether, if we
should decide to put them on, this would be a case of ‘dressing up like a Roman’ and not ‘getting
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While this problem is not normally associated with Wittgenstein, neither is it unfamiliar.  It
is of course well-known in historicist circles, many of whose key figures drew on none other
than Wittgenstein for inspiration.  Thomas Kuhn, to take a representative example, refers
explicitly to this difficulty in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, precisely at the point in
the text where he has fleshed out his notion of progress via the serial succession of more or
less ontologically incommensurable ‘paradigms’.  The historical evidence he offers is rich
and his position is compelling, but a worry remains for Kuhn.  He writes there:
“None of these crisis-promoting subjects has yet  produced a viable alternative to the traditional
epistemological paradigm, but they do begin to suggest what some of that paradigm’s characteristics
will be.  I am, for example, acutely aware of the difficulties created by saying that when Aristotle
and Galileo looked at a swinging stone, the first saw constrained fall, the second a pendulum.  The
same difficulties are presented in an even more fundamental form by the opening sentences of this
section: though the world does not change with the change of paradigm, the scientist afterwards
works in a different  world.   Nevertheless, I  am convinced that  we must  learn to make sense of
statements that at least resemble these.”286
dressed’.  I might say, “One can’t any longer mean it, if one puts on a toga nowadays”―as I cannot
mean what might be said in some language-games” (C. Diamond, “The Face of Necessity”, p. 256, in
The Realistic Spirit, op cit., pp. 243-266) 
She  refers  here,  in  conclusion,  to  a  remark  from  Zettel,  where  Wittgenstein  states:  “We  are  here
describing a language-game that we cannot learn.” (Z §339)
286T. Kuhn,  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 121.
For a thoroughly Wittgensteinian analysis of such passages in Kuhn’s work, cf. W. Sharrock and R. Read,
Kuhn: Philosopher of Scientific Revolution (Oxford: polity, 2002).  In this context it is interesting to
wonder  at  just  how  reminiscent  Kuhn’s  own  description  of  history  as  a  series  of  ontologically
incommensurable paradigms is with the manner in which Wittgenstein described his own ‘new method’
of philosophy upon his return to Cambridge in 1930.  As Moore notes, e.g.: 
“I was a good deal surprised by some of the things he said about the difference between ‘philosophy’
in  the  sense  in  which  what  he  was  doing  might  be  called  ‘philosophy’ (he  called  this  ‘modern
philosophy’), and what has traditionally been called ‘philosophy’.  He said that what he was doing was
a  ‘new subject’,  and  not  merely  a  stage  in  a  ‘continuous  development’;  that  there  was  now,  in
philosophy, a ‘kink’ in the ‘development of human thought’, comparable to that which occurred when
Galileo and his contemporaries invented dynamics; that a ‘new method’ had been discovered, as had
happened when ‘chemistry was developed out of alchemy’; and that it was now possible for the first
time that there should be ‘skilful philosophers’, though of course there had in the past been ‘great
philosophers’.” (PO, p. 113) 
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Through Kuhn’s use of illuminating historical examples we are tempted to admit that a
falling stone was not for Aristotle a pendulum, as it  was not for Galileo an instance of
constrained fall.  But how, in the absence of attributing to the earlier some form of basic
error or mere illusion, are we to make sense of the possibility that one thing can be different
things to different people at different times and still maintain that there is something there to
be different?  In other words, how are we to make sense of the possibility of fundamentally
different but equally legitimate world-views when we know at the same time that the world
in some equally fundamental sense has not itself changed?  If we are not to reject deviations
out of hand, taking such a historicist view seems to commit us to the very kinds of claims
that our intellect immediately rejects as unthinkable nonsense. 
The question at the heart of these issues is the following: Is our access to the past limited in
some fundamental way?  Though the terms of Kuhn’s investigation differ greatly from those
of Wittgenstein’s, the two thinkers share a similar concern when faced with the dilemma at
the heart  of historicism.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, given this  formulation of the problem,
Cora Diamond herself gestures briefly towards the this difficulty in Wittgenstein’s thought
in her introduction to  The Realistic Spirit.287  As we have seen, concerning what she calls
there ‘the myth of a-temporality’ in Wittgenstein’s work, Diamond writes: “In the Tractatus,
that myth of what it is for sense to be determinate is at the same time a myth of essential
changelessness.  There is no possibility of new thoughts or sorts of thought.”288  Indeed, this
287I say ‘unsurprisingly’ here because anyone familiar with her extensive critique of M. Dummett, will see
clear parallels between Dummett’s view and the historicist predicament presented above.  Though the
specifically historicist formulation of the problem circumvents that aspect of Diamond’s critique that
concerns what Dummett himself calls Wittgenstein’s ‘strict constructivism’―i.e., our supposed freedom
to assign the status of necessity to some statements at will―it nonetheless keeps in place the idea that
necessity can and is conferred upon particular statements and that the sum total set of those statements
alters over time.  (Cf. M. Dummett, “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics” and “The Reality of the
Past”, in:  Truth and Other Enigmas, op cit., pp. 166-185 and pp. 239-258), C. Diamond, “The Face of
Necessity” and “Wright’s Wittgenstein”, in The Realistic Spirit, op cit., pp. 243-266 and pp. 205-224.)
288C. Diamond, The Realistic Spirit (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), p. 7.  This naturally recalls one of
the better known remarks from the Tractatus: “To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view the world
as a whole—a limited whole.” (T 6.45)  There are, however, a great number of less ‘mystical’ remarks in
the  Tractatus  that  recall  this  same  a-temporality  (especially  concerning  his  idea  of  logical
‘forseeability’), much of which finds its origins in Wittgenstein’s acquiescence (later to be repealed) to
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is undoubtedly true of the Tractatus, where it is only from within the limits of language that
the limits of thought may be drawn.  As we have seen, if the limits of language were in
continual flux it would not have been possible for Wittgenstein to have definitively drawn
them and there would have been no ‘final solution’ to the problems of philosophy.  From the
Tractarian perspective, drawing the limits of language precisely requires one to exclude the
possibility of linguistic change.  However, Diamond concludes that although Wittgenstein
later acknowledged ‘the myth of a-temporality’ at work in the Tractatus, he was nonetheless
unable  to  give  it  up  when  he  returned  to  philosophy  ten  years  later.   The  myth  of  a-
temporality remains in Wittgenstein’s later work as much as it did in the earlier work, she
writes, “but the mythology is recognized for what it is.”289  This follows, she claims, from
his general methodological standpoint―i.e., his Sprachkritik.  As she notes there:
“Wittgenstein’s criticism of what I have called mythology or fantasy―in particular, his criticism of
the mythology attached to logical necessity―is read as if it were a rejection of the mythology as a
false  notion of how things are.  That reading of Wittgenstein is tied to insistence on the question
when it is fixed that such-and-such is logically necessary, or that such-and-such is in accord with a
definition we have given or a rule we have formulated.  The question appears to give us no choice
but to say either (a) that necessity (or what follows from a definition or is in accord with a rule that
we have formulated) is independent of and prior to our habits of inference, or (b) that necessity
comes into existence when we explicitly accept the sentence at the end of a proof or when we decide
to accept an application of a rule or definition as ‘what we meant’, and that until the acceptance or
the decision we were, as far as logic is concerned, quite free.  But treating ‘When was it fixed?’ as
the subject of philosophical dispute is not seeing it as a grammatical issue.  Whether the question
‘When does it become true (or necessary) that p?’ makes sense is a grammatical question about p.”290
Frege’s attack on ‘psychological logic’: “It may, of course, serve some purpose to investigate the ideas
and changes of ideas which occur during the course of mathematical thinking; but psychology should not
imagine that it can contribute anything whatever to the foundation of arithmetic.”  (FA, p. vi)
289C. Diamond, “Introduction I”, in The Realistic Spirit, op cit., p. 4
290Ibid, p. 6
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According to Diamond,  Wittgenstein does  not  therefore  reject  the  historicity  of  truth (a
priori  or  otherwise),  in  favour  of  the  so-called  ‘platonic  conception’ (as  espoused  by
someone like Frege, for example).  He rather encourages us to ask whether we are genuinely
able to make sense of such a dichotomy in the first place.  By this reading, stating when it
was  the  case  that  such-and-such  became  true,  or  became  in  accordance  with  a  rule
previously formulated, is as senseless as stating that it  simply has always been and will
always be.  And that  fact, according to Diamond, says more about the grammar of words
like  ‘true’,  ‘necessary’,  ‘when’ and  ‘always’,  than  it  does  about  logical  formulae  and
mathematical equations―in which, it must be granted, these words rarely if ever occur.  
In many respects,  Diamond is  not mistaken here.   Particularly her  critique of  the naïve
appeal to temporality in regards to the historicity of a priori truths―where, for example, we
might reasonably formulate expressions such as ‘p  became necessary last Tuesday’―are
justified.291  Ditto for the naïve appeal to freedom in terms of our ability to simply adopt or
abrogate such truths, rules and definitions, as we see fit. Nonetheless, we see that despite
having turned the access of the investigation around, for Diamond’s later-Wittgenstein, just
as much as it was for the earlier, there is no way for us to make sense of history from within
the stream of life.  To ask when  some possibility or other became true, or necessary, or
genuinely in accord with the those definitions we previously set down, is not to see it as a
grammatical question.  But of course, to ask whether such a question makes sense means to
ask whether it makes sense to us, here and now.  And from this perspective, the difficulties
of that other, non-empirical investigation into the past seem insurmountable and therefore,
we might be tempted to conclude, indicative of some illusion on our part.  By this account,
the  intellectual  history  of  the  world would be—for  the  Wittgenstein of  1945,  as  it  was
indeed for the Wittgenstein of 1918—a tale full of sound and fury, ultimately signifying
nothing.
The later Wittgenstein undoubtedly struggled greatly to overcome a-temporality upon which
his earlier work was founded, but he was deeply committed to resolving the tension that
291Cf. C. Diamond, “Wright’s Wittgenstein”, in The Realistic Spirit, op cit., p. 216.
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arose from its abandonment.  Though he did not wish to give up the notion of the ‘stream of
life’ and the  living  linguistic  exchange in  which purposive language finds  its  home,  he
recognized the need to acknowledge the historical dimension of language that was implied
with his renewed, non-transcendental conception of it as an embodied human practice.  We
will thus see that although he did not simply reject historicism, neither did he refuse to
admit it into the sphere of his interests.  Wittgenstein confronted the difficulties that Kuhn
refers to here, not by rejecting them, but by refining them.  He thus sought to take up the
challenge that, in a manner of speaking, Kuhn would later articulate so well: If thinking
historically does not make sense, we must rather learn to make sense of it, in order to avoid
the philosophical aporia to which it lends itself.  
II. “Don’t think, but look!”
We  have  seen  that  even  though  Wittgenstein  would  ultimately  abandon  the
phenomenological  analysis  of  time-consciousness  first  attempted  upon  his  return  to
philosophy in the early 1930’s, temporal considerations—which would later resurfaces in
the form of history—remained at the heart of his project nonetheless.  Indeed, by the time
Wittgenstein  was  composing  Philosophical  Investigations,  we  see  this  concern  for  the
historicity of linguistic form, both a priori and non-, arise repeatedly, regularly, and even
strategically at several key moments in the work.  From the introduction of the notion of
‘language-games’ and ‘forms of life’ (PI §23), to the notion of ‘family resemblance’ (an idea
that inherently incorporates the historical dimension of  genealogy) (PI §67), and perhaps
most tellingly, the idea of rule-following itself, i.e., knowing when and how one is to ‘go on’
in the same way as before (PI §187)―in all of these, the central notions of time, change,
continuity, and thus of history, arise again and again.  Indeed, as Wittgenstein himself notes
towards the end of the Investigations, it is possible to consider the entire collection from just
such a perspective:
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“What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural  history of human beings;  we are not
contributing  curiosities  however,  but  observations  which  no  one  has  doubted,  but  which  have
escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes.” (PI §415)
Keeping  this  in  mind,  one  will  notice  moreover  how  the  notion  of  history  is  deeply
embedded in many of the prominent metaphors of the work―“our language can be seen as
an ancient city” (PI §18), for example, or “we extend [a concept] as in spinning a thread we
twist fibre on fibre” (PI §67), among others―almost as if this were, in fact, the only way for
him  to  openly  appreciate  the  profound  implications  of  linguistic  change  while
sidestepping―and thus helping us sidestep―the conceptual difficulties associated with it.292
As  we  have  seen  Wittgenstein  was  always  well  aware  of  the  difficulties  surrounding
historicism, even when he was composing the Tractatus.  Recall how earlier we noted that it
may seem surprising that Wittgenstein—who, after all, denounced history so strongly in his
early work—would by the same token be concerned there with the introduction of novel
292Indeed, it  is interesting to note that Wittgenstein seems almost compelled to refer to the specifically
historical dimensions of language primarily in metaphorical terms.  Perhaps it is for this reason that the
role of history in Wittgenstein’s thought has been so thoroughly overlooked in the literature.  As H.-J.
Glock has noted, in one of the very few works that treats of the subject directly: 
“Wittgenstein’s own attitude to history is not a topic which is either obvious or popular.  To the best of
my knowledge, fortified by an examination of existing bibliographies, there is no explicit discussion of
it.  This is not a coincidence.  Obviously, unlike the nature of logic, language and the human mind,
history is not a topic that looms large in Wittgenstein’s writings, whether that be in the Tractatus, the
Philosophical  Investigations or  the  posthumous  publications  from  the  Nachlaß.”  (H.-J.  Glock,
“Wittgenstein and History”, op cit., p. 278.)
Such conclusions are mistaken and in all likelihood due to the overwhelming emphasis placed by most
contemporary Anglo-American, analytic philosophers on the ‘a-historical’ or a-temporal dimensions of
truth,  rather  than  any  real  avoidance  on  Wittgenstein’s  part.   Thus,  in  the  analytic  literature,  the
widespread references  to  conceptual  change in  Wittgenstein’s  work are  usually  considered from the
perspective of the one undergoing such a change ‘in the moment’ rather than seeing the intellectual
history of the world as the total sum of such changes undergone by others.  In recent years, however, this
too has begun to change.  As H. Sluga humorously remarked:
“Analytic philosophy which began with such resolutely un- and antihistorical sentiments has since
gone through an extended period of historical evolution and growth. Somewhat to its own surprise, it
has come to recognize along the way that it possesses a history.” (H. Sluga “What has History to do
with Me? Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy”, Inquiry, 41(1), 1998, pp. 99-121.)
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logical devices.  However, it was precisely because Wittgenstein felt compelled to denounce
the significance of history, while at the same time knowing full well that he himself was
making use of previously unrecognisable forms of logical articulation that such an account
had to be given.  What Wittgenstein required then was a conception of logic that would
permit  the  emergence  of  new logical  forms,  while  proving  them  nonetheless  to  be  a-
historical.  It is in this sense that we can see the extent to which there lay in the background
of Wittgenstein’s Tractarian project, as there had in Frege’s and Russell’s respective projects
before him, an acute awareness of his own position in the intellectual history of the West.
We might recall here,  for example, how even in Wittgenstein’s first surviving work, his
1912 review of Coffey’s The Science of Logic, he begins with stating as much:
“In  no branch of  learning can an  author  disregard the results  of  honest  research  with so much
impunity as he can in Philosophy and Logic. To this circumstance we owe the publication of such as
book as  Mr  Coffey’s  ‘Science  of  Logic’:  and  only  as  a  typical  example  of  the  work  of  many
logicians of to-day does this book deserve consideration.  The author’s Logic is that of the scholastic
philosophers,  and he makes all  their  mistakes―of course with the usual  references  to Aristotle.
(Aristotle, whose name is so much taken in vain by our logicians, would turn in his grave if he knew
that so many logicians know no more about Logic to-day than he did 2,000 years ago).  The author
has not taken the slightest notice of the great work of the modern mathematical logicians―work
which has brought about an advance in Logic comparable only to that which made Astronomy out of
Astrology, and Chemistry out of Alchemy.” (PO, p. 3)
Of course, Wittgenstein would soon drastically shift his conception of logic, language and
the task of  philosophy away from the context  of  discovery towards  one of  perspicuity;
nonetheless, he never abandoned this sense for the timeliness of the task at hand.  From all
that we have seen above, the following remark from the Nachlaß is particularly pertinent in
this regard, insofar as it marks both the dramatic change in Wittgenstein’s thought regarding
the continuity of philosophy itself as well as indicating the kind of break he himself wished
to usher in, at least circa 1930, when this remark was composed: 
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“People say again and again that philosophy doesn’t really progress, that we are still occupied with
the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks.  But the people who say this don’t understand
why it has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into
asking the same questions.  As long as there continues to be a verb ‘to be’ that looks as if it functions
in the same way as ‘to eat’ and ‘to drink’, as long as we still have the adjectives ‘identical’, ‘true’,
‘false’, ‘possible’, as long as we continue to talk of a river of time, of an expanse of space, etc. etc.,
people  will  keep  stumbling  over  the  same  puzzling  difficulties  and  find  themselves  staring  at
something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up.” (CV, p. 15 [MS 111; 24.8.1931])
Of course, Wittgenstein’s feelings in this regard would alter once again as he later began to
feel more pessimistic about whether he was capable of realising what this task demanded of
him or whether his contemporaries were able to appreciate such contributions as he was
capable of making towards it.  We will look at this in more detail below; for the moment,
however, should there remain any doubt, it serves once more as a reminder of the presence
of historical (and indeed historicist) concerns at the heart of Wittgenstein’s work, concerns
which become all the more apparent when we broaden our conception of just what counts as
a historicist reference in Wittgenstein’s work in the first place.  For, in addition to the many
remarks  concerning  linguistic  and  conceptual  change  in  his  published  works,  there  are
countless  others  to  thinkers  of  past  epochs  spread  widely  throughout  the  Nachlaß.293
Though the vast majority of them failed to find a significant place in the  Investigations,
these  remarks  in  no  way represent  a  collection  of  mere  curiosities.   They are  rather  a
293A brief example from Culture and Value―a collection which, by all accounts, positively bristles with
historical as well as historicist concerns―Wittgenstein remarks: “What a Copernicus or a Darwin really
achieved was not the discovery of a true theory but of a fertile point of view [neuen Aspekt].” (CV, p. 18
[MS 112; 22.11.1931])  In the present context, this remark is also noteworthy because it is followed
shortly after by an early reference to Goethe, and Wittgenstein’s own (albeit so far mistaken) attempt to
grasp just what kind of a project it was that Goethe was engaged in: “What Goethe was really seeking, I
believe, was not a physiological, but a psychological theory of colours.” (Ibid. [26.11.1931]) Of course, it
is  impossible  not  to  recall  here  the  extensive  treatment  of  ‘aspect  perception’—and  especially  the
‘change of aspects’—to which Wittgenstein devotes section xi  of  the remarks that  have come to be
considered Part II of the Investigations.  Putting these two side by side, we clearly witness the readiness
of scholars to interpret Wittgenstein’s remarks on aspect perception (solely) within a framework of a
philosophy of psychology, rather than (in addition) that of Weltanschauungensphilosophie.
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constructive engagement with the past, with alternate styles of thought and action, as well as
with the successes and failures of past thinkers―including the author of the Tractatus―to
bring about the kind of dramatic shift in thought that Wittgenstein himself wished to bring
about.294
Nonetheless, parallel to these concerns, we see again and again the fundamental importance
Wittgenstein places on the immanency of language-use and the reassertion of ‘the stream of
life’,  from within  which  we speak,  act  and judge  accordingly,  and which  threatens  the
coherence of such historicist considerations.  Of such remarks, the  Investigations is full.
And neither do these remarks represent a mere passing interest for him.  Even towards the
very end of his life―in the remarks collected in On Certainty, which, as we have also seen,
contains the most powerful expression of Wittgenstein’s mature interest in historicism, i.e.,
the metaphor of the river and the river-bed―Wittgenstein would still maintain that:
“What we believe depends on what we learn.  We all believe that it isn’t possible to get to the moon;
but there might be people who believe that that is possible and that it sometimes happens.  We say:
these people do not know a lot that we know.  And, let them be never so sure of their belief—they
are wrong and we know it.
If we compare our system of knowledge with theirs then theirs is evidently the poorer one by far.”
(OC §286)
Though the dominant perspective here is the familiar geographical one of ‘us and them’ (of
insiders and outsiders, as it were), we need only turn the example around its temporal axis to
witness its parallel historical dimension.  Historically speaking, it is of course we in our time
who judge those of the past for committing the most basic of errors, for not knowing what
294Indeed, when placed side-by-side, the overwhelming prevalence of historical remarks in the Nachlaß and
their near complete absence within the pages of the Investigations is noteworthy in itself, and deserves a
much more thorough analysis than we are capable of providing here.  However, that Wittgenstein did
indeed wish to have an impact on our present manner of thought and action (or present ‘form of life’, as
it were?) cannot be doubted when we consider the expression of his troubled and pessimistic evaluation
of the day in the preface to the Investigations: “It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this
work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one brain or another―but, of
course, it is not likely.” (PI, Preface)  We will look at this passage more closely below. 
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we know, and perhaps most prevalently, for falling prey to simple and naïve superstition. 295
However, though it appears confrontational—even proscriptive—by keeping in mind that
Wittgenstein is here emphasizing how we do react and not how we should to react, we begin
to see the way in which Wittgenstein sought to resolve this paradox between historicism and
the imminency of linguistic sense, and perhaps why his deep sensitivity to historical thought
has  been overshadowed in  most  commentaries  by  the  anti-psychologistic  and a-historic
present tense.   For in Wittgenstein’s  later work he proposes a  descriptive  methodology:
“Don’t  think,  but  look!”  (PI  §66)   He  is  not  putting  forward  a  theory  explaining  how
295It is of course this last of these explanatory mechanisms that forms the bulk of Wittgenstein’s critical
remarks aimed at Frazer and his clumsy attempts at explaining away the continued belief of ‘primitive
people’ in magic.  As Wittgenstein notes there, for example:
“Frazer says that  it  is  very hard to discover the error in magic―and that  is  why it  has lasted so
long―because, for example, an incantation that is supposed to bring rain certainty seems efficacious
sooner or later.  But then it is surely remarkable that people don’t realize earlier that sooner or later it’s
going to rain anyhow.” 
This remark, and the many others like it found in this collection, are very interesting for a number of
reasons.  Principle among these is, first, that Wittgenstein would later proclaim his wish to open the
Investigations with exactly this sort of ruination, but in doing so he wished to place rather philosophers
(including the author of the Tractatus) in the position of the ‘primitives’ here, in order to highlight how
we readily become enchanted by the philosophical superlative (and will, of course, accept no alternative).
For  example,  he  notes  at  the  beginning  of  the  manuscript  in  which  his  remarks  on  Frazer  are
contained―in  a  remark  which,  it  must  nonetheless  be  granted,  he  later  marked  with  an  ‘S’ for
‘schlecht’―:
“I now believe that it would be right to begin my book with remarks about metaphysics as a kind of
magic.
But in doing this I must not make a case for magic nor mat I make fun of it.
The depth of magic should be preserved.—
Indeed, here the elimination of magic has itself the character of magic.
For, back then, when I begin talking about the ‘world’ (and not about this tree or table), what else did I
want but to keep something higher spellbound by my words?
[A motto for this book: ‘Can you see the moon there? You can only see half of it, yet it is round and
beautiful.’]” (PO, p 117 [MS 110; 1931])
Secondly, I maintain that such remarks are noteworthy for capturing, many years in advance of Kuhn’s
work on scientific revolutions, the mysterious character of ‘paradigm shifts’ and indeed the impossibility
for Kuhn―were he engaged in an explanatory enterprise, rather than a descriptive one―of providing a
transhistorical  explanation of  the  process  by  which the  anomalies  that  are  at  first  seen as  marginal
exceptions to the rule of a given paradigm at some later time overwhelm the scientific community and
subsequently become the standard of its successor.
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language ought to be, but rather a description of how language is.  Is it not perhaps so with
history,  that  through  a  descriptive  methodology—one  which  borrows  from the  tools  of
natural history, constructing a perspicuous representation of language as it is and has been in
all its diverse, and even contradictory forms—that we might approach historical thought
despite the paradoxes associated with thinking historically?  
Now certainly, there is a strain of natural history that puts forth mechanistic hypotheses
about the past and how we arrived at where we are today.  That form of natural history seeks
to confirm or deny these hypotheses, and thereby arrive at a causal theory of evolutionary
development—one which shows how and the extent to which, paraphrasing the remark from
On Certainty quoted above, those earlier people precisely did not know a lot that we know,
that they were wrong and we know it―everything to which Wittgenstein was opposed in the
understanding of culture in general and the understanding of history in particular.  However,
there is another strain of natural history, one that focuses on the description of the everyday
facts that “have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes.” (PI §415)  It
is a strain of natural history whose focus does not lie in the construction of a static model of
phenomena but rather seeks to represent phenomena in respect to their dynamism.  This
strain of natural history is the descriptive methodology of morphology found in Goethe’s
scientific works.  In particular we might turn here to two works that influenced Wittgenstein
greatly, his  The Morphology of Plants296 and he  Theory of Colours297 especially.  In these
works Goethe sought specifically to discredit theoretical distortions by placing phenomena
back into the real world from whence they came and to which they truly belong. 298  In
296J.W. Goethe, “The Metamorphosis of Plants”, in J.W. Goethe, Collected Works, vol. 12., ed. and trans. D.
Miller. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 76-97.
297J.W. Goethe,  The Theory of  Colours,  ed.  and  trans. C.  L.  Eastlake  (London:  F.  Cass,  1991).   This
translation spans  only the  first  part  of  Goethe’s  (immense)  tripartite  work  Zur  Farbenlehre  (reprint
Frankfurt  a.M.:  Deutscher  Klassiker  Verlag,  1991).   The  three  parts  of  the  full  work  include  the
Didaktishe Teil (translated into English here), the Historische Teil (in which Goethe turns to the history
of colour theory) and the Polemische Teil (polemical that is, in that it is a sustained critique of Newton’s
Opticks based on the previous two parts).
298As  Nietzsche  observed,  “Goethe  saw  an  abuse  in  this  [the  promotion  of  scientific  “truth”  over
“harmony”] and demanded that sciences should have an effect on the external world only through an
enhanced praxis. (F. Nietzsche, The Uses and Abuses of History for Life, §7, in F. Nietzsche, Untimely
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particular,  Goethe wished to  draw our attention to  the  effects  that  we all  experience in
everyday life  and any reader  of  his  Theory  of  Colours is  faced—not  unlike  readers  of
Wittgenstein’s  Philosophical  Investigations—with  a  thousand  minutiae  relating  to  our
everyday  experience.   The  setting  sun  turns  red;  distant  mountains  look  blue;  rainbow
effects can be observed in spiders’ webs; tobacco smoke turns roses green, and so on.  Taken
all  together  these  observations  are  meant  to  remind  us  just  how  limited  the  kind  of
phenomena  investigated  in  laboratories—or,  for  that  matter,  by  philosophers  in  their
‘thought experiments’—actually are.  They draw our attention to the countless number of
phenomena we experience every day but have overlooked because they are always before
our very eyes.
It is only in the last decades that the influence of Goethe on Wittgenstein has begun to be
fully appreciated.  In this time, a number of commentators and biographers have drawn
attention to significant affinities between the two men’s works.299  Additionally, the many
explicit references to Goethe that have come to light since the publication of Wittgenstein’s
Nachlaß  support the fact that we are not only dealing with a question of shared cultural
heritage but of deep similarities in aim and method.300  Though this has been touched on
Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).)  A comparison to
Wittgenstein’s claim that “[t]he work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular
purpose” (PI §127) is easy to make here.
299Cf.  R.  Monk,  The  Duty  of  Genius (London:  Random  House,  1990),  pp.  303-304,  509-512;  B.
McGuinness,  Wittgenstein: A Life, Young Ludwig (1889-1921) (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1988),  passim;  M.W. Rowe, “Goethe and Wittgenstein”,  Philosophy 66 (257),  1991,  pp.  283-303;  J.
Westphal,  Colour: Some Philosophical Problems from Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987); F.
Breithaupt, R. Raatsch, and B. Kremberg (eds.) Goethe and Wittgenstein: Seeing the World’s Unity in its
Variety (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang GmbH, 2003); among others.
300As Baker and Hacker note, Wittgenstein also played with the idea of using a quotation from Goethe as
the motto for Philosophical Investigations.  The line is “Nature has neither core nor husk, you just ask
yourself whether you or core or husk”, taken from a polemical poem entitled “Allerdings” written in
reply to Haller, whom Goethe quotes: “No created spirit penetrates to the innermost heart of nature” and
“It is in bliss even if it displays only the outer husk”.  Goethe, who disdained the idea of a hidden reality
behind phenomena that had to be inferred by theory, responds:
“I have heard this reiterated for sixty years—
And cursed at it, on the quite.
I tell myself a thousand times:
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elsewhere, it will nonetheless be worthwhile to retrace a few of these affinities here.  This is
for two reasons.  First, though it is no longer possible to doubt the connections between the
two thinkers,  they are so great  and varied that by most accounts they are still  not fully
understood.301  Second, certain features of Goethe’s own influence on Wittgenstein repeat in
a strikingly illustrative manner the very problem at hand, and so this analogy of Goethe’s
influence on Wittgenstein serves not only to extend our understanding of the biographical
contexts wherein Wittgenstein’s works were produced, but also to illustrate how one might
access the past, think the thoughts of another, find sense in the linguistic expressions of
those with whom we do not—or are unable to—simply see eye to eye.   
It is worthwhile noting that the influence of Goethe on Wittgenstein was not immediately
evident to all.  The extent of their affinities only came to light after significant selections of
the  Nachlaß had became more widely available.  Even then, lacking all the pieces of the
puzzle, establishing a solid link was not without its problems.  On the hand, it may be worth
asking whether we should not be wary of making too strong a connection; for at times,
Wittgenstein seems to suggest that at least he did not feel that he was strongly influenced by
Goethe.  Wittgenstein did not place Goethe on the list of his greatest influences, for example
—comprising  Boltzmann,  Hertz,  Schopenhauer,  Frege,  Russell,  Kraus,  Loos,  Weininger,
Spengler and the Italian economist Piero Sraffe (CV, p. 19 [MS 154; 1931]), although in the
same passage he quotes a poem of Goethe further on—and in another passage from about
the same time, he mentions that Goethe dealt with problems which “do not lie in my path”
Nature gives everything amply and gladly,
She has neither core
Nor husk,
She is everything at once.
You just ask yourself,
Whether you are core or husk.” 
(Quoted  in  G.P.  Backer  &  P.M.S.  Hacker,  Wittgenstein:  Understanding  and  Meaning  (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 16.)
301As McGuinness notes: “To say what Ludwig admired in Goethe would almost be to say what he found
remarkable or worthwhile in life, so many are the themes and attitudes from Goethe that recur in his
thoughts.” (B. McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life, Young Ludwig (1889-1921), op. cit., pp. 34-35.)
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and are not  “part of my world” (CV, p. 9 [MS 110; 16.1.31]).  On the other hand, he does
place on this list of influences two thinkers who were, in their turn,  heavily influenced by
Goethe: Spengler and Weininger.
It is not only Goethe’s absence that is surprising here, but also that this list of Wittgenstein’s
greatest  influences  covers  almost  exclusively  contemporary  figures  (only  Schopenhauer
provides a notable exception to this rule).  How could Wittgenstein, who grew up in an
extraordinarily cultured fin-de-siècle Viennese household, not have found some sympathy in
the figures of the intellectual history in which he was so obviously well-schooled?  (And let
us not forget that he purposefully cultivated a deceptive image of himself as a singularly ill-
read philosopher.)  Rather than entering the biographical speculation to which Wittgenstein
scholars have been led in the attempt to resolve this apparent conundrum302, it is worthwhile
to suppose that Wittgenstein may indeed have omitted Goethe’s name from this list (as he
likewise claimed to know little of the history of philosophy, which was not exactly true) for
philosophical reasons.  These reasons may even have only dawned on Wittgenstein many
years  later,  when  he  had  a  clearer  understanding  of  what  exactly  was  at  stake  in  the
membership of a community of speakers.  As J.C. Klagge notes: “Goethe and Wittgenstein
lived in different times that pervaded their life-contexts.  How does one endorse a view that
has a home in another life-context? Wittgenstein acknowledged but did not resolve this
problem.  He accepted Goethe’s views without knowing how to publicly endorse them in his
times.”303
Wittgenstein often expressed his frustration at being unable to accomplish what he thought
philosophy most required of him.  In a characteristic remark, he notes, for example: 
“I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said: Philosophy ought really to be written
only as poetic composition. It must, as it seems to me, be possible to gather from this how far my
302As, e.g., Glock does: “His avoidance of past philosophy seems to have been fuelled at least partly by his
well-documented contempt for academic philosophy and by an urge to philosophize off his own bat,
without the dead hand of history.” (“Wittgenstein and History,” op. cit., p. 186, my emphasis).
303J. C. Klagge,“The Puzzle of Goethe’s Influence on Wittgenstein,” in Wittgenstein and Goethe. op. cit. p.
19.
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thinking belongs to the present, future or past.  For I was thereby revealing myself as someone who
cannot do what he would like to be able to do.” (CV, p. 24 [MS 146; ca. January 1934])  
So it is important to keep in mind that this is not solely a biographical question, as Klagge’s
reference  to  ‘publicly  endorsing  Goethe’  might  be  wrongly  construed.   Wittgenstein
certainly would not have been embarrassed by endorsing Goethe, for example.  Rather, it
was for him a question of finding a proper form of expression for his thought, despite what
he considered the antithetical spirit  of the times in which he was living and thinking. 304
Accordingly, even if its roots trace back to the biographical sphere, we do not need to look
far  for  a  philosophical  expression  of  this  psychological  discontent.   Klagge’s  remark
naturally recalls, for example, the formulation found in one of the forewords Wittgenstein
composed in the early 1930’s, for the work that would ultimately become  Philosophical
Investigations a decade and a half later:
“This book is written for such men as are in sympathy with its spirit.  This spirit is different from the
one which informs the vast stream of European and American civilization in which all of us stand.
That  spirit expresses itself in an onward movement, in building ever larger and more complicated
structures; the other in striving after clarity and perspicuity (Übersichtlichkeit) in no matter what
structure.  The first tries to grasp the world by way of its periphery—in its variety; the second at its
centre—in its essence.  And so the first adds one construction to another, moving on and up, as it
were, from one stage to the next, while the other remains where it is and what it tries to grasp is
always the same.” (PR, Preface)305
In this passage Wittgenstein simultaneously affirms his deep suspicion of history and points
out his reluctance to accept what is given in the present as absolute.   We see here how
304Not that this problem was without biographical expression altogether.  The remark above is, for example,
closely connected to his remarks from the 1930’s, lamenting his inability to be creative (what he then
considered to be a result of his ‘Jewishness’, undoubtedly a testament to influence of Weininger on this
thought at this time (which we will not investigate here). (Cf. A. Janik, “Wittgenstein and Weininger”, in
A. Janik,  Essays on Wittgenstein and Weininger, op cit.,  pp. 64-73.)  Nonetheless, we should not be
surprised that Wittgenstein, a thinker for whom biographical concerns were both the impetus and the aim
of philosophy, would find the expression of a philosophical puzzle mirrored in both his life and his work.
305An earlier draft of the foreward reprinted in PR. (CV, p. 6, my emphasis [MS 109; 6.11.1930]).
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profoundly Wittgenstein felt out of step with his time and struggled to find a suitable way to
express his  untimely views.  It is a sentiment repeated in the concluding paragraph, where
Wittgenstein notes:
“I  would  like  to  say  ‘This  book is  written  to  the  glory  of  God’,  but  nowadays  that  would  be
chicanery, that is, it would not be rightly understood.  It means the book is written in good will, and
in so far as it is not so written, but out of vanity, etc., the author would wish to see it condemned.  He
cannot be free it of these impurities further than he himself is free of them.” (ibid.)
The impetus is clear and we know from many sources, both publish and unpublished, as
well as anecdotal, just how dissociated Wittgenstein felt from the dominant trends of the
time.   And  yet―or  perhaps  precisely  because  of  that―everything  in  Wittgenstein’s
philosophy would seem to point towards the very impossibility of such anachronism, and
the deep communal belonging that is for each of us a birthright.  Sharing a form of life,
wherein words take on meaning through the mutual consent of the community into which
we are by necessity born, would seem to forbid it.  Forbid it, that is, unless we might find a
way to understand the  contours  of  that  community  as  extending beyond the  immediate
spatio-temporal presence of the speakers who supposedly partake in that communication.
Thus the preface continues:  
“I realize then that the disappearance of a culture does not signify the disappearance of human value,
but simply of certain means of expressing this value, yet the fact remains that I have no sympathy for
the current of European civilization and do not understand its goals, if it has any.  So I am really
writing for friends who are scattered throughout the corners of the globe.”
Scattered around the globe, in space and… in time?  As Wittgenstein once remarked to his
friend M. O’Connor Drury: “My thinking is not wanted in this present age, I have to swim
so strongly against the tide.  Perhaps in a hundred years people will really want what I am
writing.”306  To make sense of this we would seem to require some greater understanding of
306R. Rhees, Recollections of Wittgenstein. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 160.
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the logic by which this ‘spirit’ develops into a ‘vast stream’, how this Zeitgeist branches out
over time into tributaries, eddies and pools, dries up and springs forth once again.  
III. Widening the Horizons of History
So if Wittgenstein did not have any sympathy for the contemporary current of European
civilization,  where  did  his  sympathies  lie?   Having  generally  missed  the  philosophical
importance  of  the  historical  dimension  of  language  in  Wittgenstein’s  later  philosophy,
commentators have rarely treated this subject in Wittgenstein’s thought, let alone traced this
unease to his  interest  in Goethe’s works and the morphological method he employed.307
This is surprising, for the influence of Goethe on Wittgenstein’s thought had been greatly
facilitated  by  the  work  of  Oswald  Spengler―who,  as  it  is  often  remarked,  is on
Wittgenstein’s list of influences and whose principle work, The Decline of the West, purports
in fact to be a study of  world history according to precisely that methodology.  It was a
methodology  to  which  Wittgenstein,  upon  reading  Spengler,  would  adapt  his  thought
wholeheartedly—once he had made a few of his characteristic qualifications, of course.
The guiding principle of Spengler’s work is based on Goethe’s poem The Metamorphosis of
Plants, in which Goethe follows the development of the plant-form from the leaf through a
series of intermediate forms to the flower and, ultimately, its fruit.  “Just as Goethe sought
the Destiny in nature and not the Causality,” Spengler claims, “so here shall we develop the
form-language of human history, its periodic structure,  its  organic  logic.”308  Applied to
307In Goethe’s case, treatments of the role of history in his thought also seem to be rare.  Besides a handful
of  short  articles,  there  are  two notable  exceptions:  E.  Cassirer,  Goethe und die  Geschichtliche Welt
(Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1932); and F. Meinecke’s panoramic Historicism: The Rise of a New Historical
Outlook, trans. H. D. Schmidt. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 373-495.  For an overview
of the role of history in Goethe’s appreciation of art (and its relation to the morphological method he
applied to his scientific studies), see J Grave,   “Idea and History. Johann Wolfgang Goethe’s Collection
of Prints and Drawings”, Artibus et Historiae, 27(53), 2006, pp. 175-186.
308O. Spengler,  Decline of the West,  ed. A. Helps and trans. C.F. Atkinson (New York: Vintage Books,
2006), p.21, original emphasis.  Like Goethe, Spengler is here expressing his aversion to evolutionary or
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historically-situated  cultural  phenomena,  Spengler  takes  these  cultural  phenomena  as
natural phenomena in the Goethean sense.  Thus conceived, historical phenomena do not
fall prey to the static laws of causality, but rather embody the dynamic laws of ‘becoming’.
He presents the problem of history as “the  philosophy of the future”: “It expands into the
conception  of  a  morphology  of  world-history […] an entirely  different  ordering,  which
groups them, not in an ensemble picture inclusive of everything known, but in a picture of
life, and presents them not as things-become, but things becoming.”309  Wittgenstein’s post-
Tractarian method, which constructs intermediate cases, family resemblances and replaces
theory with a perspicuous representation of seemingly trivial observations, is of the same
Goethean  tradition.   “What  I  give,”  Wittgenstein  once  remarked  pointedly,  “is  the
morphology of the use of an expression.”310
Nonetheless, Wittgenstein was critical of certain elements of Spengler’s application of the
morphological method.  Spengler, in a manner that might indeed be characterised as proto-
Kuhnian, emphasised for example the insularity of cultures from one another.  He held that
earlier cultures can never influence later ones (the common belief that they do is delusion of
prejudice),  and that  from within  one  culture  one cannot  really  grasp the  perspective  of
another.311  Despite his general high regard for Spengler, Wittgenstein took issue with these
and other such details in his analysis of world history.  Drury, for example, relates that he
causal  explanations  (including  what  would  today  be  considered  socio-biology  or  evolutionary
psychology, a field we would not have to stretch our imagination to imagine Wittgenstein disparaging).
309Ibid. p. 5
310N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, op cit., p. 43.
311DeAngelis makes the following important note regarding Spengler’s (and indeed any historicist’s) own
ability to access the sense of the past, the realization of which is clearly tied to the possibility of very
project itself:
“This view, while stimulating, nevertheless raises difficulties.  For example, how can Spengler—who
presumably  thinks  from  ‘inside’  the  unique  limiting  perspective  of  a  modern  man—come  to
understand the perspective of other cultures, given what he says about cultural insularity?  His answer
—which seems  both  ad  hoc  and immodest—is,  in  effect,  that  an  occasional  intuitive  genius  can
overcome the obstacles of cultural insularity.  (He never explains what such a genius might hope to
accomplish by making his thoughts available to a general public of non-geniuses in a book.)” (W. J.
DeAngelis, “Wittgenstein and Spengler”, p. 49, Dialogue, 33, 1994, pp. 41-61.) 
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was  once  urged  by  Wittgenstein  to  read  Spengler,  but  with  the  following  important
qualification:
“Wittgenstein advised me to read Spengler’s The Decline of the West.  It was a book, he said, that
might teach me something about the age we were now living in.  It might be an antidote for my
‘incurable romanticism’.  After I had read the book I said to him,
DRURY: ‘Spengler wants to put history into moulds, and that you can’t do.’
WITTGENSTEIN: ‘In a way, you are right; you can’t put history into moulds.  But Spengler does point
out certain very interesting comparisons.  I don’t trust Spengler about the details.  He is too often
inaccurate.  I once wrote that if Spengler had had the courage to write a short book, it could have
been a great one.’
DRURY: ‘I conceived the idea that I might write a book to try and bring out just what was important
in Spengler.’
WITTGENSTEIN: ‘Well, perhaps some day you might do just that.’”312
Clearly, a number of interesting features of this short dialogue stand out.  First, Wittgenstein
admits that one ‘can’t put history into moulds’, as Drury claims Spengler has done, from
312M.  O’C.  Drury,  “Conversations  with  Wittgenstein”,  p.  128,  in  ed.  R.  Rhees,  Ludwig  Wittgenstein:
Personal Recollections (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), pp. 112-189.  The conversation is said to have
occurred in 1930, which would be significant for being around the time that Wittgenstein cited Spengler
as one of his principle influences.  However, there is a question mark next to the date given, of which
Rhees has the following to say: 
“The question mark is Drury’s.  The first remark in quotes [concerning Russell’s views on marriage]
was probably in 1930, when Drury was still an undergraduate in Cambridge, anyway.  The reference to
Russell’s exclusion from a professorship at the City College of New York [on ‘moral grounds’, as it
were, this following the opening remark on sex and marriage], must have been after the autumn of
1940.” (R. Rhees (ed.), Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981),
p. 186, f. 10.)
As the discussion of Spengler to be featured here occurs after the 1940 remark on Russell’s exclusion
from the professorship, we cannot be certain from Drury’s date alone that it took place in the 1930’s.
This makes little difference from the point of view of Wittgenstein eventual position regarding Spengler.
It only adds to the long list of sources—comprised mostly from remarks found at various points in the
Nachlaß—that support the fact that Wittgenstein was interested in certain of Spengler’s notions, while
nonetheless failing to provide concrete evidence regarding precisely what Wittgenstein found so relevant
in this notions. 
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which it follows that he would not ‘trust Spengler about the details’.  However, Spengler
does nonetheless “point out certain very interesting comparisons’.  In what sense, we might
then ask, are the comparisons that Spengler makes ‘interesting’—and in such a way that the
inaccuracy of the details does not matter to the value that might be gained from reading the
work?  Let us not forget,  that Spengler’s  Decline of  the West purports  to be a work of
history, whose value consists precisely in its rigour and in its completeness.313
The answer can be found in an extended remark composed by Wittgenstein in 1931, which
deals at length with his impression and reception of Spengler:
“Spengler could be understood if he said: I am comparing different cultural epochs with the lives of
families; within a family there is a family resemblance, though you will also find a resemblance
between members of different families; family resemblance differs from to other sort of resemblance
in such and such ways, etc.  What I mean is: we have to be told the object of comparison, the object
from which  this  way of  viewing things  is  derived,  otherwise  the  discussion  will  constantly  be
313Turning the question posed here around somewhat, we could likewise ask in what sense Wittgenstein
thought Spengler’s analysis of history might cure Drury of his ‘incurable romanticism’.  Consider here
Spengler’s characterisation of the transition between culture and civilisation—which is for him found in
the abandonment of Romanticism—: 
“At the last, when Civilization sets in, true ornament and, with it, great art as a whole are extinguished.
The transition consists—in every Culture—in Classicism and Romanticism of one sort or another, the
former being a sentimental regard for Ornamentation (rules, laws, types) that has long been archaic
and soulless, and the latter a sentimental Imitation, not of life, but of an older Imitation.  In the place
of architectural style we find architectural taste.  Methods of painting and mannerisms of writing, old
forms and new, home and foreign, come and go with the fashion.  In the end we have a pictorial and
literary stock-in-trade which is destitute of any deeper significance and is employed according to task.
This  final  industrial  form  of  Ornament—no  longer  historical,  no  longer  in  the  condition  of
‘becoming’—” (O. Spengler, The Decline of the West, op cit., p. 105)
In this context, Wittgenstein’s remark to Drury—from the same conversation, whereupon Wittgenstein
proceeds to suggest Drury read Spengler—takes on a new and surprising significance: 
“I know there have been times in history when monks were nothing but a nuisance, but monasticism
does correspond to a real need of some human beings […] But you, Drury, couldn’t be a monk.  It
would  be  all  wrong  for  you  to  wear  a  monastic  habit.”  (M.  O’C.  Drury,  “Conversations  with
Wittgenstein”, op cit., p. 128.)
Wittgenstein own monastic leanings are of course well known. 
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affected by distortions.  Because willy-nilly we shall ascribe the properties of the prototype [Urbild]
to the object we are viewing in this light; and we claim ‘it must always be…’.
This  is  because  we  want  to  give  a  prototype’s  characteristics  [den  Merkmalen  des  Urbilds]  a
purchase on our way of representing things.  But since we confuse prototype and object [Urbild und
Objekt vermischt] we find ourselves dogmatically conferring on the object properties which only the
prototype [Urbild] necessarily possess.  On the other hand we think our view will  not have the
generality we want it to have if it is really true only of the one case.  But the prototype [Urbild]
ought  to  be  clearly  presented  for  what  it  is;  so  that  it  characterizes  the  whole  discussion  and
determines its form.  This makes it the focal point, so that its general validity will depend on the fact
that it determines the form of discussion rather than on the claim that everything which is true only
of it holds too for all things that are being discussed.
Similarly the question always to ask when exaggerated, dogmatic assertions are made is: What is
actually true in this?  Or again: In what case is that actually true?” (CV, p. 14 [MS 111; 19.8.1931])
The precise way in which Spengler could be said to have influenced Wittgenstein is an
interesting story, given Wittgenstein’s elusive 1931 allusion to that influence in the list of
thinkers whose lines of thought he had taken over and ‘seized’ them for his own work.  The
exact details of that influence remain, however, a highly interpretive affair.  Despite these
and other  remarks  directed  towards  Spengler,  there  is  little  hard  evidence  for  precisely
which notions of Spengler impressed themselves upon Wittgenstein and for what reasons. 314
Nonetheless,  from these two passages—Drury’s report,  and the proceeding remark from
314von Wright  has  gone  so  far  as  to  claim that  “the  actual  influence  [of  Spengler  upon Wittgenstein]
pertains, it seems, to an idea in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, indeed to one of its most characteristic
thought manoeuvres.   This is the idea of ‘family resemblance’.” (G.H. von Wright,  “Wittgenstein in
Relation to His Times”, op cit., p. 116.)  Cavell, on the other hand, has made a more modest claim: 
“I am not in a position to claim that Wittgenstein derived his inflection of the idea of forms of life
from Spengler’s idea of cultures as organic forms (or for that matter from Goethe’s living Nature), but
Spengler’s vision of Culture as a kind of Nature (as opposed, let us say, to a set of conventions) seems
to me shared, if modified, in the Investigations.” (S. Cavell, “Declining Decline”, op cit., pp. 53-54.)   
As will be evident from what follows, I am sympathetic to von Wright’s claim; however, it is important
to  underscore—which  von  Wright  fails  to  do—that  in  Wittgenstein’s  hands,  the  idea  of  ‘family
resemblances’ acts  as  an  anti-essentialist  armament  against  the  very  pervasiveness  of  dogmatically
applied Urbilder that Spengler’s analysis relies upon.
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Nachlaß—we can see that, despite his reservations regarding ‘putting history into moulds’,
as objects of comparison there is something of value to be taken from Spengler’s account—
so long as one keeps it before one’s eyes that the seductive properties of the prototype, or
Urbild, belong first and foremost to the  Urbild itself and not the objects it is supposed to
encompass.315
Wittgenstein’s  had  reservations  about  Spengler’s  appeal  to  the  universal  validity  of  the
Urbilder employed in The Decline of the West; he was nonetheless deeply impressed by the
morphological aspects of his analysis of history.  Thus, it is not surprising that by the time
he came to deal with Goethe’s theory of morphology he was already thoroughly steeped in
questions of history and the relationship between historical and natural phenomena—the
relationship between things-becoming and things-become, in the words of Spengler—or, in
other words, between the historical dimension of language and the immanency of living
language  use.   In  Logik,  Sprache,  Philosophie,  for  example,  the  work  upon  which
Wittgenstein had been temporarily collaborating with Waismann at the time, the connection
is made explicitly:
315In this sense, it is interesting to note, as W. J. DeAngelis does, that: 
“He summarizes his purported findings in elaborate, graphic fold-out sheets in the appendices of the
work.  These foldouts outline, in the left-hand column, the supposed prototypical sequences of cultural
development and,  in parallel,  columns to the right  outline the developmental  sequences of  actual
cultures.  The resulting graphic purports to show how world cultures have actually developed along
the lines of the Spenglerian prototype.” (W. J. DeAngelis,  Wittgenstein—A Cultural Point of View
(Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2007), p. 8)  
It  is  impossible not  to compare here  the critique of Spengler’s use of  prototypes,  or  Urbilder, with
Wittgenstein later criticisms of his earlier approach in the Tractatus, in terms of having been held captive
by a picture: 
“ “But this is how it is——” I say to myself over and over again.  I feel as though, if only I could fix
my gaze sharply on this fact, get it into focus, I could grasp the essence of the matter. //  (Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5): “The general form of the proposition: This is how things are.”——That is
the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times.  One thinks that one is tracing the
outline of the thing’s nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through
which we look at it. // A picture  held us captive.  And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our
language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.” (PI §§113-115)
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“Our thought here marches with certain views of Goethe’s which he expressed in the Metamorphosis
of Plants.  We are in the habit, whenever we perceive similarities, of seeking some common origin
from them.  The urge to follow such phenomena back to their origin in the past expresses itself in a
certain style of thinking.  This recognizes, so to speak, only a single scheme for such similarities,
namely the arrangement as a series of time. (And that this presumably bound up with the uniqueness
of  the  causal  schema).   But  Goethe’s  view  shows  that  this  is  not  the  only  possible  form  of
conception.   His  conception  of  the  original  plant  [Urpflanze]  implies  no  hypothesis  about  the
temporal development of the vegetable kingdom such as that of Darwin.  What then is the problem
solved by this idea?  It is the problem of synoptic presentation [übersichtliche Darstellung].”316
In his botanical work, Goethe’s search for a suitable means to present his investigations led
him to formulate this idea of the  Urpflanze, the ‘original-’ or ‘primal plant’.  This primal
plant  did  not  for  Goethe  embody  an  evolutionary  idea  of  plant  development  (such  as
Darwin’s did).  He believed rather that this idea was to be found in the nature of plant-hood
itself, a prototype to be genuinely appreciated by the senses according to the inner laws of
its nature.  As he notes:
“The primal plant will be the most peculiar creature in the world, and nature herself will envy me.
By means of this model and the key to it one will then be able to invent plants ad infinitum.  These
plants would have to be derivable from the model, that is, even if they do not exist, their existence
would have to be possible; they should not be picturesque or poetic shadows or figments but possess
inner truth and necessity.”317
It  was,  of  course,  against  this  Urpflanze of  Goethe  that  Schiller  famously  charged  (in
Goethe’s account of the exchange): “This has nothing to do with experience, it is an idea
316F. Waissman, Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, ed. and trans. R. Harré (New York: Macmillan, 1965),
p. 80-81.
317J.W. Goethe,  Zweiter Römischer Aufenthalt,  17.4.1787, quoted in and trans.  J.  Schulte, “Goethe and
Wittgenstein on Morphology”, pp. 57-58,  in F. Breithaupt et al., Goethe and Wittgenstein, op. cit..  
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[…] I [Goethe] relied: Well, so much the better; it means that I have ideas without knowing
it; and can even see them with my eyes.”318
The difficulty that lay at the root of this exchange is this: How can one experience dynamic
development in the momentary perceptual appreciation of a static object?  One can put forth
a mechanical model, make predictions based on that model and then seek evidence that will
confirm or  deny those predictions.   However,  this  is  evidently not  what Goethe meant.
What he sought were not ‘mere facts’ relating to the contingent events of evolution, but
possibilities reflecting the inner truth and necessity of nature itself.  Wittgenstein was well
aware  of  this.319  The  tension  between  what  is  directly  present  and  what  can  only  be
reconstructed  from  the  past  or  projected  into  the  future,  between  things-becoming  and
things-become as it were, is found throughout Wittgenstein’s later works.  However, it finds
it’s  clearest  expression  in  the  remarks  composed  at  the  end  of  his  life.   The  remarks
collected in On Certainty, for example, particularly exemplify his refusal to see history as a
static, evolutionary trajectory from error to truth or from nonsense to sense—history was
not, for him, a mere ‘comedy of errors’—and yet, even here he recognized that if we try to
‘think historically’, if we try to reach back into the past where the ‘river-bed of thought’
shifted and new channels were plotted, time and again we risk running up against the limits
of what is expressible in the language of our own time.  This was not without its problems
for Wittgenstein and it is thus no surprise that at the time he was composing those remarks
collected in On Certainty he was also composing those collected in Remarks on Colour.320
318Ibid,  quoted  in  and  trans.  E.  Heller,  “Goethe  and  the  Idea  of  Scientific  Truth”,  in  E.  Heller,  The
Disinherited Mind (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1975), p. 7.  
319As he remarks in reference to Goethe’s theory of colour: “Goethe’s theory of the origin of the spectrum
isn’t  a theory of its origin that has proved unsatisfactory; it is really not a theory at all.  It is, rather, a
vague schematic outline, of the sort we find in James’ psychology. There is no experimentum crucis for
Goethe’s  theory  of  colour.”  (RCIII,  §125)  “Experimentum crucis” (Latin  =  “crucial  experiment,  the
experiment that settles the matter”) is a pointed reference to the language of Newton: “The successive
failure of those suspicions eventually led me to the experimentum crucis, which was this: To the initial
set-up of hole/prism/wall he added two boards, each with a hole in it, and a second prism.” (I. Newton,
“Letter to the Royal Society Presenting A New Theory of Light and Colours” (London: Royal Society,
1671))
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In  Remarks on Colour  Wittgenstein examines an initially puzzling series of observations,
which he sees as presenting the fundamental grammar of colour: there can be no transparent
white; white is the lightest colour; grey is not luminous; there cannot be a pure brown or
brown light (brown is essentially a surface colour); there is no blackish yellow; there can be
a bluish-green but not a reddish-green.321  The first and the last of these observations are
taken directly from a letter to Goethe from the Romantic Painter, and life-long colleague of
his, Philipp Otto Runge (RC I, §21; RC III, §94).  It may also be that he is recalling Runge,
when  he  notes  that  “Phenomenological  analysis  (as  e.g.  Goethe  would  have  it)  is  the
analysis  of  concepts  that  can  neither  agree  with  nor  contradict  physics.”  (RC  II,  §16)
Wittgenstein believed that if physics neither confirms nor contradicts ‘phenomenological
analysis’ (taken here to be in Goethe’s morphological sense), even less can it hope to solve
its problems: “This much I can understand: that a physical theory (such as Newton’s) cannot
solve the problems motivated by Goethe, even if he himself didn’t solve them either.” (RC
III, §206)  This is a feature summarized by Breithaupt et al. as follows: “Goethe’s world-
view characterizes a  morphological access to the manifold of phenomena. Morphology is,
one could say, a horizontal approach.  In contrast to this, science is essentially vertical.”322
320Cf. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright’s preface to On Certainty.  Wittgenstein had, however, been
dealing with colour in terms of Kantian notion of synthetic a priori  since his early preparations of the
Tractatus and thus there were for him difficulties in adopting the Goethean framework wholeheartedly.
Cf. von Wright and Anscombe’s preface to the 2nd edition of  Notebooks 1914-1916: “At the 20th of
December 1914 there was a rough line of adjacent crayoned patches, using 7 colours.  This was treated as
a mere doodle in the first edition, and so it may be.  But, having regard to the subject matter of meaning
and negation, which is the topic of the surrounding text, it is possible that there is here an anticipation of
Philosophical Investigations §48.” (NB, p. 1)  It is worthwhile to recall, furthermore, that PI §48 opens
(on the one hand) with a reference to Plato’s  Theaetetus  (i.e., that Platonic dialogue wherein Socrates
rejects to he Heraclitean ‘doctrine’), and concludes (on the other hand) with a remark gesturing towards
what might be euphemistically termed Wittgenstein’s ‘grammatical presentism’: “Does it matter what we
say, so long as we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case?”
321J. Westphal, Colour: Some Philosophical Problems from Wittgenstein , op cit., p. 1.
322F. Breithaupt et al., Wittgenstein and Goethe, op. cit., p. 8, original emphasis.  If there remains any doubt
about the methodological affinities between the morphological method of Goethe and Wittgenstein, the
manner in which this remark clearly recalls the preface to Philosophical Investigations should put these
to rest:  
“After several unsuccessful attempts to wield my results into such a whole [in which “the thoughts
should proceed from one subject to another in a natural order without breaks”], I realized that I should
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But what  remained unclear  to  Wittgenstein was the  precise  contours  of  this  ‘horizontal
approach’ to the natural history of colour:
“Is there such a thing as a ‘natural history of colours’ and to what extent is it analogous to a natural
history of plants?  Isn’t the latter temporal, the former non-temporal?
If we say that the proposition “saturated yellow is lighter than saturated blue” doesn’t belong to the
realm of psychology (for only so could it be natural history)―this means that we are not using it as a
proposition of natural history.  And the question then is: what is the other, non-temporal use like?
For this is the only way we can distinguish between propositions of ‘the mathematics of colour’ from
those of natural history.” (RC III, §§8-10) 
And again: “A natural history of colours would have to report on their occurrence in nature,
not their essence.  Its propositions would have to be temporal ones.” (RC III, §135)  Thus
we see  once again the tension between things-becoming and things-become or  between
temporal and non-temporal applications.
There  are  undoubtedly  significant  differences  between  Wittgenstein’s  use  of  the
morphological method and Goethe’s.  For Wittgenstein, morphology is not strictly speaking
a scientific method.  In a famous passage of the Investigations, for example, Wittgenstein
stresses the following distinction between his new morphologically-inclined methods and
those of the natural sciences: “our considerations could not be scientific ones. And we may
not  advance  any  kind  of  theory.  There  must  not  be  anything  hypothetical  in  our
considerations. We must do away with all  explanation, and description alone must take its
place.” (PI §109)  In other words, science needs explanation,  whereas philosophy needs
description; scientific inquiries are empirical, philosophical investigations are grammatical;
science produces hypotheses, while philosophy “leaves everything as it is.” (PI §124)  Thus,
never succeed.  The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my
thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural
inclination.–—And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation.  For this
compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction.—The philosophical
remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the
course of these long and involved journeyings.” (PI, Preface)
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though they agreed on many of the particulars, what Wittgenstein considered elements of an
a-scientific  world-view  were  for  Goethe  the  very  height  of  objective  scientific
investigation.323  However, there is another element of Goethe’s morphological methodology
that makes Wittgenstein’s appeal to such an approach more problematic.  For in Goethe’s
hands,  morphological  investigation  cannot  be  separated  from  another  aspect  of  his
investigations―the concern for ‘primal phenomena’ (Urphänomene).  Wittgenstein, on the
contrary,  was  highly  critical  of  such  abstractions  and  regularly  denounces  the  damage
caused by such pictures (Urbilder).324  In Goethe’s work, as in Spengler’s adaptation of it,
the morphological method is thus directed  towards the search for primal phenomena.  In
Wittgenstein’s work, this same morphological method appears as weapon directed  against
such a quest.
Nevertheless,  regardless of whether  the morphological  method is  applied to the ends of
constructing  or  destructing  Urbilder,  their  respective  methods  are  strikingly  similar.
Perhaps in the end, we must admit that the focus on variable, diverse, lived, temporal—in a
323In this sense, a very interesting comparison could be done between Goethe’s understanding of truth,
which is at once static and dynamic, and Frege’s understanding of truth.  While Frege was especially
committed  to  a  Platonic  ideal  of  mathematical  truth—timeless  and  eternal—remarks  such  as  the
following reveal cracks in his commitment that may help to explain the tension between this ideal and his
understanding of novel mathematical truths: 
“But the more fruitful type of definition is a matter of drawing boundary lines that were not previously
given at all.  What we shall be able to infer from it, cannot be inspected in advance; here we are not
simply taking out of the box what we have put into it.  The conclusions we draw from it extend our
knowledge, and are therefore, on Kant’s view, to be regarded as synthetic; and yet they can be proved
by purely logical means, and are thus analytic.  The truth is that they are contained in the definitions,
but as plants are contained in their seeds, not as beams are contained in a house.” (FA §88, my
emphasis)
324“The ‘primal phenomenon’ (Urphänomen) is, e.g., what Freud thought he recognized in simple wish-
fulfilment dreams.  The primary phenomenon is a preconceived idea that takes possession of us.” (RC III
§230)  Or again: “Just as their are ‘infantile theories of sex’, so there are infantile theories in general.
This does not mean that everything a child does has arisen out of an infantile theory as its basis.” (from
Wittgenstein’s “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough”, PO, p. 153 [TS 221; ca. 1938])  Of course, it was
not the Urphänomene themselves that Wittgenstein was critical of, but our failure to recognize them as
such.  As he notes in the Investigations:
“Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at  what  happens as a ‘proto-
phenomenon’.  That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game is played.” (PI §654)
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word,  ordinary—cases will always involve a motion both towards and away from what is
‘primal’ in the phenomena themselves.  And perhaps this is what troubled Wittgenstein most
in his considerations, or at least what he believed called for constant vigilance on his (and
on our) part.  As he would later note in regards to some of the similarities he perceived
between his own work and that of Spengler’s:
“The only way for us to guard our assertions against distortion―or avoid vacuity in our assertions, is
to have a clear view in our reflections of what the ideal  is,  namely an object of comparison―a
yardstick, as it were―instead of making a prejudice of it to which everything has to conform.  For
this is what produces the dogmatism into which philosophy so easily degenerates.
But how then is a view like Spengler’s related to mine? Distortion in Spengler: The ideal doesn’t
lose any of its dignity if it’s presented as the principle determining the form of one’s reflections.  A
sound measure.―” (CV, p. 27 [MS 157b; 27.2.1937])325
325The original German text is highly suggestive in this passage, for the word translated here as ‘distortion’
is in the original ‘Ungerechtigkeit’.  Now there is clearly a sense in which we may think of ‘justice’
and/or ‘injustice’ in terms of ‘doing justice’ to the phenomena in question, in the sense of treating the
phenomena adequately, which would fit the translation offered here.  This would, furthermore, fit the
context surrounding this remark’s subsequent incarnation in Philosophical Investigations:
“For we can avoid ineptness  or emptiness  in our  assertions  [Ungerechtigkeit,  oder  Leere unserer
Behauptungen  entgegen]  only  by  presenting  the  model  [Vorbild]  as  what  it  is,  as  an  object  of
comparison―as,  so to  speak,  a  measuring-rod;  not  as  a  preconceived idea to  which reality  must
correspond.  (The dogmatism in which we fall so easily in doing philosophy).” (PI §131)
There are, however, reasons to believe that Wittgenstein equally intended the parallel, moral aspect of the
German original, which is not captured by the English translation.  Besides the general moral imperative
behind  Wittgenstein’s  own quest  for  perspicuity―we might  recall  here,  Russell’s  early  inquiry  into
Wittgenstein’s overall aggressivity in dealing with questions of logic and philosophy: “Are you thinking
about logic or your sins?” “Both” Wittgenstein replied, of course (B. Russell,  The Autobiography of
Bertrand Russell, vol. II., op cit. p. 99.)―there is also the following remark found in the Big Typescript:
“Our only task is to be just.  That is, we must only point out and resolve the injustices of philosophy, and
not posit new parties—and creeds.” (PO, p. 181 [TS 213, p. 420; 1933])  Again, this may point simply to
the  aspect  of  adequacy  in  the  application  of  morphology.   We  might  nonetheless  consider  here  a
mysterious and ambiguous remark that Wittgenstein made on one occasion to Norman Malcolm, which
has the potential to put this more neutral interpretation of ‘justice’ into question:
“One time when we were walking along the river we saw a newsvendor’s sign which announced that
the German government accused the British government of instigating a recent attempt to assassinate
Hitler with a bomb.  This was in autumn of 1939.  Wittgenstein said of the German claim: ‘It would
not surprise me at all if it were true.’  I retorted that I could not believe that the top people in the
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Despite this risk of distortion, the twin motions towards and away from Urbilder similarly
deny the static and abstract laws of mechanical causality, which are constructed out of ideal
sets of phenomena to be held up as a one and only measure of actual phenomena.  The risk
is in failing to recognizes that they only provide just that―a measure,  nothing more and
nothing less―rather than truly capturing the elusive  Ding an sich.  And whether that be
Newton’s Opticks in Goethe’s case, Russell’s Theory of Judgement in Wittgenstein’s, or any
other theory at hand, the distinction between form and content inherent to these will not
admit the possibility of a dynamic morphology and so must present itself as the very height
of objective necessity to which subsequent alteration can only be admitted grudgingly.  The
form itself is what we claim to have discovered and that form must always have been there,
as it always will be―present and unchanging.  As Spengler aptly notes: “Kant’s Time has
no relation with the past or the future.” 326
How, then, do these considerations play out in their discussion of history?  First of all, it is
important to note that like Wittgenstein, Goethe was no historian, and, like Wittgenstein, any
historical references in Goethe’s work are inherently tied to the problems with which he was
dealing.   Perhaps  it  is  for  this  reason  that  in  both  thinkers’ works  we  find  frequent
disparaging  remarks  on  the  pertinence  of  history  to  their  investigations.   Both  had  a
‘negative’ as  well  as  a  ‘positive’ relation  to  history.   We discussed  a  few examples  of
Wittgenstein’s negative relation to history above.  In the case of Goethe, we might take as an
example his remark to the musician C. F. Zelter in 1824, “everything historical has a strange
and uncertain character,  and it  really becomes comical,  when one considers how people
British government would do such a thing.  I meant that the British were too civilized and decent to
attempt anything so underhanded; and I added that such an act was incompatible with the British
‘national character’.  My remark made Wittgenstein extremely angry.  He considered it to be a great
stupidity and also an indication that I was not learning anything from the philosophical training that he
was trying to give me.” (N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, op. cit., p. 32.)
Just what exactly Wittgenstein thought Malcolm should have learned from his lectures regarding ideas
relating to politically-motivated assassination attempts on a foreign leader is far from clear.  Although, in
this context of Urbilder, objects of comparison and ‘ideals’, it is highly suggestive.  ‘National character’
was  not  an  issue  far  from  Spengler’s  thought,  for  example―and  how  much  more  was  it  part  of
Weininger’s, the ultimate consequences of which are of course well known.
326O. Spengler, The Decline of the West, op cit., p. 77.
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convince themselves with complete certainty about the past.”327  Cassirer, speaking first of
Goethe’s  faith  in  the  primacy  of  the  experience  of  unmediated  truth  before  nature,
summarizes Goethe’s uncertain feeling for history thus:
“The sense of quiet confidence and faithful devotion leaves Goethe as soon as he enters the terrain of
history. Here he feels nothing of that inner security he found in the contemplation of nature, here he
meets misgivings from the start, he finds himself constantly in danger of losing the ground out from
under his feet. Where Goethe speaks of history and the history of science he breaks into a mood that
we scarcely see in him otherwise.  He feels himself irritated to the point of criticism and opposition,
to pure negation – and this antagonism often grows into the sharpest satire.”328
Here we find a direct analogue between Wittgenstein’s doubts in the face of history and
those of Goethe.  In Wittgenstein’s case, history is presented as that which defies the living
exchange where language and life meet.  In Goethe’s, it is that thing whose ‘strange and
uncertain character’ escapes the living encounter with the truth of nature in our present,
sensuous  experience.   However,  just  as  we  should  resist  the  temptation  to  take
Wittgenstein’s remarks in the various forewards comprised in the early 1930’s about the
scientism of  his  time as  an  indictment  of  science  itself,  we  should  likewise  resist  the
temptation  to  take  these  disparaging  remarks  against  history  as  an  indictment  of  any
historical consideration in general.329
327Quoted in F. Meinecke, Historicism: The Rise of a New Historical Outlook, op. cit., p. 427.
328E. Cassirer, Goethe und die geschichtliche Welt, op. cit, p. 5 [my Translation].
329The difference here is, of course, rather a matter of one’s attitude towards such empirical disciplines.  As
von Wright notes: “A philosophy which does not look for answers to questions, does not explain or
theorise  about  the  things  which  attract  the  philosopher’s  curiosity,  and  does  not  try  to  provide  the
foundations for our beliefs, is not a philosophy for which scientific thinking sets the pattern.  It, on the
contrary,  fights  the  infiltration  of  this  thinking  into  philosophy  and  makes  it  responsible  for  the
confusions from which the philosopher tries to rid himself.  It is not, need not be, hostile to science as
such.  But it may be said to take a critical or even hostile attitude to the influence of science outside its
proper domain—and in particular on philosophical thought.  In  this  it runs counter to an intellectual
mainstream of  the century.” (G.H.  von Wright,  “Wittgenstein and the 20th Century”,  in  The Tree of
Knowledge (New York: E.J. Brill, 1993), p. 97)
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Goethe  was  a  man  of  the  sensuous  present,  though  not  of  this  alone.   He  sought  to
understand living phenomena according to their form and shape, their sensuous appeal to
experience and their inner law as revealed to the mind.  And it  was this that set up the
barriers between him and history, for at times the latter seemed to him but a pale imitation
of the former: “History,” he notes, “even at its best, always has something corpse-like, some
smell of the tomb, about it.”330  However, like Wittgenstein, Goethe would come feel an
increasing sense of the importance of historical development for his understanding of nature
in the present.   All  life was for Goethe a mystical  union of primal forms of successive
metamorphoses.  History too, he came to see, was bound to this same law.  Although he
came closer to the primal phenomena he sought in direct communion with nature rather than
in the study of history, the later gradually came to play a greater role in his investigations as
a framework by which one might examine more closely the metamorphosis of form.331
Neither Goethe nor Wittgenstein were, so to speak, ‘doing history’—natural or otherwise—
in the  sense that  they were  not  putting forth hypotheses  concerning historical  facts  nor
seeking empirical evidence to support these hypotheses.  In fact, it is just this that Goethe
would reject as ‘mere matter’ and Wittgenstein as the lamentable spirit “which informs the
vast stream of European and American civilization in which we stand.” (PR, Preface)  Mere
historical facts were not what they sought.  Thinking historically was nonetheless central—
even inherent, through the consideration of form and perspicuity—to their work and to the
morphological methods they employed.  As Goethe remarks in his preface to  Theory of
Colours, “Indeed, strictly speaking, it is useless to attempt to express the nature of a thing
abstractedly.  Effects we can perceive, and a complete history of those effects would, in fact,
sufficiently define the nature of the thing itself.  We should try in vain to describe a man’s
330From  the  projected  preface  to  the  third  part  of  Dichtung  und  Wahrheit  (quoted  in  F.  Meinecke,
Historicism, op. cit. p. 441.)
331Regarding  Goethe’s  increasing  sensitivity  to  the  centrality  of  historical  thinking  for  his  scientific
investigations, Cassirer makes the point clearly:  “Goethe rejects history when history is imposed on him
as mere matter; but in the end he reclaims it as a necessary way finally to understand form in itself and in
its own creativity.” (E. Cassirer, Goethe und die geschichtliche Welt, op. cit. p. 26.)
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character, but let his acts be collected and an idea of his character will be presented to us.”332
This  comment,  which  clearly  recalls  Wittgenstein’s  understanding  of  ‘physiognomy’,  is
directed specifically against Newton and the abstract ideal of light and colour employed in
his Opticks (where he sought an immutable causal substructure to phenomenal appearance,
which  is  of  course  the  sustained  object  of  Goethe’s  scorn  in  the  second  part  of  the
Farbenlehre333).  Goethe continues: 
“The third part is thus devoted to the historical account of early inquirers and investigators.  As we
before expressed the opinion that the history of an individual displays his character, so it may here be
well affirmed that the history of science is science itself.  We cannot clearly be aware of what we
possess until we have the means of knowing what others possessed before us. We cannot really and
honestly rejoice in the advantages of our own time if we know not how to appreciate the advantages
of former periods.  But it is impossible to write, or even to prepare the way for a history of theory of
colours while the Newtonian theory exists; for no aristocratic presumption has ever looked down on
those who were not of its order, with such intolerable arrogance as that betrayed by the Newtonian
school deciding on all that had been done in earlier times and all that was done around it.”334
332J.W. Goethe, Theory of Colours, op cit. p. xvii, my emphasis.
333E.g., “Do not the Rays of Light which fall upon Bodies, and are reflected or refracted, begin to bend
before they arrive at the Bodies: and are they not reflected, refracted, and inflected, by and on the same
Principle,  acting  variously  in  various  circumstances?”  (I.  Newton,  Opticks,  fourth  edition (London:
William Innys, 1730), p. 315.) 
334J.W. Goethe,  Theory of Colours, op cit. p. xxi.  It is interesting to note that Goethe’s claim here—that
“the history of science is science itself”—pre-dates certain contemporary trends in the philosophy of
science by more than a century.  As noted by Breithaupt et al., “in the historical section of his Theory of
Colors,  one finds scientific-theoretical observations that, in our time, have resurfaced only since Fleck
and Kuhn.” (Goethe and Wittgenstein, op. cit.  p. 9)  Perhaps it is correct to say since Fleck and Kuhn;
however, I believe we find much more sympathy in the claims made by P. Feyerabend than Kuhn, e.g: 
“Knowledge so conceived is not a series of self-consistent theories that converges towards an ideal
view; it  is  not  a gradual  approach to the truth.  It  is rather an ever increasing  ocean of mutually
incompatible alternatives, each single theory, each fairy-tale, each myth that is part of the collection
forcing the others into greater articulation and all of them contributing, via this process of completion,
to the development of our consciousness.  Nothing is ever settled, no view can ever be omitted from a
comprehensive  account.  Plutarch  or  Diogenes  Laertius,  and  not  Durac  or  von Neumann,  are  the
models for presenting a knowledge of this kind in which the history of a science becomes inseparable
from science itself […].” (P Feyerabend, Against Method (London: Verso, 1984), p. 14).  
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Wittgenstein  read—and was  greatly  influenced by—Goethe’s  Theory  of  Colours.   Such
remarks could not have gone unnoticed by him.  However, should there be any doubt, a
letter  to  von  Wright  in  1950,  makes  it  clear  that  it  was  not  solely  the  first  part  (the
‘Didaktischer Teil’) with which he was familiar, though it is this part which Wittgenstein’s
own Remarks on Colour most clearly resemble.  As he notes there:
“The last two weeks I read a great deal in Goethe’s ‘Farbenlehre’.  It is partly boring and repelling,
but in some ways also very instructive and philosophically interesting.  You might take it out of your
bookcase  and  look  at  what  he  wrote  about  Lord  Bacon  in  the  historical  part.”  (PO,  p.  475
[19.1.1950])  
This  allusive  reference  to  the  third  part  of  the  Farbenlehre (the  ‘Historischer  Teil’)  is
illustrative for two reasons.  On the one hand, it was Bacon who in the early days of the
scientific world-view emphasized the idea of unbiased observation of sensory data through
an attention to form and creativity.335  Like Goethe would after him, Bacon sought in this
way to approach our understanding of natural law without reducing it to the mechanical
order of causality.  On the other hand, Goethe’s passage on Bacon in the third part of the
work is by far the most in-depth of the work and, moreover, lays the foundation for Goethe’s
Goethe’s notion of science has more in common with this idea of progress than Kuhn’s understanding of
the periodic alternation between ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary science’.  There is, for example, in Goethe
no notion of epistemic crisis such as that which lies at the heart of Kuhn’s theory.  Kuhn, however, was
working within the dominant paradigm of historico-evolutionary causality that Goethe would not have
upheld.
335F. Bacon,  The New Organon,  ed. and trans. F.H. Anderson (New York: Macmillan, 1960).  Indeed, as
Desroches aptly notes: “Most critiques of Bacon rest on the temporally gymnastic suggestion that he
somehow failed to capture the nature of the scientific revolution that would succeed him, and are based
on reading Bacon as an empirical thinker, which is not,  to be sure, entirely incorrect.  […] Yet such
readings have a tendency to dwell on the inadequacy of Bacon’s experimental practice of Novum’s Book
II, even despite Bacon’s own claims that his experimental practice is problematic.  What is not addressed
adequately is the fundamentally reflexive nature of the programme that he puts in place to shape how
experiment is to take place in the future, and it is this reflexivity that I equate with a theoretical turn of
mind present  in  Bacon’s  thought.   The Greek  theoria  means,  above all,  ‘to  see’,  and it  is  Bacon’s
concerted attempt to see, to look at the science around him, and to develop a method capacious enough to
accommodate  being  seen,  that  defines  the  crucial  articulations  of  scientific  knowledge  production
undertaken in Book I.” (D. Desroches, Francis Bacon and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge  (London:
Continuum, 2006), p. 6.)
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own critique of Newton in the second part  (the ‘Polemischer Teil’).   In this passage on
Bacon, Goethe writes:
“Bacon is like a man who is well-aware of the irregularity, insufficiency and dilapidated condition of
an old building, and knows how to make this clear to the inhabitants. He advises them to abandon it,
to give up the land, the materials and all appurtenances, to look for another plot, and to erect a new
building […].  They break it down and some of the inhabitants are forced to move out. He points out
new building grounds; people begin to level it off, and yet it is everywhere too narrow. He submits
new plans; they are not clear, not inviting. Mainly, he speaks of new unknown materials and now the
world seems to be well-served.”336
336J.W. Goethe, Zur Farbenlehre, op. cit., p. 677 [my translation].  R. Steiner, notable for being one of the
few who has taken Goethe’s relationship to history seriously, makes the following illuminating remark in
relation to this passage: “Contrary to Bacon of Verulam, who pointed towards the bricks of the building,
Descartes and Spinoza turned their attention toward its plan.” (R. Steiner,  The Riddles of Philosophy
(Spring Valley, NY: Anthroposophical Press, 1914), p. 92.)  It is to note in this context that one can
clearly witness how the dialectic between works of a more ‘rationalistic’ tendency (such as those of
Descartes, Spinoza, for example, or Newton, under discussion here) and those of, e.g. Goethe.  A parallel
tension, it would appear, plays itself out in the 20th century between Carnap and Wittgenstein, among
others.  Where Carnap would write in the preface to his Aufbau:
“If we allot to the individual in philosophical work as in the special sciences only a partial task, then
we can look with more confidence to the future: in slow careful construction insight after insight will
be won.  Each collaborator contributes only what he can endorse and justify before the whole body of
his co-workers.  Thus stone will be carefully added to stone and a safe building will be erected at
which each following generation can continue work.” (R. Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World,
trans. R.A. George (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. xvii)
To this, Wittgenstein would respond in the second of the draft 1930’s prefaces, which I quote at length
because it is precisely here that Wittgenstein begins to drift in his assessment of modern culture and how
exactly the ‘spirit’ in which is writing is supposed to differ from that of our mainstream Anglo-European
culture―which is to say, just before he breaks for his ruminations on what he himself describes as ‘the
danger’ of an overly long foreward:
“Our civilization is characterized by the word ‘progress’.  Progress is its form rather than making
progress being one of its features.  Typically it constructs.  It is occupied with building an ever more
complicated structure.  And even clarity is sought only as a means to this end, not as an end in itself.
For me on the contrary clarity, perspicuity are valuable in themselves.
I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as having a perspicuous view of the foundation
of possible buildings.
So I am not aiming at the same target as the scientists and my way of thinking is different from theirs.
Each sentence I write here is trying to say the whole thing, i.e., the same thing over and over again; it
is as though they were all simply views of one object seen from different angles.
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This he calls Bacon’s ‘method of dispersion’, by which natural science is ‘broken up into
fragments’.  Bacon had, most notably in Goethe’s esteem, “led natural philosophy back into
the human being.”337  What is  so noteworthy about this  remark is the manner in which
Goethe returns to this very same metaphor of the ancient and dilapidated edifice (which
must be abandoned and ‘given up to the land’) in his own preface, but this time against
Newton and his Theory of Optics.  In the preface to the Theory of Colours, he writes:
“We compare the Newtonian theory of colours to an old castle, which was at first constructed by its
architect  with  youthful  precipitation;  it  was,  however,  gradually  enlarged  and equipped by  him
according to the exigencies of time and circumstance, and moreover was still further fortified and
secured in consequence of feuds and hostile demonstrations.
The  same  system  was  pursued  by  his  successors  and  heirs:  their  increased  wants  within,  the
harassing vigilance of their opponents without, and various accidents compelled them in some places
to build near, in others in connexion with the fabric, and thus to extend the original plan.
It became necessary to connect all these incongruous parts and additions by the strangest galleries,
halls and passages […].  This care and these exertions gave rise to a prejudice in favour of the great
importance of the fortress, and although the arts of building and fortification were by this time very
much advanced, and people had learnt to construct with much better dwellings and defences in other
cases.  But the old castle was chiefly held in honour because it had never been taken, because it had
always preserved its virgin renown.  This renown, this influence lasts even now: it occurs to no one
that the old castle has become uninhabitable.”338
Goethe concludes with the remark that to level this site (to ‘raze this Bastille’, as he phrases
it) would not mean erecting a new structure and encumbering it anew, but rather “to make
use of the this area for the purpose of passing in review a pleasing and varied series of
illustrative figures.”339 
One movement constructs and takes (in hand) one stone after another, the other keeps reaching for the
same.” (CV, p. 7 [MS 109; 6.11.1930])
337J.W. Goethe, Zur Farbenlehre, op. cit., p. 677, my translation.
338J.W. Goethe, Theory of Colour, op. cit., p. ix-xx.
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IV. Held Captive, in the Philosopher’s Garden?
We see then that Goethe’s approach to history was not aimed at retracing the conceptual
development of a given phenomenon within the limited confines of a particular framework.
Goethe did not merely seek to better understand that which had been incorporated into the
dominant paradigm of scientific investigation, for example, but rather that which had been
discarded along the way, abandoned to the “rubbish-bin and lumber-room of the history.”340
As Wittgenstein similarly remarks: 
“Nietzsche  writes  somewhere  that  even  the  best  poets  and  thinkers  have  written  stuff  that  is
mediocre and bad, but have separated off the good material.  But it’s not quite like that.  It’s true that
a  gardener,  along with his  roses,  keeps manure  and rubbish and straw in  his  garden,  but  what
distinguishes them is not just their value, but mainly their function in the garden.” (CV, p. 59 [MS
134; 8.4.1947])341
339Ibid,  p. xxi.  Goethe’s original German text is even more suggestive from both the point of view of
philosophy  generally  and  Wittgenstein’s  own considerations  of  aspect-perception  in  Book  II  of  the
Investigations, with its reference not to ‘illustrative figures’ but rather Gestalten: wir wollen uns vielmehr
desselben bedienen, um eine schöne Reihe mannigfaltiger Gestalten vorausführen.  On his particular
interpretation of the German word Gestalt, Goethe has this to say: 
“The Germans have a word for the complex of existence presented by a physical  organism: Gestalt.
With  this  expression  they  exclude  what  is  changeable  and  assume  that  an  interrelated  whole  is
identified, defined, and fixed in character.
But if we look at all these Gestalten, especially the organic ones, we will discover that nothing in them
is permanent, nothing is at rest or defined – everything is in a flux of continual motion. This is why
German frequently and fittingly makes use of the word Bildung to describe the end product as well as
the activity that gives rise to it.
Thus in setting forth a morphology we should not speak of Gestalt. When something has acquired a
form it metamorphoses immediately to a new one. If we wish to arrive at some living perception of
nature we ourselves must remain as quick and flexible as nature and follow the example she gives.”
(J.W. Goethe, “On Morphology,” pp. 63-64, in J.W. Goethe, J.W., Collected Works, vol. 12, op cit..)
340A reference from the original version of Goethe’s Faust (quoted in F. Meinecke, Historicism, op. cit., p.
425).
341Wittgenstein is referring here to §155 of Human All Too Human: “Belief in inspiration: Artists have an
interest in the existence of a belief in the sudden occurrence of ideas, in so-called inspirations; as though
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One can separate the good from the bad in the reproduction of an old thought, which is to
say that one can translate it into a newer language.  And even if this is how Wittgenstein
disparagingly characterized his own ‘building work’ on occasion, it is not what he intended
for his philosophy: 
“An old  style  can  be  translated,  as  it  were,  into  a  newer  language;  it  can,  one  might  say,  be
performed afresh at a tempo appropriate to our own times.  To do this is really only to reproduce.
That is what my building work amounted to.
But what I mean is not to give an old style a fresh trim.  You don’t take old forms and fix them up to
suit the latest taste.  No, you are really speaking an old language, perhaps without realizing it, but
you are  speaking it  in  a  way that  is  appropriate  to  the  modern world,  without  on that  account
necessarily being in accordance with its taste.” (CV, p. 60 [MS 134; 10.4.1947)342
What this work thus requires is a non-reductionist appreciation of what has come before and
perhaps been rejected on the road to the present, a way to access the  roses as well as the
manure of  the  past  without  evaluating  it  according  to  the  contingent  and impermanent
standards of our own time.  
the idea of a work of art, a poem, the basic proposition of a philosophy flashed down from heaven like a
ray of divine grace. In reality, the imagination of a good artist or thinker is productive continually, of old,
mediocre and bad things, but his power of judgment, sharpened and practiced to the highest degree,
rejects, selects, knots together; as we can now see from Beethoven’s notebooks how the most glorious
melodies were put together gradually and as it were culled out of many beginnings. He who selects less
rigorously and likes to give himself  up to his imitative memory can,  under the right  circumstances,
become a great improviser; but artistic improvisation is something very inferior in relation to the serious
and carefully fashioned artistic idea. All the great artists have been great workers, inexhaustible not only
in invention but also in rejecting, sifting, transforming, ordering.” (F. Nietzsche, Human All Too Human,
trans. W. Kaufman (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).
342It is notable that the above remark is from 1947.  In the present context, it might be profitably compared
to  those  of  the  early  1930’s,  where  Wittgenstein―under  the  influence  of  Weininger―frequently
disparaged his work as an example of ‘Jewish reproductiveness’.  Similarly, the above marks a distinct
break from the influence of Spengler, also from the same period.  What is so noteworthy here is that the
historicist trend that runs through these ideas, as well as their influence on Wittgenstein, remains intact in
Wittgenstein’s thought and is there appropriated, while the influence of the other two clearly wanes. 
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And what, we might then ask, characterizes those contingent and impermanent standards by
which we judge the successes and/or  failures  of  the  past?   In  a  word,  it  is  progress.343
Wittgenstein’s  scepticism towards  progress  for  progress  sake―expressed  time  and  time
again―frequently  took  the  form  of  a  kind  of  speculative  anthropology  in  which  he
described the bizarre and often unsettling behaviour of imaginary ‘strange tribes’.  The task
of this exercise was to help us imagine that we need not take certain of our concepts as the
“absolute correct ones” and that it is not necessarily the case that having different concepts
from the ours would mean “not realising something we realise.” (PI, IIxii)  These ‘strange
tribes’,  along with the passage this  quote is  taken from, are often taken as evidence of
Wittgenstein’s indifference to history, as it begins with a caution: “we are not doing natural
science; nor yet natural history―since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our
purposes.” (ibid.)  If, however, the imaginary tribes and histories Wittgenstein evokes here
function as  well  as  the  real  ones,  this  need not  relegate  historical  investigations  to  the
sidelines of Wittgenstein’s work, but rather places it at its centre along with―and along
side―the imaginary cases that are widely regarded as an essential element in Wittgenstein’s
unique philosophical methodology.344  Thus, Wittgenstein writes, specifically speaking of
343We will look at this in more detail at a later point; however, in the present context all-pervasive (and
indeed pathological) application of Urbilder, a brief quote from Kraus will serve to sharpen the point.  In
1909, Karl Kraus published an article in Die Fackel entitled “Der Fortschritt”, arguing that progress is a
mere form, or worst—at best, a slogan: “A newspaper phrase conveying a lively image has suggested
itself to me.  This is how it is worded: we are under the sign of progress.  Only now do I recognize
progress for what it is—a mobile decoration.  We stay ahead and keep walking in place.  Progress is a
standpoint and looks like movement.” (Quoted in J. Bouveresse, “Wittgenstein, von Wright and the Myth
of Progress”, p. 303, Paragraph, 34(3), 2011, pp. 301-321.)
344Cf. H.-J. Glock, “Wittgenstein and History,” op. cit., p. 298.  The problematic qualification Glock gives
in regard to this passage—that “unlike history and cultural anthropology, fictional anthropology cannot
help to establish whether our current practices are humanly necessary, dictated by our biological needs
and capacities”—is precisely the kind explanation that Wittgenstein wishes to avoid in his morphological
notion of philosophical and scientific investigation, and hence the raising up of fictional cases along side
real ones.  The introduction of fictional cases does not mean that Wittgenstein is not interested in ‘actual
history’, as Glock suggests, but that Wittgenstein’s interest in history would not satisfy certain ideals of
what history is or should be (such as Glock’s).  Goethe too makes the point when he claims in a letter to
the  German  mathematician  and  cartographer,  Carsten  Niebuhr,  that,  “The  separation  of  fiction  and
history is invaluable: it destroys neither of them, but rather enables the value and merit of each to be
more clearly defined.” (Quoted in F. Meinecke, Historicism, op. cit. p. 430.)
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the  case  of  science:  “Science:  enrichment  and impoverishment.   One  particular  method
elbows all the others aside.  They seem paltry by comparison, preliminary stages at best. //
You must go down to the original  sources so as to see them all  side by side,  both the
neglected and the preferred.” (CV, p. 60-61 [MS 134; 13.4.1947])345  This,  of course, is
exactly the core issue at the heart of Goethe’s critique of Newton: What should in Goethe’s
esteem have been considered a marginal colour phenomena, i.e. the decomposition of the
light  spectrum  under  highly  controlled  experimental  conditions,  was  rather  turned  by
Newton into the measure by which all other colour phenomena was to be appreciated.  Thus
any colour phenomenon that we might seek to describe had from then on to conform to the
set of general axioms outlined by Newton, and these alone, lest it be rejected as the result of
an all-too-human adulteration or admixture of the nature of what passes for true,  pristine
colour.  
Like Goethe, Wittgenstein too sought to question the dominant paradigms of the age via an
appreciation of that which had been discarded along the way and abandoned to the ‘rubbish-
bin and lumber-room of the history’.  And perhaps it is for this reason that his historical
thought is largely missed in the literature or placed on the wrong side of that line which
separates genuine philosophical concerns from non-philosophical ones.  For the point of
going to ‘original sources’ is not to reproduce a unified image of the evolution of empirical
345There is an enlightening comparison one may make here to the treatment of science in the  Tractatus,
regarding how what is here criticized by the later Wittgenstein for its reductionist world-view is rather
upheld in that earlier work for the potential completeness of its expression. Interestingly, the difference
between these two perspectives is already outlined in the Tractatus, where the completeness exemplified
by mechanics, for example, exists alongside other equally complete forms of expression (or ‘nets’) for
describing  the  world.   Compare  the  above  remark  from  the  Nachlaß with  the  following  from  the
Tractatus:
“Newtonian Mechanics, for example, imposes a unified form on the description of the world. […] The
form is  optional,  since  I  could  have  achieved  the  same result  by  using  a  net  of  a  triangular  or
hexagonal mesh [rather than a square one]. […]  The different nets correspond to different systems for
describing the world.  Mechanics determines one form of description of the world by saying that all
propositions used in the description of the world must be obtained in a given from a given set of
propositions―the propositions of mechanics.  It thus supplies the bricks for building the edifice of
science, and it says, ‘Any building that you want to erect,  whatever it may be, must somehow be
constructed with these bricks, and with these alone.’” (T 6.341)
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investigation.  Rather, what is required is to see what came before in its uniqueness, its
concrete difference and diversity.  Here we might be reminded of numerous remarks from
Wittgenstein on the nature of language and the practice of philosophy itself.  Chief among
them is his remark in Philosophical Investigations: “Our language can be seen as an ancient
city:  a  maze  of  little  streets  and  squares,  of  old  and  new houses,  and  of  houses  with
additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with
straight regular streets.” (PI §18)  This is not merely a description of what language looks
like, but of how one must approach language methodologically.  The point—as Wittgenstein
makes clear in PI §122, quoted at the opening of this chapter—is “finding and inventing
intermediary cases.”346  What we require are remarks on our natural history, which are not
curiosities, but rather “observations that no one has doubted because they are always before
our very eyes.” (PI §415)  For Wittgenstein, as for Goethe, we do not approach history by
giving it a fresh trim, putting it to work, and thereby transporting it into the present.  Rather
than remaking the past over in the image of the present, we should walk the ancient paths
and little squares of the old town and describe what we see without holding it up to the
standards  of  the  straight  and  regular  thoroughfares  of  our  newly  designed  suburban
boroughs.  Renewing and reinvigorating thoughts of the past requires seeking out formal
connections, rather than proposing evolutionary models of progress which make the past
346To  repeat:  “Our  grammar  is  lacking  in  this  sort  of  perspicuity  (Übersichtlichkeit).   A perspicuous
representation (übersichtliche Darstellung) produces just that understanding which consists of ‘seeing
connections’.  Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases.” (PI§122, cf. above.)
The  original  source  of  this  remark  is,  moreover,  noteworthy  for  appearing  first  in  Wittgenstein’s
“Remarks of Frazer’s Golden Bough”, where he refers there, no less, to Spengler: 
“The concept of perspicuous representation is of fundamental importance for us.  It denotes the form
of  representation,  the  way  we  see  things  (A kind  of  ‘World-view’ [,Weltanschauung‘]  as  it  is
apparently  typical  of  our  time.   Spengler.  //  This  perspicuous  representation  brings  about  the
understanding which consists precisely in the fact that we “see the connections”.  Here the importance
of finding connecting links [Zwischengliedern]” (PO, p. 133 [MS 110; 1931])
Placed  beside  the  actual  (empirical?)  anthropology  of  Frazer,  Wittgenstein’s  own  speculative
anthropology takes on distinct historicist overtones.  Among the many examples one could draw from the
text, we find the following for example: 
“What a narrow spiritual life on Frazer’s part!  As a result: how impossible it was for him to conceive
of a life different from the England of his time.  // Frazer cannot imagine a priest who is not basically a
present-day English parson with the same stupidity and dullness.” (PO, p 125 [MS 110; 1931])
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seem at best to be series of preliminary stages on the way to a predestined and infinitely
preferable present.
If we no longer conducted our research in the fashion of Newton—in other words, if we
could  abandon  our  need  for  the  all-encompassing  experimentum crucis—we  would  not
judge the past for ‘not realizing something that we realise’ (in the words of Wittgenstein)
nor  would  we  look  down  on  those  who  were  not  of  our  time  ‘with  such  intolerable
arrogance’ (in the words of Goethe).  We would no longer insist on holding phenomena up
to a single standard of adequacy—namely, ours.  Thinking historically requires that we give
up this need to dismiss the past as, at best, an error and at worst mere nonsense.  As Goethe
writes,
“Someday someone will  write  a  pathology of  experimental  physics  and bring  to  light  all  those
swindles which subvert our reason, beguile our judgement and, what is worse, stand in the way of
practical progress.  The phenomena must be freed once and for all from their grim torture chamber of
empiricism, mechanism, and dogmatism, they must be brought before the jury of men’s common
sense.”347
In line with Goethe’s condemnation of that  which subverts  our reason and beguiles our
judgement, that ‘pathology’ from which we find it so difficult to escape, Wittgenstein too
would described his  philosophical  endeavours  as  a form of  therapy:  “The philosopher’s
treatment  of  a question is  like  the  treatment  of  an illness.”  (PI  §255)  And thus:  “The
problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always
known.  Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of
language.” (PI §109)  Wittgenstein makes the point clearly in Philosophical Investigations
in reference to his own earlier work:
“(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5):“The general form of the proposition is: This is how things
are.”—— That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times.  One thinks that
347J.W. Goethe, “Maxims and Reflections”, p. 309, in Goethe, J.W., Collected Works, vol. 4, op cit.
303
one is tracing the outline of the thing’s nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing the
frame through which we look at it.
A picture held us captive.  And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.” (PI §114-115)
Similarly,  Wittgenstein  would  later  evoke  this  sense  of  overwhelming inexorability—an
experience of the ‘logical must’ that we so often encounter when we engage in philosophical
speculation—in On Certainty:
“I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again “I know that that’s a tree”,
pointing to a tree that is near us.  Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: “This fellow
isn’t insane.  We are only doing philosophy.” (OC §467)
The release from such captivating pictures does not require ‘razing the Bastille’ of logical or
causal coherence in order to erect a new monument of another form—as if it were not a tree
the philosopher is here contemplating in the garden!—but lies rather in perspicuity and a
clear view of language.  What is required is “to make use of the this area for the purpose of
passing in review a pleasing and varied series of illustrative figures.”348  As Wittgenstein
notes: “Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as
‘proto-phenomena’ (Urphänomene).  That is, where we ought to have said: This language-
game is played.” (PI §654)  Is played… or was played, as it were.  For along the horizontal
axes of language-games, forms of life and family resemblance, it makes little difference.
Historians have always known that the past is a foreign country, a place where people do
things differently.  But from the morphological point of view the past is no less accessible
than those cultures scattered around the globe and the ‘strange tribes’ of our imagination.
What is required of us is to describe the phenomena, not ‘make sense’ of it. 
Like Goethe, Wittgenstein was ready to engage in historical analysis when it was itself the
subject of morphological description.  He investigates historical phenomena when it is a
question of finding and inventing formal connections, of describing ‘language-games’ that
348J.W. Goethe, Theory of Colours, op cit. p. xxi.
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have  been  played  and  not  a  neutral  material  to  be  affirmed  or  denied  on  the  basis  of
empirical evidence.  As a collection of phenomena among others, one to be surveyed and
arranged in the  kind of  perspicuous representation afforded by nature itself,  history too
provides access to primal forms through an appreciation of successive metamorphoses.  The
aim of this investigation is that, through a renewed appreciation of yesterday, an enhanced
praxis  might unfold tomorrow.  Goethe hoped to incorporate an historical dimension into
modern  science  in  a  manner  that  would  help  preserve  an  appreciation  for  the  true
accomplishments  of  the  past  as  well  as  keep  a  sense  for  future  possibilities  that  are
progressively more open rather than closed.  Wittgenstein too sought to pave the way for
future interventions by putting into question that which passes for absolute in the present,
the  Urbilder  which dictate the form of our investigation inexorably has to take and from
which we find it so difficult to escape.  For this restrictive ideal of progress requires an ever-
tightening grip on natural phenomena.  It thus excludes more and more from the field of
acceptable investigation until ultimately it has missed what it most desperately sought.  As
Wittgenstein remarks in the Investigations:
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and
our requirement.  (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it
was a requirement.)  The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming
empty.—We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the
conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk.  We want to walk: so we
need friction.  Back to the rough ground!” (PI §107)
The morphological method of Goethe and Wittgenstein is thus designed to help release the
grip of the pictures that hold us captive, and along with that to free phenomena from the
‘grim torture chamber of empiricism’.  The hope is that in the course of this labour, which
progressively  arrays  the  phenomena  into  more  varied  and  dynamic  groupings,  new
possibilities might unfold in the future.
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V. Concluding Remarks: Understanding Wittgenstein’s Debt to Goethe
In this chapter, we have compared the morphological methods of Wittgenstein and Goethe.
Against interpretations that Wittgenstein failed to account for history, or was uninterested in
doing so, I have argued that in his use of the morphological method we witness a deep, life-
long concern for the historical dimensions of thought and of language.  In this exploration, a
number  of  parallels  to  Goethe’s  approach  were  drawn.   Both  of  these  thinkers  were
suspicious of history as an empirical discipline; however, they were also reluctant to take
present forms of knowledge as absolute and inescapable.  Wittgenstein and Goethe likewise
both  addressed  this  tension  through  the  employment  of  morphology―a  descriptive
enterprise, and not an explanatory one―, which afforded them a way of questioning the
present, through a renewed appreciation of the past, in order to enlarge the horizon of future
possibilities in science and philosophy.  I concluded with the claim that if we have missed
the centrality of history in Wittgenstein’s thought it is because a picture of what it means to
‘do history’ held us captive.  These are, I argue, the very kinds of distorted pictures that the
use of the morphological method is meant to help us rid ourselves of.
Here we begin to see the dissolution of the historicist paradox outlined at the opening of this
chapter.  From the morphological perspective, historical consideration conflicts neither with
Goethe’s  understanding  of  nature  (whereby  truth  is  communicated  in  the  moment  of
wholistic perception) nor Wittgenstein’s understanding of living language use within the
‘steam of life’ (wherein meaning takes hold among a community of like-minded speakers,
particularly through purposive action).  In other words, the morphological understanding of
history is not simply a return to the past.  Nor is it a transportation of the past into the
present.  Rather, engaging morphologically with history implies an enhanced sense of our
own historicity through an appreciation of the past as it was and not as a mere preliminary to
the  present.   From this  perspective,  our  own time too  is  reclaimed  from the  ‘specious
present’―what Wittgenstein described in the Big Typescript in terms of relentless film strip,
the feeling that “the present vanishes into the past without our being able to stop it” (PO, p
191 [TS 213, p. 428; 1933])―via an appreciation of the fact that the present is only one
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time among many,  neither  absolute nor predestined,  and perhaps not even  preferable to
others.  The present thus serves as a bridge between the past and the future, while at the
same time maintaining its own inalienable autonomy.
We have seen that Wittgenstein’s historical thought serves as a counterpoint to the kind of
speculative anthropology found throughout his work, in which he often describes the bizarre
and unsettling behaviour of imaginary ‘strange tribes’.  For many of these examples, when
viewed from a temporal perspective, offer a clear historical parallel to the more familiar
‘geographical’ metaphor of ‘us’ and ‘them’, of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ as it were.  What he
would later describe in On Certainty, for example, in terms of our readiness to disregard the
beliefs and the belief-systems of others, is readily rotated around its temporal axis in terms
of our readiness to disregard even those of our predecessors who have made us who we are:
“What we believe depends on what we learn.  We all believe that it isn’t possible to get to the moon;
but there might be people who believe that that is possible and that it sometimes happens.  We say:
these people do not know a lot that we know.  And, let them be never so sure of their belief—they
are wrong and we know it.
If we compare our system of knowledge with theirs then theirs is evidently the poorer one by far.”
(OC §286)349
349Though taken from among Wittgenstein’s last remarks, and seemingly far removed from questions about
the  foundations  of  logic  and  mathematics,  Wittgenstein’s  remark  here  prefigures  one  of  the  key
conclusions of C. Wright’s work on Wittgenstein and the philosophy of mathematics.  He notes there, for
example:
“Measurement with soft rules will be useless in the results are applied for the kinds of purposes for
which we measure; but if they are not, it is seriously unclear what good grounds there could be for
saying that these people who, talking apparent English, solemnly lay floppy rulers alongside things
and seem to record readings are doing anything that may informatively be described as ‘measuring’.”
(C. Wright,  Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics (London: Duckworth, 1980), p. 71.)
Diamond summarizes what is at issue in this account, when she notes:
“Wright argues that Wittgenstein’s examples, if looked into and developed, will ‘destabilize’: it will
appear  either that the activity described has an application so unlike that of measuring (inferring,
calculating) as to make it unreasonable to describe it as such; or the application, the purposes, of the
activity will be like enough to ours to make it clear that these people are using procedures inferior to
ours.” (C. Diamond, “Wright’s Wittgenstein”, op cit., p.  220.)
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As Wittgenstein had already made clear in the Investigations, the point of such remarks is to
emphasis how we do act and not necessarily how we must, or even should.  The exercise is
to help us appreciate the fact that we need not take certain of our own concepts as the
“absolute correct ones” and that it is not necessarily the case that having different concepts
from the ours would mean “not realising something we realise” (PI, IIxii).  Contra early
readings  of  Wittgenstein  as  a  ‘strict  constructivist’ (those  of  Dummett  and  Wright,  for
example), we need not identify a thesis akin to relativism in this undertaking.  By the same
token, we need not assume that Wittgenstein was simply unable to give up what Diamond
has called the ‘myth of a-temporality’ in his thought.  As we have seen, even within the
pages of the  Investigations  itself,  Wittgenstein was perfectly willing to acknowledge the
historical  dimension  thought  and  language,  and  even  that  of  a  priori  mathematical
truths―when it  suited him.   For,  from the morphological perspective, these remarks are
intended as methodological signposts for approaching language, for understanding how we
are to describe it and the role it plays in our lives.  They are not intended as theses about
what language ‘is’ for example.350  Like Goethe before him in terms of colour, Wittgenstein
The point, as Diamond makes clear, is that whether or not it makes sense to describe some activity or
other as measuring (in a comparable sense to what we would general call measuring in our own case),
will depend as much upon whether that activity helps its practitioners to achieve their own purposes as it
does our own.  Diamond, interestingly, concludes her evaluation of Wright’s analysis with a concrete
historical example: medieval time reckoning, which was of course significantly different to our own.
She concludes by noting: “I do not know how far attention to such cases can help resolve the issue
Wright raises; but he has done a service raising it.” (Ibid., p. 221)
What appears significant to me in this exchange, which gets somehow lost in the difficulties presented by
the examples―e.g.,  those surrounding the adequate description of an activity that we cannot, by the
Wright own account, properly conceive of―is clearly alluded to in the quote from On Certainty above.
This point is the following: whether or not another culture’s activity is similar enough to ours or not, in
order to be considered analogous to our own, is not something that can be determined via the application
of abstract, disinterested criteria.  It is, rather, a thoroughly political issue.
350Examples explored here include that  of  PI  §23,  where Wittgenstein uses changes in mathematics to
illustrate his newly-introduced terms ‘language-games’ and ‘forms of life’, or the temporal metaphors
embedded directly in the work, e.g.  “our language can be seen as an ancient city” (PI §18) or “we extend
[our concept of number] as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre” (PI §67).  Additionally, I have
suggested that many of the work’s key ideas―that of ‘following a rule’ (as in PI §187), for example―are
easily  rotated  along  a  temporal  axis,  and  are  thus  readily  brought  into  relation  with  the  historical
dimension of language as a whole. (Examples of those themes that I have not, unfortunately, been able to
explore in detail would include, e.g., that of ‘aspect perception’ from Part II of the Investigations.  If we
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does not want to tell us what language is or must be.  Rather, through their employment of
the morphological  method, which progressively arrays phenomena into more varied and
dynamic groupings, they hoped to avoid the restrictive imposition of such  Urbilder upon
nature and, thus, that new possibilities for conscientious appreciation might unfold. 
The  kind  of  imaginative  anthropology  Wittgenstein  employed  widely  throughout  his
work―particularly  as  formulated  in  Part  IIxii  of  the  Investigations,  as  he  makes  the
following caution: “we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history – since we can
also  invent  fictitious  natural  history  for  our  purposes”―is  often  taken  as  evidence  of
Wittgenstein’s  indifference to history.   I  have argued,  however,  that  these two concerns
should rather been seen as complementary approaches.  In this regard, Wittgenstein gives an
illuminating example in his “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough”:
“But a hypothetical connecting link should in this case do nothing but direct the attention to the
similarity, the relatedness, of the facts.  As one might illustrate an internal relation of a circle to an
ellipse by gradually converting an ellipse into a circle;  but not in order to assert that a certain
ellipse actually, historically, had originated from a circle (evolutionary hypothesis), but only in order
to sharpen our eye for a formal connection.” (PO, p. 133 [MS 110; 1931]) 
Lest we make too much of Wittgenstein reference to ‘facts’ here, it is important to keep in
mind that this motion―towards finding and inventing intermediate cases―goes the other
way as well.  For, we might similarly imagine a case in which there  are no intermediary
steps where we are tempted to think that they  must rather exist.  A number of interesting
examples of just such a case are explored at length in Wittgenstein’s remarks from his 1937-
38  manuscripts,  particularly  those  remarks  he  ultimately  reworked  for  inclusion  in
Philosophical Investigations, collected under the  “Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness”
(MS 119).  There are of course many interesting passages in this collection of remarks,
have missed the historical aspect of such remarks, I have suggested that this may be because,  in the
analytic tradition, conceptual change is usually considered from the perspective of the one undergoing
such a change ‘in the moment’, as it were―thus relatively a-temporally and a-historically―rather than
seeing the intellectual history of the world as the total sum of such changes undergone by others.
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given Wittgenstein’s chosen theme.  But a particularly good example of how we might,
through  Wittgenstein’s  application  of  the  morphological  method,  begin  alternatively  to
efface those intermediary, causal connections that we (of our time, and our place) feel rather
compelled to posit―perhaps unnecessarily or even pathologically so―is the following:  
“Today, in case we actually discovered two seeds which we could not distinguish, but one produced
a  poppy  and  the  other  a  rose,  we  should  look  frantically  for  a  difference.—But  in  other
circumstances we might give this up—give up looking for a difference. This would be a tremendous
thing to do—as great as recognizing indeterminacy.  We would no longer look for a difference, and
so we would no longer say there must be a difference.  Now (today) we have every reason to say that
there  must  be a  difference.   But  we could imagine circumstances  where would break with this
tradition […] There is an ideal—a direction in which investigations are constantly pushed. ‘There
must be’ corresponds to this idea.” (PO, p. 411 [MS 119; 1937])
Clearly in this discussion we have relied heavily on such provisional, unpublished sources.
I  have highlighted, however,  how the ideas expressed in these remarks nonetheless find
expression  in  Philosophical  Investigations,  which  remains  for  many  the  definitive
expression of Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy.  The above remark, for example, though it
is taken from the Nachlaß, proves intimately connected to some of the broader themes in the
Investigations―the temporal or historical aspects of which (as I have suggested) have been
obscured by our own inattention rather than Wittgenstein’s.  This is more readily appreciated
when we consider how the manuscript in question, MS 119, begins in fact with that passage
that would become §415 of the Investigations.  And it is, of course, §415 that suggests it is
possible to consider the entire collection of remarks from just such a historical perspective:
“What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural  history of human beings;  we are not
contributing  curiosities  however,  but  observations  which  no  one  has  doubted,  but  which  have
escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes.” (PI §415)
That  Philosophical  Investigations  can  in  its  entirety  be  considered  from  a  historicist
perspective is not to suggest, however, that one must necessarily do so.  For we recall here,
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that Wittgenstein’s use of the morphological is intended to go both ways―both towards and
away from positing such ‘objects of comparison’.
It is in the tension between these two movements that we see the answer to the question with
which our investigation began, both in terms of history generally and Wittgenstein’s own
debt to Goethe.  If the influence of Goethe on Wittgenstein’s thought was not immediately
apparent  and has  for  example only come to light  since the  complete publication of  the
Nachlaß, this doesn’t mean that we have understood Wittgenstein incorrectly until now (as
Newton would claim we had not understood the true nature of colour before his Opticks, or
Russell the true nature of judgement, or Frege that of numbers).  Rather, between them they
share certain formal connections.  But that means that each also maintains its own autonomy
and stands on his own.  We may find and invent intermediary cases, by all means.  But we
need not necessarily do so.  As noted by Breithaupt et al., in regards to their own attempt to
recreate the genealogy of the morphological method from Goethe to Wittgenstein:
“The  historical  references  lend  themselves  to  translation  into  systematic  ones.   That  is,  links
(“Zwischenglieder”) can be found or reconstructed between Goethe and Wittgenstein, many in fact:
Goethe—Emerson—James—Wittgenstein; but also Goethe—Schopenhauer—Weininger/Spengler—
Wittgenstein.   Not  only  internally,  but  also  with  reference  to  the  whole  apparatus,  the  idea  of
morphology  lends  itself  beneficially  to  translation.   Then  it  can  be  seen  how  one  gets  from
morphology to transcendental philosophy here, from pragmatism here to scientism there.”351
We need not thus necessarily trace Wittgenstein’s descriptive morphology back to Goethe
(or  to Bacon before him, as I  have suggested above),  but  if  an enhanced  philosophical
praxis results from this labour then we should.
In terms of accessing the past and of thinking historically, we see now that it is mistaken to
suppose that Wittgenstein was simply unable in his later work to give up what Diamond
calls ‘the myth of a-temporality’.    Neither was he indifferent to questions of historical
import.  References to time, change and history are spread widely throughout his work and
351F. Breithaupt et al., “Introduction,” in Goethe and Wittgenstein, op. cit., p. 10.
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indeed represent a  key feature of his philosophy.  Wittgenstein was not, however, ‘doing
history’.   In  these  remarks  Wittgenstein  was  exploring  the  descriptive  potential  of  the
morphological method (in the tradition of Bacon, Goethe and Spengler, among others) to re-
evaluate the present in light of the past in the hopes of broadening the horizon of future
possibilities.  If we have missed the importance of history in Wittgenstein’s thought and his
capacity to engage meaningfully with the past, it is only because we have been forbidden by
a picture to see his historical thought as meaningful outside of its narrow scope of what we
consider to be the acceptable features—in other words, what must be the features—of such
an historical investigation.  Indeed, the very point of employing the morphological method
is not simply to ‘raze the Bastille’ of logical coherence and causal thinking, but rather to
release us from the pathological tendency to use measures such as these as the sole standard
of whether a given investigation is or is not acceptable.  What the morphological method
does is to find relations where we previously saw none at all.  Likewise, it seeks to release
the  grip  of  overly  dogmatic  Urbilder and  remove  those  relations  we  thought  were
necessarily given and could not possibly have imagined otherwise.  It is not, for example,
the case that our thoughts have simply come from nowhere and that new thoughts may
never arrive.  Nor is it the case that they must have come from some place in particular, the
inevitable result of an unalterable causal chain of historical events.  To claim the opposite is
to risk succumbing to the philosophical superlative, that “dogmatism into which we fall so
easily when doing philosophy” (PI §192).  It is to risk insisting that thought be held up to a
standard that, as Wittgenstein and Goethe remind us, was not the result of our investigation
but the requirement. 
As mentioned above, we have relied heavily on unpublished remarks drawn from various
manuscripts in Wittgenstein’s Nachlaß.  I have tried to show that this neither invalidates nor
supplants other readings of Wittgenstein’s published (in the case of the Tractatus) or ready-
to-publish works (in the case of the Investigations).  Through such an approach, it is hoped,
a new light may be cast on elements of both.  In what follows we will see how remarks one
might otherwise consider among Wittgenstein’s  marginalia can nonetheless illuminate key
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elements of the  Investigations.   I am referring here to the motto of the work (the quote
Nestroy’s  play  Der Schützling:  Überhaupt  hat  der  Fortschritt  das  an  sich,  daß er  viel
größer  ausschaut,  als  er  wirklich  ist.)  and  Wittgenstein’s  troubled  an  enigmatic
pronouncement in the preface to the work: that he makes the  Investigations  public with
“doubtful feelings” and that “it is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this work, in
its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one brain or another―but, of
course, it is not likely.”
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CHAPTER 5. THE SPECTRE OF CONSERVATISM
“Only every now and again does one of the sentences that I
write here make a step forward [macht einen Fortschritt];
the rest are like the snipping of the barber‘s scissors, which
he has to keep moving so as to make a cut with them at the
right moment.”
—from an unpublished plan for the preface to
Philosophical Investigations 
(CV, p. 66 [MS 136; 8.1.1948])
I. Wittgenstein as ‘geistige Erscheinung’
In his keynote address to the 2nd International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg am
Wechsel in 1977, von Wright announced the publication of Wittgenstein’s  pensées on art,
culture and society, entitled  Vermischte Bemerkungen  (Culture and Value  in English), and
argued that it presented an unprecedented resource for determining the relationship between
Wittgenstein’s personal beliefs and his philosophical achievements:
“It is a collection of remarks on philosophy, on architecture, literature and music, on history and
contemporary society, and on religion.  The remarks were written at different times of Wittgenstein’s
life but for the most part towards the end of it.  It is, I think, a very beautiful collection and I wish
that everyone interested in Wittgenstein and in the kind of spiritual endeavour that philosophy is
would read it again and again.  Although by no means an autobiography, it tells us more than any
other written source about Wittgenstein’s intellectual character and view of life, and also about how
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he regarded his relationship with his time.  It will be an indispensable source for any future attempt
at assessing Wittgenstein and his achievement as ‘geistige Erscheinung’.”352
In his address von Wright proceeds to ask what was then—as it is today—one of the most
pressing questions concerning Wittgenstein’s place in the Western intellectual tradition, one
which became all the more pressing with the arrival of the publication in 1978: How are we
to understand the relationship between Wittgenstein’s open and public philosophy (as found,
for  example,  in  the  Tractatus  and  the  more  or  less  publication-ready  Philosophical
Investigations) and the deeply entrenched ‘cultural pessimism’ that we witness in many of
the private remarks from his Nachlaß?
The question is important claims von Wright because, pace Wittgenstein, philosophy is the
result of certain pathological thought patterns, which in turn reflect for him a deeper malaise
on the cultural level: “If philosophical problems are symptomatic of language producing
malignant outgrowths which obscure our thinking,” von Wright notes, “then there must be a
cancer in the Lebensweise, in the way of life itself.”353  If this is correct it has the potential to
greatly problematise the reception of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.  For insofar as we engage
in philosophy at all, this would seem to suggest not only that there is something wrong with
our  use of  language—as  expressions  used  to  characterise  philosophy  in  Philosophical
Investigations,  such  as  “a  piece  of  plain  nonsense”  or  “bumps  on  the  head  of  our
understanding” (§119), might seem to suggest—in other words something that one not need
352G.H. von Wright, “Wittgenstein in Relation to His Times”, p. 73,  Proceedings of the 2nd International
Wittgenstein  Symposium (Wittgenstein  and His  Impact  on  Contemporary  Thought) (Vienna:  Höldre-
Pichler-Tempsky,  1980),  p.  73-78.   Hereafter  references  to  von  Wright’s  address  will  refer  to  the
reprinted edition: G.H. von Wright, “Wittgenstein in relation to his Times”, in eds. B. McGuinness and A.
Kenny, Wittgenstein and his Times (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), pp. 108-120.
353G.H. von Wright, “Wittgenstein in Relation to His Times”, op. cit., p. 119
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to take very seriously at all354—but also there is something wrong with us and the way that
we live our lives in these times of ours.
The fact is that Wittgenstein was intensely suspicious of the ‘spirit’ that, as he notes in a
foreword prepared in 1930 for a text that was never quite published during his lifetime,
“informs the vast stream of European and American civilization in which all of us stand.”
(PR,  Foreword)   The  hallmark  of  this  spirit,  which  Wittgenstein  found  ‘alien  and
uncongenial’, is the belief in progress—above all, the kind of progress that results from the
technological application of scientific thought to the problems of society.  “That spirit,” he
notes,  “expresses  itself  in  an  onward  movement,  in  building  ever  larger  and  more
complicated structures”; it “tries to grasp the world by way of its periphery” and “adds one
construction to another, moving on and up, as it were, from one stage to the next.” (ibid.)355
Progress is here painted as a kind of quasi-mechanical process,  self-sustaining and self-
maintaining, creating in each instance the conditions of its own perpetuation—which is to
say, its own perpetuation, and not its realisation, as one may be forgiven for mistaking.  It is
354The original German of PI §119 reads: Die Ergebnisse der Philosophie sind die Entdeckung irgend eines
schlichten Unsinns und Beulen, die sich der Verstand beim Anrennen an die Grenze der Sprache geholt
hat.  Regarding Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘schlicht’, and its potential for sarcasm that is not captured
in the English translation, Engelmann makes the following remark: “The besetting sin of false artistic
endeavour is the striving to avoid banality and its odium, thus setting oneself apart from one’s fellows.
Invariably the frantic attempts to find striking and precious phrases lead up to falsification of the second
degree, when something banal not born of personal experience is picked up second hand, because it
looked so exquisite in its original setting. (Such artificial banality is aptly described by the sarcastic use
of  the  word  ‘plain’,  in  the  German  ‘schlicht’.)   It  is  falsification  by  means  of  the  genuine.”  (P.
Engelmann, “Observations on the Tractatus”, p. 113, in P. Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein
(New York: Horizon Press, 1967), pp. 94-118.)
355As we saw in an earlier chapter, it is very likely that these lines were penned with the ‘spirit’ of the
Vienna Circle in mind, what Wittgenstein describes here as that of the ‘typical Western scientist.”  Recall
that Carnap in his preface to the Aufbau, written just a few years earlier than Wittgenstein’s here, would
note:
“If we allot to the individual in philosophical work as in the special sciences only a partial task, then
we can look with more confidence to the future: in slow careful construction insight after insight will
be won.  Each collaborator contributes only what he can endorse and justify before the whole body of
his co-workers.  Thus stone will be carefully added to stone and a safe building will be erected at
which each following generation can continue work.” (R. Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World,
op cit., p. xvii.)
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in this light that we should consider J. Bouveresse’s Krausian characterisation of progress
(which, he notes, following Kraus, is not a movement but rather a state356) as that which is
always holding off on a future promise:
“It would seem that additional growth is  necessary to solve the problems posed by growth […]
Adversaries of the dogma of unlimited growth are thereby compelled to a certain degree of caution;
but this circle also considerably weakens the position of the advocates of the dogma, because their
foremost advantage is that the real and considerable improvements that might follow on a thoughtful
and judicious use of what is gained through growth can always be held over to the next day and even
deferred indefinitely.”357
Viewed from a particular angle, such progress may indeed seem impressive, like a great
machine that produces a great deal of noise and heat though it is not clear to what other end
it has been created.  However, as Wittgenstein reminds us in the motto of  Philosophical
Investigations, the thing about progress is that it generally looks much greater than it really
is: Überhaupt hat der Fortschritt das an sich, daß er viel größer ausschaut, als er wirklich
ist.358  Given that  this  line  is  the  only occurrence of  the  word  Fortschritt (‘progress’ in
356In 1909, Karl Kraus published an article in Die Fackel entitled “Der Fortschritt”, arguing that progress is
a mere form, or worst—at best, a slogan: “A newspaper phrase conveying a lively image has suggested
itself to me.  This is how it is worded: we are under the sign of progress.  Only now do I recognize
progress for what it is—a mobile decoration.  We stay ahead and keep walking in place.  Progress is a
standpoint and looks like movement.” (Quoted in J. Bouveresse, “Wittgenstein, von Wright and the Myth
of Progress”, p. 303, Paragraph, 34(3), 2011, pp. 301-321.)
357J. Bouveresse, “Wittgenstein, von Wright and the Myth of Progress”, op cit., p. 303.
358In English: “In general it is characteristic of progress that it looks much bigger than it really is.”  The
motto is taken from the play of Austrian playwright J. N. Nestroy’s, Der Schützling (Act IV), where the
story’s hero,  Gottlieb Herb (the son of a poor bookbinder),  proclaims it  at  the end of a monologue
deploring the limited success of fighting to eradicate physical  and social evil  in the world.   (Cf.  H.
Spiegelberg,  “The  Significance  of  Mottoes  in  Wittgenstein’s  Major  Works,”  Proceedings  of  the  2nd
International Wittgenstein Symposium (Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought) (Vienna:
Höldre-Pichler-Tempsky, 1980), pp. 54-57.)  The full passage reads thus: 
“There are so many means of extirpating and eradicating, and nevertheless so little evil has yet been
extirpated, so little wickedness eradicated from this world, that one clearly sees that people invent a lot
of things, but not the right on.  And yet we live in the era of progress, don’t we?  I s’pose progress is
like a newly discovered land; a flourishing colonial system on the coast, the interior still wilderness,
steppe, prairie.  It is in the nature of all progress that it looks much greater than it really is.” (Quoted in
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English, literally translated as ‘forward step’) in the work—Wittgenstein’s second magnum
opus, of which he was acutely aware that it would stand as the sole published testimony to
the developments that his philosophy had undergone since returning to Cambridge in 1929
—how are we to understand this enigmatic pronouncement?
There is one sense in which the motto might be read entirely in isolation from what we
would traditionally consider to be the philosophical content of the book: i.e. as a reflection
upon Wittgenstein’s own work and upon its value as a philosophical corpus.  We cannot
forget here the particularly radical change that occurred in Wittgenstein’s style of thought
between his  earlier  work in  the  Tractatus  and in  his  later  work,  such as  it  is  found in
Philosophical Investigations, nor his characterisation of the second book as a response to
“grave  errors”  identified  in  the  first  (PI,  Preface).   Although  Wittgenstein  had  already
written disparagingly of the possibilities of his philosophy to deliver any form of substantive
redemption in the Tractatus—the second thing in which the value of that work consists, as
he notes in the preface to that work, is that “it shows how little is achieved when these
problems are solved” (T, p. 4)—there is little reason to assume that Wittgenstein felt his
later work in  Philosophical Investigations  had any more emancipatory potential.  On the
contrary,  Wittgenstein  often  remarked disparagingly  about  the  legacy of  his  later  work,
noting on several occasions that he felt his thought was only ‘reproductive’ and unlikely to
inspire anything but a kind of pseudo-philosophical jargon.359  In the preface to the later
G.P. Baker and P.M.S.  Hacker,  Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning  (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1980), p. 16.)
359As Malcolm relates of Wittgenstein:  “In his lectures he would sometimes exclaim in a time of real
suffering ‘I am a dreadful teacher!’ He once concluded a years’ worth of lectures with this sentence: ‘The
only seed that I am likely to sow is a certain jargon’.” (N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, op
cit.,  p. 63.)  This recalls also Wittgenstein’s response to Moore in his 1930’s lecture—in response to
Moore’s question regarding whether Wittgenstein was using the expression ‘rule of grammar’ in the
ordinary sense when he said that colour incompatibility reflected a grammatical impossibility rather than
a psychological  incompatibility: “The right  expression is  “It  does not  have sense to say—”; but  we
usually express it badly by speaking of a rule of grammar.” (L. Wittgenstein,  Wittgenstein’s Lectures:
Cambridge, 1930-1932. ed. D. Lee (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980), p. 97)  Wittgenstein’s remarks here
may also recall the series of remarks, circa 1930, where under the influence of Weininger he described he
work disparagingly in anti-Semitic terms; however, as we saw earlier, he continued to describe is work as
‘reproductive’ even into the mid-1940’s, long after Weininger’s influence in this regard had waned (cf.
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book,  for  example,  he  notes  that  much  of  the  material  from which  it  was  drawn  was
“marked by all the defects of a weak draughtsman”, and that after they were rejected only a
number of “tolerable ones” remained—that he should have liked to produce a good book;
however: “This has not come about, but the time is past in which I could improve it.” (PI, p.
ix)
Is this motto a reflection, then, on the limited value of Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy
post-1929, and consequently of that which we are often inclined to consider one of his most
enduring qualities as a philosopher—i.e., his inability to rest content with what he had just
written, and his consequent capacity to continually advance into unknown territory…  in a
word, to progress?360  Or is it rather, as the 1930 foreword suggests, a signal announcing that
only those readers who are in sympathy with the spirit of the work will understand it?  Von
Wright suggests that the motto is best read according to this second sense.361  As he remarks:
CV, p. 60 [MS 134; 10.4.1947]).
360This is in fact how Malcolm describes the significance of the motto in his memoirs: “His concept of the
value of his own work would not be easy to describe.  In the preface to the Investigations he says that it
is  not  ‘a  good  book’,  and  this  remark  was  not  an  affectation  of  modesty.  […]  He  expounded  and
defended his  views  ideas  in  argument  with confidence and power.   He did not  think of  the  central
conceptions of his philosophy were possibly in error.  He certainly believed, most of the time, that he had
produced an important advance in philosophy.  Yet I think that he was inclined to feel that the importance
of  this  advance might  be exaggerated by those who were too close to  it.   This  feeling is  probably
reflected in his choice of Nestroy’s remark for the motto of the  Investigations.” (N. Malcolm,  Ludwig
Wittgenstein: A Memoir, op. cit., pp. 59-60.)  
361So too do Baker and Hacker, in their ‘analytical commentary’ on the Philosophical Investigations.  They
note,  in their  defence,  that between 1930 and 1947 Wittgenstein played with several options for the
motto.  Not one of these points towards the personal and self-depreciating reading of the motto that
Malcolm advocates (a reading that has been taken up in other places besides, with Malcolm’s remark the
only source of evidence for it;  cf.  e.g.  H. Spielberg,  “The Significance of Mottoes in Wittgenstein’s
Major Works”,  op. cit.).  They discuss there options that Wittgenstein explored at various points in the
Nachlaß, sources as diverse as: 
1.  A quote  from Matthias  Claudius’ poem “Abendlied”  (noted  in  1931):  “Do  you see  the  moon
there? // Only half of it is visible // Yet it is round and beautiful!”
2. A quote from Hertz, referred to as early as the Blue and Brown Books (1933): “When these painful
contradictions are removed, the question as to the nature [of force] will not have been answered; but
our minds, no longer vexed, will cease to ask illegitimate questions.”
3. Longfellow’s poem “The Builders” (noted in 1938): “In the elder days of Art // Builders wrought
with greatest care, // Each minute and unseen part, // For the gods are everywhere.” (Wittgenstein
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“If one reads it  in its  context in Nestroy’s play,  Der Schüztling  [The Protégé],  one will
perhaps understand it better.  Progress, we are told, is only the greening fringe of a colonial
territory with a vast hinterland of the impenetrable wilderness.”362  He notes in this regard
that Wittgenstein’s personal and political views are rarely, if ever, prophetic.  Of Nietzsche
—who did precisely describe his work as prophetic, and himself as ‘a shaft of longing for
the  opposite  shore’—Wittgenstein  once  wrote  that  he  had  touched  on  problems  of  the
intellectual world of the West which no other philosopher had even approached, let alone
solved,  problems  which  could  “only  be  written  in  the  obscure  language  of  prophecy,
comprehensible to very few indeed.”  (CV, p. 9 [MS 110; 16.1.31])  Wittgenstein, on the
contrary, did not pursue obscurity, but rather clarity.  He sought directness of speech, what
one might  even call  the  emancipation of  ordinary language.   Far  from ‘longing for the
opposite shore’, he longed for a return to the ordinary, everyday world of the here and now,
which he felt was rather obscured by philosophical thinking.  In this sense it might indeed
be claimed that  if Wittgenstein had no faith in the potential of the future to resolve the
follows this transcription with a parenthetical remark: “könnte mir als ein Motto dienen”, of which
Backer and Hacker aptly note: “It is unclear whether the sense of the parenthesis is that these verses
could serve as a motto for the book, or as a motto for W. himself.”  Also interesting to note here, is the
title  to  the  poem  and  the  famous  ‘Builders’ of  Wittgenstein’s  own  ‘language  game  #2’ of  the
Investigations.)
4. A remark of unknown origin (circa 1939): “A rascal who gives more than he has.” (Again, I would
note that it is not clear whether Wittgenstein intends to refer here to the book or to its author!)
5.  Goethe’s  poem “Allerdings”  (noted  in  1946):  “Nature  has  neither  core  nor  husk,  ask  yourself
whether you are core or husk.” 
6.  Finally,  M. O’C. Drury relates that  (in 1931) Wittgenstein once thought of using as a motto a
quotation from Shakespeare’s King Lear: “I’ll teach you differences”.
About versions 1 and 3-5, Backer and Hacker note: “It is striking how the Nestroy motto and [these four
alternatives] display a kind of family resemblance.  The image of husk and core, appearance and reality,
the revealed and the concealed run through them, even though they alternate in evaluation.” (G. P. Baker
and  P.M.S.  Hacker,  Wittgenstein:  Understanding  and  Meaning,  op.  cit., p.  16.)   They  fail  to  note,
however, that the other options, 2 and 6, relate precisely to Wittgenstein’s post-Tractarian philosophical
methodology, nor do they consider what these methodological remarks might have in common with the
other four.
362G.H. von Wright, “Wittgenstein in Relation to his Times”, op. cit., p. 114.
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problems of the present he may nonetheless have had no clear philosophical vision of that
failure.
However, to do so would be to misunderstand the deep affinities that he felt his thought had
with that of Spengler,  both in terms of what Wittgenstein took from his reading of  The
Decline of the West, as well as what he rejected in the work.  Though von Wright notes that
Wittgenstein did not, like Spengler, develop a clearly defined ‘philosophy of history’ per se,
he nonetheless lived the decline of the West, so to speak:
“He lived it, not only in his disgust for contemporary Western civilization, but also in his deep awe
and understanding of this civilization’s great past.   How else could he have written these words
which I find deeply moving: ‘The earlier culture will become a heap of rubble and finally a heap of
ashes, but spirits will hover over the ashes’.”363
This  is  certainly  a  fair  characterisation.   In  private,  Wittgenstein  often  expressed  his
frustration at being unable to accomplish what he thought philosophy most required of him,
a fact that was tied for him to what he felt was the inability of the present age to grasp that
which he sought to achieve in his work.  As he noted in an alternate version to the preface of
Philosophical Investigations:
“It is not without reluctance that I deliver this book to the public.  It will fall into hands which are
not for the most part those in which I like to imagine it.  May it soon—this is what I wish for it—be
completely forgotten by the philosophical journalists, and so be preserved perhaps for a better sort of
reader.” (CV, p. 66 [MS 136; 8.1.1948])
But besides the many personal recollections of Wittgenstein’s students and colleagues, we
need not restrict ourselves to anecdotal evidence for confirmation, nor for that matter to its
wealth of expression in the unpublished remarks from the Nachlaß.  Particularly, we might
consider here the preface to  Philosophical Investigations,  where he notes that  it  is with
“doubtful feelings” that he makes the work public, and that: “It is not impossible that it
363G.H. von Wright, “Wittgenstein in Relation to his Times”, op. cit., p. 116.
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should fall to the lot of this work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring
light into one brain or another—but, of course, it is not likely.” (PI, p. x)
It is a curious remark, whose dark and fatalistic tone stands out in stark contrast to the
content  of  the  work  to  follow.   For  within  the  pages  of  the  Investigations there  is  no
indication  that  it  is  intended to  be  anything more  than  than  the  Tractatus  had  been:  a
‘treatise’, albeit of a very different form, on the nature of language, and one which deals
moreover  almost  exclusively  with  a  set  of  standard  problems  taken  precisely  from the
contemporary philosophical milieu of its times.  Certainly, there is no expression of anything
even remotely reminiscent of the kind of troubled and pessimistic historical consciousness
that such a remark suggests.
It  is  in  this  sense  that  von  Wright  is  right  to  isolate  three  interrelated  threads  in
Wittgenstein’s thought: 1. his view that the individual’s beliefs, judgements, and thoughts
are entrenched in shared linguistic forms that are by nature resistant to questioning; 2. his
view that philosophical problems arise as disquietudes of the mind, having resulted from
some malfunction in our linguistic forms and hence our communal way of life; and 3. his
apparent  rejection  of  the  scientific-technological  world-view  of  modern  industrialised
societies, which he considered a form of cultural decay.  Regarding these three points von
Wright notes:
“It can hardly be denied that these three aspects are closely interconnected and deeply integrated in
Wittgenstein’s intellectual personality.  An effort to understand it which does not pay attention to this
fact is doomed to failure.  What is problematic, however, is whether or to what extent the three
aspects are separable from one another in thought or whether there is also some kind of conceptual
connectedness between them.  Particularly pertinent is the question whether the third aspect,  the
Spenglerian one, is only contingently, that is for historical and psychological reasons, connected with
the other two in Wittgenstein’s thought.  If the connection is only accidental or contingent, then one
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could say that Wittgenstein’s attitude to his times is irrelevant to the understanding of his philosophy,
even though it may be quite important to an understanding of his personality.”364
The difficulty arises here because Wittgenstein, unlike many other philosophers,  did not
claim an a-historical,  timeless  validity  to  the  view of  philosophy he was advancing,  or
indeed to any philosophy at all.   In fact, quite the opposite; for insofar as philosophical
problems arise form malfunctions in particular manners of speaking and living, philosophy
itself is not a ‘historical constant’—at least no more than our ways of speaking are.  As
those  malfunctions  are  expressed  only  within  the  psycho-social  horizons  of  particular
linguistic forms, so too will be the various forms of philosophy that are to be addressed and
ultimately dissolved.  As he notes in Culture and Value: 
“People say again and again that philosophy doesn’t really progress, that we are still occupied with
the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks.  But the people who say this don’t understand
why it has to be so.  It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into
asking the same questions.  As long as there continues to be a verb ‘to be’ that looks as if it functions
in the same way as ‘to eat’ and ‘to drink’, as long as we continue to talk of a river of time, of an
expanse of space, etc. etc. people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find
themselves staring at something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up.
And what’s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because in so far as people think they
can see the “limits of human understanding”, they believe of course that they can see beyond these.”
(CV, p. 15 [MS 111; 24.8.1931])
If Wittgenstein’s own radically different form of philosophising is a legitimate response to
the unhealthy patterns of thought he identified in our ways of speaking—a longing for the
transcendent?—this will determine the extent to which, once those problematic patterns are
dissipated, the philosophical conundrums that torment us will simply no longer arise.  At
that time,  there will  no longer be any need for the kinds of insight that  his  philosophy
364G.H. von Wright, “Wittgenstein in Relation to his Times”, op. cit., p. 118.
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affords.  As he notes in Philosophical Investigations, in a meditation on his novel, post-1929
conception of the task of philosophy:
“It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of
ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed  complete  clarity.  But this simply means that the
philosophical problems should completely disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to.—
The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself
in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can
be broken off.—Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.” (PI
§133)
Wittgenstein’s way of approaching philosophy was not an attempt to draw a picture of what
philosophy in its essence is, or even should be, but rather what he believed it demanded of
him given  the  nature  of  the  times  in  which  he  was  living.   By  the  light  of  his  own
philosophy it would seem that if Wittgenstein felt the need to philosophise in the precise
manner that he did, this would be attributable to his feelings toward the broader historical
trends  of  the  times.   For  it  is  the  concrete  historical  expression  of  those  linguistic
malfunctions that demanded being addressed as he sought to address them.  It is in this
sense that we are confronted with von Wright’s question: To what extent can we separate the
third aspect of Wittgenstein’s ‘intellectual personality’,  i.e. the  pessimistic one,  from the
other two?
II. The ‘Conservative Paradox’
In his reply to von Wright’s call to probe what were then the relatively uncharted boundaries
between these three interconnected aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought—his philosophy, his
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view of philosophy, and his deeply entrenched cultural pessimism—J.C. Nyíri proposes in
fact that no such distinction is possible.  Spurred on by his intense cultural pessimism, the
core elements of Wittgenstein’s philosophy are, Nyíri argues, as thoroughly conservative
(‘neo-conservative’, in Nyíri’s terms) as his politics.  Though he recognises that drawing a
universally valid characterisation of conservatism presents some difficulties—and thus, for
example, one is only able to draw ‘family resemblances’ between Wittgenstein’s thoughts
and those of the leading conservative theorists of his day—, he points nonetheless towards
the conservatives’ thoroughgoing suspicion of theory, which manifests itself in a scepticism
regarding all  promises of a future utopia,  a nostalgia for traditional,  authentic modes of
existence and the un-intellectual closeness to life that these are supposed to embody.  “The
most  radical  expression  of  the  conservative  hostility  against  theory,”  he  states,  “is  the
distaste for all abstract concepts: the conservative preference for silence.”365
Though  Nyíri  is  concerned  principally  with  exploring  elements  of  Wittgenstein’s  later
philosophical work in relation to conservatism, one would also not fail to recognise certain
of these traits in the author of the Tractatus as well, if one wished to search for them: e.g.,
his distrust in the capacity of instruction (“Perhaps this book will be understood only by
someone  who  has  himself  had  the  thoughts  that  are  expressed  in  it.—So  it  is  not  a
textbook”), his dismissal of the value of novelty (“Indeed, what I have written here makes
no claim to novelty in any detail, and the reason why I give no sources is that it is a matter
of indifference to me”), his call for an almost folksy brand of simplicity (“The whole sense
of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said
clearly”), and, of course, the work’s final invocation of silence regarding all  things of a
higher, spiritual order (“and what we cannot talk about must pass over in silence”). (T, p. 3-
4)  Despite the great change that took place in Wittgenstein’s thinking upon his return to
philosophy nearly ten years after the publication of the Tractatus, his later remarks are rife
with similar thoughts.  While this is particularly true of those personal remarks collected in
Vermischte Bemerkungen, it is by no means true of them alone.  
365J.C.  Nyíri,  “Wittgenstein’s  Later  Work in  Relation  to  Conservatism”,  p.  47,  in  ed.  B.  McGuinness,
Wittgenstein and his Times (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), pp. 44-68.
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However, insofar as this characterisation of conservatism has a bearing on the content of
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, Nyíri goes one step further.   Most controversially,  Nyíri
claims that with the later concepts of ‘rule-following’, ‘language games’ and ‘forms of life’,
Wittgenstein paints a conservative picture of human nature as one that needs, and ought to
be, constrained by its form of life, which in turn places it beyond the reach of criticism: “A
criticism presupposes a form of life, a language, that is, a tradition of agreements; every
judgement is necessarily embedded in traditions.  That is why traditions cannot be judged.
‘One can only describe here’ Wittgenstein wrote in 1931, ‘and say: this is what human life is
like’.”366  Nyíri quotes a familiar-sounding passage from Wittgenstein here, regarding the
stability of practices and the inexorability that enforces conformity among its participants,
as in for example the practice of counting:
“We should  presumably  not  call  it  ‘counting’ if  everyone  said  the  numbers  one after  the  other
anyhow; but of course it is not simply a question of a name.  For what we call ‘counting’ is an
important  part  of  our  life’s  activities.  […]  Counting  (and  that  means:  counting  like  this)  is  a
technique employed daily in the most various operations of our lives.  And that is why we learn to
count as we do: with endless practice, with merciless exactitude; that is why it is inexorably insisted
that we shall all say ‘two’ after ‘one’, ‘three’ after ‘two’ and so on.” (RMF, I, 4)
Someone counting thus hastens as it were to a ‘common meeting point’ with everyone else;
where no such meeting point can be found each man declares the other a fool and a heretic,
according to the popular citation from among Wittgenstein’s last remarks (OC §611).  This
366J.C. Nyíri, “Wittgenstein’s Later Work in Relation to Conservatism”,  op. cit., p. 39.  Feyerabend too
would note—although unlike Nyíri—in order to criticise what he considered the conservative leanings of
this formulation of the task of philosophy as that which ‘leaves everything as it is’: “‘Wittgensteinian’
analyses  are  characterized by the fact  that  they are  restricted to  a  single  ‘language-game’;  they are
monistic.  Alternatives are brought in, not in order to arrive at a better theory through a criticism of the
existing one, but rather in order to get a better insight into existing theory.  And getting better insight into
the existing theory (the existing ‘language-game’) means revealing its hidden strengths, i.e., its capability
to deal with problems that have arisen and to remove the impression that a revision might be needed.  A
Wittgensteinian  uses  alternatives  with  a  dogmatic,  or  conservative,  purpose.   Knowing  where  the
argument is  going to lead,  he does not  really take them seriously,  although he may admit  that  they
possess an important therapeutic function.” (P. Feyerabend, “Problems of Empiricism”, p. 227, fn. 20, in
ed. R. Colodny, Beyond the Edge of Certainty (Pittsburgh: CPS Publications, 1965), pp. 145-260.)   
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in no way implies in Nyíri’s view that forms of life, language-games, etc., are static.  Quite
the  opposite;  however,  Wittgenstein’s  conservative  attitude  is,  he  argues,  most  clearly
expressed in his disdain for any language which—insofar as it is a new language—has not
‘grown organically’ from its proper, which is to say traditional, ‘soil’.367
According  to  Nyíri,  the  notion  of  rule-following  arises  in  Wittgenstein’s  later  work  in
response to  what  he  calls  the  ‘neo-conservative  paradox’,  a  sentiment  that  undoubtedly
prevailed among Europe’s German-speaking population, and Austrians especially, following
the collapse of the old world-order after the First World War.  Noting first the conservative’s
‘preference for silence’, Nyíri continues: 
“This silence seems to become ever more compelling as the distance grows between contemporary
reality and the order of the past—the order that is to be re-established.  But, at the same time, the
need to possess a guiding theory becomes ever more compelling.  The so-called old conservatism of
the nineteenth-century spoke simply of an historically developed or indeed divine order which was
to be preserved or re-erected.  But the German and Austrian neo-conservatives of the twenties and
early thirties were no longer acquainted with any traditions that would have been worth preserving;
they wanted change,  without  however  knowing—or being able  to  know—in what  direction this
change should occur.  As K. von Klemperer368 puts it, ‘the new conservatism was clearly heading
367An illustrative, and humorous, example is provided by Carnap, in his intellectual biography: 
“I sometimes had the impression that the deliberately rational and unemotional attitude of the scientist
and likewise any ideas which had the flavor of ‘enlightenment’ were repugnant to Wittgenstein.  At our
first meeting with Wittgenstein, Schlick unfortunately mentioned that I was interested in the problem
of an international language like Esperanto.  As I had expected, Wittgenstein was definitely opposed to
this idea. But I was surprised by the vehemence of his emotions.  A language which had not ‘grown
organically’ seemed to him not only useless but despicable.” (R. Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography”,
p. 26, in ed. P.A. Schilpp,  The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (London: Cambridge University Press,
1963), pp. 3-43.) 
That meeting was in 1927.  As late as 1946, Wittgenstein still speaks of a “feeling of disgust” that he
experiences when thinking of Esperanto, which merely “plays at being a ‘language’.” (CV, p. 52 [MS
132; 26.9.1946])
368von Klemperer was a prominent member of a generation of European historians who fled Nazi Germany
and  established  themselves  as  scholars  in  the  United  States.   (The  quote  that  follows  is  from  his
Germany’s New Conservatism: Its History and Dilemma in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957), p. 7.)
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into  a  dilemma  between  conserving  and  destroying,  between  a  positive  attitude  towards  our
civilization and nihilism.’  The old conservatism had, philosophically speaking, an ontology as its
basis;  neo-conservatism,  however,  is  a  conservatism  from  which  history  had  taken  away  the
possibility of an ontology.”369
Using the language of Wittgenstein,  the core of  the neo-conservatives’ insight might be
described as having given rise to a ‘mental cramp’ in their world-view.  The conservatives
longed for a return to the past, but in fact they found nothing there worth re-establishing;
they felt intuitively that one must put one’s faith in the traditions that hold society together,
but found none in which they are confident enough to do so.  Their conundrum then was
that: “on the one hand man, by his very nature, cannot do without absolute standards, that he
needs and ought to observe fixed truths, but that on the other hand all absolute standards
have perished historically, are a thing of the past, and fixed truths do not exist at all.”370
Perhaps surprisingly, the ‘neo-conservative paradox’ that Nyíri formulates here does indeed
find  an  analogous  expression  in  the  later  work  of  Wittgenstein,  at  least  as  it  has  been
interpreted by some.  And here, Nyíri is by no means alone.  This is most notably the case in
the what has come to be called ‘the rule-following paradox’, which lays at the heart of the
so-called Private Language Argument of the Investigations.  The problem, as it has come to
be commonly characterised, is that the very phenomenon of rule-following seems to point
directly towards its own ‘autonomy’, an underlying region of arbitrarity in truth (which
Nyíri  describes  as  ‘anarchistic’).   “This,”  Wittgenstein  writes  in  Philosophical
Investigations,  “was  our  paradox:  no  course  of  action  could  be  determined  by  a  rule,
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule.”  The solution, also
as it is commonly formulated, lies in the fact that ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice, and one that
we engage in blindly: “If everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also
be made out to conflict with it.  And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.” (PI
§201)  According to Nyíri, Wittgenstein’s solution to the neo-conservative paradox is found,
369J.C. Nyíri, “Wittgenstein’s Later Work in Relation to Conservatism”, op. cit., p. 48.
370J.C. Nyíri, “Wittgenstein’s Later Work in Relation to Conservatism”, op. cit., p. 56.
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as  is  his  solution  to  the  rule-following  paradox,  in  his  insight  that  the  possibility  of
alternative orders in no way weakens the inexorable force that our own exercises upon us. 371
The arbitrarity of truth—which, it might be noted, arises in the conservative’s mind by a
certain unsettling  historical consciousness372—is brought back into line by re-inscribing it
into the givenness of the present social order and the unwavering force that our traditions
exert  upon  us:  “The  basic  concepts  of  the  new framework,”  Nyíri  notes  in  regards  to
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, are thus: “training and behaviour, use, custom, institution,
practice, technique, agreement.”373  Put differently, one might claim that the possibility of
encountering some strange tribe or other, as Wittgenstein was fond of imagining in his later
remarks—including, not incidentally, the possibility that it is  we ourselves who may have
371An interesting parallel that merits much more consideration than I am able to provide here is presented in
Culture and Value, where Wittgenstein discusses what he calls the “Catholic dogma” in terms not unlike
those of  the  rule-following paradox:  “The effect  of  making men think in  accordance with  dogmas,
perhaps in the form of certain graphic propositions, will be very particular: I am not thinking of these
dogmas  as  determining  men’s  opinions  but  rather  as  completely  controlling  the  expression  of  all
opinions.  People will live under an absolute, palpable tyranny, though without being able to say they are
not free.  For dogma is expressed in the form of an assertion, and is unshakeable, but at the same time
any practical opinion can be made to harmonize with it; admittedly more easily in some cases than in
others.” (CV, p. 28 [MS 118; 15.9.1937])
372It is interesting to note, briefly, that the temporal dimension to the rule-following paradox is explored at
length in Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, where it is unfortunately removed from
any historical sensitivity that Wittgenstein may have intended to address with these considerations. E.g.: 
“Now suppose I encounter a bizarre sceptic.  This sceptic questions my certainty about my answer, in
what I just called the ‘metalinguistic’ sense.  Perhaps, he suggests, as I used the term ‘plus’ in the past,
the  answer  I  intended  for  ‘68+57’ should  have  been  ‘5’!   Of  course  the  sceptic’s  suggestion  is
obviously insane.  My initial response to such a suggestion might be that the challenger should go
back to school and learn to add.  Let the challenger, however, continue.  After all, he says, if I am now
so confident that, as I used the symbol ‘+’, my intention was that ‘68+57’ should turn out to denote
125, this cannot be because I explicitly gave myself instructions that 125 is the result of performing
the addition in this particular instance.  By hypothesis, I did no such thing.  But of course the idea is to
say what function this was?  In the past I gave myself only a finite number of examples instantiating
this function.  […] The sceptic claims (or feigns to claim) that I am now misinterpreting my own
previous usage.  By ‘plus’, he says, I  always meant  quus; now, under the influence of some insane
frenzy, or a bout of LSD, I have misinterpreted my own previous usage.” (S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on
Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 8-9.)
373J.C. Nyíri, “Wittgenstein’s Later Work in Relation to Conservatism”, op. cit., p. 85.
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been that strange tribe in the past, or become so estranged in the future—does not in the
least loosen the grip that our own immanent form of life has upon us.
Or does it?  There is certainly some justification to Nyíri’s position here, for Wittgenstein
would indeed appear to hold that those aspects of human life that are closest to us are—if
not immune to all critique, as Wittgenstein’s condemnation of the ‘spirit’ of his own times
clearly illustrates—at least immune to a certain kind of critique, for example what we might
traditionally consider to be philosophically enlightened critique ‘from first principles’.  In
particular, the kind of critique embodied in naturalised moral philosophies, which would
paint a picture of our social and spiritual lives as governed by moral facts, was undoubtedly
repugnant  to  Wittgenstein.374  But  at  the  same  time  Wittgenstein  clearly  articulated  a
methodology, most eloquently expressed in his understanding of imagination, for releasing
the grip of certain fantasies that can take hold of one—fantasies such as the conservatives’,
which would dictate the need for tradition and constraint on the basis of certain general facts
of human nature.375  Most notably, in section xii of Part II of Philosophical Investigations,
Wittgenstein notes:
374Perhaps  the  best,  or  at  least  the  most  flamboyant  demonstration  of  this  relates  to  the  meeting  of
Wittgenstein and Popper at the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club in October 1946.  According to the story
—which has now ascended to near legendary status—Popper was there to deliver a paper called “Are
There Philosophical Problems?”, a title that no doubt would have annoyed Wittgenstein from the outset.
According to Popper’s version of the story, no doubt exaggerated, but telling nonetheless, Popper had put
forth  a  series  of  problems  that  he  insisted  were  real  philosophical  problems,  rather  than  what
Wittgenstein  would  have  called  mere  ‘puzzles’.   Wittgenstein  naturally  dismissed  them  all  with
increasing agitation.  When the subject of ethics came up, his agitation reached its height.  Wittgenstein
challenged him to give an example of a genuine moral rule, waving a poker from a nearby fireplace in
the air as he did so.  Popper—so the story goes—replied: ‘Not to threaten visiting lecturers with pokers’,
whereupon Wittgenstein threw down the poker and stormed out of the room.  (Cf. D. Edmonds and J
Eidinow, Wittgenstein’s Poker, op. cit.) 
375We might consider here, the following from Nyíri: 
“Wittgenstein is of course perfectly aware of the fact that there are different forms of life, different
ultimate givennesses.  And that these different forms of life all have the same value, that human nature
can manifest  itself  equally  in  various  forms  of  life.   But  there  is  a  human nature,  since it  is  an
unalterable anthropological fact—a fact that is, indeed, a precondition for the existence of logic—that
any human being must, in order to be a human being, be constrained by some form of life, by some
network of tradition.” (J.C. Nyíri, “Wittgenstein’s Later Work in Relation to Conservatism”, op. cit., p.
59.) 
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“If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, should we not be interested, not in
grammar, but rather in that in nature which is the basis of grammar?—Our interest certainly includes
the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature.  (Such facts as mostly do not
strike us because of their generality.)  But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes
of the formation of concept; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history—since we can
also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes.
I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different people would have different concepts
(in the sense of a hypothesis).   But:  if  anyone believes that  certain concepts are absolutely the
correct, and that having different ones would mean not realising something that we realize—then let
him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the
formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him” (PI, p. 230)
According to A. Janik, remarks such as this suggest that although Wittgenstein may have
had a conservative temperament in his dealings with life and the political situation of post-
war Europe, the significance that his philosophy has for those of us practising it today need
not be essentially tied to this.   We need not commit ourselves to Wittgenstein’s general
social  and  political  conservatism,  nor  to  the  cultural  pessimism  that  is  (justifiably)
characterised  as  its  source.   Regarding  Wittgenstein’s  own  view  about  the  extra-
philosophical  lessons  that  might  be  taken  from  his  life  in  order  to  understanding  the
significance of his work, Janik notes: 
“Indeed,  it  appears  to  be  characteristic  of  his  work  as  a  whole  that  he  wished to  separate  his
philosophizing  from his  personal  beliefs.   We have  in  recent  years  discovered  more  and more
evidence that Wittgenstein was profoundly profoundly [sic] conservative and that this conservatism
certainly casts a new light on his work but I think it also makes it all the more amazing that the only
work  [sic]  in  which  he  deliberately  and  explicitly  emphasizes  his  conservatism,  Vermischte
We will return briefly to look at what it mean to speak of ‘tradition’ here in relation to Wittgenstein’s well
known remarks on ‘forms of life’.  Schulte has argued, for example, that although ‘tradition’ is a useful
way to emphasise what Wittgenstein means by the expression ‘form of life’, one would not be referring
to such things as we normally consider as part of our ‘cultural traditions’ (celebrations, holidays, etc.)
with this phrase (as Nyíri is perhaps doing here).
331
Bemerkungen, is much more a personal statement which intends to reveal the man’s thoughts rather
than the philosopher’s positions.  Nyíri emphasizes that the evidence we have to go on is scant but I
think that what we do have to go on indicated that Wittgenstein took great pains to separate his
cultural pessimism from, say, his view of meaning or thinking.”376
Besides  pointing  to  the  numerous  difficulties  that  one  is  presented  with  in  trying  to
characterise ‘conservatism’ at all—Nyíri’s appeal to the notion of ‘family resemblances’, for
example, does not in Janik’s view absolve him from giving an argument regarding precisely
what does and what does not fall under the concept in a given instance377—it is particularly
problematic in his view to classify methodological concepts such as ‘language-games’ and
‘forms of life’ under such a rubric.  Wittgenstein actually tells us very little about what he
means by terms such as ‘form of life’, Janik notes—and for good reason.  According to
Janik, there is: 1. no evidence that by the term Wittgenstein meant anything other than an
arbitrary set of contingent social practices (rather than a reified conception of a real, existing
‘society’ or ‘culture’, as Nyíri suggests), and 2. there is no evidence for this because it was
not a part of the problem he was addressing.  “We should bear in mind,” Janik notes, “that
our problems often arise from his solutions.”378
376A. Janik, “Nyíri on the Conservatism of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy”, p. 130, in A. Janik, Essays on
Wittgenstein and Weininger (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1985), pp. 116-135.  A similar but more modest claim
is made by Bouveresse, when he notes: “Though, in different places in his manuscripts, he expressed his
antipathy for modern civilization and his feeling of  belonging to a world which was condemned to
disappear,  and  had  practically  disappeared,  one  would  look  in  vain  for  some  trace  of  that  in  the
philosophical  texts  that  he  intended for  publication.”  J.  Bouveresse,  “‘The  Darkness  of  this  Time’:
Wittgenstein  and  the  Modern  World”,  p.  12,  in  ed.  A.P.  Griffiths,  Wittgenstein  Centenary  Essays
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 11-39)
377This criticism is directed specifically at Nyíri’s claim that: “Conservative theory can take the form of
anthropology, or the theory of history; in its content it can embody very different tendencies, depending
on what remains—if anything at all—that is regarded as worth conserving, or even re-establishing. […]
A conservative political creed as such does not exist, and conservative politics change with the times;
many of today’s conservative aims correspond to liberal ideas of yesterday.” (J.C. Nyíri, “Wittgenstein’s
Later Work in Relation to Conservatism”, op. cit., p. 46)
378A. Janik, “Nyíri  on the Conservatism of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy”,  op. cit., p. 133.  There is
certainly some truth to this.   During the period in which Wittgenstein was writing the  Tractatus,  for
example, he certainly believed he could prove the existence of elementary propositions, starting from the
general premisses about the nature of factual language, and that it was neither necessary nor possible for
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Nonetheless, even if we were to apply the notions of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to particular
social arrangements drawn from real-life situations, Janik argues that there is no sense in
which our ‘form of life’ is not amenable to critique, nor even to radically progressive social
change.   Just  as  our  daily  social  practices  change  in  terms  of  the  various  forms  of
expressions  we  use  and  the  significance  these  take  on  at  some  time  or  another  for  a
community of speakers, the constraint of a given practice is no more and no less restrictive
than our capacity to encounter or imagine alternative forms of life and make readjustments
in  our  own  in  light  of  these  encounters.   However,  for  Janik,  that  this  is  a  highly
individualistic affair—a characteristic that runs completely counter to Nyíri’s sketch of the
social conservative’s view of human nature, and one that Wittgenstein himself undeniably
possessed in spades.
A final voice to be considered here, which has weighed in on this debate, is that of Cora
Diamond.  Where Janik states that the problems in Nyíri’s argument are for the most part
“subtle rather than gross errors”379—requiring not one refutation but a “constellations of
reasons” for believing that even if Wittgenstein had a conservative temperament in life this
need not commit us to viewing his philosophy by that light—Diamond suggests that Nyíri is
indeed guilty of gross errors, errors that are in fact just plain “nutty”:
him  to  specify  them  in  more  detail.   Later,  looking  back  on  this  combination  of  dogmatism  and
agnosticism, he found it unacceptable.  This has not, however, stopped commentators from attempting to
address precisely this difficulty in his earlier work.  (Cf. D. Pears “Logical Independence of Elementary
Propositions”, in ed. I. Block, Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1981), pp. 74-81)  Ironically, Janik here draws the opposite moral from Nyíri on this same point.  Having
referred to a series of Wittgensteinian remarks from the Cambridge conservative political theorist, and
possible one-time student of Wittgenstein’s, M. Oakshott, Nyíri notes: 
“It is hardly necessary to refer here to parallel passages in the writings of Wittgenstein—the reader
must certainly have noticed likenesses both in content and in formulation.  It is not only similarities
which meet the eye, however, but also an important difference.  The passages quoted from Oakshott
are the logical starting points of his arguments, they serve as premises to large-scale conclusions about
society  and  history.   In  the  writings  of  Wittgenstein,  however,  the  corresponding  passages  are
themselves  the  conclusions,  the  results  of  penetrating,  rigorous  analyses.   It  is,  I  believe,  in  the
implication of this difference that Wittgenstein’s significance for conservatism consists.” (J.C. Nyíri,
“Wittgenstein’s Later Work in Relation to Conservatism”, op. cit., p. 64)
379A. Janik, “Nyíri on the Conservatism of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy”, op. cit., p. 117.
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“There is nothing in Wittgenstein’s writings, in particular nothing in the kinds of criticism he brings
to philosophizing, which implies that moving with words beyond what we have done with those
words in the language-games in which we learned to use them has anything the matter with it, or is
not  something  we can  judge  as  appropriate  or  inappropriate,  worth  doing  or  not.   The  idea  of
Wittgenstein’s  philosophy  as  inherently  conservative  is  nutty.  […]  The  interpretation  of  his
philosophy  as  conservative  results  in  part  from  a  lack  of  attention  to  what  he  says  about
mathematics; but it is supported also by what I earlier described as the imposition on philosophy
itself of the philosophical requirement that it lay down requirements.  And this is the refusal of the
kind of liberation that he hoped philosophy might bring.”380
The “imposition  on  philosophy itself  of  the  philosophical  requirement  that  it  lay  down
requirements” to which Diamond refers here is of course explored at length throughout her
work.   It  is,  she  claims,  nothing  less  than  the  ‘metaphysical  spirit’  that  would  lay
requirements upon the world, language, or what have you, which  it must in turn meet in
order  to  be  considered  philosophically  significant  at  all.   The  metaphysical  spirit  thus
focuses on the requirements, rather than the phenomena that they are intended to capture.  It
thinks, but does not look.381
We recall Nyíri’s characterisation of the origin of the ‘conservative paradox’—much like
that  of  the  ‘rule-following  paradox’ of  Philosophical  Investigations—as  laying  in  the
tension between two opposing insights: that, on the one hand, man by his very nature cannot
do without absolute standards and a fixed set  of truths,  and that,  on the other hand, all
absolute  standards  have  perished  historically  and  fixed  truths  thus  do  not  exist  at  all.
Wittgenstein’s  solution,  he  proposed,  was  to  re-inscribe  our  arbitrary  practices  within  a
network of  traditions  that  is  necessary  for  us as  a  community despite  its  overall  world
380C. Diamond, “Introduction II”, p. 34, in The Realist Spirit (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 13-
38.
381Though  she  does  not  speak  of  this  directly,  we  might  easily  imagine  that  the  target  of  Diamond’s
criticism here  is  Nyíri’s  idealised characterisation of,  for  example,  “the essence  of  the  conservative
mentality”, “the source of everything conservative”, and other such claims. (J.C. Nyíri, “Wittgenstein’s
Later Work in Relation to Conservatism”, op. cit., p. 46ff.)
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geographic-historical  contingency,  and thus  is  in  no way threatened by the existence of
alternate orders.  The arbitrarity of grammar, he suggests—far from committing us to a form
of  relativistic  nihilism  with  regards  to  truth  and  to  its  standards—only  reasserts  the
importance of tradition and the inexorable role that shared practices have (and ought to
have) in the regulation of our everyday lives.  Diamond’s alternative demand is to rethink
the nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy according to the light of what it was that he was
trying  to  achieve,  rather  than  what  he  may  have  appeared  to  be  saying  about  such
‘metaphysically spirited’ positions.  Wittgenstein did not set out,  on Diamond’s view, to
institute a philosophical theory about rules, practices, forms of life, etc., but rather to engage
in a global critique of laying down such theoretical frameworks at all.
What Diamond has particularly in mind here is the clash between certain realist/anti-realist
trends in the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy (especially, as we saw earlier, those
found  in  the  ‘anti-realist’  camp  such  as  Michael  Dummett’s  or  Crispin  Wright’s).382
Granted,  she  does  not  identify  precisely  this  tension  in  Nyíri’s  paper  on  Wittgenstein’s
supposed  conservatism,  but  her  characterisation  of  the  core  of  the  debate  as  one  that
revolves around a misunderstanding of what it is that Wittgenstein sought to do in his work
fits nonetheless.  For on Diamond’s view it makes no difference whether one argues that
Wittgenstein was a realist, an anti-realist, or some hybrid of the two (as Nyíri does, reading
into Wittgenstein’s political views something very much like Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’ to
the ‘sceptical paradox’ of rule-following).383  To argue that there is such a philosophical
theory in Wittgenstein’s thought is to misunderstand deeply the function of his philosophy.  
382Cf. the collection of essays presented in M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, op cit. and C. Wright,
Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics, op cit.
383Kripke is, of course, much more prudent in this regarding, noting as he does: “I suspect—for reasons that
will become clearer later—that to attempt to present Wittgenstein’s argument precisely is to some extent
to falsify it.   Probably many of my formulations and recastings of the argument are done in a way
Wittgenstein would not  himself.   So the present  paper,  should be thought  of  as expounding neither
‘Wittgenstein’s’ argument  nor  ‘Kripke’s’:  rather  Wittgenstein’s  argument  as  it  struck  Kripke,  as  it
presented a problem for him.” (S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, op. cit., p. 5)  Of
course, the extent to which Kripke is able to maintain this prudence in his work has been called into
question,  particularly  by  Stanley  Cavell.   (Cf.  S.  Cavell,  Conditions  Handsome  and  Unhandsome
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 64-100.)
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According to Diamond, readings such as Nyíri’s are tied to a faulty historical consciousness
and an insistence on the kinds of questions that arise, for example, when we ask ‘when it
was fixed’ that such-and-such is true, or ‘when it was recognised’ as faulty (and of course
where do we stand in the present given that that was then and this is now, or not yet as it
were), etc.  Treating questions of fixed, necessary truths as the material for philosophical
dispute  in  this  manner  is  not,  according  to  Diamond,  to  engage  in  a  ‘grammatical
investigation’ in  Wittgenstein’s  sense.   Rather,  to  investigate  whether  the  form  of  that
question even makes any sense—this is a grammatical investigation:
“Wittgenstein wanted us to see that the grammar of a-temporality has application in a life that looks
looks like this and this and this; that is, he shows us what life with definitions that fix meaning, life
with formulations of rules that do (in an unmysterious sense) contain all of their applications.”384
This remark is evidently intended to be made from one point of view, with its focus on
logical necessity and a-historical logical frameworks.  But the same might be said regarding
the other side of that coin—for example, Nyíri’s—where the role of possibility in historical
developments is central, which in an analogous and completely unmysterious sense does not
constrain our  applications  of  a  fixed  rule  in  future  cases.385  The  point,  according  to
Diamond, is that there are no problems here that Wittgenstein sought in his philosophy ‘to
solve’.  If we do not see Wittgenstein as drawing our attention to the various roles of words
such as ‘necessary’, ‘possible’, ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘rule’, etc., have in our lives: “We shall miss
altogether  the  kind  of  philosophical  criticism  he  was  engaged  in.”386  That  kind  of
philosophical criticism—which orients Wittgenstein’s thought in the later works as much as
it ever did in the Tractatus, despite the change in perspective between the two periods—is,
384C. Diamond, “Introduction I”, The Realistic Spirit, op. cit., p. 6.
385Hence  Diamond’s  comment,  discussed  above,  that:  “There  is  nothing  in  Wittgenstein’s  writings,  in
particular nothing in the kinds of criticism he brings to philosophizing, which implies that moving with
words beyond what we have done with those words in the language-games in which we learned to use
them has anything the matter with it, or is not something we can judge as appropriate or inappropriate,
worth doing or not.” (C. Diamond, “Introduction II”, The Realist Spirit, op. cit., p. 43.)
386C. Diamond, “Introduction I”, The Realistic Spirit, op. cit., p. 7.
336
of  course,  none  other  than  his  Sprachkritik,  the  critique  of  language,  which  is  not  a
philosophical theory but a global critique of such theorizing. 
Janik argues that it is characteristic of Wittgenstein’s thought that he wished to separate his
philosophy from his personal beliefs, and thus the significance that his philosophy might
have for us today is independent of the biographical and historical circumstances that gave
rise to it, such as his deeply committed cultural pessimism.  The life of the man, he suggests,
is interesting but not essential  to our understanding of the significance of his work; our
problems often arise, Janik notes,  from his solutions.  Diamond, on the other hand, argues
that we cannot understand the significance of the work unless we understand the man; our
problems persist because we have misunderstood that his solution was rather to dissolve
such ‘problems’ in  general.   As the  penultimate  proposition of  the  Tractatus,  one upon
which Diamond has lain great emphasis throughout her work, states: 
“My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually
recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them.  (He
must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.” (T 6.54)
Diamond draws our attention to that fact that Wittgenstein here asks us to understand him,
the author of the Tractatus, and not the propositions contained therein.  Because philosophy
traffics in nonsense, in which there is properly speaking nothing to understand, we must
rather understand what it is the author of the work is trying to achieve in order to understand
the work as a whole.  For what the author is trying to achieve is the work.  Though they take
home different messages about the significance that Wittgenstein’s view of language has for
our understanding of its historical dimension and the cultural decay that he felt characterised
the spirit of his time, both suggest that in his work—perhaps unlike in his private life—the
question about what von Wright calls the ‘third aspect’ of Wittgenstein’s post-Tractarian
thought, the Spenglerian one, has little bearing.
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III. Sprachkritik and History
The fact that these three responses to von Wright’s challenge each re-orient in different ways
the role of the historical development of language in Wittgenstein’s philosophy—whether
that be in terms of its content, or its aim—suggests that there is something important going
on here.  As noted above, Wittgenstein did not in any immediately apparent sense have ‘a
philosophy of history’, as it might be claimed that he had a philosophy of mathematics or a
philosophy of psychology.  And yet, again and again in this discussion we bump our heads
against the historical  dimensions of notions like rule-following,  forms of life,  or indeed
language itself.  What is disputed is thus not the presence of some historical reflection in
Wittgenstein’s thought, but rather its significance.  However, in that case, what still has to be
characterised is how these considerations manifest themselves.  For it  is not at all  clear
whether  Wittgenstein’s  (perhaps  vaguely  expressed)  understanding  of  the  historical
dimension of language and the place that it may or may not have had in his philosophy or in
his critique of culture did not change as much as some of the other, more obviously central
aspects of his thought.  As such, invoking Wittgenstein’s attitude towards history (as each of
the above commentators do) would necessitate (as is rarely done, here or elsewhere) a more
precise articulation of just ‘which Wittgenstein’ we are talking about here, as well as a more
thorough exploration of the more overt themes being developed in parallel to that at the
time.
From the outset, historical considerations were an integral part of the sources that are, by
everyone’s reckoning, central Wittgensteinian notions: those such as ‘misunderstanding the
logic of language’ and ‘the critique of language’, the later of which he felt was required in
order to command a clear view of the former.  Perhaps there is no greater testament to this
than that which can be found in Paul Ernst (one of the more suggestive comparisons that
Nyíri draws between Wittgenstein and ‘conservative thinkers’ of his time).  As Wittgenstein
once noted, regarding the source of the notion ‘misunderstanding the logic of language’:
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“Should my book ever be published its foreword must contain an acknowledgement to the Foreword
of Paul Ernst to his edition of Grimms’ Fairy Tales, which I should have have acknowledged already
in  the  Log.  Phil.  Abhandlung as  the  source  of  the  expression  ‘misunderstanding  the  logic  of
language’.”387
The comparison with Ernst  that  Nyíri  draws here is  not only suggestive because of the
conservative views Ernst expressed at length elsewhere—views with which Wittgenstein
may or may not have been familiar388—but also because of the clear link that Ernst draws to
the  historical  dimension of  that  misunderstanding.   What  fascinated  the  author  of  the
Tractatus  in  Ernst’s  writings  on  the  Grimm Fairy  Tales  was  not  (as  was  typically  his
fashion) its central thesis, but rather a more or less incidental passage.  Here is the passage
that aroused the young Wittgenstein’s interest so greatly that it would direct the course of his
research for many decades to come:
“The overwhelming majority by far of motifs and material that can still be used today certainly does
not originate in reality.  It is often the extremely ancient legacy of peoples, occurring in enigmatic
and still not adequately explained form among the most distant and different peoples, originating
from changes of language, when later ages no longer understood the logic of the language of the past
387Quoted by W. Künne, “Paul Ernst and Ludwig Wittgenstein”, Scientia Poetica, 2, 1998, pp. 151-166.  It
should be noted that this work by Ernst is not, however, the Foreword to the collection but the Afterword.
388Many of these are indeed reminiscent of Wittgenstein nonetheless.  We might consider, for example, a
remark such as the following: 
“[Men have now been] freed of every form-creating constraint, and have been left completely on their
own. And it is clear that nothing can come of this except senseless barbarism.—Thus because man
needs form and constraint  he  has  come to feel  profoundly unhappy,  and the yearning which had
already arisen amongst the old bourgeois as a result of the schism between culture and reality has
acquired a vastly greater power” (Quoted in J.C. Nyíri,  “Wittgenstein’s Later Work in Relation to
Conservatism”, op. cit., p. 53)  
Here, it is easy to draw a comparison with Wittgenstein’s remarks in an alternate version of the 1930
Foreword to Philosophical Remarks: 
“A culture is like a big organism which assigns to its members a place where he can work in the spirit
of the whole; and it is perfectly fair for his power to be measured by the contribution he succeeds in
making to the whole enterprise.  In an age without culture on the other hand forces become fragmented
and  the  power  of  an  individual  man  is  used  up  in  overcoming  opposing  forces  and  frictional
resistances.” (CV, p. 6 [MS 109; 6.11.1930]) 
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and interpreted it through fabrications; through changes in views about the connection of the world,
about  death,  the  soul,  the  afterlife,  God,  etc.,  by  rationalistically  interpreting  uncomprehended
remnants  of  previous  beliefs;  through  the  migration  of  this  material  to  other  peoples,  through
retelling in changed circumstances and through adaptation to the new.  The process is essentially
always this:  a problem that  is  unsolvable by means of the experience of reality is  solved by an
invented, rationalised story.”389
Though Wittgenstein gestures in some sense towards this historical dimension of the logic
of language in the  Tractatus—as, for example, when he discusses the development of the
modern  alphabetic  script  from  ancient  Egyptian  hieroglyphics  (T  4.016),  or  when  he
compares  the  world-views  of  the  ancient  and  modern  times  (T  6.371-6.372)390—it’s
significance is nonetheless conscientiously obscured in the work as a whole, most famously
and most directly with the cry recorded in the wartime Notebooks: “What has history to do
with me?  Mine is the first and only world!” (NB, p. 82)  However, there are additional
signs that Wittgenstein actively sought to circumscribe the role of history in his earliest
published work.  No one familiar with the work of Fritz Mauthner, for example, can fail to
note the similarities between the views expressed above by Ernst and those of Mauthner,
regarding the latter’s own conception of  Sprachkritik—and it was of course Wittgenstein
who  famously  rephrased  Mauthner’s  original  methodological  demand  within  the  pages
Tractatus  with  the  following  qualification:  “All  philosophy  is  a  ‘critique  of  language’
(though not in Mauthner’s sense).” (T 4.0031)
389Quoted by W. Künne, “Paul Ernst and Ludwig Wittgenstein”, op. cit.
390It might also be noted that traces of this ‘mythological’ aspect of the logic of language can be witnessed,
in  a  non-historical  sense,  in  at  least  one  of  the  propositions  of  the  Tractatus,  where  Wittgenstein
elucidates his understanding of logical isomorphism—between the musical idea, the musical notation,
the sound waves produced when it is performed and the gramophone record on which it is recorded—as
follows: “To all of them the logical structure is common. (Like the two youths their two horses and their
lilies in the fairy tale.  They are all in a certain sense one.)” (T 4.014)  This reference is taken directly
from one of the Grimms’ fairy tales, “Gold Children”, in which the lilies in the garden blossom or wither
depending on how the youths fare.
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Mauthner,  initially  a  journalist,  came to  philosophy particularly  in  response to  what  he
perceived as linguistic ‘wizardry’,  embodied in the politically motivated usage of words
such as  Volk  and  Geist, which were gaining dubious currency in the popular conservative
discourses of the time.  As a staunch nominalist, who sought to merge a liberal politics with
philosophical  empiricism, Mauthner argued that  such concepts  were generated solely by
language—through  the  persuasive  use  of  metaphor  and  analogy—rather  than  genuine
entities to be referred to directly.  Beginning from this traditional starting point, not unlike
that  of  the  British  Empiricists,  Mauthner  drew radical  conclusions  about  what  kind  of
activity philosophy should be and the political implications to be drawn from it.   As he
wrote in the introduction to his Wörterbuch der Philosophie:
“Philosophy is theory of knowledge.  Theory of knowledge is critique of language.  Critique of
language, however, is a labour on behalf of the liberating thought, that men can never succeed in
getting  beyond  a  metaphorical  description  of  the  world  utilising  either  everyday  language  or
philosophical language”391
Philosophical language is indeed a ‘refinement’ of ordinary language in Mauthner’s sense,
as logicians such as Russell and Frege might well have claimed themselves; however, as
such,  it  is  for  Mauthner  no  less  metaphorical  and no more  veritable  for  that.   On  the
contrary, in this ‘refinement’ the foundations of language are rather obscured and forgotten.
What Mauthner found problematic in this, and thus what necessitated his critical enterprise,
was  what  he  perceived to  be  a  tendency  to  attribute  a  stable  reality  to  the  high-flown
abstractions that we make out of our words’ otherwise ordinary and flexible everyday use.
Unlike the explicit statements of the author of the Tractatus—the still uncertain status of the
relationship  between  his  philosophical  thoughts  and  his  politics  notwithstanding—for
Mauthner, this tendency to reify conceptual abstractions is not simply the result of a mere
‘linguistic confusion’.  Where Wittgenstein diagnosed only a misguided manner of attending
391F. Mauthner,  Wörterbuch der Philosophie: Neue Beitrage zu einer Kritik der Sprache, vol 1  (Leipzig:
Georg Müller, 1910), p. xi, my translation.
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solely to the superficial surface structure of language, Mauthner saw the source of real,
practical injustice in the world.  As Janik and Toulmin note:
“Reification—to use a Machian phrase—begets all sots of ‘conceptual monsters’.  In science, these
include such misleading notions as force, laws of nature, matter, atoms and energy; in philosophy,
substance,  objects  and  the  absolute;  among religious  ideas,  God,  the  devil  and  natural  law;  in
political and social affairs, obsession with notions like the Race, the Culture, and the Language, and
with their purity or profanation.  In all such cases, reification involves assuming the existence of
entities which are ‘metaphysical’. So Mauthner considered metaphysics and dogmatism to be two
faces of the same coin, which was also the fountainhead of intolerance and injustice.”392
The substantial  core  of  Mauthner’s  analysis  of  such terms finds  a clear  methodological
analogy in Der Wörterbuch der Philosophie, the aim of which is to analyse one hundred and
one crucial words from our common philosophical vocabulary (beginning, incidentally, with
‘A=A’393).  The methodology of the book—which is no doubt a treatise on the nature of
language  and  not  a  reference  source  of  philosophical  terms,  as  it  remains  somewhat
mysteriously classified today―reflects Mauthner’s theory of knowledge and his attack on
the role of grammatical metaphors in philosophy.
392A. Janik and S. Toulmin, Wittgenstein’s Vienna (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), p. 123.
393Given Wittgenstein’s life-long interest in logic, this entry is worth dwelling on briefly. In this passage
Mauthner notes significantly that “the proposition is true, but so empty, that outside logic it must arouse
the suspicion of insanity.” Also: “There is no identity in reality;  there is no identity in nature.  The
proposition A = A is so true, that in the whole world it fits nothing better than it does itself.” (p. 2)  Such
remarks clearly recall those of the later Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations, as elsewhere: “ ‘A
thing is identical with itself.’—There is no finer example of a useless proposition, which yet is connected
with a certain play of the imagination.  It is as if in imagination we put a thing into its own shape and saw
that it fitted.” (PI §216)  Mauthner also address the notion of tautology in his Beiträge, concerning the
uselessness  of  logic  in  ordinary  language,  where  he  notes,  “If  someone  says  ‘cheese  is  cheese’ or
‘schnapps is schnapps’ or ‘a word is a word’, then this utterance is not a special case of the general
formula ‘A is A’.” (F. Mauthner,  Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache (vol.  III: Zur Grammatik und
Logic) (Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 1999), p. 359, my translation.)  Similarly, Wittgenstein would remark:
“One says “I know” where one can also say “I believe” or “I suspect”; where one can find out.  (If you
bring up against me the case of people’s saying “But I must know if I am in pain!”, “Only you can know
what you feel”, and similar things, you should consider the occasion and purpose of these phrases. “War
is war” is not an example of the law of identity either.” (PI, p. 221)
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Mauthner begins by exploring the psychological or empirical origin of his chosen terms and
proceeds  to  explain  how  the  ordinary  functional  elements  of  these  once  primarily
descriptive words have been transformed into nouns, ultimately to be theorised about by
philosophers and other intellectuals.  He then demonstrates how the use of these words has
shifted  in  relation  to  the  history  of  philosophy  through  the  process  of  nominalisation.
Because language is essentially metaphorical and thus unstable by nature—in a constant
state of flux or  statu nascendi—the knowledge gained through using language “is neither
going to grasp nor alter the real world.”394
In the  Tractatus,  immediately prior  to  Wittgenstein’s  admission that  all  philosophy is  a
critique of language, he notes: “Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is
no less complicated than it.” (T 4.002)  To this Mauthner might very well have added:
Neither more nor less!  For Mauthner our world is the world of the senses, and our senses
are accidental.  If they were by chance different in nature or number, our language would be
different too, and consequently so would the picture of the world that we have made for
ourselves.  The contingency of the senses (what Mauthner calls Zufallssinne) demonstrates
that necessary truth—that is to say knowledge that is universally true, eternally valid once
and for all—is an absurdity, one more piece of reified conceptual nonsense.  Every word is
historical and in every word it is solely its history that is preserved.
Despite  their  different  attitudes  towards  language,  its  logic,  and  the  philosophical
significance of its historical development, like the author of the  Tractatus, Mauthner was
nonetheless aware of the unstable grounds upon which he was standing, methodologically
speaking.  He attacked metaphysics by pointing out the meaninglessness of the words used
in it.  Consequently, he was forced to recognise the extent to which his own use of terms,
such as ‘language’,  represented an instance of what he considered illegitimate reification.  “
‘Language’,” he notes, “does not exist; it is an abstractum.  That we cannot enter twice the
same river, applies also to language.”395  The very idea of  Sprachkritik thus confronts its
own limit.  It is undertaken in and through words, and Mauthner recognised that his own
394F. Mauthner, Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol 1, op. cit., p. 25 (entry: ‘an sich’) 
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critique must itself be subjected in turn to the critique of language.  Born of contradiction
and ending in silence, it is the ‘suicide of language’: “If I want to ascend into the critique of
language,” he notes, “which is the most important business of mankind, then I must destroy
language behind me and in me, step by step: I must destroy every rung of the ladder while
climbing up it.”396  It is, of course, Wittgenstein who has most famously rephrases the ladder
metaphor that Mauthner employs here, although he paints a very different picture of the
critique of language―that is to say, not one of despair but one of transcendence.  However,
as we have seen, in order for Wittgenstein to do so he had to safeguard language from its
historical dimension.
Naturally, Wittgenstein’s interest in employing Sprachkritik in order to dissolve conceptual
confusions did not end with the publication of the Tractatus, and neither did his interest in
Ernst’s  particular  formulation  of  the  issue.   However,  upon  Wittgenstein’s  return  to
philosophy in the 1929 it was not only Ernst’s expression ‘misunderstanding the logic of
language’ that returned with him, but also his understanding of what Ernst characterised as
the ‘mythological’ element inherent to the logical structure of language.  For example, in the
so-called Big Typescript—TS 213, composed in the early 1930’s and considered by many to
be  the  source  of  the  most  substantial  passages  of  what  would  eventually  become
Philosophical Investigations, especially those regarding the practice of philosophy itself—
Wittgenstein  refers  directly  to  Ernst  in  a  subtitle  to  one  of  the  most  significant  of  the
nineteen ‘chapters’ that make up the book; indeed, entitled simply “Philosophie”, it is very
possibly  one of  the  most  significant  selection of  unpublished remarks  in  Wittgenstein’s
entire  post-Tractarian  oeuvre.   In  the  last  of  the  passages  that  fall  directly  under  his
mediations on the nature of philosophy and upon the novel conception of its task that had
395Quoted in G. Weiler, “On Fritz Mauthner’s Critique of Language”, p. 83, Mind, 67, 1958, pp. 80-87.  We
see here in fact, that Mauthner had already approached many of the issues Wittgenstein himself later
would, upon his immediate return to philosophy in 1930.  A great deal could be said, I believe, about
Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy as a reversal of the a-historicism he once upheld in the Tractatus as,
indeed, the antithesis of Mauthner: “All philosophy is a ‘critique of language’ (though not in Mauthner’s
sense).” (T 4.0031)
396Quoted in G. Weiler, “On Fritz Mauthner’s Critique of Language”, op. cit. p. 80.
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arisen in his mind since his return to Cambridge, Wittgenstein has the following serve as the
subtitle: THE MYTHOLOGY IN THE FORMS OF OUR LANGUAGE ((PAUL ERNST)).
Unfortunately,  Ernst  is  not  mentioned  directly  in  the  subsequent  material.   However,
remarks  such  as  the  following  suggest  interesting  possibilities  for  the  significance  that
Wittgenstein  felt  Ernst’s  characterisation  had  for  his  newly-conceived  philosophical
methodology and the historical dimensions of language that he was beginning to address:
“An entire mythology,” he notes, “is laid down in our language.” (PO, p. 199 [TS 213, p.
434; 1933])397  For the most part, Wittgenstein dwells here rather on the anthropological
work of Victorian ethnologist J.G. Frazer, and his book  The Golden Bough.398  We might
consider here briefly a reflection such as that which Wittgenstein puts forth in this section,
which is also reminiscent of Mauthner’s original understanding of Sprachkritik as directed
against the illegitimate reification of grammatical metaphors: 
“Driving out death or killing death; but on the other hand it is portrayed as a skeleton, and therefore
as dead itself,  in a certain sense.  “As dead as death.” ‘Nothing is as dead as death; nothing as
beautiful as beauty itself!’ The picture according to which reality is thought of here is that beauty,
death, etc., is the pure (concentrated) substance, whereas in a beautiful object it is contained as an
admixture.—And don’t I recognize here my observations about ‘object’ and ‘complex’? (Plato)
397Though the mythological dimension of language sketched here only became central to Wittgenstein’s
thought after is return to Cambridge in the 1930’s, it is interesting to note a handful of remarks in the
Notebooks which suggest that Wittgenstein had perhaps already been prepared for this shift.  We might
consider here a pair of parenthetical remarks from early 1915: “Words are probes; some reach very deep;
some only to a little depth.” (NB, p. 39) and “The older a word, the deeper it reaches.” (NB, p. 40) 
398A  particularly  noteworthy  remark,  however,  concerning  just  what  Wittgenstein  might  mean  by
“mythology” here and how this meaning has been adapted from Ernst’s remark, is found right at the
opening of Wittgenstein’s reflections.  It is that which concerns his iconic analysis of the ‘Cornwolf’
ritual:
“In ancient rites we find the use of an extremely well-developed language of gestures.
And when I read Frazer, I would like to say again and again: All these processes, these changes of
meaning, we have right in front of us even in our language of words.  If what is hidden in the last sheaf
is called the ‘Cornwolf’, as well as the sheaf itself, and also the man who binds it, then we recognize
in this a linguistic process we know well.” (PO, p. 197 [TS 213, p. 433; 1933])
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The primitive forms of our language: noun, adjective and verb, show the simple picture into whose
form language tries to force everything.” (PO, p. 199 [TS 213, p. 434; 1933])
This tacit critique of the Tractatus that is contained in this remark is a familiar one.  It finds
a wealth of expression in Wittgenstein’s various unpublished sources, and occasionally in
Philosophical Investigations as well.399  The Mauthnerian character of this critique need not
surprise us either, given the re-emerging significance of the historically situated and indeed
evolving ‘mythology’ of Wittgenstein’s own conception of language.400  But what may seem
rather surprising is how in the following passage (the last of the chapter) Wittgenstein refers
to the ‘dangers’ inherent to such abstractions—a point that is also reminiscent of Mauthner’s
perception  of  the  dangers  inherent  to  the  reification  of  grammatical  metaphors  in
philosophy, which he identified with dogmatism and thus a source of real political injustice
in the world.  Wittgenstein notes here the following:
399E.g.: “Thought is surrounded by a halo.—Its essence, logic, presents an order, in fact the a priori order of
the world: that is, the order of possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought.  But this
order, it seems, must be utterly simple.  It is prior to all experience, must run through all experience; no
empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it——It must rather be of the purest crystal.
But  this  crystal  does  not  appear  as  an  abstraction;  but  as  something  concrete,  indeed,  as  the  most
concrete, as it were the hardest thing there is (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus No. 5.5563).” (PI §97)
400Here I think it should be clear just to what extent I agree and disagree with the following insightful (but
incomplete) analysis of Wittgenstein’s post-1930 shift in thought, specifically in terms of his budding
appreciation for the historical dimension of language, provided by Janik and Toulmin:
“Did Wittgenstein acquire this anti-historicism from Gottlob Frege?  Was he converted to this view in
part by Frege’s denunciation of the “psychologistic” and “genetic” fallacies, and his insistence that
conceptual analysis must be pursued in formal, logical and timeless terms?  This could be so.  But,
given the tenacity of Wittgenstein’s moral attitudes, it is more plausible to assume that this particular
view antedated his  acquaintance with Frege,  and that  previous moral  and intellectual  inclinations
predisposed him to find Frege’s logicism congenial.  Here again, Wittgenstein’s views stand in clear
contrast with Mauthner’s views, which he rejected.  Mauthner’s feeling for historical and cultural
diversity  may have  driven  him to the  extreme of  relativism,  but  at  any  rate  it  kept  his  sense of
historical relevance alive.  Even when Wittgenstein had abandoned his earlier Russellian belief in a
universal structure of real logical forms, in his own later phase, in favor of a more Mauthnerian or
Loosian analysis  of  language as  a  function  of  forms of  life,  he  never  followed up the  historical
implications of his new approach.” (A. Janik and S. Toulmin, Wittgenstein’s Vienna, op. cit., p. 244.)
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“So long as one imagines the soul as a thing, a body, which is in our head, this hypothesis is not
dangerous.  The danger of our models does not lie in their imperfection and roughness, but in their
unclarity (fogginess).
The danger sets in when we notice that the old model is not sufficient but then we don’t change it,
but only sublimate it, as it were.  So long as I say the thought is in my head, everything is all right;
things get dangerous when we say that the thought is not in my head, but in my spirit.” (PO, p. 199
[TS 213, p. 434; 1933])
This is undoubtedly an obscure passage, whose significance is better left indeterminate for
the time being.  However, it suggests that at least for a time Wittgenstein did indeed have a
sense for the socio-political consequences of his philosophy.  Far from a mere linguistic
confusion that arises from attending solely to the superficial surface structure of language,
as in the  Tractatus, philosophical models are here portrayed as dangerous sublimations of
older belief systems, whose danger—rather than salvation—lies precisely in the attempt to
remedy the ‘imperfections’ of the old system; for that remedy is achieved by imposing upon
them ‘unclarity’ and ‘fogginess’ rather than something like ‘precision’, as philosophers such
as Frege or Russell or Carnap would have wished.401  It is a suggestive image, one with
which Mauthner would undoubtedly have felt quite at home; however, why this might be
dangerous is ultimately left unstated.
It  is worth noting, however,  that  an earlier subtitle  from the same chapter suggests  one
option,  in  terms  of  ‘justice’:  THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY:  THE PERSPICUOUS
REPRESENTATION OF GRAMMATICAL FACTS. THE GOAL: THE TRANSPARENCY OF ARGUMENTS.
JUSTICE. (PO, p. 171 [TS 213, p. 414; 1933))  Unfortunately, like the case of the reference of
401If it is the case, as Christiane Chauviré has suggested, that “philosophy and mythology are of the same
nature” (“Wittgenstein et la tradition philosophique”, op cit., p, 45), I would suggest that this is so in the
sense  that  both  may  be  considered  in  terms  of  the  sublimation  of  older  belief  systems,  which  are
themselves poorly understood, thus resulting in new practices that are no more veritable than the earlier
ones.  They are, however, different with regards to whether or not one thinks one has thereby resolved
some earlier problem, à la philosophy, and thus they differ with regards to the role that they play in our
lives.   It  is  not  therefore simply the case,  as Schulte has suggested,  that  due to their  similar  nature
Wittgenstein positioned himself towards both pejoratively.
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Paul  Ernst  referred  to  above,  the  notion  of  justice  alluded  to  here  lacks  a  substantial
exploration  in  the  ensuing text.   Its  sole  development  is  a  parenthetical  remark,  placed
among  those  that  express  the  necessity  for  perspicuity  and  clarity  in  philosophy.
Wittgenstein notes there, parenthetically: “Our only task is to be just.  That is, we must only
point out and resolve the injustices of philosophy, and not posit new parties—and creeds.”
(PO,  p.  181  [TS 213,  p.  420;  1933])   Whether  Wittgenstein  is  referring  here  to  some
conception of moral and socio-political justice, or to something like ‘doing justice’ to the
phenomena themselves, is difficult to say.  There is good reason to suspect that Wittgenstein
may have intended the latter, at least insofar as the phenomena of language are concerned.402
But then the question arises nonetheless: In what does the value of ‘doing justice to the
phenomena’ consist,  if  not in the restoration of a more authentic form of life free from
maladroit  linguistic  expressions and the  unhealthy thought patterns  of  which they are  a
402Among other remarks by Wittgenstein which I consider in greater elsewhere, we might here briefly refer
to Wittgenstein’s initial  remark from the same period, in the notebook dealing with Frazer’s  Golden
Bough: “Nothing is so difficult as doing justice to the facts.” (PO, p. 129 [MS 110; 1931])  Earlier, we
took a close look at what it might mean here, to speak of doing justice to the facts.
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symptom?403  The question of the spiritual purpose of the book—of why Wittgenstein wrote
it, and of what dangers he sought to address, if any—remains unanswered.
IV. Concluding Remarks: Philosophising in the Darkness of this Time
The fact that Wittgenstein did not see fit to include a great many of the remarks from The
Big Typescript in the final version of Philosophical Investigations—including, of course, his
use of chapter headings and subheadings, of which we have been making liberal use here—
is not without its problems for the reading presented above.  As Janik and others have noted,
Wittgenstein  did  indeed  seem to  take  pains  to  separate  his  personal  views  from those
remarks that were prepared for publication, as found in the Tractatus and the more or less
publication-ready Philosophical Investigations.  It is, for example, easy to draw heavily on
403In favour of this interpretation, which would suggest that Wittgenstein believed his work was directed
towards  a  socio-political  form  of  justice,  we  might  nonetheless  consider  here  a  mysterious  and
ambiguous remark that Wittgenstein made on one occasion to Norman Malcolm:
“One time when we were walking along the river we saw a newsvendor’s sign which announced that
the German government accused the British government of instigating a recent attempt to assassinate
Hitler with a bomb.  This was in autumn of 1939.  Wittgenstein said of the German claim: ‘It would
not surprise me at all if it were true.’  I retorted that I could not believe that the top people in the
British government would do such a thing.  I mean that the British were too civilized and decent to
attempt anything so underhanded; and I added that such an act was incompatible with the British
‘national character’.  My remark made Wittgenstein extremely angry.  He considered it to be a great
stupidity and also an indication that I was not learning anything from the philosophical training that he
was trying to give me.” (N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, op. cit., p. 32.)
Just what exactly Wittgenstein had thought Malcolm should have learned from his lectures regarding
ideas  relating  to  politically-motivated  assassination  attempts  on  a  foreign  leader  is  far  from  clear.
However, an interesting possibility presents itself further on in Malcolm’s Memoir, where he notes that
towards the  end of World War II,  Malcolm wrote to  Wittgenstein,  speaking of the war as a terrible
‘boredom’.  To this Wittgenstein replied:
“I want to say something about the war being a ‘boredom’.  If a boy said that school was an intense
boredom one might answer him that, if he only could get himself to learn what can really be learned
there, he would not find it  so boring.  Now forgive me for saying that I can’t help believing that an
enormous lot can be learnt about human being is this war—if you keep your eyes open.  And the better
you are thinking the more you’ll get out of what you see.  For thinking is  digestion.” (N. Malcolm,
Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, op. cit., p. 41)
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Nachlaß sources,  such as these and many others besides,  as evidence for Wittgenstein’s
pessimistic  image of  contemporary culture  as  one dangerously cut  off  from its  spiritual
source.  It is likewise easy to conclude that the ‘mental cramps’ he identifies as the source of
philosophical  malaise  should not  be  viewed as being intended to express Wittgenstein’s
alone, or even those of the Cambridge philosophical elite, but rather those shared by the
broader culture in which we all continue to live.  However, it cannot be denied that the
Philosophical Investigations contains no such references to the contemporary ‘spirit of this
civilization’, the ‘danger’ of our current unclarity, nor even the supposed ‘justice’ of the task
to be undertaken, which can be found in the earlier versions of the work.  Only his oblique
reference to the ‘darkness of this time’ in the preface to the Investigations and its motto from
Nestroy—Überhaupt had der Fortschritt das an sich, daß er viel größer ausschaut, als er
wirklich ist—serve as condensed reminders of the work’s earlier expressed purpose.
Certainly,  it  would have been quite characteristic  of Wittgenstein’s  temperament that  he
should proclaim to be writing for people who, like himself, found the ‘spirit’ of modern
European  and  American  civilization  alien  and  uncongenial,  while  at  the  same  time
refraining from indicating precisely what it is about that other spirit—i.e. the one in which
he was presumably writing, and of which we would have to partake in order to understand
his work correctly—that would shed a new light upon what he considered to be the darkness
of these times.  Perhaps it is for this reason that the significance of Wittgenstein’s remark in
the  preface  to  the  Investigations,  as  well  as  the  work’s  ambiguous  motto,  remained  in
obscurity for so long.  Were they perhaps written off as just one more expression of his
eccentric  and  often  antagonistic  personality?   If  such  a  superficial  reading  was  once
possible,  it  is  clearly no longer  the case.   For  throughout the remarks composed in the
1930’s, now widely available to the public, Wittgenstein repeatedly tried to give an adequate
expression to this negative evaluation of contemporary society, and these remarks are not
bereft of any indication of what he believed the way forward might consist in.  Specifically,
it is in the two forewords of 1930 and 1931 that he set out to communicate what one might
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justifiably call the ‘spiritual purpose’ of his work and how that purpose was to be embodied
the work’s very form more than in any other aspect of it.
What must have been surprising for those who were not familiar with the Nachlaß sources
before their appearance in  Culture and Value in 1978, is that in composing these remarks
Wittgenstein consistently  employed a vocabulary that  bears the unmistakable imprint  of
Spengler,  both  in  terms  of  his  tone  and  his  vocabulary.   In  the  first,  the  Spenglerian
vocabulary is most prominent.  Here, Wittgenstein describes our own age as precisely one of
a ‘civilisation’, which is therefore without ‘culture’; he describes the present age as one in
which the arts have disappeared, as one in which great men are drawn not to the production
of great works but to the application of technical skills.  “This is,” he notes, “not a value
judgement”:
“For in times like these, genuine strong characters simply leave the arts asides and turn to other
things and somehow the worth of the individual man finds expression.  Not, to be sure, in the way it
would at  a time of high culture.   A culture is  like a big organization which assigns each of its
members a place where he can work in the spirit of the whole; and it is perfectly fair for his power to
be measured by the contribution he succeeds in making to the whole enterprise.  In an age without
culture on the other hand forces become fragmented and the power of an individual man is used up
in overcoming opposing forces and frictional resistances; it does not show in the distance he travels
but perhaps only in the heat he generates in overcoming friction.” (CV, p. 6 [MS 109; 6.11.1930])
These are remarkably Spenglerian characterisations, which should certainly give us pause
for  thought.   However,  the  picture  that  these  remarks  provide  of  Wittgenstein’s  aim in
philosophy is not yet a complete one.
As we saw above, it was around the time that Wittgenstein was composing these remarks
that  he also set  out to enumerate a list  of those thinkers who he felt  had exercised the
greatest influence on his own thought.  It is a list that includes, among others, Spengler.  It is
highly doubtful that Wittgenstein would have placed Spengler on this list merely because
Spengler  had  provided  him with  a  convenient  vocabulary  for  expressing  his  own,  pre-
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existing attitudes towards a society with which he felt out of step.  Rather, in composing this
list  of  influences  he  notes  that  he  had  taken  over  these  figures’  lines  of  thought
[Gedankbewegungen], incorporating elements of their thought into his own: “I have simply
straightaway seized on it  with enthusiasm for my work of clarification (Klärungswerk)”
(CV, p. 19 [MS 154; 1931])  
It is this direct influence, not only upon Wittgenstein’s attitudes towards the times, but also
upon what he thought might serve as a legitimate  response to its ailments—what he calls
here, significantly, his ‘Klärungswerk’—that the wider significance of Spengler’s Decline of
the West for Wittgenstein can be seen.  Particularly, it in the second version of the same
foreword quoted above, posthumously published in the collection  Philosophical Remarks,
that we witness just how this might be so:
“This book is written for such men as are in sympathy with its spirit.  This spirit is different from the
one which informs the vast stream of European and American civilization in which all of us stand.
That  spirit expresses itself in an onward movement, in building ever larger and more complicated
structures; the other in striving after clarity and perspicuity in no matter what structure.  The first
tries to grasp the world by way of its  periphery—in its  variety;  the second at its centre—in its
essence.  And so the first adds one construction to another, moving on and up, as it were, from one
stage to the next, while the other remains where it is and what it tries to grasp is always the same.”
(PR, Preface)
Here we see that in fact Wittgenstein had already begun to characterise early on what that
‘other spirit’ might look like, more than a decade and half before composing the preface that
would ultimately be published in Philosophical Investigations.  It is, unsurprisingly, one that
strives after ‘clarity’ and ‘perspicuity’.  It is this spirit that for him is opposed to that of the
present  age,  the  obscure  one  of  a  progressive  ‘onwards  movement’ that  Wittgenstein
characterises in accord with Spengler as one of a dark decline.  Though the name Spengler
hardly  appears  in  Wittgenstein’s  writings  after  the  early  1930’s,  what  we  have  here
characterised  as  that  ‘other  spirit’  is,  indeed,  precisely  how  Wittgenstein  would  later
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characterise  his  work  in  the  Investigations  as  a  whole:  as  one  that  finds  and  invents
‘intermediate  cases’,  identifies  ‘family  resemblances’  and  holds  diverse  linguistic
phenomena up as ‘objects of comparison’ in order to achieve a perspicuous representation.
It is in this sense that Wittgenstein could be said to have adopted not only a Spenglerian
assessment of his times as one of decline, but also how Spengler helped form his conception
of how one might respond to its ills and so begin taking steps towards overcoming them.
Thus, if Wittgenstein did not refer directly to such considerations in the final version of
Philosophical Investigations, this should not be understood as a mere form of defiance on
his  part.   In  fact,  following  his  initial  sketch  to  the  unpublished  foreword  of  1930,
Wittgenstein notes that for him: “It is a great temptation to try to make the spirit explicit.”
(CV, p. 8 [MS 109; 7.11.1930])  However, despite this temptation to make the spirit of the
work explicit, Wittgenstein recognised that such an attempt could only end in failure.  For:
“When you bump up against the limits of your own honesty it is as though your thoughts get
into a whirlpool, an infinite regress: You can  say  what you like, it takes you no further.”
(ibid.)  As many remarks from the  Nachlaß demonstrate,  Wittgenstein did not reject the
‘spiritual side’ of his ethical or social-political thought.  What Wittgenstein rejected was the
temptation to express that directly, and especially to provide a foundation for such thoughts
on the basis of theoretical and philosophical considerations.404  He considered especially the
pretension of giving reasons for such considerations, where none can in fact be given, as the
sign of a half-hearted and dishonest character.  It was this dishonesty that he abhorred most
of all.
However, this does not mean that Wittgenstein was writing in order to save us from some
form of nihilism in matters of ethics and social order—as if the inability to give reasons
precluded their non-existence—as Nyíri’s claim that Wittgenstein’s resolution to what Nyíri
calls the ‘neo-conservative paradox’ was spurred on by a will to save “the neo-conservative
404Besides the Wittgenstein-Popper affair, we might also consider for example that in his conversations with
the Vienna  Circle,  McGuinness  records,  Wittgenstein employed in  a  modified  form a  formula  from
Schopenhauer:  “Preaching morals is  difficult,  founding it  impossible.” (B. McGuinness,  Wittgenstein
and the Vienna Circle (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1979), p. 118.)
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position from a theoretical catastrophe at a time when, in Germany, it could no longer be
saved from a political catastrophe” might suggest.405  If one were inclined to read a form of
conservatism  into  Wittgenstein’s  work  in  this  manner—by,  for  example,  citing  the
‘conservative’s preference for silence’—one might likewise consider remarks such as the
following from On Certainty: “To be sure there is justification; but justification comes to an
end.” (OC §192)  As Nyíri demonstrates, a conservative reading of remarks such as this is
possible.  However, that is not the final word.  For the kind of spiritual silence we encounter
in Wittgenstein’s  published works is  a  principled silence; it  does not arise from a mere
‘distaste for abstractions’, for example.  He specifically seeks not to speak of his spiritual
purpose,  but  rather  to  show  it.   Especially  in  Philosophical  Investigations,  where  the
pragmatic consideration of meaning-making in lived contexts is designed to return linguistic
acts, such as justification, to their original home―giving reasons, Wittgenstein unceasingly
seeks to remind us, has a purpose.  Where that purpose will not, or cannot in principle be
fulfilled, reasons will fail despite our deepest conviction of their correctness.
Ethical  concerns  designed  to  help  restore  a  non-philosophical  equilibrium  to  what
Wittgenstein considered the spiritual malaise of his times were central to his project from
the  start.   We need hardly  recall  his  well-known characterisation  of  the  Tractatus  as  a
fundamentally ethical work in just this sense, despite—or perhaps, more precisely, because
of—its general silence on such matters.  As he noted in the letter sent to Ficker upon the
completion of the manuscript:
“You won’t—I really believe—get too much out of reading it.  Because you won’t understand it; the
content will seem strange to you.  In reality, it isn’t strange to you, for the point of the book is
ethical.  I once wanted to give a few words in the foreword which now actually are not in it, which,
however, I’ll write to you now because they might be a key for you: I wanted to write that my work
consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of everything which I have  not  written.  And
precisely this second part is the important one.  My book draws the limits to the sphere of the ethical
from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those
405J.C. Nyíri, “Wittgenstein’s Later Work in Relation to Conservatism”, op. cit., p. 57.
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limits.  In short, I believe that where many others today are just gassing, I have managed in my book
to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it”406
This  reflection  on  the  ethical  part  of  the  work—which  is,  he  categorically  states,  the
important  one—concludes  with  the  following  suggestion:  “For  the  time  being,  I’d
recommend that you read the  foreword and the  conclusion since these express the point
most  directly.”407  The  conclusion  is,  of  course,  the  most  forceful  expression  of
Wittgenstein’s quietism in spiritual matters, here and very probably throughout all his work,
published or otherwise: Whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must be silent.  Though his
ethical and spiritual stance remains unexpressed in the pages of the book, it is not absent for
it.  Rather, because it remains unexpressed it is capable of permeating the entire work as a
whole.
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Tractatus,  this  quietism  is  connected  to  what  he  then
considered to be the limits of language, which impose silence upon expressions of a higher
spiritual order.  Following his remark towards the end of the book that the sense of the
world must lie outside of it, Wittgenstein remarks: “So too it is impossible for there to be
propositions  of  ethics.  //  Propositions  can  express  nothing  that  is  higher.”  (T  6.43)
However, as we have seen, by the time Wittgenstein began writing again upon his return to
Cambridge in the early 1930’s, this framework had undergone an extensive revision.  In the
place of the ‘general form of the proposition’ outlined in the Tractatus, according to which
the limits of language are drawn and ethics is situated squarely beyond them, he later sought
to construct a ‘perspicuous representation’ or ‘synoptic view’ via a collage of observations
on the basis of our lived experience with language.  With this reorientation, the limits of
language—previously rigid and a-historical, capable of being drawn solely from the ‘inside-
out’—became blurred amongst  the imaginative play of  overlapping language-games and
flexible, evolutive forms of life.
406Quoted in C.G. Luckhardt,  Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives (Sussex, UK: Harvester Press, Ltd.,




For all that, Wittgenstein’s quietism regarding spiritual matters did not disappear.  But in
line with his new appreciation of the cultural-historic dimensions of language—where, if
indeed  anywhere,  the  clearest  connection  between  his  cultural  pessimism  and  his
philosophical programme is to be situated—the impossibility of clear spiritual expression is
not tied to the logical limits of language but to the horizons of the expressive possibilities
that belong to a given culture.  For example, in the 1930’s foreword, Wittgenstein dedicates
his work with the following clarification: “I would like to say ‘This book is written to the
glory  of  God’,  but  nowadays  that  would  be  chicanery,  that  is,  it  would  not  be  rightly
understood.” (PR, Foreword)  In the alternate version of the same foreword, reprinted in von
Wright’s  Vermischte  Bemerkungen,  Wittgenstein  explains:  “I  realize  then  that  the
disappearance of a culture does not signify the disappearance of human value, but simply of
a certain means of expressing this value, yet the fact remains that I have no sympathy for
the current of European civilization and do not understand its goals, if it has any.” (CV, p. 6,
my emphasis [MS 109; 6.11.1930])408
In what sense, then, might Wittgenstein have given a description of the ‘spirit’ in which a
work such as Philosophical Investigations was written, when he clearly felt that the means
for  expressing  that  spirit  had  been  all  but  lost?   Whatever  it  may  be,  Wittgenstein
undoubtedly felt that the higher spiritual purpose that the work was intended to embody
remains intimately tied to the work itself—we might recall here the phrase used by Drury,
when he reports asking himself whether he can see, as Wittgenstein had suggested to him,
that the problems discussed in the Investigations are being seen from a “religious point of
view”409—but the reader who does not yet share in that spirit will fail to understand the work
and  those  who  already  share  in  it  will  understand  it  anyway.   So,  it  is  useless  to
408This idea of the limits of expression finds an uneasy parallel in Wittgenstein’s consideration of how
people  think  in  accordance  with  certain  ‘dogmas’ in  1937:  “The  effect  of  making  men  think  in
accordance with dogmas, perhaps in the form of certain graphic propositions, will be very particular: I
am not thinking of these dogmas as determining men’s opinions but rather as completely controlling the
expression of all opinions.  People will live under an absolute, palpable tyranny, though without being
able to say that they are not free.” (CV, p. 28 [MS 118; 11.9.1937])  It is difficult not to recall in this
regard the quote from Karl Kraus with which we opened this chapter, among others from this dark period
of European history.
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communicate it to  either of these readers why the book has been written.  In fact, it may
very well do more harm than good.  As Wittgenstein notes, following his initial sketch to the
unpublished 1930 foreword: “The danger in a long foreword is that the spirit of the book has
to evident in the book itself and cannot be described.” (CV, p. 7 [MS 109; 7.11.1930])
Must this danger leave one helpless and mute before an inexpressible monolith, or might it
perhaps be indicated in other ways?  In this regard it is very significant that, following these
reflections in the unpublished 1930’s foreword, Wittgenstein proceeds to compare the book
to a room into which the author does not want certain people to be admitted:
“If you have a room which you do not what certain people to get into, put a lock on it for which they
do not have a key.  But there is no point in talking to them about it, unless of course you want them
to admire the room from the outside!
The honourable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only by those who can
open it, not by the rest.” (CV, p. 7-8 [MS 109; 7.11.1930])410
409Wittgenstein: “I am not a religious man, but I cannot help but see problems from a religious point of
view” (Quoted in:  M. O’C. Drury,  “Some Notes on Conversations  with Wittgenstein”,  p.  26,   Acta
Philosophica Fennica, 28, 1976, pp. 22-40.)  Drury, furthermore, picks up on the historical quality of the
expressibility  of this ‘point of view’, in regards to the 1930’s preface,  wherein Wittgenstein notes:  “I
would like to say, ‘this book is written to the honour of God’, but nowadays this would be the trick of a
cheat, i.e. it would not be correctly understood.” (PR, Preface)—Drury responds: “I would dwell on this
quotation for a moment.  It implies that words which in one age could be correctly used can at a later
date be ‘the words of a cheat’;  because if these words are constantly used in a superficial way they
become so muddied that the road can no longer be trod.” (ibid., p. 24)  Here we find a rich comparison to
Mauthner and Mauthner’s conception of Sprachkritik, outlined earlier in this chapter.
410This passage finds a familiar refrain in the following from 1942: “A man will be imprisoned in a room
with a door that’s unlocked and opens inwards; as long as it does not occur to him to pull rather than to
push  it”  (CV,  p.  42  [MS  125;  18.5.1942])   However,  I  believe  a  more  fruitful―and  more
critical―comparison can be made with Wittgenstein’s earlier attempt at just such a prefacing remark in
the Tractatus begs to be drawn here.  We recall that it was there, of course, that Wittgenstein opened the
work with the words: 
“Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that
are expressed in it―So it is not a textbook.” (T, p. 3)  
Despite the centrality this remark maintains among important readings of the work today, these fail to
appreciate the extent of Wittgenstein’s later critique of the book’s tone in addition to the ideas contained
there.  For example, it is lines such as this, I believe, that must be recast in light of Wittgenstein’s later
remark that the value of the  Tractatus  is  cast  into doubt  by the pervasiveness of “kitsch” in it.   As
357
It is worth dwelling on this metaphor for a moment.  For indeed, as Bouveresse has noted,
“despite  the  fact  that  at  various  places  in  his  unpublished  manuscripts  Wittgenstein
expressed  a  strong  antipathy  for  modern  civilization,  which  he  felt  was  condemned  to
disappear or perhaps already had, one would look in vain for some trace of that  in the
philosophical texts that he intended for publication.”411  However, if we limit ourselves to
the  published  works  because  of  this,  we  will  miss  neglecting  an  undeniably  important
element  in  Wittgenstein’s  thought.   On  the  other  hand,  if  we  focus  too  fixedly  on  the
unpublished remarks, which Wittgenstein felt for various unknown reasons were not fit for
public scrutiny, we risk misrepresenting his views.  
Under these conditions, if it is at all valuable to try to determine the relationship between
Wittgenstein’s philosophy and those aspects of his personality that are habitually described
as  ‘culturally  pessimistic’,  one  may  perhaps  have  to  look  elsewhere―perhaps  to  the
margins of Philosophical Investigations.  Its motto, for example.  From one perspective, it
may seem surprising that Wittgenstein, who was so against ornamentation in all aspects of
his  life  and work would trim his  publication-ready work with such a showy decorative
device as a motto.  (Even the planned titles of his latter works—such as  Philosophical
Grammar, Philosophical Remarks,  Philosophical Investigations, etc.—give the uninitiated
reader little clue of what is contained within them.)  However, from another perspective, the
one that keeps in mind what Wittgenstein felt was the only honest and honourable thing to
do in an age where the possibility for the expression of higher spiritual purpose had all but
disappeared, it becomes perhaps more clear.  
The thing about the motto to Philosophical Investigations is that it generally appears to be
much  smaller  than  it  really  is,  much  less  important.   For  here,  as  in  the  Tractatus,
Wittgenstein noted in shortly after his return to philosophy in 1929:
“Aside from the  good  &  genuine,  my book the  Tractatus  Log.-Phil.  also  contains  kitsch,  that  is,
passages with which I filled in the gaps and so-to-speak in my own style. How  much of the book
consists of such passages I don’t know & it is difficult to fairly evaluate now.” (PPO, p. 133[MS 183,
p. 30; 16.5.1930])
411J. Bouveresse, “ ‘The Darkness of this Time’: Wittgenstein and the Modern World”, op cit., p. 12.
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Wittgenstein may indeed be drawing our attention to the ‘second part’ of  this work—the
important  one?412—by drawing the  limits  of  his  own capacity  for  language from in the
opposite direction, i.e., from the outside-in as it were.  In this case, that second part of the
work indicated by the motto would seem to point not only towards the presence  of some
cultural-historic facet  in Wittgenstein’s thought,  but also towards its significance for the
meaning of his philosophical work as a whole and what he relentlessly sought to achieve
with it.  While, in the end, the meaning of the motto is far from transparent, if we seek to
understand  the  relationship  between  Wittgenstein’s  published  philosophy  and  the
historically-oriented cultural pessimism we find expressed in many of his private remarks—
as, indeed, von Wright rightly claims that we should—it is perhaps here at the margins of
the Investigations that we should begin.
412Here I am reminded of one of the earliest of the mottoes Wittgenstein explored as a possibility for the
second work he would someday publish, discussed briefly above, quoted in Backer and Hacker.  The
quote  is  from  the  poem  “Abendlied”  (also  known  as  “Der  Mond  ist  aufgegangen”),  by  Matthias
Claudius: “Seht ihr den Mond dort stehen? Er is nur halb zu sehen, und ist doch rund und schön” (“Do
you see the moon there?  Only half of it is visible, and yet it is round and beautiful.”) Remarked in 1931,
it unclear whether the ‘other half’ that is not there to be seen is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s attitude
towards something like the ‘second part’ of the Tractatus, referred to in the letter to von Ficker, or rather
to something similar he intended in what would become Philosophical Investigations. 
However,  the full  context  of the remark from which this motto is taken suggests another interesting
possibility, one that is not explored by Backer and Hacker, which speaks more to the importance of
mythology and the ‘charm’—be that in the best or worst sense—of language. From MS 110 (ca. 1931),
among those remarks dealing with none other than Frazer’s Golden Bough:
“I now believe that it would be right to begin a/my/ book with remarks about metaphysics as a kind of
magic.
In them, however, I ought neither to defend magic nor make fun of it.
The profoundness of magic must be retained.—
Indeed, the switching off of any/of/ magic has the nature of magic itself.
For if I begin to speak of the ‘world’ (and not of this tree or table), what else would I be trying to do
but to charm something greater into my words?
|A motto for this book: ‘Can you see the moon there? You can only see half of it, yet it is round and
beautiful.’|” (PO, p. 117 [MS 110; 1931], translation altered.)
It is difficult not to recall the opening lines of the Tractatus here—“The world is all that is the case.” (T
1)—and Wittgenstein’s proposed opening of the  Investigations, before he had decided on the passage
from Augustine’s  Confessions—“A lamp is  standing  on  my table”—from MS 108,  written  between
between December 1929 and August 1930.
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It is undoubtedly significant that the remarks we find in the Nachlaß, as well as some in the
Investigations  perhaps,  can be read by a conservative light.  And this feature should not,
contra Diamond, be discounted out of hand.  What we must ask ourselves, however, is why
this is so and what is at stake here.  Cavell has put this point well.  In his lecture “Declining
Decline”,  where  he  does  not  deal  with  Nyíri’s  claims  precisely,  but  where  he  notes  of
Kripke’s  interpretation  of  the  so-called  ‘rule-following  paradox’—and  especially  what
Kripke calls Wittgenstein’s ‘sceptical solution’ to the ‘sceptical problem’ of the arbitrarity of
rules, which, as I have argued above, echoes that of Nyíri’s analysis almost perfectly—he
notes: 
“[M]y general response, for example, to Kripke’s influential interpretation of Wittgenstein on rules is
that since the solution Kripke proposes for what he calls Wittgenstein’s skepticism with respect to
rules continues a conventionalist view of agreement, agreement about ordinary usage, the way he
interprets Wittgenstein’s skepticism must be equally conventionalist, or rather it must have a hook of
arbitrariness already in it.  That Wittgenstein can be taken so is important; no less important is that
he need not be so taken.  Then the philosophical task is to uncover the force of this alternative, to
discover whether for example one side takes undue credit from the denial of the other.”413
Indeed,  it  is  most  notably  Cavell  who  has  persistently  characterised   ‘Wittgenstein’s
philosophy’—a  term  according  to  which,  he  notes,  “I  will  always,  and  almost  always
exclusively,  mean  what  is  contained  in  Philosophical  Investigations”414—as  precisely  a
spiritual struggle, through and through.  According to Cavell, even if a conservative reading
of Wittgenstein’s philosophy finds evidence for that conservatism in certain aspects of his
work,  it  is  only  able  to  persist  because  the  features  of  the  struggle  itself  have  been
overlooked there.  For in that struggle we witness, not simply a nostalgia for some original,
more authentic way of living, nor a return to some more familiar past arrangement,  but
rather a call for a future transformation:
413S. Cavell, “Declining Decline”, op cit., p. 51.
414S. Cavell, “Declining Decline”,op cit., p. 31.
360
“Wittgenstein’s formulation about having to accept the given plays its part, I feel sure, in conveying
a political or social sense of the Investigations as conservative.  This was the earliest of the political
or social descriptions, or accusations, I recall entered against the Investigations.  Writers as different
as Bertrand Russell and Ernest Gellner415 greeted the book’s appeal to the ordinary or everyday as the
expression of a so to speak petit bourgeois fear of change, whether of individual inventiveness or of
social revolution.  Now I think that Wittgenstein must leave himself open to something like this
charge, because a certain distrust, even horror of change—change that comes in a certain form—is
part of the sensibility of the Investigations.  But simply to say so neglects the equally palpable call in
the book for transfiguration, which one may think of in terms of revolution or conversion.”416
According to Cavell, the root of the confusion between the two parallel interpretations of
Wittgenstein’s  philosophy—the  one  as  ‘conservative’,  and  the  other  as  something  like
‘progressive’ in  a  sense  that  undoubtedly  still  begs  further  clarification417—lies  in  what
415Russell’s  criticisms  of  what  he  considered  to  be  the  ‘lazy  consequences’ of  Wittgenstein’s  later
philosophy,  the  latter  having in  his esteem ‘grown tired of  serious thinking’,  are  well  known.   The
criticisms of Gellner—who, not  unlike Russell  sought to marry a liberal  politics with an optimistic,
scientifically-oriented philosophy—are of the same vein.  Given that a quote from Russell serves as the
epigram for Gellner’s Words and Things, and that Russell wrote the foreword to the work—stating that
“for my own part, I find myself in very close agreement with Mr. Gellner’s doctrines as set forth in this
book” (p. xiv)—we might wonder in what sense Russell and Gellner really are ‘so different’ as Cavell
notes here, though they are certainly among the earliest commentators on what has been perceived as the
‘political’ consequences of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and so the pool of authors was perhaps then rather
limited (as it  generally remains to today,  somewhat surprisingly).   The following is  a representative
sample of the kind of criticism Gellner offers against Wittgenstein’s apparently conservative demand to
‘accept the given’: 
“The ‘late-Wittgenstein’ theory of language, and of the authority it conferred on all its customs and
norms, simply in virtue of being part of a natural language, changed all this with a single stroke—and
it was the very same stroke which had also solved the problems of validating the norms of our life.  It
saved the rich old Lebenswelt whose practices and perceptions are built into our language, as well as
validating our principles.  At long last we could embrace both our principles and our mistress, and yet
fear neither pox nor gallows.  If ordinary speech, and the entire corpus of custom of which it is a part,
are a self-justifying system which neither permits nor requires external validation—well then, we need
never  fear  the  erosion of  our  customary ideas  and the identity  articulated in  terms of  them.” (E.
Gellner, Words and Things (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), p. 12)
416S. Cavell, “Declining Decline”, op. cit., p. 43.
417Christian Chauviré is, to the best of my knowledge, one of the very few to have treated this subject at any
length.  In her essay, “Humanisme et anthropologie”, she notes, for example: 
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Wittgenstein wishes to emphasise by saying, for example: “What has to be accepted, the
given, is—so one could say—forms of life.” (PI, p. 226)  For there is a sense in which
Wittgenstein’s reference to Lebensformen can be read as a reference to forms of life, limiting
itself to a kind of ‘horizontal movement’ whereby conservative readers hear a call to re-
integrate the natural into the social, to re-appropriate it into our manners of living as an
unalterable given—a given that philosophy must, furthermore, respect.  Here, of course, we
might think of such remarks from Wittgenstein about the nature of philosophy as that which
“leaves everything as it is.” (PI §124)  We might also think about it in terms of what we
explored earlier, that of ‘doing justice to the facts’ (rather than, say,  discovering them, as
someone  like  Russell  might  wish  to  do).   According  to  this  reading,  Wittgenstein  is
emphasising the social nature of language and a conventionalised sense of agreement.  We
should  not,  therefore,  be  surprised  that  a  conventionalised  sense  of  Lebensformen  will
support  a  conventionalised,  contractual  sense  of  agreement  among  the  members  of  a
community with which it is supposed to be co-extensive—i.e. a contractual sense such as
the conservatives’, à la Nyíri’s characterisation of it. 
However,  Cavell  argues  there  is  another  sense  in  which  one  might  read  Wittgenstein’s
reference to Lebensformen—as a reference rather to ‘forms of life’, which Cavell calls the
“The question of the human, of human nature and of how to characterise it, has rarely been rarely been
posed as such in relation to Wittgenstein.  Numerous texts are however dedicated to his anthropology
and to his concept of natural history, probably derived from Goethe.  But these fail to offer as evidence
one of the essential dimensions of his thought : his humanism, and particularly its almost paradoxical
character, since he drew heavily on the global pessimism of Spengler and the sense of decline.  It is up
to us, then, the show how a humanist can also be a pessimist.”, op. cit., p. 139, my translation)
For my part, I have tried to show precisely how this might be so elsewhere.  Though he does not address
the question of how Wittgenstein might orient himself towards the possible foundations for radical social
change in as much detail as Chauviré, John Moran makes an interesting suggestion in this regard towards
the end of his biographically-focused summary of Wittgenstein’s possible leftism, “Wittgenstein and
Russia”.  He notes there, in relation to that which is typically cited as ‘Exhibit A’ in all judgements of
Wittgenstein’s conservatism: 
“If he proposes that philosophy should leave everything (conceptually) as it is, this is for the sake of
accuracy, aimed among other things at avoiding the acceptance of spurious language reform in lieu of
real change.” (J. Moran, “Wittgenstein and Russia”, p. 96, New Left Review, 73, 1972, pp. 85-96, my
emphasis.)
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‘vertical’  sense.  Its function would not then be to proscribe a re-integration of the natural
into the social, but rather to challenge the individual to acknowledge one’s own separateness
and to feel one’s own personal responsibility for the future of the life of which one is a part.
It is the philosopher’s struggle with philosophy—not to overcome it, but to transform it and
to transform himself in the process.  It  is in this sense that Cavell takes issue with von
Wright’s  formulation of  the  problems of  ‘cultural  pessimism’ in  Wittgenstein’s  thought.
Cavell notes in this regard, for example, that: 
“von Wright’s appeal to ‘cancer in the way of life’ makes me uneasy.  ‘Way of life’ again to me
sounds too exclusively social, horizontal, to be allied so directly with human language as such, the
life form of talkers.  And the idea of a cancer in a culture’s way of life does not strike me as a
Spenglerian thought.  ‘Cancer’ says that a way of life is threatened with an invasive, abnormal death,
but Spengler’s ‘decline’ is about the normal, say the internal, death and life of cultures.”418
Thus,  Cavell  does  indeed  see  in  the  Investigations  a  preoccupation  with  the  kinds  of
culturally pessimistic thoughts of Spengler; however,  he sees Wittgenstein’s work in the
Investigations as the embodiment of Wittgenstein’s intention to combat the conditions that
have given rise to that decline.419
Nonetheless, a lingering question remains regarding whether or not Wittgenstein sought to
treat that cultural-historic malaise that gives rise to ‘malignant philosophical thought’ via
some  form  of  conservatism.   Cavell  admits  the  ambiguity  inherent  to  this  notion  of
418S. Cavell, “Declining Decline”, op. cit., p. 53.
419For  my  part,  I  would  defend  von  Wright  on  this  point.   For  surely  what  Cavell  offers  is  a
mischaracterisation of cancer.  Cancer is neither invasive nor abnormal; it is rather the response of  an
over-active  autoimmune  system,  the  result  of  ‘crossed-signals’ and  ‘mistaken identities’,  as  it  were.
While not ‘average’ or ‘everyday’, malignant cancer is not ‘abnormal’ at all, expect insofar as it might be
considered as too much of the normal.  To run with this metaphor just a bit further than it was probably
intended by its originator, and to quote Cavell himself on this matter: it is the “strain of language against
itself, against the commonality of criteria which are its conditions, turning as it were against its origins.”
(S. Cavell, “Declining Decline”, op. cit., p. 58.)  Cavell’s point, that this notion of Wittgenstein’s is not
Spenglerian, may nonetheless stand insofar as cancer is curable, while death is not of the same order, not
something one ‘treats’ by a therapeutic method (as PI §133 indicates).
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‘transfiguration’, which may give rise to the impression that a deep-seated conservatism lies
within his work:
“The rhetoric of humanity as a form of life, or a level of life, standing in need of something like
transfiguration—some radical  change,  but  as  it  were  from inside,  not  by  anything;  some say in
another birth, symbolizing a different order of natural reactions—is typical of a line of apparently
contradictory sensibilities, ones that may appear as radically innovative (in action or in feeling) or
radically conservative: Luther was such a sensibility; so were Rousseau and Thoreau.  Thoreau calls
himself disobedient, but what he means is not that he refuses to listen but that he insists on listening
differently while still comprehensibly.  He calls what he does revising (mythology).  Sensibilities in
this line seem better called revisers than reformers or revolutionaries.”420
Cavell thus sees in Wittgenstein’s work a call for revision, but he acknowledges that this call
may  be  distorted  by  Wittgenstein’s  apparently  transparent  demand  for  a  return to  the
‘ordinary’ or ‘everyday’.  In this sense, he argues that Wittgenstein’s appeal to the ordinary
does not represent a desire to return to an original and more authentic form of life; in fact,
for Cavell, it is not a return at all, since we are not returning to anywhere we have already
been.  Why then, if it is not ‘strictly speaking’ a return, does this demand present itself as
directed  precisely  towards  what  should  be most  familiar  to  us?   Because,  according to
Cavell, along this vertical line, the direction one follows out of the philosophical illusions in
which we get caught up is  not  up,  towards  a higher order  of  transcendence,  but  down:
“along each chain of a day’s denial.”421
Every reader of the Investigations will have some way of addressing the pattern of self-
defeat that is presented in the work, even if it is only to say no more of philosophers than
that they ‘misuse language’.  For no one can deny the manner in which the philosopher is
portrayed in the work, and not see in it at least something of oneself (even if one feels it is
perhaps  hyperbolically  presented).   As  Cavell  notes:  “The  philosopher  portrayed in  the
420S. Cavell, “Declining Decline”, op. cit., p. 44.
421S. Cavell, “Declining Decline”, op. cit., p. 46.
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Investigations,  confounded  by  unsatisfied  interlocutors,  has  show  them  their
dissatisfactions,  their  loss of progress.”422  And indeed,  we cannot fail  to recognise that
tendency in ourselves to see anything short of the ideal as arbitrary, artificial, or mediocre.
We recognise in ourselves that lust for the excesses of the sublime, or a longing for the
transcendent, against which Wittgenstein offers only poverty: “Here,” Cavell remarks aptly,
“I propose that we take the famous description in the preface to the  Investigations—‘this
work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time’—to be naming the time in question as
what is conceived and depicted by and in the work as a whole, in its apparently empty-
handedness.”423  It is the refusal to see the work either as exempt from its times, or as having
already achieved the task that it sets before itself and before us.
We saw above that Wittgenstein had hoped his work might be preserved for a “better sort of
reader” (CV, p. 66 [MS 136; 8.1.1948]), presumably one of a future in which a genuine
culture had replaced the degenerate civilisation of the present.  Did he, like Nietzsche, feel
that this was an inevitability?  One can only speculate.  In any case, he certainly did not feel
that its arrival was immanent.  We might consider here a remark Wittgenstein made to Drury
on a separate occasion from that discussed above, regarding Spengler: “My thinking is not
wanted in this present age, I have to swim so strongly against the tide.  Perhaps in a hundred
years people will really want what I am writing.”424  It has now been over seventy years
since Wittgenstein’s death, and scholars continue to wrangle over the finer points of his
philosophy.   Though  they  often  concern  minute  interpretive  details,  which  can  prove
frustrating to the casual reader, the issues being dealt with are not peripheral ones.  They
422S. Cavell, “Declining Decline”, op. cit., p. 56.
423S. Cavell, “Declining Decline”,  op. cit.,  p. 69.  Once again, we meet in a rather unexpected place the
precise shift in Wittgenstein’s  style  of thought, rather than that which we might typically consider its
substance,  between  the  Tractatus  and  the  Investigations.   The  above  line  from  the  preface  to  the
Investigations,  for  example,  stands  out  in  stark  contrast  to  its  youthful  and  boisterous  Tractarian
equivalent:  “On the other  hand,  the  truth of  the  thoughts  that  are  here  communicated seems to me
unassailable and definitive.  I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final
solution to the problems.  And if I am not mistaken in this belief, then the second thing in which the
value of the work consists in that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved.” (T, p.
4) 
424R. Rhees, Recollections of Wittgenstein, op cit., p. 160.
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concern rather the core ideas of his philosophical programme and the very nature of what he
sought to achieve with his work.  Whether or not these lingering questions will be resolved
in  the  near  future,  no  one  can  say.   Perhaps  with  the  passing  of  time  we  will  see  in
Wittgenstein’s work the clarity and perspicuity he longed for.  For the present, it seems to be
neither.
However, from out of this exploration one can at least perceive a tentative answer to the
question of von Wright with which we began:  How are we to understand the relationship
between Wittgenstein’s public philosophy and the deeply entrenched ‘cultural pessimism’
that we witness throughout his private remarks?  Firstly, the Nachlaß clearly illustrates what
many  had  already  intuitively  discerned  in  those  remarks  that  were  made  available  by
Wittgenstein himself during his lifetime: i.e., that in his work he was attempting to bring
about  a  new  form of  philosophising.   The  Nachlaß further  suggests,  however,  that  he
distinctly perceived this body of work as one which was ahead of its time and which might
thus one day shed a new light upon the darkness of our own.  Whether or not one submits
oneself to his same dire diagnosis of the present age as Wittgenstein did, we should not
ignore  the  fact  that  aspects  of  his  philosophy―very  significantly―can  be  read  in  a
conservative light.  Neither should we forget, however, that throughout Wittgenstein’s work,
though he may have done so  gloomily,  he  always kept  one eye on the  possibility  of  a




CHAPTER 6. ETHICS AND AESTHETICS ARE ONE: WITTGENSTEIN AND 
THE AVANT-GARDE
“When we think of the world’s future, we always mean the
destination it will reach if it keeps going in the direction we
can see it going in now; it does not occur to us that its path is
not a straight line but a curve, constantly changing.
—Culture and Value, p. 4 [MS 107; 24.10.1929]
I. What is the Avant-garde?  Peter Bürger and the Politics of Artistic Practice
The title alludes to a juxtaposition which may at first sight seem unorthodox. 425  Certainly,
from  the  point  of  view  of  Wittgenstein’s  otherwise  quite  conservative  artistic  taste,  a
comparison  of  his  work  with  the  aesthetic  strategies  of  the  avant-garde  is  surprising.
Nonetheless, when carried out conscientiously, it provides an illuminating perspective on
what  Wittgenstein  wished  to  achieve  in  his  work  and  how  that  wish  motivated,  even
necessitated, the unorthodox methodology he adopted.  For by all  accounts,  the form of
Wittgenstein’s  writing  is  considered  essential  for  grasping  the  content  of  his  thought.
Nonetheless, we still lack a clear understanding of the shift between his two major works,
especially  in  terms  of  the  stylistic  demands  placed upon readers  of  the  later  work.   In
particular, this comparison of Wittgenstein’s writing with the European avant-garde seeks to
highlight the uniquely political character of his post-1930 philosophy, which was all but
absent in his earlier writing.  What is revealed here is that, while the ‘anti-philosophical’
aim of Wittgenstein’s thought remains consistent across his work, in the latter part of his life
425This chapter originally appeared in a slightly condensed form as J.M. Fielding, “Wittgenstein and the
Avant-garde”, in eds. A. Weiberg and S. Majetschak, Aesthetics Today: Contemporary Approaches to the
Aesthetics of Nature and of Arts  (Amsterdam: De Gruyter, 2017), pp. 281-296.  Reprinted here  with
permission. 
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this critique of philosophy is placed alongside a more general critique of culture and of the
prevailing ideology that he felt was the source of our maladroit philosophical practices.
Undoubtedly, the term ‘avant-garde’ is one that is thrown around all too easily today.  A
theoretical framework is therefore necessary for understanding what is unique to the avant-
garde in  the  historical  sense rather  than the  adjectival,  i.e.  that  period  of  art  beginning
shortly after the turn of the century and continuing until the start of the Second World War.
According to Peter Bürger, whose  Theory of the Avant-garde remains a milestone in this
area of aesthetics, ‘avant-garde art’ in this historical sense thus encompasses the well-known
artistic  schools  of  Futurism (ca.  1909-1914),  Dada  (ca.  1916-1921) and Surrealism (ca.
1922-1939).426
The crux of Bürger’s thesis is his attempt to define the historical avant-garde in terms of a
shifting perception regarding the  social function of art,  as opposed to its production and
reception alone.  For this shift in the avant-gardistes’ understanding of the social function of
art followed, in particular, the earlier generation’s belief that art should be autonomous with
regards  to  the  practical,  socio-political  demands  of  living  in  contemporary  bourgeois
society.  The analysis of art in terms of bourgeois ideology is central here.  In fact, Bürger
quotes a well known passage by Marx on this point, regarding the ‘untruth’ of religion.  The
young Marx, he recalls, denounces as false consciousness the Christian ideology (in this
case), to which he cannot for all that deny some element of truth, for it does illuminate real
suffering in this world.  Quoting first Marx’s well-known passage in his Critique of Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right427, Bürger continues:
“It is in religion that this twofold character of ideology is brought out. 1. Religion is an illusion.  Man
projects into heaven what he believes he would like to see on earth.  To the extent that man believes
in God who is no more than an objectification of human qualities, he succumbs to an illusion.  2. But
religion  also  contains  an  element  of  truth.   It  is  ‘an  expression  of  real  wretchedness’ (for  the
426P. Bürger, Theory of the Avant-garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
427K. Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Cambridge: CUP, 1971), p. 131. 
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realization of humanity in heaven is merely a creation of the mind and denounces the lack of real
humanity in human society).  And it is ‘a protest against real wretchedness’ for even in their alienated
forms, religious ideals are a standard of what ought to be.”428
The traditional social function of art, like religion, is thus characterised by Bürger in the first
instance by its ‘duplicity’: while it  permits  an illusionary sense of unity and purpose, it
simultaneously makes less pressing the need to establish the kind of real social change that
would bring about such qualities in the daily life of the public.  In terms of art and the
consumption  of  art  by  the  museum-going  public,  it  is  aesthetic  diversion  which,  while
satisfying  the  public’s  demand  for  relief  from  the  turmoil  of  contemporary  society,
simultaneously brings to light the need for that diversion and suppresses the will to alleviate
the conditions that have given rise to it.
Fin-de-siècle aestheticism—which culminated at the time in the doctrine of l’art pour l’art
—thus figures heavily in Bürger’s account.  It figures there as a radical first attempt to rip
art  away  from  the  constraints  of  realist  aesthetics,  which  had  in  its  turn  already  been
appropriated by the interests of the ruling class of its day.  Where the early aestheticism of
the 19th century had begun by emphasizing the power of art to regenerate public life through
a  renewed  relevance,  by  the  turn  of  the  century  it  ended  up  insisting  on  its  complete
independence, isolating the artist from the needs of that same public they had once sought to
address.  In this respect, it is interesting to note that one of the more distinctly doctrinal
elements  of  the  l’art  pour  l’art movement  was  clearly  inscribed  over  the  door  of  the
Jugendstil’s House of the Secession in the Vienna of Wittgenstein’s youth:  Der Zeit Ihre
Kunst, Der Kunst Ihre Freiheit.  For aestheticism ceaselessly stressed that as a consequence
of art’s inherent autonomy, no period of art was superior to another.  Each was autonomous
in and of itself.429  This, in turn, gave way to the peculiar phenomena of the Ringstrasse in
428P. Bürger, Theory of the Avant-garde, op cit., p. 7.
429To take just a few examples from the milieu of Wittgenstein’s youth, we might consider here Klimt’s
return to two-dimensional figure drawing or Hoffmansthal’s poetics of silence and the crisis of language
it evoked (two decades before Wittgenstein’s Tractatus).  However, for all of aestheticism’s radicalism,
its absorption by the bourgeois elite―of whom the Wittgenstein family occupied a privileged place in
370
Vienna.   In  a  time without  a  progressive  sense  of  its  own aesthetic  identity,  architects
borrowed freely from historical styles of the past as they felt befitted the purpose of the
buildings  themselves.430  Thus,  the  Rathaus  was  designed  after  the  Gothic  style,  the
Burgtheatre after the Renaissance, while the Hellenic Reichsrat, complete with its imposing
statue of Athena at the entrance, stood as the very symbol on Vienna’s cultural superiority
within  Europe.   This  eclecticism was  not,  of  course,  restricted  to  architecture.   It  was
reflected in the interior spaces of Vienna’s inhabitants as well, its ubiquity ultimately leading
to a conflict within the movement itself.  Aestheticism was, in a manner of speaking, undone
by its own success.  Its social prestige attracted intense popular interest, popular interest
brought vulgarisation, and vulgarisation brought satirical attack.  Aestheticism, as Clement
Greenberg would note in his early 1930’s defence of the avant-garde, had by the turn of the
century degenerated into an all-pervasive culture of Kitsch.431
L’art pour l’art’s claim to autonomy was hardly a turn-of-the-century phenomena.  It has, in
fact, been generally attributed (rightly or wrongly) to Kant and Schiller’s aesthetic doctrines
from over a century before.  With aestheticism, however, Bürger argues that the autonomy
doctrine met a kind of historical limit where it was forced to confront the paradox buried
deep within its foundations.  As the autonomy of art grew into a concrete artistic ideology,
its lack of social impact became increasingly apparent.  What had begun over a century
before as a unique position in the social matrix—that is to say, a real, independent realm of
value, exclusive to art, and thus a unique responsibility on the part of the artist to instigate
social and political rejuvenation—had degenerated into a cloistered alienation.
In Bürger’s analysis,  the avant-garde thus emerged as a movement opposed to this shift
towards hermeticism in the pre-war generation of fin-de-siècle artists.  Art, he argues, thus
entered into an age of ‘self-criticism’, an activity he defines in terms of ‘ideology critique’.
Vienna―was not  lessened in the least:  Margaret  Stonborough-Wittgenstein famously sat  for a Klimt
portraiture, Hoffmansthal was indeed a distant relation of the family, and even the  Secessionsgebäude
itself was erected with the help of Karl Wittgenstein’s philanthropical contributions.
430C.E. Schorske, Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture (Oxford: OUP, 1998), pp. 24-115.
431C. Greenberg, “Avant Garde and Kitsch”, The Partisan Review, 1939, pp 34–49.
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As Bürger notes: “At the moment it has shed all that is alien to it, art necessarily becomes
problematic  to  itself.   As  institution  and  content  coincide,  social  ineffectuality  stands
revealed as the essence of art in bourgeois society, and thus provokes the self-criticism of
art.”432  If we look at the three main movements isolated by Bürger—Futurism, Dada, and
Surrealism—such intentions are apparent.  A work such as Duchamps’ The Fountain strikes
at the very heart of the notion of the artistic genius and the unity of the signature; Magritte’s
paintings ceaselessly confront the notion of the frame and its legitimating function; while
the  Futurists  aimed  to  identify  artistic  authenticity  with  technological  progress  and  a
readiness  for  violence,  claiming that  one must  even risk one’s  own life  in  the  process.
Artists of the avant-garde thus sought to attack art’s hermeticism, exploding not art itself but
the institution that surrounds it, in order to deliver artistic practice unto the real needs of the
public and so play a part in the transformation of everyday life.
Despite the differences in these schools, in each movement there is a similar adoption of the
preceding  age’s  turn  to  the  medium itself,  but  the  limits  of  that  medium are  exploded
beyond what artists at the turn of the century would have considered appropriate, or even
essential,  to  artistic  production.   More  radical  than  the  impressionists’  reduction  of
representation  to  its  barest  possible  elements,  for  example,  or  Klimt’s  use  of  two-
dimensionality  in  otherwise  ‘high  art’,  the  avant-gardistes  sought  materials  outside  the
traditional realm of aesthetics, which they employed in the diverse but similar techniques of
collage and montage.  In line with their critique of the institution of art and their desire to
return art to the everyday, avant-garde artists took freely from the materials of the real world
and pasted scraps of newspaper or fragments of cloth on canvas, overlapped representational
images with words and everyday objects, or, indeed abandoned representation altogether,
entitling works that were barely recognisable as such in blatantly absurd or contradictory
ways.   The  artwork  thus  began  to  shed  its  work-like  character,  in  order  to  became  a
‘happening’,  a singular event,  in which the participation of the audience was frequently
crucial.  Abandoning the work-like character of artistic production, the age of the manifesto
432P.  Bürger, Theory of the Avant-garde, op cit., p. 27.
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was ushered in as artists sought to inform the public of the new relation between art and
society that their works announced.433
Though certain aspects of their work varied greatly, Bürger articulates in particular such
common  theme  as  the  avant-gardistes’ continual  attack  on  what  he  calls  the  ‘organic
character’ of traditional works of art.  “The insertion of reality fragments into the work of
art,”  Bürger  notes  in  relation  to  the  practice  of  montage,  for  example,  “fundamentally
transforms the work.  The artist not only renounces shaping a whole, but gives the painting a
different status […] They are no longer signs pointing to reality, they are reality.”434  Like
Magritte’s superimposition of equally ‘real’ but spatially or logically incongruous pictorial
elements or the characteristic representation of frames within frames, the unity of meaning
that  characterises  the  part-whole  relationship  of  the  traditional,  organic  work  was  thus
disrupted.  As Bürger explains:
433Of course, the works themselves do not speak of what Bürger has here termed their ‘social function’,
since they sought to exploit their own institutional appropriation in a confrontational and ironical manner.
Hence, the need for manifestos.  We might consider here, for example, Marinetti’s claim from Futurist
Manifesto: 
“It is from Italy that we have flung this to the world, our manifesto of burning and overwhelming
violence, with which we today establish ‘Futurism’, for we intend to free this nation from its fetid
cancer of professors, archaeologists, tour guides, and antiquarians” (“The Founding and the Manifesto
of Futurism”, p. 5, in ed. E. Rainey, Modernism: An Anthology (New Zork: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005),
pp. 3-6.).  
Hermann Broch sums up quite nicely the distinctly political impetus for such aesthetic rejuvenation that
had begun a little earlier and then taken hold in the turmoil following the First World War.  As he notes: 
“That this feeling for the new, this affirmation of the new, this will to a new world-epoch was first
proclaimed by seemingly mediocre painters in a seemingly mediocre document, the Futurist Manifesto
of 1904, and the fact the manifestants went on the become not good painters but good fascists, is
relatively unimportant.  (Even a  futuristic  manifesto can prescribe no artistic,  but  a  most  political
attitudes.)” (H. Broch, Hugo von Hofmannsthal and his Time (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1984), pp. 153-154.)
Of course, the spirit of rejuvenation and return to real life alluded to here were not unique to Futurism,
but were central to the writings of the Dada and Surrealist manifesto as well (though the violence of the
Futurists was later mitigated). 
434P. Bürger, Theory of the Avant-garde, op cit., p. 78.
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“The organic work of art is constructed according to the syntagmatic pattern; individual parts and the
whole form a dialectical unity.  An adequate reading is described by the hermeneutic circle: the parts
can be understood only through the whole, the whole only through the parts.  This means that an
anticipating  comprehension  of  the  whole  guides,  and  is  simultaneously  corrected  by,  the
comprehension  of  the  parts.   The  fundamental  precondition  for  this  type  of  reception  is  the
assumption of a necessary congruence between the meaning of individual parts and the meaning of
the whole.  This precondition is rejected by the nonorganic work, and this fact defines its decisive
difference from the organic work of art.  The parts ‘emancipate’ themselves from a superordinate
whole; they are no longer its essential element.”435
What this means, Bürger emphasises,  is that the parts lack hermeneutic necessity.   New
elements of the same or similar type could be added, or present elements could be omitted
altogether, with no corresponding shift in the significance of the work as a whole.  Far from
a change solely in the production of art,  this shift in the technique of artistic production
naturally had important consequences for the reception of artworks as well.  The work’s
objective became associated with its shock-value, Bürger argues, drawing the recipients’
attention  to  the  principles  underlying  the  work  and  particularly  to  their  contingency—
ultimately like those principles structuring our everyday lives outside the gallery as well.
Shock was aimed at, as a stimulus to change one’s life.  It was employed as a means to
break through aesthetic immanence and to initiate a change in how the audience viewed not
only art, but life itself and the corresponding institutions which govern human interaction
more generally.  The avant-gardistes were thus not attempting to reinforce the aestheticist’s
belief in a distinct domain of experience, which would reside in the aesthetic realm alone.436
435P. Bürger, Theory of the Avant-garde, op cit., p. 79-80.
436Bürger’s work has been criticised for drawing from too narrow a pool of examples.  R. Murphy, for
example,  argues that  Bürger has missed similar  critiques of the organic work of art  in other artistic
schools  of  the  time,  most  notably  expressionism.   In  this  regard,  he  notes,  the  various  forms  of
discontinuity and disruption in expressionist writing, and expressionism more generally, are parallel to
those of the avant-garde movements:
“These non-organic textual structures dramatize subjectivity not by channelling it into the traditional
format, namely a combination of plot and characterisation based on the notion of the individual as a
single, unified and unique Cartesian entity—in other words not into the form which Bürger sees as
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Rather,  they  were  adapting  the  public’s  readiness  to  accept  such a  domain,  in  order  to
exploit its weakness and expose the faltering ideology upon which it rested.
Naturally,  seen  from  the  point  of  view  that  defends  a  continual  development  between
romanticism, aestheticism and the avant-garde, this development may appear paradoxical.
For, when we think of avant-garde works today, we often imagine them as those that are
most removed from everyday life, the most esoteric, elitist even.  In other words, they are
often  viewed  as  the  very  height  of  l’art  pour  l’art  decadence.   Hence  the  perennial
question―‘But  is  it  art?’―associated  with  avant-garde  works  in  particular.   However,
according  to  Bürger’s  analysis,  this  does  not  negate  the  avant-gardists’ intentions,  but
merely signals their failure to bring about the kind of total transformation of the relationship
between art and life that they sought.  Nonetheless, even if the avant-gardistes fell short of
their their aim in this regard—their artworks having eventually been appropriated by the
very institution they sought to destabilise—the movement was not a total failure for all that.
Their  critique  of  the  institution  of  art  succeeded  in  making  the  general  categories  that
pervade its legitimating function apparent, raising important questions about the validity of
institutionally determined artistic norms that continue to define aesthetic discourse to this
day.
providing an aesthetic compensation for the ‘lost totality of the human being’.  Instead, the avant-
garde text  stages  subjectivity  as  fragmented  and discontinuous,  for  example as  a  constellation of
personae, a series of mutually conflicting and contradictory roles played out by seemingly separate
figures in the text.” (R. Murphy, Theorising the Avant-garde (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), p. 18.)
Bürger’s response to this critique is clear: montage and collage are by no means an invention of the
avant-garde,  nor  its  sole  property.   In  this  respect  certain  aspects  are  shared,  between  it  and
expressionism, for example.  In both types of work, individual elements are deprived of their function
and joined  together  in  such  a  way as  to  disrupt  the  coherence  of  the  whole.   Nonetheless,  Bürger
correctly emphases that similar styles of work need not have an identical social basis.  Similar modes of
production may differ greatly in regards to their social function, which will in turn shift to locus of their
reception.  As Murphy makes clear,  the expressionist work still  ‘points’ beyond itself: representing a
discontinuous and fragmented subjectivity, it still  serves the self-understanding of the bourgeois,  art-
going public.   Though it  thus  began to weaken the  letter  of  l’art  pour l’art’s  stringent  doctrine  of
autonomy, it remained within the spirit of aestheticism, quite traditionally conceived in terms of art’s
general autonomy, i.e. its unique ability to represent that which cannot find expression elsewhere in our
lives.
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II. Some Limitations on the Parallel between Art and Philosophy
This has undoubtedly been a hasty summary of Bürger’s conscientiously articulated and
thoroughly dialectic argument.  However, the extent to which Wittgenstein partook in some
of  the  aesthetic  strategies  of  the  avant-garde  is,  hopefully,  already  becoming  clear.
Nonetheless,  in  order  to  make  it  clear  that  Wittgenstein  was  motivated  by  comparable
historical considerations,  and  that  he  was  not  simply  borrowing  from  the  avant-garde
because of some inclination towards its bald aesthetic value―which, given the preceding
analysis, would be an absurd claim―, it remains to be made clear how aestheticism differed
from philosophy around the turn of the century and how Wittgenstein positioned himself
towards the latter.
Firstly,  it  is  clear  that  philosophy  never  went  through  the  same  progressive  movement
towards autonomy that art had made from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards.
Even if post-enlightenment philosophy had isolated itself from dominant social practices in
many significant respects, particularly as it freed itself from religious constraints, by the turn
of  the  century  the  practical  import  of  philosophy  was  again  centre-stage.   This  was
especially the case in analytic philosophy, in Vienna and Cambridge in particular, and the
benefits  that  analytic  philosophers  felt  they could bring to  science and mathematics.  437
437Nonetheless, it must be noted that the ideal of ideological disinterestedness, which Bürger characterises
as essentially bourgeois in its apolitical universalism, ran deeply throughout it.  Specifically, the socio-
political consequences of the progress that analytic philosophy was assumed to represent were to be
divorced  from the  value  of  truth  itself.   Indeed,  as  the  following  quote  from Russell  illustrates,  a
philosopher’s ‘moral authority’―specifically as ‘a seeker of truth’―was intimately tied to one’s ability
to severe oneself from political interests:
“Morally,  a philosopher who uses his professional competence for anything except  a disinterested
search for truth is guilty of a kind of treachery.  And when he assumes, in advance of inquiry, that
certain beliefs, whether true or false, are such as to promote good behaviour, he is so limiting the
scope of philosophical speculation as to make philosophy trivial; the true philosopher is prepared to
examine  all  preconceptions.   When any limits are placed,  consciously or unconsciously,  upon the
pursuit of truth, philosophy becomes paralysed by fear, and the ground is prepared for a government
censorship  punishing  those  who  utter  ‘dangerous  thoughts’—in  fact,  the  philosopher  has  already
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Furthermore,  Russell,  Frege,  and  the  logical  empiricists  who  would  soon  adopt  their
programme in Vienna, held a firm belief in the notion of progress—not only for science but
for philosophy as well.  Der Zeit Ihre Philosophie, Der Philosophie Ihre Freiheit would be
inscribed over no doors here.
Autonomy, simply put, was not part of the wider philosophical program of the day.  At the
same  time,  however,  the  question  must  be  asked:  What  would  such  an  ‘autonomous
philosophy’ look  like?   How  could  philosophy  sever  itself  from  the  independent  and
objective truth that it had always sought to express with fidelity?  Much like a novel without
a narrative, no matter how minimal, a work of philosophy without the aim of understanding
the world—or, at least, of articulating a sceptical voice regarding such an understanding—
placed such a censorship over his ow investigations.” (B. Russell, History of Western Philosophy, op
cit., p. 863.)  
Naturally, Russell himself was highly politically engaged, as were many of the Vienna Circle heirs of
logical empiricism. Nonetheless, attributing a distinct political orientation to logical empiricism itself is
problematic.   Russell  himself  insisted  that  his  socio-political  thought  and  his  mathematical-
epistemological thought were distinct, as would Carnap after him.  In terms of the Vienna Circle, in
particular,  this  tension  between  the  ‘value-neutrality’  of  logical  empiricism  and  strong  political
convictions of some of its practitioners has given rise to lively and as-yet-inconclusive debate.  (For a
survey of this debate, cf.: T. Uebel, “Political Philosophy of Science in Logical Empiricism: The Left
Vienna Circle”,  Studies in  the History of  Science,  36,  2005,  pp.  754-773;  S.  Richardson,  “The Left
Vienna Circle, Part 1; Carnap, Neurath, and the Left Vienna Circle Thesis”, Studies in the History and
Philosophy of Science, 40, 2009, pp. 14-24; and T. Uebel, “What’s right about Carnap, Neurath and the
Left Vienna Circle: A Refutation”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 41, 2010, pp. 214-
221.)
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would surpass the limit of its integrity and become unrecognisable as such.438  Significantly,
such a work would cease to be a work of philosophy per se and become rather a work of art.
What such limitations highlight is the need to distinguish between the aesthetic strategies of
the historical avant-garde, in Bürger’s sense, as specific to the plastic and performative arts,
and those of modernism more generally, which thrived in a wide variety of domains at about
the same time, with or without the doctrine of autonomy.  Admittedly, it  is tempting to
identify  the  avant-garde  with  modernism  wholesale.   Such  wholesale  identification  is
facilitated,  moreover,  by  the  lack  of  a  clear  definition  of  what  modernism  is  precisely.
Unlike parallel endeavours within the avant-garde, it was never organised by a group who
shared an agenda or even a set of clearly articulated priorities.  In light of this fact, it has
been claimed that modernism developed out of a prevailing desire to resist the collective
stress of contemporary life and the total rationalisation of the human being within industrial
society.   It  was  of  course  Marx  who  had,  only  shortly  before,  highlighted  how  the
438The comparison with literature is illuminating here.  In his survey of turn-of-the-century literature, Broch
suggests  that  of  all  modernist  literature,  perhaps Joyce came closest  to  achieving something like  an
avant-garde work in Bürger’s sense, i.e. in terms of exploiting and critiquing the institutional framework
within which a work takes on its specific work-like character.  Noting first the sense of anxiety that
prevailed among writers in the early years of the twentieth century—here, for example, he considers
Proust,  Thomas Mann and Henry James—and the failure  of their  aesthetic  impulses to  express  that
anxiety in prose, Broch explains:
“Of the three men, James had the weakest impulse, Proust probably the strongest, to approach the new
with all its threats.  But none of the three did so.  Joyce at one time began to do so with Ulysses (which
appeared after the war), and it would be idle to deliberate whether and how the others might have
taken a similar route. […] For unlike the new painting, whose new symbolic language had attained
group value, Joyce had most likely conceived a unique experiment.  Although, having retained the
form of the novel, he had created a hybrid structure, it could hardly be further radicalised; and if it
could be radicalised, it would have become still more subjective in the formation of language and
symbol; it would have to flow into a subjective esoteric which no one would be able to resolve.” (H.
Broch, Hugo von Hofmannsthal and his time: The European Imagination 1860-1920, op cit., p. 160.)
What such limitations in the domains of literature and philosophy reveal is, of course, not an ontological
boundary, but rather a normative boundary beyond which readers would not be able to identify such a
work of literature or philosophy as such.  The discussions of Wittgenstein’s highly literary  style and the
status of his works as works of philosophy, are in this sense not without good reason.  (Cf., e.g., M.
Perloff, “Writing Philosophy as Poetry,” in eds. O. Kuusela and M. McGinn The Oxford Handbook of
Wittgenstein (Oxford: OUP, 2011), pp. 714-728.)
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commodification of time and the reification of the individual would progressively engender
alienation within society.  Modernist strategies that turn radically towards the material of a
work’s  construction,  alternate  abruptly  between  perspectives  and  voices,  and  ultimately
fracture the coherence of the work as a whole, are thus interpreted as providing a refuge
from the all-encompassing rationalisation of the individual within modern society.
Leaving aside the question of whether modernism succeeded or failed in this attempt, it is
important to note that, so-conceived, it remains subject to the ‘duplicity’ of aestheticist art
diagnosed by Bürger at the outset of his work.  And it is perhaps Georg Lukács, in his 1957
essay  “The  Ideology of  Modernism”,  who levelled the  strongest  arguments  against  this
‘taking refuge’ from contemporary society, specifically in terms of its bourgeois character.
This is not to say that the works themselves were bourgeois  per se.  High modernism’s
“obsession with morbidity,” he notes, “had ceased to have a merely decorative function,
bringing  colour  into  the  greyness  of  reality,  and  become  a  moral  protest  against
capitalism.”439 However, modernist art, with its abdication of social responsibility in a time
of great economic and political upheaval, did not and could not have contained any concrete
criticisms, which ultimately compromised any character of protest it  may have had.  As
Lukács remarks of Musil, and modernist art more generally:
“With  Musil—and  with  many  other  modernist  writers—psychopathology  became  the  goal,  the
terminus ad  quem,  of  their  artistic  intentions.   But  there  is  a  double  difficulty  inherent  in  their
intention,  which follows from its  underlying ideology.   There is,  first,  a lack of definition.  The
protest expressed by this flight into psychopathology is an abstract gesture; its rejection of reality is
wholesale and summary, containing no concrete criticisms.  It is a gesture, moreover, that is destined
to lead us nowhere; it  is  an escape into nothingness.  Thus the propagators of this  ideology are
mistaken in thinking that such a protest could ever be fruitful in literature.  In any protest against
particular social conditions, these conditions themselves must have the central place.”440
439G. Lukács, “The Ideology of Modernism”, p. 1224, in ed. D.H. Richter,  The Critical Tradition: Classic
Texts and Contemporary Trends (Boston and New York: St. Marten’s Press, 1989), p. pp. 1218-1232.
440G. Lukács, “The Ideology of Modernism”, op cit., p. 1224
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Modernism  could  not  advance  towards  a  concrete  terminus  ad  quem,  argues  Lukács,
because it had denied itself, from the outset, any concrete conception of history that would
support the establishment of a  new order upon the ruined foundations of the present, and
thus, despite its protestations, it served in the end merely to reinforce that existing order.
Though the human condition was exalted in its abstract particularity, it was robbed of its
concrete potential for improvement.  Human nature was seen from the point of view of what
it has always been and always would be.  Our collective condition was thus treated as static,
as opposed to dynamic, and “the denial of history, of development, and thus of perspective,
becomes the hallmark of true insight into the nature of reality.”441
Lukács criticism of modernism may itself be called into question, not least of all due to its
ideological character, which risks white-washing the details surrounding particular authors
and the full nuance of their art.442  However, the notion of history that he evokes there, as
well  as the tension between the abstract/timeless/a-historical  individual and the concrete
human-being,  is  significant  for  our  understanding of  what  distinguishes  the  avant-garde
from modernism more generally.  In such a case, furthermore, it is of little consequence that
Lukács includes schools such as Futurism and Surrealism within modernism, i.e. schools
which Bürger considers as distinct from the movement more generally.  For, according to
Bürger, most criticism has in fact lost sight of the goals that the avant-garde set up for itself.
That is, most critics have failed to adequately consider how the avant-garde sought to shift
art’s social function.  Crucially, as opposed to Lukács’ characterisation of modernism in
general, for Bürger, the avant-gardistes were not merely reacting to feelings of angst, ennui,
or a sense of  Weltschmertz, engendered by the alienation inherent to life in contemporary
industrial  society.   What  in  fact  distinguishes  the  avant-garde  from  modernism  more
generally is, for him, precisely the  terminus ad quem that Lukács diagnoses as lacking in
modernism.  It is the destruction of the institution of art and the return of art to the everyday
praxis  of  life.   This,  by  its  very  nature,  was  specifically  supported  by  the  objective
441G. Lukács, “The Ideology of Modernism”, op cit., p. 1226
442S. De Cauwer, “Pathology and the Search for a Modern Ethics in the Writings of Robert Musil”, in ed. S.
Symons, The Marriage of Aesthetics and Ethics (Leiden: Brill, 2015), pp. 251-256.
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understanding  of  historical  progress  lacking  in  turn-of-the-century  aestheticism,  and
(according to Lukács) the post-war modernism that followed in its wake.  As we will see, it
is furthermore this shifting sense of historical progress that placed Wittgenstein at the heart
of the more general cultural shift taking place in the aesthetic realm, from aestheticism to
something more like the avant-garde, with its attack on the institutions which shape our
lives and its desire to return aesthetic praxis—or in the case of Wittgenstein, philosophical
praxis—to the everyday.  
III. Turning The Axis of the Investigation Round: From Modernism to Avant-garde
The preceding remarks lead us to the natural question: If autonomy was not part of the
philosophical landscape at the time, what is to be gained from a comparison of the aesthetic
strategies of the avant-garde, which sought to reject such autonomy and thrust art back into
the centre of real life, with Wittgenstein’s philosophical corpus?  At first sight, it may seem
like  the  answer  is  ‘not  a  great  deal’.   However,  it  is  noteworthy  that  Wittgenstein
himself―unlike  figures  such  as  Frege,  Russell,  or  the  various  members  of  the  Vienna
Circle―felt that there was no connection between what passed as philosophy within the
academy and the everyday praxis of real life.  He felt that the vast majority of philosophy
was little more than nonsensical pseudo-babble, that there was not and could be no such
thing as progress in philosophy—for he denied the realm of distinctly ‘philosophical truths’
upon  which  logical  positivism  in  particular  relies,  its  own  version  of  the  ‘autonomy
doctrine’,  so  to  speak—and he  thus  felt  that  contemporary  philosophers  were  guilty  of
making the same mistakes that the ancient Greeks had made two thousand years prior.  As
he noted early on, after his return to Cambridge:
“People say again and again that philosophy doesn’t really progress, that we are still occupied with
the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks.  But the people who say this don’t understand
why this is so.  It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking
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the same questions.  As long as there continues to be a verb ‘to be’ that looks as if it functions in the
same way as ‘to eat’ and ‘to drink’, as long as we still have the adjectives ‘identical’, ‘true’, ‘false’,
‘possible’, as long as we continue to talk of a river of time, of an expanse of space, etc., etc., people
will keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at something
which no explanation seems capable of clearing up.
And what’s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because in so far as people think
they can see the ‘limits of human understanding’, they believe of course that they can see beyond
there.” (CV, p. 15 [MS 111; 24.8.1931])
From this,  we  see  that  Wittgenstein  distinctly  recognised  the  ‘duplicitous’ character  of
philosophy, which in his view pretended to satisfy a human demand that it could not in
principle succeed in fulfilling.  Thus, as philosophy is incapable of satisfying its promise for
a higher, transcendent form of knowledge, it cannot but defer that satisfaction, propelling
philosophers into the future armed only with the same dissatisfactions and doomed to repeat
the same mistakes.  Thus, though philosophy was not conceived of in aestheticist terms by
the majority of its practitioners at the time, Wittgenstein himself understood philosophy in a
strikingly similar manner.  It proves perhaps less surprising, then, that he should ultimately
employ  similar  avant-gardist  strategies  in  his  attack  upon  it  following  his  return  to
philosophy in 1929, a decade after having completed the Tractatus.
Now,  as  noted  above,  modernism  lacks  a  coherent  definition.   So  any  survey  of  the
modernist  style will  have to  content itself  with a reliance on a ‘family resemblance’ of
diverse and often incongruent features.  Nonetheless, looking at Wittgenstein’s  Tractatus,
one readily identifies a great deal that might justifiably be characterised as modernist in the
aesthetic sense.  Like many modernist classics, the text employs an arcane structure and
replaces  the  consistent  development  of  a  stable  perspective  with  formal  patterning.   It
alternates  dramatically  between  diverse  perspectives,  interrupting  the  coherence  of  the
‘narrative’.  Mirroring the Viennese eclecticism of Wittgenstein’s youth, statements on the
nature of language and logic, mathematics, physics, ethics, death and the meaning of life, as
well as colour, music and visual perception, are placed ‘side by side’ and positioned in such
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a way that chains of reasoning may be followed both vertically and/or horizontally.  Like
many modernist works, it takes the ‘primitive state’ of humankind as a point of reference
and  shows  ambivalence  towards  the  contemporary  worldview.   In  turn,  it  displays  a
sensitivity to the unequal relation between the mind and the self—and, perhaps above all, it
includes  the  heroic  idea  that  philosophy,  when  done  correctly,  can  transcend  the
misconceptions  of  the  modern world  and provide a stable  footing  against  its  prevailing
confusions.443
Of  course,  when  Wittgenstein  returned  to  philosophy  in  the  1930’s,  his  position  had
radically changed.  He recognised “grave errors” in his earlier work and clearly felt that his
new approach to philosophy addressed a lack in its form as well as in its content.  He later
described some of the work’s stylistic features as “kitsch” (PPO, p. 133[MS 183, p. 30;
16.5.1930]), and even a casual glance at the two works side-by-side will reveal the almost
complete lack of ornamentation in the second, even when compared to the already rather
443As modern scholarship has illuminated, there is a critical element at work in the  Tractatus.  However, the
object of that criticism may be much broader than is commonly assumed.  If it appears to be about the
traps that modern logicians (such as Russell, for example) fall into, one could easily claim that the object
of  that  criticism is modern society’s  overactive rationality  more generally  (with Russell  standing in
proxy).  However, it cannot be denied that in Wittgenstein’s early work―unlike the latter―that critical
element takes the form of an isolated struggle by the individual to overcome the negative impact of that
culture, which is to say, without aide from nor consequences for one’s fellow community.  In the words
of Lukács:
“Man, thus conceived, is an ahistorical being. […] This negation of history takes two different forms
in modernist literature.  First, the hero is strictly confined within the limits of his own experience.
There is not for him—and apparently not for his creator—any preexistent reality beyond his own self,
acting upon him or being acted upon by him.  Secondly, the hero himself is without personal history.
He is ‘thrown into the world’: meaninglessly, unfathomably.  He does not develop through contact
with the world; he neither forms nor is formed by it.  The only ‘development’ in this literature is the
gradual revelation of the human condition.  Man is now what he has always been and always will be.
The narrator, the examining subject, is in motion; the examined reality is static.” (G. Lukács, “The
Ideology of Modernism”, op cit. p. 1220.)
Whether or not one wishes to impugn the entirely of modernist literature as such with these remarks, as
Lukács evidently does, anyone familiar with the Tractatus and especially the pre-Tractarian Notebooks
will  recognise  these features  there.   Perhaps above all,  Wittgenstein’s remarks on solipsism and his
oblique  reference  to  the  fictional  book  The  World  as  I  Found It  encapsulate  this  spirit  of  resolute
individualism.
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austere  Tractatus.  In place of the earlier, punchier, aphoristic style, what we find in the
Investigations is a generally playful and imaginative rumination on the common behaviour
of humankind, which is almost banal in its everydayness.  In a word, what marks the shift
from the Tractatus to the Investigations is the distinctly social character that the early work
lacked—even if the object of Wittgenstein’s criticism, which is to say the empty speculative
use of language in philosophy, remained consistent across the two works.  Beyond merely
reflecting on one’s use of language, in the latter work the task is refocused on one’s life and
the role that language plays within it.  What is significant in this change, moreover, is the
corresponding shift in the production and intended mode of reception of the work, which
correspond to this shift towards a more social character.
In Bürger’s view, the modernist aesthetic continues in many significant respects along the
path first laid down by fin-de-siècle aestheticism.  For with respect to the categories of his
analysis,  modernism  partakes  in  similar  modes  of  production  (individual),  modes  of
reception (also individual), as well as a common purpose or social function (the portrayal of
bourgeois self-understanding).  That this characterisation bares a certain resemblance to the
Tractatus is born out by the fact that, if one were to adopt a Tractarian world-view, nothing
in one’s outer appearance would change.  One would still carry on much as one had done
before, only without the temptation to enter into metaphysical speculation when questions
present themselves as great world-shaping riddles.444  The aim here is thus not to transform
444Regarding the comparison drawn between the Tractatus and certain modes of modernist aesthetics, it is
worthwhile noting here that Hofmannsthal would write of a similar indiscernibility in his Lord Chandos
Letter, published almost two decades before the  Tractatus.  In this unique story, told in the form of a
letter  to  the  protagonist’s  contemporary―none other  than Lord Francis  Bacon himself―Chandos  (a
poet) is writing to explain how he has fallen into what might be described as a ‘Tractarian crisis’, where
all the words he once used to transcend our ordinary experience of the world have ceased to have any
meaning and thus, though mystical experience pervades his existence, the expression of that experience
is on the verge of escaping him forever:
“Since then, I have led a life such as you will scarcely understand, I fear, so uninspired, so thoughtless
in the course of my days—a life, I might add, that is virtually indistinguishable from the lives of my
neighbours, my relatives, and most of the landowning gentry of this realm, and one not wholly without
its blissful and quickening moments.” (H. von Hofmannsthal,  The Lord Chandos Letter (Marlboro,
VT: Marlboro Press, 1986), p. 22.)  
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one’s  practice,  but  to  return  it  to  a  more  originary  one.   The  ethical  aspect  of  such a
transformation is made clear in the preparatory  Notebooks, where Wittgenstein notes: “It
seems one can’t say anything more than: Live happily!” (NB, p. 78)  As we have seen,
however, Bürger continues by defining the avant-garde in terms of its conscientious attack
on such an aesthetic locus of bourgeois individualism.
What, then, is it about the latter text that is specifically avant-garde in its approach and
which the earlier text lacked?  By Bürger’s light, there is an important distinction to make
between the criticism of philosophers (what he calls ‘dogmatic criticism’), the criticism of
philosophy by  means  of  philosophy (‘system-immanent  criticism’),  and  the  criticism of
philosophy in toto, which is to say, as an institutionalised practice (what Bürger calls ‘self-
criticism’ or ‘ideology critique’).  The meaning of ‘dogmatic criticism’ should be clear here,
also that this term is not intended to be dismissive.  What is interesting to note, rather, is the
shared dialectic nature of the other two categories, which for all that are not identical.  In
system-immanent critique, the reference to philosophising becomes the principle means of
doing philosophy and advancing its endeavours.  This most readily recalls Kant and his own
self-proclaimed  ‘critical  philosophy’.   Kant’s  critique  remained  system-immanent  in
Bürger’s sense insofar as he failed to question the wider institution of philosophical practice,
proposing rather to trace the limits of thought ‘from the inside out’, as it were, thus drawing
positive  philosophical  theses  from that  critique.   Although Kant’s  investigation into  the
antinomies was historically conditioned, for example, the result of that investigation was
posited as an atemporal, timeless norm.445  With self-critique, on the contrary, philosophising
For a detailed treatment of the significance of this line, and the indiscernibility between Chandos and his
neighbours,  cf.  B.  Bennett,  “Chandos  and  his  Neighbours”,  Deutsche  Vierteljahrsschrift  für
Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 49, 1975, pp. 315-331.
445A key example of such a positive thesis is found in the doctrine of the autonomy of art itself.  Bürger
outlines the bourgeois character of this thesis thus: “With his demand that the aesthetic judgment be
universal, Kant also closes his eyes to the particular interests of his class.  Towards the products of the
class enemy also, the bourgeois theoretician claims impartiality.  What is bourgeois in Kant’s argument is
precisely the demand that the aesthetic judgment have universal validity.  The pathos of universality is
characteristic of the bourgeoisie, which fights the feudal nobility as an estate that represents particular
interests.” (Bürger, The Theory of the Avant-garde, op cit., p. 43.)
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becomes the sole subject of philosophy and the work becomes about nothing other than the
practice itself, thus conceived as a historically and temporally situated.  In Bürger’s terms,
‘the institution’ and the ‘content’ of particular works completely coincides, thus drawing our
attention to the various institutional functions which grant or deny them legitimacy—i.e.,
from the outside-in.  The realization of this aim requires, however, a shift in the respective
modes of production and reception of the work in question.
For Wittgenstein,  it  is  undoubtedly on the  level  of  its  intended reception  that  the  great
differences between his earlier and later work were most readily felt.  Among early readings
of the work, there was a recognition of a new conversational tone that led many to ask: to
whom precisely is this work addressed?  Certainly, the ‘metaphysical subject’ was rejected
along with other key notions from the  Tractatus—although, as the penultimate section of
that earlier work makes clear, this was already to be rejected at that time along with the rest
of the work’s pseudo-philosophical architecture.  Nonetheless, in contradistinction to the
smattering of references to the reader of the Tractatus, it was noticed early on that the reader
takes a key position in the latter work.  Here, however, the reader appears not in the third
person, nor instructed how the work is to be read, but rather in the  second person, being
thus  invited to  participate  in  a  shared  problematic,  frequently  elucidated  by  the  author
himself (not surprisingly) in the first person.  
The first section of the Investigations, which begins with a quotation from Augustine about
the learning of language, thus continues: “These words, it seems to me, give us a particular
picture of the essence of human language.” (PI §1, my emphasis)  Such a tone, as Cavell has
suggested, suggests a refusal on Wittgenstein’s part to see the work either as exempt from
the intellectual milieu of its time or—unlike the Tractatus—as having already achieved the
task that  it  sets  before itself.446  Despite the difference in intensity between avant-garde
‘happenings’ and Wittgenstein’s inclusion of the reader in the problematics addressed in the
work, this dissolution of the distance which separates the producer and the recipient of a
446S. Cavell, “Declining Decline”, op cit..
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work  resonates  with  Bürger’s  evaluation  of  the  role  of  the  ‘recipient’ of  avant-garde
artworks.
The dialogical style of reasoning found in the  Investigations, one could further point out,
finds a strong parallel in Wittgenstein’s method of classroom instruction.  Addressing the
attendees directly,  while jumping from topic to topic, appears to have been a means for
Wittgenstein to  bring  about  a  mode of  understanding that  saw each topic  as  intricately
entwined,  and  thus  arising  not  from a  single  misunderstanding  but  from a  network  of
misconceptions.  They had to be resisted from many sides at once, lest one misconception
be replaced by another that had been previously knocked down.  These were not errors in
the traditional sense.   As Wittgenstein noted already in 1933,  in the first  of the section
headings for the chapter entitled ‘Philosophy’ in the Big Typescript:
“DIFFICULT OF PHILOSOPHY NOT THE INTELLECTUAL DIFFICULTY OF THE SCIENCES,  BUT THE
DIFFICULTY OF A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE.  RESISTANCES OF THE WILL MUST BE OVERCOME.” (PO,
p. 161 [TS 213, p. 406; 1933])  
From the recollection of Wittgenstein’s students, we know that they frequently experienced
a kind of shock in while undergoing this process, as the confusions that arose from jumping
from one to another topic gave way to a sudden insight into what Wittgenstein had intended
all  along.447  Apparently,  however,  these  ‘revelations’ were  not  long-lived—the  will  to
447Lest  we think that  such shocking insights  were the result  of  Wittgenstein’s  domineering personality
alone, consider here the account of P. Hadot, a scholar not of analytic philosophy but ancient philosophy,
who credits Wittgenstein with the genesis of the guiding idea of his work, that of l’exercice spirituel, or
‘spiritual  exercise’,  as one that  reveals how philosophy in antiquity was a way of life rather than a
doctrine.  As Hadot notes: 
“The analysis—which one can call  revolutionary—of language that  is  developed in  Philosophical
Investigations  provoked in  me,  I  must  say,  an  overturning  (bouleversement) of  my  philosophical
reflections.  All sorts of new perspectives opened up to me in my work as a historian of philosophy.”
(P. Hadot, Wittgenstein et les limites de langage (Paris: Vrin, 2006), p. 11, my translation.)
It was, furthermore, Wittgenstein’s rejection of the mentalist view of language, and his replacement of
the analysis in the Tractatus with that of language as a social activity, or form of life, that revolutionised
the study of ancient thought for Hadot.  
“This  idea  helped  me  to  resolve  the  problem  that  was  put  before  me,  as  well  as  many  of  my
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philosophise  being,  perhaps,  stronger  than  Wittgenstein  had  imagined—and  the  same
procedure would typically begin again at the following séance, with a different, dizzying set
of examples.
It is only when this pattern of dialogic reasoning is compared to the style and structure of
the Tractatus that it receives its full significance.  Like the Tractatus,  the Investigations is
comprised of a series of numbered paragraphs; however, unlike the Tractatus, the later text
seems to have no greater organising principle.  Paragraphs appear to be arranged willy-nilly,
with neither tempo nor crescendo, and the endpoint of the work seems to have no greater
necessity than any other.  The key to understanding this inherently contingent structure is
what Bürger calls the ‘non-organic’ character of the avant-garde work.  We have seen how
this implicates a significant shift in the relation between the parts of the work and the whole.
The parts of a non-organic work lack hermeneutic necessity.  New elements of the same or
similar  type  could  be  added,  present  elements  could  rearranged,  or  omitted  altogether,
without a corresponding shift in the overall significance of the work.  Given this unusual
mode of production,  moreover,  there  seems to be no particular  benefit  to  be gained by
reading the remarks in the order they have been arranged. Wittgenstein himself appears to
have eschewed all traditional forms of argumentative linearity.
Of course, we know today that Wittgenstein struggled immensely over the final arrangement
of the remarks in the text.  In fact, the difficulties that Wittgenstein underwent finding an
acceptable form for this, his second magnum opus, are referred to directly in the preface of
the work, where Wittgenstein characterises the unique form of work as an ‘album’.  As he
notes there:
“I have written all these thoughts as remarks, short paragraphs, of which there is sometimes a fairly
long chain about the same subject, while I sometimes make a sudden jump, jumping from one topic
to another.—It was my intention at first to bring all this together in a book whose form I pictured
colleagues: that of the apparent incoherence of the philosophical writers of Antiquity […] It is with
this lens that I began to speak of l’exercice spirituel” (Ibid.)
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differently at different times.  But the essential thing was that the thoughts should proceed from one
subject to another in a natural order and without breaks.
After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my thoughts together into such a whole, I realized I
should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks;
my thoughts were soon crippled if I  tried to force them on in any single direction against  their
natural inclination.——And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation.
For  this  compels  us  to  travel  over  a  wide field of  thought  criss-cross  in  every direction.—The
philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were
made in the course of these long and involved journeyings.” (PI, Preface)
Despite Wittgenstein’s new conversational tone, early readers of the work were prone to
underestimate the significance of these remarks.  Where some were once inclined to read in
this an admission of a personal incapacity to write a ‘better’, more coherent work, we now
prioritise his claim that such a work would be contrary to the what he was trying to achieve.
Thus, when Wittgenstein remarks a little further on that “this book is really only an album”
(ibid.), he is rather indicating something essential about what one should expect from the
work and how it is to be read.  The Nachlaß in particular shows how the final order of these
remarks  was painstakingly constructed  from a ‘cut-and-paste’ rearrangement  of  remarks
contained  in  several  manuscripts,  which  had  themselves  in  turn  been  constructed  from
previously rearranged manuscripts over the course of the previous fifteen years, with any
number of additional commentaries, interlinear insertions and frequently minute, apparently
senseless alterations.448 
448In terms of the comparison articulated here an interesting example presents itself, which unfortunately,
can only be indicated here.  The comparison concerns Bürger’s discussion of ‘chance’ in surrealist works
and their doctrine of ‘objective chance’ as a means to attend to the particulars in life which others fail to
notice.  As Bürger notes: 
“Valery once correctly observed that chance can be manufactured.  One need only close one’s eyes as
one picks an object from a number of similar ones to make the result a chance result.  Although the
Surrealists do not manufacture chance, they devote a heightened attention to events whose occurrence
is not held to be likely.  They can therefore register ‘chance events’ that, because of their triviality (i.e..
their unrelatedness to the preoccupations of the individual concerned) escape others.  Starting from the
experience that a society is organized on the basis of a means-ends rationality increasingly restricts the
individual’s scope,  the Surrealists  attempt to discover elements of the unpredictable in daily life.”
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In  sum,  this  technique  of  building  an  ‘album’ is  perfectly  in-line  with  the  avant-garde
approach.  In the first place, its mode of production is reminiscent of the techniques of
collage and montage, and in the second, the dialogic-therapeutic focus of the work mirrors
the avant-garde’s intended mode of reception.  But what of the work’s social function?
Given that little is said by Wittgenstein about what he specifically wished to achieve in his
final work―unlike the avant-garde, who clearly proclaimed theirs in the various manifestos
of the day―the ideological character of his attack on the institution of philosophy can only
be witnessed directly in various  Nachlaß sources.  Specifically, in the early 1930’s, when
Wittgenstein returned to philosophy with his new culture-critical agenda in hand, it is the
series of prefaces to the work he hoped to publish at that time that stand out most clearly
today  as  something  like  his  own  private  ‘manifesto’  for  the  legitimate  practice  of
philosophy.   There,  what  Wittgenstein calls  the  dominant  ‘spirit  of  the  times’—and the
extent to which the alternative mode of philosophical composition he was developing then
was precisely intended to be an alternative to that spirit—is expressed by him thus:
“This book is written for such men as are in sympathy with its spirit.  This spirit is different from the
one which informs the vast stream of European and American civilization in which all of us stand.
That spirit expresses itself in an onwards movement, in building ever larger and more complicated
structures; the other in striving after clarity and perspicuity no matter what structure.  The first tries to
grasp the world by way of its periphery—in its variety; the second at its centre—in its essence.  And
so the first adds one construction to another, moving on and up, as it were, from one stage to the next,
while the other remains where it is and what it tries to grasp is always the same.” (PR, Foreword)
(Bürger, The Theory of the Avant-garde, p. 65).  
This  understanding  of  chance  is  far  from  the  spontaneous  splashing  of  paint  on  canvas,  or  the
unpredictable drip.  It is rather painstakingly calculated.  And in this sense, it may also be reminiscent of
Wittgenstein’s ‘cut up’ method.  In this regard N. Venturinha offers a relevant story: 
“[A] paper by Paul, also posthumously published, sheds light on the matter.  He reports an episode in
which,  showing  him ‘different  copies’ of  TSS  228  and  230  ‘housed  in  two  identical  box-files’,
Anscombe said ‘Wittgenstein wanted them to show how philosophical ideas could lead on the each
other in different orders’.” (N. Venturinha, “Introduction: A Composite Work of Art”, op cit., p. 7.) 
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Dogmatic criticism, as we have seen, pits one theory against another and infers its own truth
from the untruth of the other.  Dialectical criticism, on the other hand, proceeds immanently,
deriving its force from the gaps and contradictions within the object of its criticism.  In this
way, the  Tractatus  proceeded to lead the reader along, from one familiar philosophically-
sounding proposition to another, in order to end by exposing the very nonsensical character
of those propositions.  Like the German literary genre of Bildungsroman, the story is told in
a series of stages through which the reader progresses towards self-discovery, a form of
knowledge which would moreover be empty without having gone through this precise series
of  mishaps  and  misplaced  enthusiasms.   Crucially,  like  Kant  before  him,  the  result  of
Wittgenstein’s investigations at that time were posited as an atemporal norm.  And despite
his claim in the preface, that the works value consists in recognizing “how little is achieve”
when the problems of philosophy are finally resolved (T, p. 4), the results are cast as the
highest standard of philosophical achievement, to be upheld indefinitely upon completion of
the work.
The  dialectical  nature  of  the  Investigations  is  of  a  significantly  different  sort,  which
ultimately allowed Wittgenstein’s  latter  work to  escape the  atemporal—and  apolitical—
character of the earlier work, and finally achieve a more thoroughly ideologically-centred
critique.  As Wittgenstein concludes the preface to that later work, in stark contrast to a
similar remark with which he once opened the preface to the Tractatus: “I should not like
my writing to  spare  other  people  the  trouble  of  thinking.   But,  if  possible,  to  simulate
someone to thoughts of his own.” (PI, Preface)  
Nonetheless, it is  clear that doing so, and to the extent that Wittgenstein was willing to
pursue this relentless task, it also posed a real risk to the work’s comprehension.  As Bürger
notes:
“For dialectical criticism, the contradictions in the criticized theory are not indications of insufficient
intellectual rigour on the part of the author, but an indication of an unsolved problem or one that has
remained hidden.   Dialectical  criticism thus stands in  a  relation of  dependency to the  criticized
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theory.  That also means, however, that it reaches its limit where such a theory cannot validate its
claim to be a theory.  All that remains to it is ‘rejection’, as Hegel called it, whereby it also renounces
its own claim to being a theory, for it can oppose the nontheory only as opinion.”449
With the Investigations, Wittgenstein—like the avant-garde before him—reached that limit
where  he  openly  confronted  the  non-workly  character  of  his  thought.   Much  like  the
perennial question with which the avant-garde has been confronted over the decades—‘But
is it art?’—we may therefore be tempted to ask ourselves whether that which is to be found
in the  Investigations  is philosophy at all. Wittgenstein himself certainly did, and for good
reason.450
However, it must be admitted today that his work has been thoroughly appropriated by the
very institutions he once opposed and thus, like the avant-garde before him, it no longer
makes sense to ask the question that vexed its author during a significant portion of his life.
No-one wonders today whether what is found in the  Investigations is philosophy, though
naturally  one  may  reject  it  as  ‘non-theory’ and,  thus,  not  as  false  but  rather  as  an  ill-
conceived and wrong-headed endeavour.   But what of those of  us who believe there is
something of value to be taken from it?  How are contemporary Wittgensteinians to resolve
the tension that  Wittgenstein  himself  was  never  able  to  resolve to  his  satisfaction:  that
between the anti-establishment character of his work and the institutional forums wherein
that work continues to receive its legitimacy to this day?
449P. Bürger, Theory of the Avant-garde, op cit., p. liv.  
450Russell, once famously remarked that, after returning from the War Wittgenstein “seems to have grown
tired  of  serious  thinking  and  to  have  invented  a  doctrine  which  would  make  such  an  activity
unnecessary.” (B. Russell, My Philosophical Development (London: Routledge,  1959), p.161).  By the
same token, A. Badiou―no analytic philosopher himself and an otherwise enthusiastic reader of the
Tractatus―was prepared to write  Wittgenstein entire post-Tractarian oeuvre off  as  ‘sophism’ (cf.  A.
Badiou, Wittgenstein’s  Antiphilosophy (London and New York:  Verso,  2011)).   Wittgenstein  himself
asked  within  the  pages  of  the  Investigations,  just  there  where  he  he  introduces  the  key  notion  of
‘perspicuity’,  or  Übersichtlichkeit:  “The  concept  of  a  perspicuous  representation  is  of  fundamental
significance for us.  It earmarks the form of the account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a
‘Weltanschauung?’)” (PI §122)
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IV. Wittgenstein’s Continued Legacy: Lessons from the Avant-Garde
We need not find it surprising that Wittgenstein failed to communicate the cultural-critical
objectives of his work more openly.  Like the avant-garde before him, he did not demand
that the content of philosophy should become politically-charged in order to be critical of
the prevailing ideology.  In fact, it was probably just the opposite.  For unlike the artists of
the avant-garde, who very publicly announced the new relationship of art to life that their
works heralded, Wittgenstein’s pessimism forbade such an open announcement.  Ironically,
it  is  perhaps  the  central  feature  of  the  Investigations’  composition—its  non-organic
character,  which purposefully lacks hermeneutic necessity and thus encourages isolation,
abstraction,  and reconstitution  according  to  the  reader’s priorities,  and  not those  of  its
author—which facilitated the obscuration of its goals.
Of course, it has now been almost seventy years since the Investigations’ first appearance,
and the latent ideological challenge that his work contains has not gone unnoticed by all.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this insight is most frequently (though not exclusively) associated
with those scholars most familiar with the Nachlaß sources.   Alois Pichler, for example, has
developed a thorough re-assessment of the relationship between Wittgenstein’s critique of
culture and the alternative method of philosophising that he sought to develop, and from a
specifically ideological prospective moreover.  Pichler draws our attention to the material
principles of Wittgenstein’s method of philosophical composition and the manner in which
this  was  precisely  intended  to  be an  alternative  to  other,  more  dominant  forms  of
philosophising, then as now.  Furthermore, he highlights the manifesto-like character of the
various draft prefaces to the body of work that would ultimately become the Investigations
and, interestingly, how Wittgenstein penned these remarks in clear opposition to the very
public manifesto of the Vienna Circle.
Despite the decades that separate us from the Vienna Circle’s staunch scientism, Pichler
argues  that  the  challenge  that  is  contained,  not  only  in  the  content  of  Wittgenstein’s
philosophy, but also in its form, remains salient to this day.  As he concludes a recent paper:
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“Wittgenstein was doubtful about the success of his work: whether someone would understand his
way of doing philosophy and manage or even want to apply it on their own: to follow his example.
In this chapter I did not want to criticize the standards or conceptions of philosophy that Wittgenstein
opposes.  My chapter conforms to those standards rather than Wittgenstein’s (however, one might
say that my chapter is not  philosophy).  But I wanted to stress a point that was made early on by
Wittgenstein, but today often seems to be forgotten or underacknowledged: Wittgenstein challenges
our Western academic traditions not only in matters of content and conceptions, but even more so, it
seems to me, in matters of the form philosophy should take.”451
By historicising Wittgenstein, and drawing certain parallels between his strategies and those
of the avant-garde, I have sought to arrive at precisely such questions: What does it mean to
continue philosophising in a Wittgensteinian spirit today?  What could it mean ‘to follow
Wittgenstein’s example’, as Pichler has put it, given the anti-establishment character of his
work?  And can we truly do justice to that work while its legitimacy remains tied to the very
institutions  that  Wittgenstein  himself  deeply  opposed?   This,  I  argue,  is  where  the
comparisons  between  Wittgenstein’s  late  work  and  the  European  avant-garde  end—and
where we in philosophy may perhaps learn something from the contemporary reception of
the avant-garde within modern aesthetic practice and discourse.
In Bürger’s work, he comments on the failure of the avant-garde to bring about the complete
alignment of the praxis of art with the praxis of everyday life thus:
“A contemporary aesthetic can no more neglect the incisive changes that the historical avant-garde
movements effected in the realm of art than it can ignore that art has long since entered a post avant-
gardiste phase.  We characterize that phase by saying that it revived the category of work and that the
procedures invented by the avant-garde with anti-artistic intent are being used for artistic ends.  This
must not be judged a ‘betrayal’ of the aims of the avant-garde movements (sublation of art as a social
institution, uniting life and art) but the result of a historical process that can be described in these
very  general  terms:  now  that  the  attack  of  the  historical  avant-garde  movements  on  art  as  an
451Pichler, A., “Ludwig Wittgenstein and Us Typical Western Scientists”, op cit., p. 57.
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institution has failed, and art  has not been integrated into the praxis of life,  art  as an institution
continues to survive as something separate from the praxis of  life.   But the attack did make art
recognizable as an institution and also revealed its (relative) inefficacy in bourgeois society as its
principle.”452
Such a remark acknowledges that history moves one, and the time has passed wherein one
might have been able to legitimately repeat the critical gestures of the avant-garde in any
kind of straightforward way.  After World War II, we can no longer uphold the advances of
technology as the harbinger of utopian redemption, à la Futurism.  After Freud, we can no
longer consider the subconscious a naïve and trustworthy guide for engaging with the world,
as did the Surrealists.  Neither can we, in the manner of Dada, continue to simply place
familiar objets trouvés in the museum as examples of the aesthetic qualities of everyday life.
While  such  gestures  continue  to  motivate  artistic  works  in  significant  ways,  their  bald
critical character does not bare infinite repetition; the times have changed and with that
these gestures have ceased to function in the same way as before.  However, the avant-garde
has  had  a  lasting  impact  on  our  commerce  with  art.   For,  following  the  avant-garde’s
revelation of its ideologically-determined institutional status, the question of what it means
for art to be critically engaged has become central to aesthetic discourse today.
Like the avant-garde,  it  goes without  saying that  Wittgenstein failed to  bring about the
destruction of  the  institution  of  philosophy.   Unlike  the  avant-garde,  however,  it  would
appear that he also failed to pose lasting questions about philosophy’s institutional status.
Or did he?  
While the various  Nachlaß  sources cited here help highlight what Wittgenstein wished to
achieve in his work, it is the material construction of the  Investigations that most clearly
states the case: its unique method of production (the ‘album-form’), its intended mode of
reception (dialogic-therapeutic), as well as the social function at which it was aimed (the
self-critique of philosophy  in toto, in order to bring about a realignment of the praxis of
452P. Bürger, Theory of the Avant-garde, op cit., p. 57.
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philosophy and the praxis of life).  Only when we admit the fact that Wittgenstein failed to
achieve this goal can we begin to move his programme forward in a manner appropriate to
the  challenges  that  we  are  presented  with  today―challenges  that  do  not  necessitate
repeating his critical gestures of over a half a century before, but rather finding a means to
express those challenges that are unique to our times and to begin addressing them with
regard to our own historical particularities.  Perhaps above all, it means being conscious of
the extent to which the institutional status of our contemporary academic discourse may or
may not pose a threat to the social relevance that we would wish our works to have—if that
is  indeed what  we would wish.   And I am not suggesting that  it  need be.   What I  am
suggesting, however, is that it was so for Wittgenstein and we would do well to keep this in
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